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Abstract 
 
It is a defining quality of the category of games fitting under the label of the ‘figure game’ 
that they not only establish a world to be explored and experienced, but also a subjective 
identity for the player to inhabit in relation to this world. It is this subjective identity 
within the gameworld, termed the ludic subject, that this dissertation takes as its focus. The 
question this dissertation sets out to answer is: What is the nature of the ‘I’ that exists as a 
subject in relation to the experiential world established by the game? 
The investigative approach that shall be adopted with regard to the question of 
subjectivity is that of phenomenology. A twofold understanding of subjectivity is drawn 
upon – both as the ‘subject’ of experience in its first-personal givenness, and as the 
objectified ‘self’ that emerges in a second-order act of reflection upon first-order 
subjective experience. With regard to the ludic subject, these two dimensions of 
subjectivity are integrated in the development of a double perspectival structure of ludic 
experience, by which the player inhabits both a perspective internal to the gameworld as 
the ludic subject, and a perspective external to the gameworld, which frames the ludic 
subject as an object of perception.  
This twofold understanding provides the structure for the two-part claim this dissertation 
makes with regard to ludic subjectivity. Firstly, the player’s involvement with the 
gameworld through incorporation in the form of a playable figure (containing within it 
the senses of both ‘avatar’ and ‘character’) reflects the experiential and existential 
structures of embodied being-in-the-world. Secondly, the capture and representation of 
this ludic subjectivity within the frame of the game as a textual unity sets in motion an 
aesthetics of subjectivity, by which the player’s own in-game ‘I’ is offered back to her as a 
represented ludic self.  
In addressing these dimensions of the ludic subject, this dissertation, firstly, engages in an 
analysis of the formal mechanisms by which the player is located within a specific ludic 
subject-position in relation to the gameworld, and is thereby determined as a ludic subject. The 
phenomenological investigations of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty are 
brought to bear upon this stage of the investigation.    Secondly, this dissertation 
interrogates the nature of the ludic self that is enacted in the player’s engagement with the 
gameworld from the standpoint of the ludic subject-position, that the player identifies 
as ‘I’ within the gameworld. Here, the notion of a narrative self developed by Ricoeur 
and Zahavi is integrated with a literary-theoretical approach to character as a means of 
conceptualizing the ludic self as it is constructed textually through the game’s 
representation of the player’s actions and experiences as a ludic subject in the gameworld. 
Thirdly, on this basis, the dissertation maps out the web of relations – of identity and 
difference, proximity and distance, selfhood and otherness – that play out across the gap 
between the player outside the game and the ludic subject in the game, and which 
represent a formally-enshrined foregrounding of the experiential structures of 
subjectivity and selfhood.   
	  	  
 
 
	  	  
Resumé 
 
En definerende kvalitet ved kategorien af spil som betegnes ‘eventyrsspil’ er, at de ikke 
kun etablerer en verden som skal udforskes og opleves, men at de også etablerer en 
subjektiv identitet for spilleren at påtage sig i relation til spilverdenen. Det er denne 
subjektive identitet inde i spilverdenen, kaldet det ludiske subject, som denne afhandling vil 
fokusere på. Spørgsmålet som afhandlingen vil besvare er derfor: Hvad er ‘Jeg’ets’ væsen der 
eksisterer som et subjekt i forhold til den oplevede verden etableret af spillet?   
Den udforskende tilgang som vil tages i brug med hensyn til spørgsmålet om 
subjektivitet er fænomenologiens. Der trækkes på en todelt forståelse af subjektivitet – 
både som ‘subjektet’ af oplevelsen i sin første-personlige givethed, og som det 
tingsliggjorte ‘selv’ der opstår i en andenordens refleksionshandling på en førsteordens 
subjektive oplevelse. Med hensyn til det ludiske subjekt, så er disse to dimensioner af 
subjektivitet integreret i udviklingen af den ludiske oplevelses dobbelt perspektiverende 
struktur, hvorved spilleren påtager sig både et perspektiv internt til spilverdenen, som 
indrammer det ludiske subjekt som en genstand for erkendelse.  
Denne dobbelte forståelse giver en struktur for den todelte påstand som denne 
afhandling laver med hensyn til ludisk subjektivitet. Først og fremmest reflekterer 
spillerens engagement med spilverdenen igennem inkorporering i form af en spilbar figur 
(som indeholder forståelserne af både ‘avatar’ og ‘karakter’ i sig) de erfaringsmæssige og 
eksistentielle strukturer af den kropsliggjorte væren-i-verden. For det andet, igangsætter 
indfangelsen og repræsentationen af denne ludiske subjektivitet inden for spillets rammer 
som en tekstuel enhed en subjektivitetsæstetik, hvorved spillerens eget ‘jeg’ i spillet gives 
tilbage til hende som et repræsenteret ludisk selv.  
Til at behandle disse dimensioner af det ludiske subjekt, så beskæftiger denne afhandling 
sig først med en analyse af de formelle mekanismer hvorved spilleren er placeret indenfor 
en specifik ludisk subjekt-position i relation til spilverdenen, og derved er bestemt som et 
ludisk subjekt. De fænomenologiske undersøgelser af Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre og 
Merleau-Ponty lægger grund for denne del af udredningen. Dernæst undersøger denne 
afhandling det ludiske subjekts væsen, som udføres i spillerens deltagelse med spilverdenen 
ud fra det ludiske subjekt-positions standpunkt, som spilleren identificerer som ‘jeg’ 
inden i spilverdenen. Her er forståelsen af et ’narrativt selv’, udviklet af Ricoeur og 
Zahavi, integreret med en litterær-teoretisk tilgang til karakter som et middel til at 
konceptualisere det ludiske selv, da det er tekstuelt konstrueret igennem spillets 
repræsentation af spillerens handlinger og oplevelser som et ludisk subjekt i spilverdenen. 
Ud fra dette grundlag kortlægger afhandlingen et net af relationer – ud fra identitet og 
forskel, nærhed og distance, jeghed og andethed – der udspilles over kløften mellem 
spilleren udenfor spillet og det ludiske subjekt i spillet, og som repræsenterer en formelt 
forankret fremhævelse af de oplevelsesmæssige strukturer ved subjektivitet og jeghed. 
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“Cold glass, how you insert yourself 
Between myself and myself.” 
- Sylvia Plath, “The Other” 
 
 
“An inconsequential snow scene like this creates images in my mind, induces in me a 
desire to enter it. By entering the snow scene I would become the back of someone. This 
back of course would not have any particular meaning if I were not at this window 
looking at it.” 
- Gao Xingjian, Soul Mountain  
 
 
Craig Schwartz:  [as Maxine Puppet] Tell me, Craig, why do you like puppeteering? 
Craig Schwartz: [as Craig Puppet] Well Maxine, I’m not sure exactly. Perhaps the 
idea of becoming someone else for a little while. Being inside 
another skin – thinking differently, moving differently, feeling 
differently. 
- Being John Malkovich (Spike Jonze) 
 
 
“Then the system of strings tugs at the tip of my wings 
(Cut from cardboard and old magazines) 
Makes me warble and rise, like a sparrow.” 
- Joanna Newsom, “Sawdust and Diamonds” 
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Chapter One 
Introducing the ludic subject 
 
William Crowther and Don Woods’ seminal work of interactive fiction, Adventure (1976), 
begins with these lines: 
You are standing at the end of a road before a small brick building. Around you is a forest. A 
small stream flows out of the building and down a gully.  
To a contemporary reader, there is little in these lines that appears to be particularly 
noteworthy. However, looking at these sentences in the light of the novelty with which 
they announced themselves, what they reveal is the emergence of a new aesthetic form. 
Espen Aarseth (1997, 100) argues that we can trace the impact of Adventure across more 
than thirty-five years of this form’s historical development. His analysis grounds itself 
firmly within the structural effects of the text-based adventure game (or interactive 
fiction (IF)), before suggesting that the same observations are essentially true of games as 
diverse as Rogue (Toy and Wichman 1980) and Doom (id Software 1993). What unites this 
broad genre, Aarseth writes, is the focus each of these games has on “spatially oriented 
themes of travel and discovery” (ibid., 101). This paves the way for the privileging of 
questions of spatiality in the field of game studies: witness Stephan Günzel’s observation 
that “space is the one category that has come to be accepted as the central issue of game 
studies” (2008, 171). With regard to Adventure’s opening lines, directly concerned as they 
are with the presentation of a locus that invites exploration, it is an observation that 
could hardly appear more apt. 
At the same time, Aarseth’s statement masks a number of assumptions regarding 
the aesthetic foundations of the genre. Firstly, while we might speak of a space that is 
made available to be explored and traversed by the player (cf. Aarseth 2000; Wolf 2001; 
2010; Günzel 2008; Nitsche 2008; Gazzard 2013; Leirfall 2013), if it is indeed a space 
that Adventure establishes, it is a very particular kind of space. Adventure’s representation 
of the Mammoth Cave system in Kentucky, no less than the Mushroom Kingdom in 
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Super Mario World (Nintendo 1990) or the colony on Phobos in Doom, is not continuous 
with the player’s actual space – or, indeed, with any space the player recognizes as actual 
in her own world.1 Instead, it constitutes a discrete, bounded world established by, and 
exclusively accessible through, the game artefact.  
This observation – that Adventure establishes what can, in experiential terms, be 
understood as a world - could be framed in several terms. One way to deploy this insight 
is to use it as a criterion by which to identify Adventure as a particular kind of game. We 
might say that Adventure belongs to the category of games that have been termed “games 
in virtual environments” (Aarseth, Smedstad and Sunnanå 2003, 48; Calleja 2011, 14). 
This is a useful approach, allowing for the foregrounding of a specific subset of the vast 
array of objects gathered under the umbrella of the term ‘game’, while highlighting the 
notion of ‘virtual environment’ (Klastrup 2004, 27; Calleja 2007, 44), a computationally 
upheld ontological domain experienced as a spatiotemporal organization. 
At the same time, this world-establishing quality can be used to align Adventure – 
and, by extension, the genre it founds – with a wider aesthetic tradition upon which it 
draws, and to which it grants a new inflection. An established body of critical work exists 
which looks at the notion of the heterocosm – the idea of a textual, represented world (cf. 
Abrams 1971a; Ruthven 1984; Doležel 1998; Ryan 2001a). Locating Adventure within the 
aesthetic tradition of the heterocosm would open up the possibility of investigating the 
milieu it establishes according to the techniques developed for the analysis of such 
textual worlds (cf. Pavel 1986; Ryan 1991; Eco 1994; Ronen 1994).  
However, it is not enough to stop at considering the world of Adventure, or other 
games of its ilk, in the same light as the world of a novel, a play, or a film. It is certainly 
true that it qualifies as a textual artefact which established a world, but this is a ludic 
heterocosm, indebted for its ontological nature and aesthetic character to the formal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Of course, unlike these latter two examples, the space set up by Adventure does have a representational 
relation to a space the player recognizes as actual in her own world, and – especially if the player is familiar 
with the represented space in the actual world – this can certainly colour the player’s relation to the game 
space in significant ways. This, however, is another matter entirely to the question of the relation between 
the space established by the game – in this case, the virtual environment modeled on the Mammoth Cave 
system – and the space of the player’s actual embodiment, which are not, in any meaningful sense, 
continuous. 
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qualities of the medium of its presentation – that is, through its being established as a 
gameworld (cf. Aarseth 2008; Leino 2010; Gazzard 2011b; Jørgensen 2013; Wolf 2014).  
If the formal tradition to which Adventure belongs is one that foregrounds – to 
return to Aarseth’s phrasing - “spatially oriented themes of travel and discovery”, it is so 
by virtue of its establishment of a heterocosm that stands to be explored. However, it is 
not enough that there is a spatial expanse to be travelled through and discovered, one 
that takes the form of a heterocosmic world. It is just as essential that there is someone, 
an agent of some sort, who does the travelling and discovering. This agent has to be a 
member of the world in question, literally in place within it: phenomenological approaches 
to the conceptualization of space have forcefully argued that it is only in relation to an 
active, embodied position within it that space can be brought forth as meaningful in an 
experiential sense – that is, as a space that is lived (cf. Tuan 1977; Casey 1993).  
Of course, that a perceptual standpoint needs to be established for the world to 
be brought into view is as true of the world of a novel, a play, a film or a painting as of 
that of a game: witness the various attempts to determine perspective, point of view and 
focalization in relation to literary heterocosms (cf. Genette 1980; Rimmon-Kenan 1983; 
Chatman 1986; Prince 2001; Bal 2006; Margolin 2009) or filmic ones (cf. Mitry 1965; 
Branigan 1992; Sobchack 1992). However, the formal operations by which such a 
standpoint is established in relation to the ludic heterocosm are fundamentally different, 
and need to be considered in their own right.  
It is perhaps by means of a case of direct contrast that an initial glimpse of this 
difference can be obtained. J.R.R. Tolkien’s The Hobbit opens with the line, “In a hole in 
the ground there lived a hobbit” (1994[1937], 3). By contrast, in its IF adaptation (Beam 
Software 1982), the scene is set with the line, “You are in a comfortable tunnel like [sic] 
hall with a perfectly round green door like a porthole.” The setting established by these 
two sentences is the same – the description offered by the IF sentence matches the 
description of the hobbit-hole that Tolkien himself provides right after the opening 
sentence. But what about the agent we encounter in that setting?  
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Should we wish to talk about the agent encountered in Tolkien’s novel, we would 
not hesitate in naming him “Bilbo Baggins,” including him under the category of entities 
we might term ‘fictional characters,’ and investigating him through the lens of the various 
theoretical apparata literary theory and narratology provide us with (cf. Price 1983; 
Rimmon-Kenan 1983; Margolin 1986; 1990; Phelan 1989; Palmer 2004; Heidbrink 2010). 
However, if we then move on to a consideration of the agent encountered in the opening 
lines of the IF adaptation, we might experience a telling moment of hesitation. Certainly, 
it is possible for us to decide that the agent being addressed – the entity standing in the 
hall in front of a perfectly round green door – is the same Bilbo Baggins described by 
Tolkien; or, at least, a representation in a new medial form that refers intertextually back 
to this earlier entity. We might, in other words, conclude that we are still dealing with a 
character here. However, it is also inevitable for us to note a recurrence of the ‘you’ we 
have already encountered in Adventure, and surmise that, as in the earlier title, it is the 
player herself, as the ‘reader’ of this ‘you’, that is being addressed.  
The two answers would appear to be incommensurable, requiring a decision in 
one direction or the other. However, it is precisely in the hesitation between the two 
understandings of the entity that a glimpse of its unique nature can be caught. An 
advertisement published at the time of The Hobbit’s release proclaims:  
Based on the fantasy land described in J.R.R. Tolkien’s brilliant novel, in this 
program you take on the role of Bilbo, the hobbit: danger, adventure, and 
excitement are all part of it, presented to you in words and graphics, but it is you 
who must confront and solve the problems this time. (Your Computer 1982(12), 4) 
This linguistic conflation of “you” and “Bilbo” is echoed in reviews at the time of the 
game’s release: a review in the April/May 1983 issue of ZX Computing states that, “you 
take the role of Bilbo, the hobbit of the title, and your task is to steal treasure from a 
dragon” (Garratt 1983).  
This intertwining of the second-person pronominal ‘you’ (as referring to the 
player) with the proper name designating an entity distinct from the player is emblematic 
of a duality that is fundamental to the entity under investigation, which can be 
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summarized by saying that, from the player’s perspective, the entity is grasped as both self 
and other. By way of setting the scene for this dissertation, I shall now proceed, in this 
introductory chapter, to outline these two dimensions of the entity under investigation.  
 
1.1 The Adventures of You 
 
Though I have used Adventure as a means of introducing this apparent identification of 
the player with a heterocosmic individual – and though it constitutes a major historical 
milestone in this regard – its originality should not be overstated.2 Aarseth (1997, 98) 
notes the debt of inspiration Crowther and Woods’ game owed to the tabletop role-
playing game Dungeons & Dragons (TSR, 1974, henceforth referred to as D&D). Nor did 
D&D itself constitute a bolt from the blue – as Jon Peterson argues, its roots could be 
identified in a set of earlier practices which, in various ways, explored the idea of 
establishing a role for the player in relation to a simulated situation (2012, 376-457).3 
What Adventure takes from D&D is both the sense of spatial exploration within the 
bounds of a systemically-upheld heterocosm (the dungeon becoming a cave, but, in 
principle, changing little) – and, crucially, the structuring of the player’s engagement with 
this heterocosm on the basis of her investment in a playable figure– whether we call this 
figure a character, a hero, or, as in the case of Adventure, simply ‘you’. 
It is hardly surprising that Frank Mentzer’s 1982 D&D manual makes use of 
second-person address that effaces the distinction between the player and the character, 
directly identifying the player with her character in the ludic heterocosm: “a dungeon is a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 In addition to its debt to D&D, Adventure is also preceded by Hunt the Wumpus (Yob 1972), which, though 
it featured a much sparer and more matter-of-fact verbal dimension than Adventure and later IFs, 
anticipated them in making use of second-person address to refer to the player and locate her in its maze 
of interconnected rooms (“You are in room 2”). 
3 In Peterson’s comprehensive survey of the prehistory of the tabletop role-playing game, which is far too 
extensive to cover in depth here, he lists such practices as the mid-1950s shift, in US military practices of 
strategic simulation, from a more rigid, kriegsspiel-style paradigm of wargaming to a freer, less formalized 
style in which each player would take on the role of the government of a country in the playing-out of 
political and diplomatic encounters, an innovation which found its way into the board game Diplomacy 
(Calhamer 1959);  Gygax’s stressing that D&D answered to the same impulse that animated childhood 
games of “Let’s Pretend”; the imaginary worlds of ‘Coventry’ developed within the Los Angeles science-
fiction and fantasy fanzine community in the late 1950s and early 1960s; and that of ‘Midgard,’ developed 
among a similar community in the United Kingdom in the late 1960s.  
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group of rooms and corridors in which monsters and treasures can be found. And you 
will find them, as you play the role of a character in a fantasy world” (1983, 2). By this 
time, the notion had become an established trope: one year earlier, Steve Jackson and Ian 
Livingstone’s The Warlock of Firetop Mountain (1982), the first in the influential Fighting 
Fantasy series of adventure gamebooks, described itself, on its front cover, as “a fighting 
fantasy gamebook in which YOU become the hero!”.4 Over the next years, it would 
become apparent that this same idea – and the typically hyperbolic language by which it 
is described – had become firmly entrenched in the wider cultural consciousness. In the 
film The Last Starfighter (Castle 1984), for instance, the line by which the protagonist, Alex 
Rogan (Lance Guest), is addressed by the titular videogame becomes a repeated mantra: 
“Greetings, Starfighter! You have been recruited by the Star League to defend the 
frontier against Xur and the Ko-Dan armada!” By 1992, the trope was prominent enough 
to become the subject of parody in the title of Terry Pratchett’s videogame-referencing 
novel Only You Can Save Mankind. 
The move from a linguistic to an audiovisual mediality of the ludic heterocosm 
has meant that the direct address inherent in the usage of the grammatical second person 
has lost its centrality. Still, the fact that the underlying subjective and aesthetic structure 
remains unchanged is borne witness to by the continuing resurgence of the second-
person mode of address whenever a recourse to verbal presentation is made – witness, to 
select two examples at random, the scrolling chat text in massively multiplayer online 
role-playing games such as World of Warcraft (Blizzard Entertainment 2003), informing the 
player that, “You have gained loot,” or the on-screen text informing the player that “You 
died” in Dark Souls (From Software 2011).  
The centrality of this direct second-person address across a wide category of 
digital and non-digital games, then, is beyond question – a point already observed in Jill 
Walker’s exhaustive survey of the trope (2000). It is easy to locate precedents for this 
trope in literary techniques of second-person address. In classical rhetorics, Quintilian 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 It is worth noting that Jackson and Livingstone’s series of books was itself following in the wake of 
Edward Packard and R.A. Montgomery’s Choose Your Own Adventure series, which started with Packard’s 
The Cave of Time (1979) and was initially – and tellingly – titled The Adventures of You.	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(1953[c.95CE], 3: 38-39) and Longinus (1890[c. 1stc. CE, 51-52) extol the virtues of such 
direct address for its “effect of placing the reader in the midst of the scene of action” 
(Longinus, 51-52). In literature, direct second-person address to the reader is a common 
device – as, for instance, in the famous opening line of J.D. Salinger’s The Catcher in the 
Rye, where the narrator begins by directly addressing the reader as narratee: “If you really 
want to hear about it, the first thing you’ll probably want to know is where I was born”. 
Some narrative texts – for instance, Italo Calvino’s Se una notte d’inverno un viaggiatore 
(2002[1979]) – go much further in fleshing out this ‘you’ into what Bruce Morrissette 
terms a “narrative “you”” (1965), an entity to which distinct attributes are ascribed: the 
“you” in Calvino’s novel is male, is attracted to a female reader, and so on. 
It need hardly be said that, in its inherently deictic nature,5 this is a ‘you’ that is 
intended to be read – by the player of Adventure as much as by the reader of The Catcher in 
the Rye – as ‘I’. Just as the Adventure player identifies the perspective of the textual second 
person as ‘her own’ within the heterocosm, such that, for her, it is she herself that sees a 
small brick building in front of her and a forest surrounding her, so does the graphical 
adventure player – in the act of playing, say, The Last of Us (Naughty Dog 2013) – identify 
the subjective position through which the ludic heterocosm is framed as being, primarily, 
her own. As such, its function is that of establishing a heterocosmic first-personal 
subjectivity and, in the same move, locating the player within it.6  
 
1.2 The playable figure 
 
Despite this take-up of the second-person pronominal reference to ‘you’ as demarcating  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 I am here drawing on Paul Ricoeur’s usage of the notion of deixis, as referring to terms that are 
determined according to “the relation to the utterance, taken as a fixed point” (1992, 30). Ricoeur’s 
ontological investigations into the nature of selfhood shall prove instrumental in later sections, and shall be 
drawn on extensively.  
6 It is tempting to compare this mechanism to Louis Althusser’s influential concept of interpellation, by 
which the individual is similarly constituted as a subject in relation to the social sphere through being hailed 
by the police officer’s call of “Hey, you there!”, and through the inevitable realization on the part of the 
individual that she is the one addressed by this “you” (1971). This is an observation which invites a 
consideration of the ideological nature of ludic constructions of subjectivity. However, such an analysis – 
fruitful though it may be – is beyond the scope of this current study, which must limit itself to the 
necessary initial work of determining the formal aesthetic structures by which we might speak of a ludic 
subjectivity in the first place. 
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an agent and a subjective existence that is identified by the player as ‘I’ in the gameworld, 
it is crucial not to fall into the trap of simplistically equating this in-game ‘I’ with the 
player. The brief consideration of the IF adaptation of The Hobbit is already sufficient to 
make it apparent that this second-person pronominal reference identifies an entity which 
stands against the player. This is true even when the player refers to the entity in the first-
person: it is not “This is me,” but “That (over there) is me.” At a basic, initial level, this 
entity is encountered by the player as a ‘thing’ prior to any identification or to being 
taken up as ‘I’.  
 Moreover, as with Morrissette’s “narrative “you,”” the entity is rendered concrete 
through the attribution of qualities and characteristics. Just as in the case of the ‘you’ in 
Se una notte d’inverno un viaggiatore, the ‘you’ addressed in such games, even if it is a ‘you’ 
that the player takes up in the first-person, is established as an entity that, through these 
qualities or characteristics, is distinguished from the player. An example will serve to 
highlight this. In the survival horror game Resident Evil (Capcom 1996), the player’s 
exploration of a mysterious mansion leads her to the kitchen. There, an examination of 
the counter results in a verbal description which states, simply, “A bunch of spices 
you’ve never seen before.” 
One might insist that the “you” being addressed here is still the player – this 
information is received in response to the player’s decision, as an agent traversing and 
discovering the gameworld, to walk into the kitchen and investigate the counter, and, as 
such, the information is intended to be read as ‘her’ viewpoint upon the gameworld. 
However, what the response highlights is that this is a viewpoint obtained through eyes 
that are not the player’s own. It makes no difference whether the player, as an actual 
individual playing the game, knows nothing of cookery or gastronomy, or whether she is 
an experienced chef with extensive knowledge of spices. In either case, at this moment in 
her playing of Resident Evil, she has taken on the mantle of S.T.A.R.S. operative Chris 
Redfield, an ‘I’ whose culinary skills apparently do not extend to an in-depth knowledge 
of spices. 
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Such attributions of distinct qualities and characteristics can be understood as the 
establishment of the entity addressed by this ‘you’ as a character, a distinct member of 
the represented heterocosm (Margolin 1986, 206). In fact, the identification of the entity 
taken up by the player as ‘I’ within the gameworld as a character is one that is as old as 
the form itself. In the introduction to Eric Holmes’ 1977 update to Gary Gygax and 
Dave Arneson’s original D&D player’s manual, which itself eschewed introductions or 
scene-setting,7 the notion of a character that serves as a proxy for the player within the 
confines of the heterocosm is already present:  
Each player creates a character or characters, who may be dwarves, elves, 
halflings or human fighting-men, magic users, pious clerics or wily thieves. The 
characters are then plunged into an adventure in a series of dungeons, tunnels, 
secret rooms and caverns. (1977, 5)  
Here – five years prior to Mentzer’s updated manual, which made an explicit equation 
between the player and the character – the nature of this entity as a distinct character was 
strongly underlined. Already in Gygax and Arneson’s original 1974 documentation, this 
entity described as a ‘character’ was present at the core of the game, as the player’s entry 
point to its fantastical domain. Operating within a heterocosm defined primarily in 
statistical terms, the character was itself a statistical entity, existing as a set of numerical 
variables which could be placed in mathematical relations to the other entities 
constituting the gameworld (see Fig. 1.1).  
 
Figure 1.1. Character record for “Xylarthen” (Gygax and Arneson 1974, 10) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 As Peterson notes, the embedding of D&D in a subculture already familiar with the practices mentioned 
in footnote 3, meant that although “its three rulebooks said nothing on the subject of role-playing, of how 
a player should relate to or act as their character,” it was the case that “seasoned role-players read between 
the lines,” drawing on “the tacit assumptions that both the authors and the players of the game derived 
from their previous experiences” (2012, 375). 
10	  	  
 
This fleshes out the understanding of the nature of the ‘character’ as an entity: it 
becomes apparent that it is, in the strictest ontological terms, what Aki Järvinen would 
term a “game component” (2008): one of the set of interrelating entities constituting the 
computational game system. For this reason, ‘character’ might start to seem an 
inadequate term for addressing this entity. While the idea of ‘character’ covers the nature 
of the entity as a represented individual within the textual heterocosm, it does not 
account for the status of the entity as an element of the game system.   
I shall instead refer to this entity as the playable figure - the benefit of this term is 
that it encapsulates both the fact that the entity is taken on and ‘played out’ by the player 
(in the sense that the player might say she is “playing Bilbo” in The Hobbit), but also the 
fact that it remains a figure in its own right. In this sense, as has already become 
apparent, the playable figure has at least two distinct dimensions. I shall take up Rune 
Klevjer’s argument that “we must make a distinction between ‘avatar’ understood as a 
playable character (or persona), and ‘avatar’ understood as a vehicle through which the 
player is given some kind of embodied agency and presence within the gameworld” 
(2012, 17),8 and shall examine the work that has been done to date within game studies in 
terms of defining the playable figure as both avatar (Klevjer 2006; 2012; Jørgensen 2009; 
Mukherjee 2012) and player-character (Jørgensen 2010; Fernández-Vara 2011; Lankoski 
2011). Complicating this binary distinction, I shall make the argument that the playable 
figure is an entity defined by two linked but separate dualities: the ontological duality that 
has already become apparent – that is, from the player’s perspective, between self and 
other; and the phenomenological duality, which, as I shall outline at a later stage, describes the 
fact that the figure is both a subject, with a perspective upon the gameworld that the player 
adopts, and an object, being itself perceived. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 For this reason, adopting the term ‘playable figure’ also allows me to make use of a neutral term that does 
not bear any of the implications of either ‘avatar’ or ‘player-character’.  
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1.3 The ‘figure game’ as domain of study 
 
The aesthetic form that the opening lines of Adventure announce, then, depends not only 
upon the establishment of a ludic heterocosm, but also upon the location of the player 
within the heterocosm as an active entity. In tandem, these two criteria combine in the 
sense, on the part of the player, of being-in-the-heterocosm, and it is arguably this sense 
that constitutes the particular aesthetic effect defining the form under investigation. This 
insight allows me to clarify both the scope of this dissertation and the primary question 
that serves as its motivation.  
In terms of scope – keeping in mind Gordon Calleja’s caution that games 
“diverge so much in their constituent characteristics that they cannot all be taken as one 
homogeneous mass” (2011, 3) – this dissertation is concerned exclusively with the set of 
games that fulfil the two basic criteria I have just outlined: firstly, the establishment of 
the ludic heterocosm as an experiential world for the player, and, secondly, the player’s 
incorporation into this heterocosm in the form of an entity belonging to the world. The 
genre of games defined by these two criteria is, as I have already pointed out, that 
defined by Aarseth as the adventure game – though it should be noted that this sense of 
‘adventure game’ has a wider remit than the more restricted usage defined, for instance, 
by Clara Fernández-Vara (2008). As such, to avoid confusion with a term that has 
developed an entrenched set of significations, I shall refrain from using the term 
‘adventure games’ to refer to the form in question. Instead, I shall use the general term 
‘figure games’ to the refer to the set of all games that establish a world within which the 
player is located as an entity, or figure, belonging to that world.  
This dual criterion is met not only by the tradition of games belonging to the 
various formulations of the adventure game genre – IFs such as Adventure, graphical 
adventure games such as The Secret of Monkey Island (Lucasfilm Games 1990) and action-
adventure games such as The Last of Us – but also the majority of games typically classed 
in, for example, the platform game, first-person shooter (FPS) and role-playing game 
(RPG) genres, all of which, therefore, shall be considered to fall within the remit of my 
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investigations. At the same time, it needs to be stressed that this does not mean that the 
set of games my investigations shall relate to is coterminous with the set of games we call 
‘videogames’. The criteria I have determined are formal, not technological. Many generic 
traditions associated with videogames – including, for instance, the majority of strategy 
games, puzzle games, management games and team sports games – fall outside these 
bounds, and shall only be considered, where necessary, by way of contrast with the 
games with which this dissertation is directly engaged. Conversely, a number of analogue 
games do match the two criteria. Under this category, we can include not only tabletop 
role-playing games such as D&D, to which I have already made reference, but also a 
number of board games: Arkham Horror (Fantasy Flight Games 2005), in which each 
player takes on the role of an investigator dealing with supernatural events in the titular 
town, can serve as an example here.9 As such, though this investigation shall primarily 
take videogames as its focus, attention shall also be paid, wherever relevant, to figure 
games operating in non-digital formats. 
Upon this ontic foundation – the player being granted an existence within the 
gameworld through being interpellated in the form of the entity addressed as ‘you’, that 
is, being made a literal being in the gameworld – is built the phenomenological structure 
which represents the key aesthetic function of the figure-game. The presentation of the 
ludic heterocosm as a space that is available for the player to inhabit and explore implies 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 As always, points of clarification regarding borderline cases are an indispensable aid to the more precise 
drawing of boundaries. An unstructured childhood game of make-believe might appear to clearly fit these 
two criteria: such a game might, perhaps along the lines suggested by a Waltonian understanding of make-
believe (1990), turn a playground into a set of props representing the Spanish Main, within which the 
children participating in the game take on the roles of infamous pirate captains. There is certainly a great 
degree of overlap between such play and the games with which this study is directly concerned – and, 
indeed, as noted in footnote 3 above, a line can be drawn between this form of “let’s pretend” play and 
more formalized systems of role-playing. However, this formalization is a key distinction that sets the two 
apart. The investigations I shall undertake in later chapters shall make it apparent, firstly, that it is in the 
nature of the heterocosm that it is a textual construct possessing the qualities of fixity and totality inherent 
to its textual nature; secondly, and relatedly, in the games I am concerned with, the ludic heterocosm is 
materially upheld by the game system in such a way that it offers concrete resistance to the player, 
resistance which, as I shall argue, is integral to the formation of the ludic subject. Of course, no game of 
make-believe is entirely freeform, gaining structure through its adherence to generic conventions and to the 
unspoken social rules that determine such play, and such a game can become more and more structured as, 
over time, it accrues rules and fixed patterns of play emerge. This might lead us to conclude that the 
difference between such play and the games this study is directly engaged with is one of kind rather than 
degree, but it nonetheless remains the case that the distinction is an essential one to make, and that, as a 
result, unstructured make-believe play does not fall within the remit of this study.    
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that the player is made present within the heterocosm, such that she is able to adopt an 
internal perspective on it, perceiving herself to exist not, primarily, as a subject engaging 
with the game as an artefact from a detached standpoint (though this perspective, as I 
shall argue, is also an intrinsic aspect of the phenomenology of ludic engagement) but as 
a subject belonging, in an ontological sense, to the gameworld, thereby perceiving it from 
a perspective internal to it.  
This was already evident in the kitchen scene in Resident Evil, where the 
individuality of Chris Redfield as a character distinct from the player was signalled by 
means of his subjective perspective upon the spices on the counter. An even more 
striking example of this kind of subject-positioning can be found in the role-playing 
game Planescape: Torment (Black Isle 1999). Here, the player takes on the role of the 
Nameless One, an immortal being in the fantastical city of Sigil who has lost his memory 
of his previous incarnations. At one point, the player finds an apparently ancient 
mummified arm. Examining it on the inventory screen provides the following 
description: 
Upon closer inspection, you know for a fact that this arm is yours. How long it 
has been lying around waiting for you is anyone’s guess. You can’t explain why, 
but you feel like you should take this arm to a tattoo artist and have it 
examined…the tattoos might tell something of what happened to your previous 
incarnation when this arm was still attached to him.   
The ‘you’ that is invoked repeatedly in this passage is a ‘you’ who recognizes the arm as 
their own, who has a sense that the markings on the arm should be examined for any 
insights they might lead to regarding their own past lives. The player is here being asked to 
look at the arm as the Nameless One sees it – its significance is highlighted in relation to 
the Nameless One’s own personal history (he recognizes the arm as having been his 
own) and in terms of how it can help him in pursuing his goals (he believes it can help 
him recover his lost memories of his past life). In other words, the player is being asked 
to step into the consciousness of a heterocosmic subject, to see the things in the 
gameworld from his subjective standpoint, as determined by this subject’s history, 
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inclinations, abilities and goals, and to take action (take the arm to a tattoo artist) on this 
basis – in short, to see the ludic heterocosm as, and to act within it as, a subject belonging 
to it. This is the subject I propose to call the ludic subject, and it represents the object of 
inquiry upon which this dissertation is focused. 
  
1.4 Ludic subjectivity as analytical focus 
 
In order to understand how it is that a player can experience a sense of being-in-the-
gameworld, then, it is necessary to investigate the ludic subject, the ‘you’ that is addressed 
by the game system which the player identifies as ‘I’ within the confines of the ludic 
heterocosm. I shall argue that such an identification – and the adoption of a particular 
subject-position it implies – is the basic phenomenal structure by which a sense of 
immersion (Murray 1998; Ryan 2001a; Grau 2003; Ermi and Mäyrä 2005; Thon 2008), 
presence (Lombard and Ditton 1997; McMahan 2003) or telepresence (Minsky 1980; 
Steuer 1992; Taylor 2003) within the gameworld is rendered possible, constituting a 
mechanism of “recentering” of the player’s indexical frame of actuality (Ryan 2001a, 103) 
to a position internal to the gameworld. Moreover, the ontological foundation for the 
ludic subject in the playable figure means that the nature of ludic subjectivity can best be 
conceptualized with reference to notions of embodiment (Taylor 2002; Grodal 2003; 
Klevjer 2006; 2012; Bayliss 2007a; 2007b; Gee 2008; Leino 2010; Gazzard 2011a; 2011b; 
Norgård 2011) and incorporation (Calleja 2011). 
Despite these close links, however, the ludic subject is distinct from the playable 
figure. First of all, if the ludic subject is defined as the ‘I’ the player adopts in relation to 
the gameworld, we would have no difficulty in finding examples of ludic subjects that are 
not linked to a playable figure: the Mayor in SimCity (Maxis 1989) is an example of such a 
ludic subject, and, indeed, many genres (including strategy games in most of their 
formulations) operate almost exclusively through such ludic subjects. In the light of this 
observation, a distinction can be made between an embodied and a transcendent ludic 
subject. These represent radically divergent modes of player involvement with the 
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gameworld, and it would be difficult to speak of both kinds of ludic subject without 
falling into vague generalizations. Instead, I shall make the clarification that the focus of 
this investigation – as the introduction by way of Adventure and the delimitation of the 
field of study to the figure game form will have already made apparent – is the structure 
of the embodied ludic subject.  
Even within this narrowed remit, however, the tie of ludic subject to playable 
figure should not be taken to signal an equation between the two. The playable figure 
does not become a ludic subject until it is picked up and played. It is initially encountered 
as a distinct entity, encompassed in the player’s perception as an element of the ludic 
heterocosm. However, when the player takes on the ludic subject-position and enacts a 
ludic subjectivity, she is, to paraphrase Aarseth (2004, 48), no longer looking at the 
playable figure, but looking at the gameworld through the figure.10 This shall be discussed 
at greater length in Chapter 5, when I shall bring phenomenology of the body to bear 
upon the question of the influence of the playable figure upon ludic subjectivity; for now, 
it is enough that the distinction be kept in mind.  
In the opposite direction, the ludic subject must also be thought of as distinct 
from the player. As I shall go on to argue, though the ludic subject is indeed taken on as 
‘I’ for the purposes of the player’s engagement with the gameworld, its foundation in an 
entity that is a member of both the game system and the ludic heterocosm means that 
this is inherently an identification which bridges a chasm of difference.   
An echo might be read here of James Paul Gee’s argument regarding the 
emergence of a shared “projective identity” between the poles of the playable figure’s 
“virtual identity” and the player’s “real-world identity” (2004, 54): if the parallel were 
followed, ludic subject could be equated to Gee’s formulation of the projective identity. 
Gee’s notion of a projective identity grants us indispensable insights into the relation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Of course, this is not to say that the ludic subjectivity played out through the playable figure cannot 
itself, in a reflexive turn, be made into an object of perception – in fact, I shall make the case that this is 
one of the primary dimensions of the relation of the player to the ludic subject. However, what is brought 
into view is no longer the playable figure as its own entity, but rather the playable figure insofar as it 
represents an embodiment for the ludic subject which is constructed through the player’s engagement with 
the game. I shall focus on this point in Chapter 8. 
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between the player and the figure – particularly insofar as the double signification of the 
term ‘projective’ accounts for the status of this in-game identity both as a projection of the 
player into the gameworld, and as a project that requires active development by the player 
through her engagement with the game. A similar insight can be identified in Kelly 
Boudreau’s notion of the “hybrid-identity,” which “does not belong solely to the player, 
nor to the playable character” (2012, 13), but which, instead, is “a fluid, sometimes 
fleeting form of being that exists somewhere between the player and the avatar (or player 
character) during the process of videogame play” (ibid., 86). While these are crucial 
insights, Gee’s and Boudreau’s accounts of the phenomenon are limited. Firstly, there is 
no anchoring of the notions of projective identity or hybrid-identity in a rigorous 
understanding of the ontological status the player is granted in relation to the game, and, 
secondly, there is no attempt at a systematic approach to explaining, in 
phenomenological terms, how this identity is brought into view as an aspect of the 
player’s experience of the gameworld.  
The question this dissertation sets out to answer, then, is: What is the nature of the 
‘I’ that exists as a subject in relation to the experiential world established by the game? The first part 
of my two-part claim with regard to this question is that the player’s involvement with 
the gameworld through a phenomenal incorporation into the form of the playable figure 
reflects the experiential and existential structures of embodied being-in-the-world, as 
explored in the phenomenological tradition. The second part of my claim is that the 
capture and representation of this ludic subjectivity within the frame of a game artefact 
that constitutes an aesthetic unity to the player as external observer sets in motion an 
aesthetics of subjectivity, by which the player’s own in-game ‘I’ is offered back to her as a 
focus of aesthetic engagement.  
As taken by the player as an ‘I-in-the-gameworld’, the ludic subject is significant 
in two distinct senses answering to the two parts of this claim. First, the ludic subject is 
the first-personal pole of experience of the gameworld, establishing a ludic subject-position 
for the player: this constitutes a perspective upon the gameworld and hence, at a 
fundamental level, determines the form in which the game is made phenomenally 
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available to the player as a lifeworld (Husserl 1970[1936]). Secondly, a subjective identity or 
self coalesces around the ludic subject-position, the ‘who?’ that gathers into a coherent 
unity the complete set of the player’s perceptions of, and actions towards, the 
gameworld: to distinguish this dimension of ludic subjectivity, in which it is perceived by 
the player in a mechanism of self-consciousness, I shall term this the ludic self.  
In order to address these dimensions of ludic subjectivity, firstly, it is necessary to 
analyze the formal mechanisms by which a ludic subject-position is established - that is, by 
which the player is located within a specific subjective standpoint in relation to the 
gameworld. Secondly - in an extension of the first task – one must interrogate the nature 
of the ludic subject that is enacted in the form of ludic engagement from the standpoint of 
the ludic subject-position. Thirdly, this investigation shall need to consider the ways in 
which this subjective existence is represented to the player in the form of a ludic self that 
she identifies as ‘I-in-the-gameworld’.  
These three avenues of inquiry shall guide my investigations over the course of 
this study, and shall structure an engagement with the web of relations – of identity and 
difference, proximity and distance, selfhood and otherness – that play out across the gap 
between the player outside the game and her ludic subjectivity in the game. Due to the 
inherently interrelated nature of these questions, however, they shall not be treated as 
separate queries, but shall instead be interwoven during the course of this dissertation. 
 
1.5 A twofold methodology for a twofold understanding of subjectivity 
 
What I have attempted to isolate from the player on the one hand and the playable figure 
on the other under the name of the ‘ludic subject’ is the idea of a subjectivity that stands 
in relation to the gameworld. By invoking the notion of subjectivity and the related idea 
of selfhood, I am of course bringing into view a tangle of vexing and long-standing 
debates cutting across fields as diverse as philosophy, cognitive science and sociology, 
crystallizing around questions such as the social determination of subjectivity, the nature 
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of the self as a dimension of experience, the deconstruction of the very notion of a 
unitary self, and so on.  
Needless to say, it is beyond the scope of this investigation to venture into such 
debates, much less to attempt to untangle the aporias they underline in our received 
conceptualizations of subjectivity. Nonetheless, it is necessary to identify a theoretical 
framework through which to approach the question of subjectivity as it applies to the 
ludic subject. With this in mind, I shall take up Dan Zahavi’s explanation that subjectivity 
and the self have tended to be formulated within two primary conceptualizations (2008, 
8) as my starting-point. On the one hand, Zahavi argues, one finds the idea of “the self 
as an experiential dimension”, in which the subject is equated with the first-person 
perspective that is the ground for any sensible experience, but that, by that token, cannot 
itself be experienced: this is the phenomenological subject which finds its initial 
concretization in the work of Edmund Husserl (1973[1900/01]; 2012[1931]), before 
being developed through Martin Heidegger’s conception of human being as Dasein or 
being-in-the-world (2008[1927]), the existential phenomenology of Jean-Paul Sartre 
(1966[1943]) and the embodied phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty (2002[1945]; 
1968). Opposed to it, we find the idea of “the self as a narrative construction”, an a 
posteriori postulate created after the fact in order to unite the disparate strands of 
moment-to-moment experience under the sign of a coherent identity, and which finds its 
expression par excellence in the writings of Paul Ricoeur (1992) (Zahavi 2008, 8). 
 Zahavi’s argument is that, rather than siding with one approach or the other, it is 
crucial to seek to understand these two senses of subjectivity as the two faces of the same 
coin: “the investigations of self and experience have to be integrated if both are to be 
understood” (ibid., 106). The amenability of this twofold framing of subjectivity to the 
ludic subject as an object of study becomes clear once we draw out the parallel between 
the two dimensions Zahavi identifies in the subject and the two senses of the ludic 
subject I have already outlined: the ludic subject as the first-personal pole of the player’s 
experiences and acts in the gameworld, and the ludic self that gathers the player’s acts 
within the gameworld under the unifying sign of a personal identity.  
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 These two understandings of the subject constitute two distinct, albeit 
interrelated, projects, both of which directly imply their own methodology through the 
determination of their respective domains of study. Ricoeur terms the first of these 
projects an “egology,” whose theme is that of identifying the first-personal pole of 
experiences of the world, the ego to which experiences relate and which allows me to 
grasp sensations and other experiences of the world proprioceptively, that is, as my 
experiences (1992, 323). This dimension of the subject – and, for our current purposes, 
of the ludic subject – is the domain of phenomenology, and it is in this direction that I 
shall turn in bringing to light what Zahavi calls the “minimal or core self” (2008, 8) – the 
self that emerges in the first-personal givenness of experience – that forms the basic 
foundation of the ludic subject.  
However, there are limits to the understanding of the subject that can be reached 
through such an approach: for this reason, Zahavi argues, the egological project needs to 
stand alongside what Ricoeur terms a “philosophy of the self” (1992, 323) that can bring 
my self into light as a significant identity that emerges in relation to the world. This latter 
project, Ricoeur writes, is an inherently narrative one: “to answer the question ‘Who am 
I?’ is to tell the story of a life” (1985, 447), and Zahavi, following the same lines, speaks 
of the “narrative self” (2008, 8), that can frame the acts of the subject – acts understood 
in the broadest sense, to include physical actions, acts of perception, speech-acts, mental 
acts, etc. – as meaningful events within a coherent narrative under the sign of a 
consistent identity.  
 I shall undertake both of these projects in relation to the ludic subject. Firstly, I 
shall draw upon the phenomenological tradition in order to determine the nature of the 
ludic subject as the bearer of experience of the gameworld. In adopting a 
phenomenological perspective on player experience, I am following in the wake of 
Klevjer’s deployment of Merleau-Ponty to ground an understanding of the embodied 
phenomenology of avatar-play (2006; 2012), as well as Olli Tapio Leino’s application of 
Sartre’s existential phenomenology to the foundation of a theory of the gameplay 
condition (2010). However, while Klevjer and Leino’s insights shall be granted due 
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attention in my arguments, my own research aims to go further in this regard, attempting 
to establish the basic structure of subjective experience of the gameworld, and, 
inseparably, of the subjective existence the player adopts in relation to the gameworld. In 
order to do so, I shall reach back to the basic foundations of phenomenological inquiry 
in Husserl’s development of the intentional model of consciousness (1973[1900/01]; 
2012[1931]), while also drawing heavily on Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty’s crucial 
elaborations to the phenomenological method.  
 My approach to the narrative dimension of ludic selfhood shall initially be framed 
through Ricoeur’s philosophy of the self (1992). However, since the ludic subject – 
unlike the selfhood of a human individual in the actual world – is played out within the 
bounds of the game artefact, and thereby constitutes a heterocosmic subject, I shall also 
be drawing on narratological and literary-theoretical models of character, in particular the 
structural approach proposed by Uri Margolin (1986; 1990). 
The implications of this essential duality, by which a subjectivity is established 
that is experienced by the player in the first person –as “I”, the player herself – but that, 
at the same time and inseparably, constitutes an external entity within a mediated 
heterocosm – warrant closer examination, particularly once we take into account the 
logical conclusion that what this dual structure renders possible is a form of autoscopy 
(Mishara 2009) by which the player’s subjectivity, externalized in the shape of a figure 
within the ludic heterocosm, can itself become an object of aesthetic perception, thereby 
establishing what we can term an aesthetics of subjectivity.  
Moreover, as I shall argue during the course of my investigations, these two 
dimensions of the ludic subject are intrinsically linked to a double phenomenology of 
ludic experience, resulting from the fact that the player simultaneously inhabits two 
subjective standpoints in relation to the game. The structure of this double 
phenomenology, which shall be discussed in detail in section 2.4, is determined by the 
fact that the game is gathered into an experiential world around the ludic subject-position 
as an internal experiential standpoint, while, at the same time, from the perspective of the 
implied player external to the gameworld, the game (and all its constituent elements, 
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including the ludic subject) is perceived as an aesthetic artefact exhibiting a formal 
organization. 
The three dualities I have highlighted – the duality of the ludic subject as 
experiential standpoint and as perceived figure, the duality of the subject as the first-
personal pole of experience and as a narrative self, and the duality of internal and 
external perspectives upon the game – reflect and implicate each other, and are perhaps 
best understood as an uptake by the aesthetic form of ludic engagement of a 
fundamental duality in the structure of subjective experience. In its various implications, 
this duality shall serve as the primary structuring principle of the investigation at hand.  
 
1.6 A clarification of concepts 
 
The ludic subject exists at the centre of a network of closely related concepts that must, 
for analytical purposes, be kept distinct. As such, before proceeding directly towards an 
engagement with the ludic subject, it is vital to engage in a clarification of these concepts. 
In short: 
- The playable figure is the entity in the gameworld that is taken up and played out by 
the player; it is both an avatar – a game component under the player’s direct 
control – and a character – the representation of an individual within the ludic 
heterocosm.  
- The player that shall be referred to during the course of this investigation is an 
implied player (Aarseth 2007b, 132), defined by the formal structure of the game 
object, rather than any actual individual who might occupy this role. 
- The ludic subject-position is the perceptual standpoint the playable figure establishes 
for the player in relation to the gameworld; standpoint is to be understood not only 
in spatiotemporal terms but also, more generally, as the particular subjective 
relation in which the player is placed towards the gameworld. As such, the ludic 
subject-position is as a set of interrelating formal mechanisms which coalesce 
around the form of the playable figure.  
22	  	  
- The ludic subject is the subjective ‘I-in-the-gameworld’ the player crystallizes 
through engaging with the gameworld by means of the playable figure (hence, 
from the standpoint of the ludic subject-position), and can be understood as the 
set of experiences of, and in, the gameworld gathered together in their first-
personal mineness. 
- The ludic self refers to the representation of this ‘I-in-the-gameworld’ that is made 
available to the player as an object of perception, as a coherent and distinct 
identity. 
These terms – all of which I shall return to, and expand upon, over the course of 
subsequent chapters – shall also be contrasted against other terms that have been used to 
define the ontological status of the player’s active existence within the gameworld – not 
only ones I have already touched upon, such as avatar and player-character, but also others 
such as point of action (Neitzel 2002; Thon 2006), locus of manipulation (Zagal et al 2005; 
Bayliss 2007a) and Game Ego (Wilhelmsson 2008).  
 In addition, it might also be helpful to clarify the distinctions between a second 
cluster of terms, those related to the conceptualization of the domain established by the 
game, which the ludic subject takes as its own: 
- Game system refers to the complete set of game components, as computational 
objects, and the mechanics of their interrelations (Salen and Zimmerman 2004, 
50) .  
- Virtual environment refers to the organization of the elements of the game system 
into a perceived spatiotemporal arrangement (Calleja 2007, 44). In this sense, the 
virtual environment can be understood as the ‘material’ underpinning of the 
experiential gameworld.  
- Gameworld refers to the taking-up of the virtual environment as an experiential 
world for the player (Leino 2010, 186), towards which her existential projects can 
be directed. 
- Ludic heterocosm refers to the diegetic world represented by the virtual environment. 
The ludic heterocosm can extend far beyond the virtual environment, in that a 
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much wider world can be suggested than is actually modelled as part of the game 
system. This should not be confused with the notion of a ‘fictional’ world: the 
domain of reference of the represented heterocosm can just as easily be actual, 
as, for instance, in the case of the representation of Liberty Island in the opening 
level of Deus Ex (Ion Storm 2000).  
 It is according to these definitions that these concepts shall be used throughout the 
course of this investigation. 
 
1.6.1 The implied player and the ludic subject 
I shall linger for a moment on the crucial distinction between the ludic subject and the 
implied player. First, a note on the notion of ‘implied player’ itself: my approach in this 
study is not that of the social-scientific “player studies” paradigm which places an 
ethnographic focus on the specificities of actual players as historically situated and 
culturally determined individuals and communities. Instead, what concerns me in this 
study is the player as existing as an element of the game’s formal structure. 
To define a similar notion with relation to the literary text, Wolfgang Iser 
described the “implied reader”, an entity that “has its roots firmly planted in the structure 
of the text” (1980, 34). It is an element of the text’s formal structure, not to be identified 
with any actual reader: “no matter who or what he may be, the real reader is always 
offered a particular role to play, and it is this role that constitutes the concept of the 
implied reader” (ibid., 34-35). The implied reader, as a formal element within the text, 
constitutes the perspective – and hence the standpoint or subject-positon of perception – 
the reader is to adopt: “the text must therefore bring about a standpoint from which the 
reader will be able to view things that would never have come into focus as long as his 
own habitual dispositions were determining his orientation” (ibid., 35).  
Aarseth has adapted Iser’s concept into that of the implied player, which he defines 
as “a role made for the player by the game, a set of expectations that the player must 
fulfill for the game to “exercise its effect”” (2007b, 132). All of this makes the implied 
player a close conceptual companion to the ludic subject that is my focus in this study: 
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both are formal structures established by the game for the player to inhabit, and both can 
be taken as the answer to the question as to who is the ‘I’ to whom ludic experience 
belongs. However, despite the links between the two, they must not be understood as 
synonymous. The distinction between the two can be expressed most simply in this way: 
the ludic subject is an entity that belongs to the gameworld, and is thus in a position to 
perceive the gameworld from an internal perspective, while the implied player is the 
standpoint the game establishes for the player as an individual outside the gameworld, 
engaging with the game as an artefact.   
Another way of illustrating the distinction is by noting that, in the course of a 
single game, it is possible for the player to play out multiple ludic subjects, but all of 
these only ever relate back to a single implied player. In Giants: Citizen Kabuto (Planet 
Moon Studios 2000), for example, the player is invited to interact with the gameworld 
through a successive embodiment in three different playable figures: Baz, a gun- and 
jetpack-equipped Meccaryn, Delphi, a magic-using Sea Reaper, and Kabuto, the 
eponymous giant, each of which grants the player different sets of capabilities and puts 
her in radically divergent subjective relations to the gameworld. Each of these, then, 
represents a distinct ludic subject-position, with their respective abilities and limitations 
leading to very different modes of being-in-the gameworld. However, the implied player 
that moves in succession between these three ludic subject-positions remains singular. 
The implied player of Giants is one caught in a pattern of learning to relate to the 
gameworld as a particular ludic subject, only to have these learned assumptions and 
behaviours challenged in the shift into a different ludic subject-position. Although, in 
many cases, the gap between the ludic subject and the implied player might be narrower 
than it is in Giants, it remains not only ever-present but is, I would argue, an essential 
formal structure of the medium.   
 
1.6.2 Ludic subjectivity as opposed to role-playing 
As an additional aside, it is important to note that ludic subjectivity and ludic subject-
positioning should remain conceptually separate from the notion of role-playing. It is true 
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that ludic subjectivity can be construed as a form of ‘role-playing,’ in the broad sense of 
the latter term, insofar as the nature of ludic subjectivity is precisely that of the taking-on 
of a role in relation to the ludic heterocosm. However, the specific meanings that ‘role-
playing’ has accrued in relation to games are at once too specific and too broad to fit the 
notion of ludic subjectivity. Ludic subjectivity does not depend upon the specific set of 
game-mechanical affordances typically associated with the RPG genre (such as an 
experience-based character progression system and inventory management), nor does it 
require the conscious adoption of a role-playing attitude wherein the dramatic 
performance of a character takes precedence over a direct engagement with the game 
system (in the sense in which Gary Alan Fine, in his sociological study of D&D players, 
distinguished between the goal-oriented “gamer” and the “role-player” whose fantasy-
orientation leads her to “play the character” (2002[1983], 207)). As such, ludic 
subjectivity can be identified and discussed even in a game such as Minecraft (Mojang 
2011) or Proteus (Key and Kanaga 2013), where it would be limiting in the extreme to 
speak of role-playing in the traditional sense.  
 
1.7 The structure of this dissertation 
 
In this introductory opening chapter, I have identified the ludic subject as the focus of 
my investigations, specifying the methodologies and theoretical paradigms by which I 
shall be tackling this focus, and clarifying the central concepts that shall be at play during 
the course of this study. 
 In Chapter 2, I shall lay the ground for the investigations to follow by making 
explicit the implications of an aesthetic approach to games. I shall present the 
assumptions underpinning aesthetics as a specific approach to the art object (Rancière 
2009) developed within the philosophical tradition emerging in the wake of Kant 
(2007[1790]), focusing on the insights to be gleaned from adopting this perspective on 
the game object. Eugen Fink’s working-out of an ontology of play (2012[1958]) and 
Hans-Georg Gadamer’s aesthetic approach to play (1989[1960]) shall be utilised as the 
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basis for proposing an aesthetics of ludic action. Upon this foundation, I will outline the 
operation of a double perspectival structure of ludic experience resulting from the 
player’s simultaneously inhabiting two perceptual standpoints. Building on existing work 
in this direction (Grodal 2003; Leino 2010; Möring 2013) I shall discuss these 
standpoints as the external and the internal perspectives, identifying the subjective bearers 
of these perspectives as being, respectively, the (implied) player and the ludic subject, and 
defining the object of the two perspectives as, respectively, the game as text and the game as 
world. Here, the dual structure of the ludic subject shall be brought into view, as the 
exploration of the two perspectives shall lead to the insight that the ludic subject-
position, which constitutes the standpoint for the internal perspective, is itself brought 
into frame as an object of perception by means of the step into the external perspective, 
thereby coming into view as a ludic subject bearing its distinct identity. 
 In Chapter 3, I shall then engage with the multiple implications unfolding around 
the notion of a ‘gameworld’ when approached from a phenomenological perspective. 
Providing an overview of notions of ‘world’ within the phenomenological tradition, I 
shall make the case that there are three senses of ‘world’ which are relevant to an 
understanding of the experiential character of gameworlds: the lifeworld of direct, first-
personal lived experience and existential praxis, the cosmos or total, ordered system as it 
emerges in third-person contemplation as the result of an act of interpretation upon 
direct experience, and the earth or material substrate underpinning the phenomenal world 
while resisting being entirely subsumed into it. A multi-dimensional phenomenological 
understanding of the idea of a gameworld shall be established upon this structure, 
keeping in mind previous work that has been done in this direction (cf. Aarseth 2008; 
Nitsche 2008; Leino 2010; Jørgensen 2013; Wolf 2014). Briefly, it shall consist of the 
following dimensions: the primary first-personal experiential dimension of the 
gameworld as lifeworld accommodating an existential praxis; hermeneutical 
interpretations of the gameworld (Arsenault and Perron 2009) that move simultaneously 
in two directions – as game system and as represented heterocosm; and the underlying 
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ludic materiality that stands to be encountered as a factical situation against which the 
player’s project of play can manifest itself (Leino 2010). 
 Chapter 4 shall take on the task of defining the experiential nature of the player’s 
sense of being-in-the-gameworld. This task shall be unfolded against the background of a 
survey of notions that have been proposed within game studies to account for this sense: 
namely, immersion (Murray 1998; Ryan 2001a; Grau 2003; Ermi and Mäyrä 2005; Thon 
2008), presence (Lombard and Ditton 1997; McMahan 2003), telepresence (Minsky 1980; 
Steuer 1992; Taylor 2003), focalization (Neitzel 2002; Nitsche 2005; Arjoranta 2013), 
recentering (Ryan 2001a) and agency (Murray 1998; Mateas and Stern 2005; Wardrip-
Fruin et al. 2009), finally leading to an explicit link between the player’s experiential sense 
of existing in the gameworld and her embodiment through the playable figure as a 
member of the same gameworld. 
 Taking up the argument at this juncture, Chapter 5 shall focus on the role of the 
playable figure in establishing an ontic habitation for the player within the gameworld. In 
doing so, I shall build on the work done in elaborating a theory of player embodiment 
(Grodal 2003; Klevjer 2006; 2012; Bayliss 2007a; 2007b; Gee 2008; Leino 2010); this shall 
be explored against the background of the phenomenology of the body developed in the 
writings of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, which shall lead to the development of a 
phenomenology of the embodied ludic subject-position.  
This engagement with the phenomenological character of embodiment as it 
relates to the player’s involvement with the playable figure shall then be directed, in 
Chapter 6, towards concretizing a structural approach to what can be termed the player-
figure relation. A model shall be proposed that breaks down this relation into four 
interlinked aspects, organized at the intersection of an identity distinction between the 
figure’s status as self and as other, and a perspectival distinction between the figure being 
related to subjectively and objectively. The four aspects of the player-figure relation that 
the model shall isolate, then, are the subjective relation of self, the subjective relation of other, the 
objective relation of self and the objective relation of other. A close analysis of a scene in Kentucky 
Route Zero (Cardboard Computer 2013-) shall be used to demonstrate both the 
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distinctions delineating these relational dimensions and their intertwining in the 
aesthetics of ludic engagement. 
 With the multiple dimensions of the player-figure relation having been laid out, 
Chapter 7 shall then expand upon the phenomenal character of the subjective relation. 
The primary aim of this chapter shall be to map out the structure of the embodied ludic 
subject-position as a set of formal mechanisms organized around the form of the 
playable figure. These mechanisms shall be listed as: the establishment of a spatial 
standpoint, point-of-view and aural standpoint, the delimitation of capabilities and 
limitations, goal-orientation and passion (in the sense in which the term is opposed to 
action, that is, as referring to the ways in which the figure, as an entity in the gameworld, is 
open towards that world and can be passively affected by it). In its second half, this 
chapter will consider the integration of these mechanisms in the establishment of a 
particular mode of being-in-the-gameworld for the player. To this end, this chapter will 
conclude with an analysis of Minecraft (Mojang 2011) and Proteus (Key and Kanaga 2013) 
– the two having been chosen both for their thematic similarity in drawing upon the 
trope of the lone wanderer in the natural landscape, and for the radical contrast that 
emerges against this common ground in terms of the respective relation they structure 
between the player and the heterocosmic landscape. 
 While the earlier focus on the ludic subject-position being geared towards 
understanding how perception of the gameworld is coloured by the particularities of the 
ludic subject-position, in Chapter 8 attention shall be directed to answering two 
questions. Firstly, the focus shall be on how the player’s taking-up of the ludic subject-
position, and the adoption of the comportment it determines, leads to the enactment of a 
ludic subjectivity the player recognizes as her own being-in-the gameworld. In this 
regard, the mechanisms for the conceptual analysis of action within the analytical 
philosophical tradition (von Wright 1971; Anscombe 1979[1957]; Davidson 1980) shall 
prove instrumental. Secondly, this consideration of action and the enactment of ludic 
subjectivity will clear the ground for a shift, in the second half of the chapter, into a 
consideration of the second dimension of ludic subjectivity – the ludic self that is 
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represented to the player in the game’s textual presentation as an object of perception. In 
order to conceptualize this, an overview of phenomenological approaches to the self-
reflexivity of experience – the givenness of the subject in her own subjective stream of 
experiences – shall lead to an engagement with Ricoeur’s investigations into identity and 
selfhood. The usage of voice-over narration in Bastion (Supergiant Games 2012) shall be 
explored as an exemplification of the capacity for games to mediate a representation of 
the player’s own performance of a ludic subjectivity – that is, of her own in-game ‘I’ – 
back to her, thereby establishing an aesthetic mechanism of “autoscopy” (Günzel 2013).  
 The question that shall remain to be answered is that of the form taken by the 
ludic subject when it is considered as an element of the textual unity of the game as an 
aesthetic object. Following on from the deployment of Ricoeur’s notion of the self as a 
narrative construct in the previous chapter, Chapter 9 shall advance the proposition that 
the ludic self, as the perceived representation of the ludic subjectivity enacted by the 
player in the course of engaging with the game, takes its place within the unity of the 
game’s heterocosmic presentation in the form of a “possible non-actual individual” 
(Margolin 1990, 847), a member of the heterocosm – in other words, a character. The 
chapter shall therefore be dedicated to an investigation into the player-character as the form 
taken by the presentation of the enacted ludic subject. Starting off with a survey of 
existing approaches to the question of character in game studies (Lankoski, Heliö and 
Ekman 2003; Montfort 2007; Westecott 2009; Jørgensen 2010; Fernández-Vara 2011; 
Lankoski 2011), it will then be suggested that it is to narratology that we must turn in 
order to locate a more satisfactory approach to theorizing character (Price 1983; 
Margolin 1986; 1990; Phelan 1989; Palmer 2004; Heidbrink 2010). The chapter will 
proceed to suggest a modification of Uri Margolin’s structural approach to character as 
the foundation for a systematic conceptualization of the player-character, developing this 
in relation to analyses of the player-characters of Joel in The Last of Us and Kaitlin 
Greenbriar in Gone Home (The Fullbright Company 2013). 
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Chapter Two 
The aesthetics of ludic engagement 
 
Before I can justify the claim, stated in Chapter 1, that the ludic subject is both the lens 
through which the player’s experience of the gameworld is focalized and the object of an 
aesthetics of subjectivity, it is necessary that the ludic subject in both of these dimensions 
is brought to the fore within a conceptualization of the aesthetic and experiential form of 
games as concretized in the player’s experience. In doing so, I do not propose to venture 
down the path of defining the notion of ‘game’. The practical and conceptual difficulties 
intrinsic to the endeavour of reducing ‘game’ to a set of constitutive qualities has been 
amply demonstrated in the historical overviews of such attempts mapped out by Katie 
Salen and Eric Zimmerman (2004, 72-79) and Jesper Juul (2005, 29-42), and I shall not 
rehearse them here.1 Nonetheless, the necessity of fixing a coherent sense for the term 
upon which to found my investigations is clear: 
Are games works of art? Are they rule-based systems? Are they player-driven 
processes? Are they media? Are games just for fun, or can they be as serious as 
life itself? Games are many different things to different people and their societies 
and practices, and, therefore, to different academic disciplines and practices. 
When two or more game researchers are using the word “game”, they may or 
may not be speaking about the same thing. (Aarseth 2011, 50) 
As such, taking on board Ludwig Wittgenstein’s caution regarding the intellectual pitfalls 
of essentialist definitions of inherently hazily-bordered concepts,2 my intention is only 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Salen and Zimmerman list Huizinga 1955; Caillois 1962; Abt 1970; Suits 1978; Crawford 1984; Parlett 
1992; Costikyan 1994. Juul’s overview covers Huizinga; Caillois; Suits; Avedon and Sutton-Smith 1971; 
Crawford; Kelley 1988 and Salen and Zimmerman’s own definition. In one way or another, all the 
definitions surveyed are engaged in attempting to define ‘gameness’ by locating the elements an object or 
activity needs to possess in order to be considered a game – Salen and Zimmerman identify a set of fifteen 
elements identified by at least some of the definitions as being constitutive of games – although no one 
definition features more than six of these elements, while Juul summarizes his overview by means of set of 
six criteria for gameness. 
2In his oft-quoted – though ultimately only tangentially relevant to game studies – commentary on defining 
the concept of game, Wittgenstein, noting the undesirability of drawing hard borders on a concept that is 
inherently blurred around its edges, does not argue as he is often taken to be saying, that we should entirely 
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that of arriving at a contingent framing of games, one that shall allow me to say: this is the 
understanding of games to which my analysis of subject-positioning and the ludic subject relate. In this 
sense, this chapter shall be as much about defining the frame through which I intend to 
conceptualize games as it shall be about pinning down a particular dimension of these 
objects we call ‘games’. 
  
2.1 The aesthetic approach  
 
By having referred to games as aesthetic objects, I have, of course, already made a set of 
far-reaching assumptions. In this chapter, I shall set out aesthetic theory as the 
epistemological frame through which games shall be considered in this study. In 
highlighting the implications of an aesthetic perspective on games, and in identifying 
what an aesthetics of games would entail, I shall aim to provide a conceptual foundation 
for the investigations into ludic subjectivity that shall follow in subsequent chapters. 
The “aesthetic regime of art” (Rancière 2009, 51) refers to a broad understanding 
of art developed against the background of the field of philosophical aesthetics which, to 
a great extent, finds its point of origin in the work of Immanuel Kant (2007[1790]). In 
this sense, the term ‘aesthetics’ has a very different import to the meaning it is typically 
granted within both popular and academic discourses surrounding games, where it often 
refers to extra-ludic elements, such as a game’s visual style, soundtrack, etc., that are 
distinguished from the game’s mechanical dimension. This is not to say that there have 
not been examples of aesthetic theory being fruitfully applied to games. The influence of 
philosophical aesthetics can be observed, for example, in David Myers’ consideration of 
play as form (2009), while the most involved application of aesthetic theory to the study 
of videogames to date has been in the work of Graeme Kirkpatrick (2011). While 
aesthetics is not the focus of this investigation, it is still necessary to provide an outline of 
the principles that are relevant to this investigation, their implications when applied to a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
refrain from attempting such definitions, but that we should not fall for the temptation to essentialize. 
When defining ‘game’, we should not claim the last word on the matter, but only define them for such and 
such a purpose (Wittgenstein 2009[1953], 37, §69) 
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perspective on games as objects of study, and the benefits that adopting an aesthetic 
perspective grants a theoretical approach to the ludic subject. In this section, then, I shall 
pause briefly on four characteristics of the aesthetic approach to the art object, focusing 
on how these shall inform the approach to ludic engagement I shall adopt over the 
course of subsequent chapters. 
 
2.1.1 The aesthetic object as ‘concretization’ in experience 
Jacques Rancière offers a particularly succinct précis of the aesthetic approach to art, 
writing that aesthetics describes “a mode of thought that develops with respect to things 
of art and that is concerned to show them to be things of thought” (2009, 4). The object 
of study for the aesthetic perspective is not the artwork as a physical object, but the 
mental object determined by the recipient’s faculties in the encounter with that physical 
object: in other words, the phenomenal representation of its appearance as it is 
experienced by its recipient. A painting, considered as an aesthetic object, is not 
understood as an distribution of pigments of varying chemical compositions on a flat 
surface: instead, the aesthetic object is the resolution of this material “extrafunctional 
invariant” (Genette 1997, 8) into a perceived spatial arrangement of colour, line and 
shape, bearing formal and potentially representational dimensions. In this regard, Roman 
Ingarden theorized a distinction between the objective artwork and the aesthetic object, 
which results from the work’s “concretization” in the recipient’s mind (Ingarden 1985).  
Taking the insight further, Wolfgang Iser, using the literary artwork as his focus, 
distinguishes between two polarities of the work: the artistic pole refers to “the author's 
text”, while the aesthetic pole is “the realization accomplished by the reader” (1980, 21). 
The duality of the material object and its aesthetic realization is captured in Iser’s 
delineation of the verbal and affective aspects of the literary work: “the verbal aspect guides 
the reaction and prevents it from being arbitrary; the affective aspect is the fulfillment of 
that which has been prestructured by the language of the text” (1980, 21). Iser’s 
suggestion is that the work is not to be identified with either pole: instead, its essence lies 
in the process that is set in motion between the two polarities, by the mobilization of the 
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reader’s faculties of aesthetic judgment in forming, reassessing and reforming an image of 
the text in the imagination. What is revealed by this understanding of the literary work – 
which we can extend, mutatis mutandis, to an understanding of the artwork in whatever 
form, including that of games – is “the character of the text as a happening and the 
experience of the reader that is activated by this happening” (ibid., 22). 
Of course, this focus on the concretization of the aesthetic object in its 
phenomenal dimension should not be taken to mean that the artwork as physical object 
becomes irrelevant. On the contrary, it is an essential quality of the character of the 
aesthetic judgment that the aesthetic object is the result of a perceptual encounter with 
an actual, empirical object. Though the aesthetic object is an object of thought, liable to 
changing form and character as the recipient’s understanding of the artwork develops, it 
is not a freewheeling, subjective flight of fancy, but a structured response to the formal 
properties of a concrete, intersubjectively verifiable object – a fact which leads aesthetic 
inquiry to stress the essentially artifactual nature of the artwork. Taking the aesthetic 
perspective on games as artworks therefore allows us to link the understandings of the 
game as an empirical object and as an experience for the player – that is, combining an 
ontology of games with a phenomenology of games in the structure of an aesthetic 
relation. 
 
2.1.2 The formal specificity of the aesthetic object 
It is not enough, however, to say that the starting-point of aesthetic engagement is the 
material encounter with the extrafunctional invariant constituting the ontic foundation of 
the art object. This still reveals nothing about the nature of the outcome of the process 
of aesthetic concretization – that is, the shape of the resulting aesthetic object in the 
recipient’s experience. In order to gain a clearer idea of the manner in which the artifact 
is unfolded in the experience of it, it is necessary to pay attention to the formal nature of 
the art object under consideration. For this reason, considerations of the formal 
specificities of different forms of art are part and parcel of aesthetic theory. 
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It is important to note here that ‘form’ is understood less as referring to the art 
object’s material dimension, and more as describing the structures of experience relating 
to the art object in question. Gotthold Ephraim Lessing’s influential Laocoon: An Essay on 
the Limits of Painting and Poetry (1914[1853]) is typical of art criticism informed by 
philosophical aesthetics, in that its approach is founded upon an understanding of 
different art forms as constituting different structures of experience. Offering a 
comparative consideration of the arts of painting and poetry, for instance, Lessing argues 
that “their imitations make use of entirely different means and symbols – [painting] of 
form and colour in space, [poetry] of articulated sounds in time” (ibid., 91), and that, as a 
result, they mobilize different structures of experience: 
…the meaning of a poem as an aesthetic object is that it should unfold in time, 
that its signs should form a sequence of before and after […] whereas the 
meaning of a painting is that everything should be given at once. (Wallenstein 
2010, 5) 
This stress on the specificity of the art form in terms of its aesthetic effects can be 
witnessed at the birth of game studies as a discipline, in Aarseth’s assertion that “games 
are not a kind of cinema, or literature” (2001), but a new form that must be studied on its 
own terms. Of course, this emphasis on the absolute uniqueness of each art form can be 
taken too far – Noël Carroll has underlined the problems inherent in what he terms the 
“medium specificity thesis,” arguing that the assumption that underpins the thesis is an 
unexamined equation of what he terms the excellence and difference requirements – that 
is, “that what a medium does best will coincide with what differentiates media (and art 
forms)” (1985, 12).  This is, at best, a problematic assumption – no art form exists in a 
cultural vacuum, and an understanding of the formal specificities and experiential 
character of a given medium needs to be balanced out with an awareness of what it 
shares with other art forms. This, in fact, appears to be the direction that Aarseth’s later 
work develops in, making the point that the direction in which games have developed as 
a cultural form arguably renders them more amenable to analysis as “integrated 
crossmedia packages” requiring a “ludonarrative approach” (Aarseth 2012) than to a 
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purely ludological analysis. Nonetheless, this note of caution does not change the fact 
that one of the crucial tasks of an aesthetics of games remains precisely that of 
identifying the form that games take as a structure of experience – in Kirkpatrick’s term, 
as “shapes and patterns in the experiential order” (2011, 14).  The observation of the 
formal specificity of the aesthetic experience therefore leads to the question of what 
idiosyncratic structures of experience are established by games considered as aesthetic 
objects.  It is my assertion that the notion of ludic subjectivity can be framed as an 
answer to this question. 
 
2.1.3 The formal unity of the aesthetic object 
Another important quality of the aesthetic object is that it appears to the recipient as a 
formal unity. This observation implies, firstly, that the aesthetic object is brought forth, 
in its singularity, as a distinct figure against its contextual ground; secondly, by the same 
token, that, even if the recipient’s moment-to-moment sensory intuitions might capture 
different objects of perception (as when the viewer’s attention wanders between different 
elements in a painting, or the reader follows, one by one, the sequence of sentences 
constituting a novel), the focus remains on the overarching totality which each individual 
intuition relates back to. All the parts and aspects of the object are subsumed to the 
whole; furthermore, this whole is understood not simply as a gathering of its constituent 
elements, but as displaying a logos or principle of order determining the selection and 
arrangement of these elements.  
This observation invites the obvious question of where this logos is to be found, if 
it is not equal to any of the moment-by-moment sensory intuitions of the art object. The 
difficulty we encounter in attempting to answer this question, Rancière argues, is what 
separates the aesthetic regime of art from the earlier “representative regime”, which 
framed the work of art as the self-evident embodiment of its logos, an ““ordered 
arrangement” of thinkable concepts” (2009, 51). By this understanding, the single 
‘meaning’ of a work of art was available to be extracted like a seed from a husk. Instead, 
following the foundational philosophical development of the notion of aesthetic 
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judgment in Immanuel Kant’s third Critique (2007[1790]), it might be more accurate to 
say that it is the expectation of an ordered logos that makes the art object appear as a formal 
unity, and not the actual intuition of such an order.  
This warrants some explanation. In Kant’s account of the faculties of reason, the 
manifold that is received in sensory intuition is given shape through the bringing-to-bear 
of the rational concepts provided by the faculty of the understanding: it is this which 
allows the faculty of the imagination to give this sensory manifold the shape of a 
comprehensible representation. However, the aesthetic object is a special case, one which 
occurs with respect to “that representation of the Imagination which occasions much 
thought, without, however, any definite thought, i.e. any concept, being capable of being 
adequate to it” (ibid., 117, §49). Here the relation between the two faculties is inverted: 
the faculty of the imagination supersedes that of the understanding, producing a 
‘complete’, unified representation, a formal whole, without the help of the latter faculty. 
The faculty of the understanding, struggling to find concepts to match up to the 
representation that the imagination has presented, finds itself not up to the task. The 
aesthetic judgment is therefore a response to that object which occasions a rupture in the 
operations of the faculties of reason by presenting an image that bears the properties of a 
formal unity, but for which no formal concept seems satisfactory: 
Kant describes an aesthetic idea as that procedure by which we attempt to 
subsume the unity of the manifold under a concept, but fail to do so. In other 
words, it is never possible for us to say what a work of art is exactly about, 
although it appears to have advanced into a depth that could not have been 
reached by any other means. We will have to continue to make attempts to 
express what this depth contains, but no single one can be satisfying and final. 
(Hammermeister 2002, 30) 
The aesthetic object, then, escapes the grasp of a single, determining concept, revealing 
“the presence of non-thought in thought” (Rancière 2009, 28) – it is this fundamental 
resistance to closure that, as Iser observes, gives the aesthetic object the character of a 
“happening” (Iser 1980, 22) – or, in Kant’s terms, sets in motion a productive “free play of 
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the cognitive faculties” (2007[1790], 38, §9) 3 a creative back-and-forth between the 
imagination and the understanding in an open-ended attempt to bring the aesthetic 
object under the sign of a concept.  
 Of course, such an interpretative impulse – opening, when taken to its logical 
conclusion, upon the hermeneutical dimension of the aesthetic reaction that is most fully 
articulated in Hans-Georg Gadamer’s aesthetics (1986) – is predicated upon the fact that, 
in the first place, the aesthetic object is already received, prereflectively, as the intimation 
of a formal unity that demands an interpretative movement by which the various 
elements of the object are subsumed to the logic of the whole. The fact that the process 
does not admit closure (ibid., 146) does not change the fact that it is in view of a putative 
final resolution that the recipient encounters the work of art in the interpretative mode.  
An aesthetic approach to games, then, needs to follow the same impulse, understanding 
the player’s disposition towards the game as being structured around a hermeneutic 
engagement with the game object (Aarseth 2003; Arsenault and Perron 2009; Arjoranta 
2011; Karhulahti 2012; Möring 2013) oriented towards the expectation of an underlying 
principle of order or logos.   
 
2.1.4 Aesthetic disinteredness 
The fourth, and final, point I wish to highlight regarding the implications of the aesthetic 
perspective on games is the notion of disinterestedness. For Kant, one of the key 
characteristics of the aesthetic judgment is the fact that the object of such a judgment is 
encountered in a relation of disinterested contemplation (2007[1790], 28, §2). By 
‘disinterested,’ Kant is underlining the fact that the object does not disappear against 
some extrinsic purpose or goal towards which it is put – it is the object itself which holds 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 As a side note, it is pertinent to point out here that the usage of the term ‘play’ to describe the cognitive 
operations pertaining to the aesthetic encounter is a constant theme within aesthetic discourse. A more 
sustained engagement with the intersection between aesthetics and the philosophy of play would have the 
scope to engage more fully with the conceptual overlap between the two fields revealed by the 
terminological connection, which could be extended, by way of Friedrich Schiller (1967[1794]), as far as 
Hans-Georg Gadamer’s location of the “to-and-fro movement” of play at the foundation of art 
(1989[1960], 104) and even, tangentially, to Roland Barthes’ writing regarding the play of signification set in 
motion by the text (1977, 162).  
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the subject’s attention, not any ulterior interest or function which the object might serve. 
Kant frames this disinterested engagement as a prerequisite for attention to fall onto the 
object’s formal properties. In the famous terms of a later philosopher, the aesthetic 
object is encountered as present-at-hand rather than ready-to-hand (Heidegger 2008[1927], 
98[H.69]), figured in detached, objective contemplation rather than disappearing into the 
affordance it reveals in the direction of the world.  
For the purposes of the current investigation, it is pertinent to point out that the 
attribution of this quality to the aesthetic perspective aligns it closely with a number of 
the most influential theorizations of play. As diverse as their approaches are, Johan 
Huizinga (1950), Roger Caillois (2001[1958]), Eugen Fink (2012[1958]) and Hans-Georg 
Gadamer (1989[1960]) all, in various ways, propose as one of the determining 
characteristics of the playful its dissociation from the network of means and ends giving 
shape to practical life. Huizinga puts it succinctly when he writes that “not being 
“ordinary” life [play] stands outside the immediate satisfaction of wants and appetites” 
(1950, 9).  I shall take this observation of a congruence between the conceptualizations 
of aesthetics and play as an impetus to proceed from this introductory presentation of 
the implications of the aesthetic perspective, to its direct application in developing an 
understanding of the aesthetic nature of play and games.  
 
2.2 Play as aesthetic action 
 
Once we turn from the consideration of aesthetics in general to the specific matter of its 
application to the study of games, it becomes evident that, despite the advantages the 
approach affords, we are also brought face-to-face with a fundamental difficulty. After 
all, games demand a mode of engagement that is entirely different to the receptive 
contemplation inherent to the aesthetic relation. The mode in which games are 
encountered is that which Espen Aarseth (1997, 1) termed the ergodic, defined through 
the operation of a user function that is not merely interpretative, but also exploratory and 
configurative, demanding active effort in order to actuate a path of traversal. The question 
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that needs to be addressed, then, is: how can a game be an object that is encountered 
both in the mode of aesthetic contemplation and ergodic engagement?  
To a great extent, answering this difficulty aligns closely with the focus of this 
study as a whole. The argument I shall build to, in short, is that the active, ergodic effort 
undertaken by the player is both an element of the process of reception of the work and 
an element of what is received. In particular, in my discussion of what I shall term, in 
section 2.4, the double perspectival structure of ludic experience, I shall present the 
argument that it is thanks to the establishment of a phenomenal structure that locates the 
player within two simultaneous subjective standpoints - as a ludic subject in the game and 
an implied player outside the game – that the player’s own ludic subjectivity, through 
which she engages in active effort within the gameworld, can be disclosed to her 
perception and contemplation, both as an aesthetic object in its own right, and as an 
element of the aesthetic whole of the game.  
For this reason, an analytical privileging of the aesthetic function of the game 
object should not be read as entailing a dismissal, or a relegation to the background, of 
the ludic functions which defines the status of games as games, and which has, inevitably, 
been the focus of much scholarship in the field of game studies.4 It is only on the basis 
of their first being ludic objects that games can subsequently be taken as aesthetic objects 
– or, put differently, their ludic nature is their aesthetic character.  
 
2.2.1 Fink and the ontology of the play-act 
As a starting-point in attempting to pin down the aesthetic character of games, I shall 
take Fink’s development of an ontology of play. Fink figures play as a self-reflexive 
phenomenal structure defined primarily by its capacity to bring itself into view, rather than 
any final purpose it opens onto. This is achieved through a contextualization of play 
within an existential understanding of human being as fundamentally forward-looking 
and future-oriented: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The term “ludology” as a descriptor for the analytical approach developed with respect to the game 
object as game (Frasca 1999) is indicative in this regard. 
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We know ourselves to be “on the way.” We are always torn away from and 
driven beyond [weg- und vorwärtsgerissen] each present moment by the force with 
which we project our life onto the proper and successful existence […] We are 
entranced [hingerissen] by the urge to complete and fulfill our fragmentary being. 
We live in the prospect of the future. We conceive the present as a preparation, 
as a station along the way, as a way of passage. (2012[1958], I) 
Against this context, play is understood as the phenomenal mechanism which allows us 
to momentarily step out of this purposive future-orientation and, in bringing itself into 
view for its own sake, serves as the vehicle by which the structures of existence can be 
represented to perception, through being ‘played out’:  
Play is a fundamental phenomenon of existence, just as original and independent 
as death, love, work and mastery, but it is not directed, as with the other 
fundamental phenomena, by a collective striving after the final purpose. It 
stands over and against them, as it were, in order to assimilate them into itself by 
portraying them. (ibid.) 
Play stands for the existential phenomena that constitute human being-in-the-world, 
modeling and thereby presenting them. In other words, “play is a specific way of 
engaging with Being or with one’s existence, since it makes some essential laws and 
structures of Being experienceable” (Möring 2013, 118).  If we were to follow Fink in 
this observation, we would conclude that what is revealed here is the inherently aesthetic 
nature of the play-act, as a model of acting-in-the-world that is removed from its purpose 
and made to represent itself. We might go even further and claim that the very idea of 
play can be defined precisely as aesthetic action – action that constitutes an aesthetic object 
not by virtue of its end product, but in its very status as an action. To put it differently, if 
play represents the structures of being-in-the-world, it does so not statically, but by 
enacting these structures – literally, by putting them into action.   
The status and nature of ‘action’ is a problem that has been taken up in the most 
sustained manner within the analytic philosophical tradition. I shall not wade far out into 
these waters, though I shall touch upon the conceptual analysis of action again in section 
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8.1.2, when linking ludic action to the ludic subject as agent. At this stage, by way of 
providing a working understanding of ‘action’ against which the notion of aesthetic 
action can be defined, I shall point out that, on a basic level, the central problem tackled 
by the philosophy of action is the distinction between an action and a ‘mere’ happening 
or event. Clearly, an action is an event – on a basic level, it is something that happens – 
but what distinguishes actions from other kinds of events is that they are motivated by an 
intention (Anscombe 1979[1957]; Davidson 1980) – an action is not a happening but a 
making-happen. As such, it is teleological, oriented towards and determined by an end. It is 
this quality of the action which, as Paul Ricoeur argues, renders it a valid object of 
hermeneutical analysis, insofar as “action can be treated as a text and the interpretation 
of motives as a reading” (1992, 64).   
Moreover, following the trail of questions which such an interpretative project 
would move through, proceeding through the ‘why?’ and ‘what?’ of the action that are 
joined together in being answered by the identification of the pertinent intention,5 
eventually leads to the question ‘who?’, at which point both action and intention must be 
ascribed to an agent (ibid., 88-112). Action, then, implies the extension of an agent 
towards the things of the world, embodying the same agent’s intention to effect a change 
in the state of one or more of these things.  
It is against the background of this general idea of action that I shall attempt to 
tease out the implications of the notion of an aesthetic act. First, however, I shall make 
the obvious caveat that, in a way, it is not at all surprising to state that an action can be 
taken as an aesthetic object – Ricoeur’s assertion that an action can be read and demand 
interpretation in the mode of textuality speaks to precisely this possibility. Action has 
traditionally been the preeminent matter of a number of art forms, among which drama 
and the novel take particular prominence – witness Aristotle’s claim, in the Poetics, that 
“imitative artists represent men in action” as their primary task (2004[c.335BC], 59). 
However, what concerns this investigation is something different: it is not the aesthetic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 That is, Ricoeur argues, in stating the intention underpinning an action, one does not only answer the 
question of why the action was performed, but, even more fundamentally, of what the action was: “to say 
what an action is, is to say why it is done” (1992, 63). 
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reception of the actions of another individual, whether actual or fictional, in whatever 
medium of presentation or representation, but rather the taking of one’s own actions as 
aesthetic. Here – once, in Ricoeur’s terms, the questioning of the play-act is extended to 
address the ‘who?’ of the act – it starts becoming apparent how closely this consideration 
of the aesthetics of play is returning us to the territory of the ludic subject.  
 Using as a starting-point the understanding of action I have just outlined, it is 
possible to establish two divergent interpretations of the notion of an aesthetic action, 
understood as an action that is geared towards its own presentation rather than towards 
effecting change in the world. I shall briefly expand upon both of these possible 
interpretations of the nature, focusing on their respective success (or otherwise) in 
dealing with the case of ludic actions as a sub-category of the wider range of play-acts. 
 
2.2.2 Merleau-Ponty and the abstract movement 
In order to explicate the first possible understanding of the notion of an aesthetic action, 
I shall turn to Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s distinction, within his phenomenology of the 
body, between what he terms concrete and abstract bodily movements. An abstract bodily 
movement, as opposed to a concrete one, is not oriented towards an end in the world – a 
purpose having its terminus in an object towards which the gesture is oriented – but, 
rather, is focused on itself. It is not only the purposive nature of concrete action that is 
absent from the abstract movement, but also its transitive vector in the direction of an 
object in the world. In an abstract act, “my body, which a moment ago was the vehicle of 
the movement, now becomes its end; its motor project is no longer directed towards 
something in the world,” but, reflexively, towards the active parts of my body: 
…it is directed towards them, furthermore, in so far as they are capable of 
breaking with their involvement in the given world and giving shape round about 
me to an imaginary situation […] The abstract movement carves out within that 
plenum of the world in which concrete movement took place a zone of reflection 
and subjectivity; it superimposes upon physical space a virtual or human space. 
(2002[1945], 127-128) 
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Two points are important here. First is the suggestion that the abstract act projects or 
maps out an experienced, or phenomenal, space that is its own, meaning that it is set in 
contrast to the general sphere of action that constitutes the lived-world of the everyday.  
This is a point I shall return to in section 2.3 below, where I follow it to its conclusion in 
the positing of the ludic domain that can be termed, with varying emphases, the play-
world, the gameworld or the ludic heterocosm. Secondly, while concrete movement – as 
shall become evident in later chapters, when Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of the 
body shall be drawn upon at length in outlining the experiential structure of ludic 
subjectivity – is centripetal, moving outward to outline the sphere of the world from the 
body-as-centre, abstract movement: 
…is clearly centrifugal, outlining in space a gratuitous intention which has 
reference to one’s own body, making an object of it instead of going through it to 
link up with things by means of it. (ibid., 139) 
The location of Merleau-Ponty’s insight within his development of a phenomenology of 
the body gives the notion of abstract action (or movement) a specifically corporeal 
inflection. The bodily movement performed for its own sake rather than for an 
instrumental purpose – the arm that is extended not to reach for a glass of water but 
simply in order to unfold the movement itself – thereby foregrounds not only the action 
itself, but also the embodied subject as actor. 
This understanding of what the notion of aesthetic action might imply is a good 
fit for conceptualizing the nature of an activity such as dance as it is experienced by the 
dancer6 – more broadly, its range of application would seems to overlap with the 
category of activities Roger Caillois identifies under the label of ilinx-play, which invoke 
the pure pleasure of movement and bodily action (2001[1958], 23). However, this is not 
an adequate description of ludic actions, which do in fact have a focus and a terminus in 
an object and a state of affairs external to the agent. The swing of a racket in a game of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Of course, this is not to deny that an alternative framing of the aesthetics of dance would be equally valid 
– one whose object would be the unity of the movement of the dance as it is unfolded for an audience. 
Such an aesthetics would hew closer to Gadamer’s framing of play as a ”patterned movement” 
(1989[1960], 107) which I shall consider in section 2.2.3 below.  
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tennis differs from the extension of the arm in a dance, in that the former is performed 
with the purpose of striking the ball and, by doing so, returning a serve. The same is just 
as clearly true of, say, mining a seam of coal in Minecraft (Mojang 2011), or throwing a 
brick to distract a clicker in The Last of Us (Naughty Dog 2013). The intention and 
teleology of both of these actions is evident: in the first case, the aim of the action is that 
of obtaining coal; in the second case, it is that of shifting the clicker’s attention away 
from the player’s intended path. Both of these are actions in the fullest sense, requiring 
no qualification to fit the stipulated criteria. By the same token, they are evidently not 
‘abstract,’ in Merleau-Ponty’s sense. 
A different understanding of aesthetic action is required to account for ludic 
actions, one that, in a seeming paradox, can allow it to retain the general teleological 
structure of action at the same time as it is granted the intransitive nature of the aesthetic 
object. It is such a conceptualization that I shall now work towards. Firstly, an 
engagement with Gadamer’s aesthetics of play will bring to the fore the task-orientedness 
of ludic actions; secondly, the notion of play as a metacommunicative frame (Bateson 
2000[1955]; Goffman 1961) shall serve to account for the aesthetic bracketing of the 
entire system of play, including not only the action, but also the agent and the thing 
towards which the action is directed. 
 
2.2.3 Gadamer and the task of play 
Gadamer writes that “every game presents the man who plays it with a task” (1989[1960], 
107): the golfer must get the ball in the hole, the Space Invaders (Taito 1978) player must 
shoot the invading aliens before they reach the bottom of the screen, and so on. Indeed, 
task- or goal-orientedness has repeatedly been stated as one of the essential qualities of 
games, whether in the specific form of the delineation of a goal or through the notion of 
a preferred or disequilibrial outcome (cf. Avedon and Sutton-Smith 1971, 7; Suits 
1990[1978], 34; Costikyan 2002, 11-14; Juul 2005, 36).  
These tasks are arbitrary, in the sense that they are only taken on as important in 
the context of the game. While getting the golf ball into the hole is a matter of the 
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utmost importance to the golfer while the game is in play, once the game is done it is 
entirely likely she will simply pick the ball out of the hole, perhaps to perform the task 
again. Another way of saying this is to say, as Huizinga does, that there is “no material 
interest” in the completion of the task (1950, 13), or, perhaps more accurately, to say, as 
Juul does, that games have “negotiable consequences” (2005, 36, italics in original) – that is, 
that any consequence attendant upon the completion of the task is not resultant from the 
task itself, but assigned by the social community within which the game occurs. 
This arbitrary quality of its tasks is one of the key components of the 
understanding of play – to which Huizinga subscribes – as being defined in opposition to 
the ‘serious’ (1950, 3). Having said that, Gadamer argues that even if “what is merely play 
is not serious,” it remains the case that “seriousness in playing is necessary to make the 
play wholly play” (1989[1960], 101-102). For the purposes of play, it is crucial not only 
that the task is there, but also that it is taken on by the player as her task: that is, once the 
individual has taken on the mantle of player, the task stops being arbitrary, being adopted 
as the focus of the player’s existential project.  
This observation touches upon the central question of the ludic subject: once the 
player has taken on the task of play as her own, she has taken on the ludic subjectivity 
which, as I shall argue in section 7.2.5, is, to a considerable extent, shaped precisely by 
this orientation towards a specific task. More relevant at the current stage of the 
investigation, however, is that this answers the objection raised against the first 
understanding of the aesthetic action. In this conceptualization, the ludic action is 
oriented towards the end of effecting a change in the state of the world. On the micro 
level, as the examples of the tennis serve, mining a seam of coal in Minecraft and throwing 
a brick to distract a clicker in The Last of Us demonstrated, each individual ludic action 
has its directly attached goal; on the macro level, each such action the player takes is 
linked in an overarching chain of cause and effect, intention and result, ideally 
culminating in the player’s achieving the task or goal she has adopted by playing the game 
(or, potentially, a decisive failure to do so). 
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However, in countering the difficulty presented by a conceptualization of the 
aesthetic action founded on Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the abstract movement, we 
appear to have been left with no criterion on which to distinguish between ludic actions 
and general actions in the world, and, as such, no basis upon which to assign the former 
an aesthetic character. It remains necessary to find a way in which ludic actions can be 
distinguished as a special category of action, placed at a critical distance that allows them 
to come into view as objects of contemplation in their own right, and hence to be 
reincorporated into the practices of everyday life in the aesthetic mode.  
That this is the case, for Gadamer, is evident: it is the play-act itself, and not the 
completion of the task, that is the vehicle for the “self-presentation” of play (ibid., 108). 
For this reason, it is important not to make the mistake of concluding that it is the 
achievement of the task that constitutes the crux of play, in a sense in which the process 
of play fades into the background as the means towards an end. Golf is not about placing 
a ball in a hole, but about how the golfer’s orientation towards this task gives purpose 
and structure to her traversal of the golf course. Likewise, Space Invaders is not about 
saving the world, but about the test of strategies and reflexes the player is put to in 
directing herself towards the task of delaying the aliens’ traversal of the screen’s y-axis. It 
is, Gadamer insists, as a patterning of movement, a “comportment,” (ibid., 107) that play 
is to be understood. Even if it is in view of the task that the player’s movements are 
gathered into a particular pattern, and her disposition geared towards a particular 
comportment, it is nonetheless the patterning and the comportment that are the focus. 
This is the decisive difference that sets the aesthetic action apart; however, 
Gadamer’s project has little to say about how it is that attention is shifted away from the 
end result of the completed task towards the play-act in its own right. To put the 
question differently: in what way are play-acts labeled as play-acts, and, as such, made 
available for aesthetic contemplation?  
 
2.2.4 ‘Play’ as frame 
In order to provide an answer to this question, I shall turn to Gregory Bateson’s idea of  
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play as a metacommunicative frame delimiting a set of significant actions. Bateson 
articulates this insight upon a sustained analysis of an observed instance of animal play – 
a playful nip given by one monkey to another. What is understood through this 
observation is an inherent paradox of play – the playful nip both is a bite, in that a purely 
physical account of the action would equate it with the action of biting, and also is not a 
bite, in that it is marked as ‘only play’. 
In order to follow Bateson’s insight, it is necessary, first of all, to adopt a semiotic 
perspective upon action – that is, to think of an act as bearing denotative significance in 
the context in which it is performed. This, in itself, is not incompatible with what I have 
already said regarding the notion of action: Ricoeur’s assertion that actions require 
interpretation is made on the basis of precisely such a distinction between the action as 
an event in the world and the underlying intention the action-event refers back to, as well 
as the context “composed of rules of interpretation and norms of execution” (Ricoeur 
1992, 64) linking the agent with the observer of the action. It is such an understanding of 
action that allows Bateson to remark that, “the playful nip denotes the bite, but it does 
not denote what would be denoted by the bite” (2000[1955], 180). In other words, the 
intention to be read in the playful nip is that of representing the bite, and, as such, the 
action does not bear the intention that the bite would have (such as, for instance, 
signalling aggression).  Extended into a general conceptual formula, Bateson renders the 
insight as, “these actions, in which we now engage, do not denote what would be 
denoted by those actions which these actions denote” (ibid.).  
 In this context, play is understood as the metacommunicative frame delimiting 
the set of actions to be identified by the collective pronominal reference (these actions) 
and highlighting their representative intention – representing actions shorn of the telos the 
represented actions would bear. This point is picked up by Erving Goffman, in his usage 
of games as an example in his development of social frame theory. Games, Goffman 
argues, are demarcated by means of the application of a ‘frame’ to contain and mark out 
the activities forming part of the game, and to determine the meaning that is to be 
attached to these actions: “games place a ‘frame’ around a spate of immediate events, 
49	  	  
determining the type of ‘sense’ that will be accorded everything within the frame” 
(Goffman 1961, 20).7 
This allows for a perspective on the aesthetic action would appear to be a much 
better fit for ludic actions. The first possible understanding of an aesthetic action – that 
of an act with no teleological orientation or reference to anything outside itself – was 
found wanting in relation to ludic actions, which are inherently bound up in relations of 
intention and effect with the objects of the game, and are purposively directed towards 
the task set by the game. Instead, then, ludic actions must be characterized as actions first, 
bearing the structure and attributes of action in a general sense, before being framed as 
play-acts, and hence, related to aesthetically.  
This should not be taken to mean that ludic action, and ludic experience in a 
more general sense, should be understood as ‘fictional,’ or, in some other sense, ‘not 
real.’ Quite the opposite: this model of ludic action in fact requires that such an action is, 
first and foremost, a real action oriented towards a real object and governed by a real 
teleology. Moreover, as I shall argue in section 3.5, it is in the nature of games that the 
consequences of ludic actions are materially upheld: this is an integral dimension of what 
Olli Tapio Leino – standing similarly upon Gadamer’s shoulders – terms the “gameplay 
condition” (2009, 12; 2010, 101), the condition of responsibility for one’s in-game 
choices and actions insofar as it is the materially upheld results of these actions that 
determine the player’s success or failure in relation to the task that has been set.8  
Another significance, then, needs to be attributed to the play-frame than that of 
demarcating ‘real’ actions and experiences from ‘unreal’ ones. Instead, what the play-
frame should be taken to mark out is not simply the set of actions constituting play, but, 
rather, the complete sphere of action within which they occur, including within it the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Social frame theory has proven influential in game studies – see, for instance, Gary Alan Fine’s 
application of Goffman to the study of tabletop role-playing games (1983). 
8 This is also the reason why I must follow Leino in rejecting the psychologist Michael Apter’s notion of a 
paratelic state (1991, 16-18), which “refers to experiencing one’s actions as taking place within a protective 
frame” (Leino 2010, 44), and, as a result, of not having consequences beyond the present moment. The 
main problem with Apter’s concept is its adherence to what Leino terms the ”fictional safety fallacy” (ibid., 
48), as evidenced by Apter’s claim that the protective frame demarcates its contents as ‘not real,’ and is 
“supported by a fictional context” (Apter 1991, 17-21). 
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actions themselves, the system of objects towards which the actions are directed, and the 
goals in view of which the actions are performed. In short, the notion of the play-frame 
as a cognitive system refers to the establishment of this sphere as a distinct ontological 
domain, within which the significance granted to objects can be different from the 
significance those same objects hold within the frame of reference of the player’s ‘actual’ 
world (to retain for the moment a problematic term I shall soon focus on).   
What is needed, then, is an ontology of the sphere of action contained by the 
play-frame, and, linked to this, a phenomenology of this same sphere of action as it 
appears to the player in the act of playing. The notion of the play-frame as articulated by 
Bateson and Goffman does not provide us with the critical tools required to perform 
these tasks. In the next section, I shall argue that such a formulation can be identified in 
the notion of the sphere of play as a ‘world’. Such an approach, moreover, will also have 
the side-benefit of providing us with a concept for the manner in which the free-form 
productions of play can coalesce into the formal unity of ‘game’ as an aesthetic object.  
 
2.3 ‘Game’, ‘gameworld’ and the formal unity of play 
 
The discussion so far has led to the insight that it is in the nature of the play-frame to act 
as a boundary around a sphere of activity, delimiting both the set of actions constituting 
play and the realm of objects at which these actions are directed. In order to think 
through this unity of the sphere determined by the frame of play, I shall begin by 
returning to Fink, specifically to his development of the notion of the play-world.  
 
2.3.1 The notion of the play-world 
For Fink, the ontology of play is founded upon its establishment of a play-world: “play is 
creative bringing-forth […] the product is the play-world” (2012[1958], III). Here, “play-
world” refers to the ontological domain of things as defined by the meanings given to 
them by the frame of play. Fink’s account uses the example of a wooden doll as a 
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plaything: the doll “is a piece of material and wire or an artificial mass […] but, seen from 
the perspective of a playing girl, a doll is a child, and the girl is its mother” (ibid., II). 
In this case, the play-world is the world in which the child that the doll stands for is 
actual. It is in relation to these things that ludic actions are significant. Moreover, just as 
the plaything is granted its significance in the play-world, so does the player herself 
become a being of different significance – a member of the play-world, determined by 
the logic of its frame, or, in other words, a ludic subject.   
Fink here builds on the recurring trope of the realm of play as a ‘world apart’ – 
antecedents can be traced from Huizinga’s notion of the magic circle as referring to the 
“temporary world circumscribed by play” (1955, 10),9 to Kurt Reizler, who precedes Fink 
in using the term playworld to refer to a conceptual domain distinct from the actual world 
within which “things mean what we want them to mean” (1941, 511). Speaking of chess, 
specifically of the ontological nature of the queen as object, Riezler writes: 
… [the queen] is an entity in the game defined by the movements the game 
allows her. The game is the context within which the queen is what she is. This 
context is not the context of the real world or of ordinary life. The game is a little 
cosmos of its own. (ibid., 505) 
This begins to address part of the task identified in the previous section – that of 
determining an ontology for the sphere demarcated by the play-frame. The notion of the 
play-world highlights the establishment of a ludic domain that constitutes a world distinct 
from what can be termed the player-world –the world the player recognizes as her actual 
world. Nonetheless, it remains necessary to go further in outlining the ontology of this 
domain, in the sense of specifying precisely what is meant by the concept of ‘world’ in 
this context. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 The magic circle is, of course, a much-contested term within game studies. The form in which the notion 
has been the subject of debate owes much to Salen and Zimmerman’s expansion of Huizinga’s concept 
(2004, 95-96). It is Salen and Zimmerman’s emphasis on the inflexibility of the magic circle and on the 
absoluteness of the separation it dictates between the game space and the ‘real world’ that has led to 
frequent and extensive critique of the notion (Castronova 2005; Copier 2005; Lammes 2006; Taylor 2006; 
Malaby 2007; Liebe 2008; Pargman and Jakobsson 2008; Consalvo 2009; Calleja 2012); though attempts 
have also been made at clarifying the notion into a more workable form (Juul 2008; Stenros 2012).  
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2.3.2 From the play-world to the gameworld   
It is at this point that the argument circles back from the activity of play to the game 
artifact.10 The distinction between game and play can be paralleled to that drawn by 
Caillois between ludus, as a structured, rule-bound activity, and paidia, as a free play or 
“uncontrolled fantasy” unbound by the fixity of a structure (2001[1958], 13).11 By this 
understanding, for an activity of play to achieve the status of a ‘game’, what is required is 
precisely that delimitation into a clear, ordered form that also allows it to achieve the 
formal unity required of the aesthetic object. I shall therefore briefly outline the manner 
in which the productions of play can coalesce into the formal unity of a game.  
The first, most obvious way in which a game sets limits on play is by means of 
the drawing of spatiotemporal boundaries – this is Huizinga’s point when he writes that 
play occurs “within certain limits of time and place” (1950, 9). Moreover, the 
formalization of play into the structure of a game is also accomplished by means of the 
specification of the total set of entities to which the game pertains. The material totality 
of the game of chess, for instance, consists of a board and thirty-two ‘pieces’, divided 
into sixteen of each colour. Once these boundaries have been set, it becomes possible to 
conceive of these entities as a defined set of “game components” (Järvinen 2008) 
organized into a structured game system (Salen and Zimmerman 2004, 50). 
 A game, then, imposes limits and restrictions on a sequence of play through 
determining the totality of its components as well as its boundaries in space and time: as 
such, the difference between what Fink calls the play-world and what can be termed – to 
retain the more current term in the discourse of game studies – the gameworld is not 
necessarily one of kind, but simply one of degree of codification and fixity. This is a 
fundamental criterion for the domain of a game to obtain the status of a ‘world’ – in his 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Though, of course, the linguistic distinction would not have been at issue in Fink’s or Gadamer’ original 
German texts due to the concept’s reduction to the single term spiel, it is evident that the phenomenon 
both writers have in mind is closer to the notion of ’play’ than that of ’game’.  
11 This is not to suggest that ‘play’ and ‘game’ stand in a diametric opposition. Both Huizinga and Caillois 
argue that the impulse towards formalization and delimitation is present within play from the start – in 
other words, one can say, play, in its primordiality, already contains as an intrinsic element the drive 
towards gamehood. As such, rather than thinking of ‘play’ and ‘game’ as monolithic opposites, a better way 
to conceptualize the distinction might be to think of the two as the poles of a spectrum, with each 
particular activity lying at some distance between the two. 
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approach to solving the philosophical problem of grounding the demarcation of possible 
worlds as separate entities, David Lewis (1986) settled precisely upon the idea of the 
isolation of each distinct world as key. At the same time, this movement between the free 
self-determination of play and the structured finitude of a game – reflecting, incidentally, 
Gadamer’s notion of the “transformation into structure” by which the primordial energy 
of play is translated into the fixed forms of the artwork (1989[1960], 111) – is precisely 
what allows the world of the game – and the activity of play as an aspect of that world – 
to be concretized into a fixed aesthetic form.  
 Drawing the discussion back to the category of games this investigation is directly 
concerned with, as delimited in section 1.3 under the banner of the ‘figure game,’ one can 
note that the boundaries of the virtual environment as a distinct ontic domain not only 
determine the spatiotemporal expanse of the realm of play, but also specify the set of 
game components: the things in the virtual environment constitute the set of things that 
are in play, in all of their particulars that are relevant to the situation of play. For this 
reason, we can agree with Gordon Calleja (2012) that this category of games does not 
require the idea of the magic circle or any similar notion of a conceptual demarcation for 
the domain of play. The worlds of the category of games under our consideration form 
the intersection of the sets “play-world” and “virtual environment,” taking, from the 
former, their aesthetic character, and, from the latter, their computational ontology: it is 
to this intersection that I shall apply the term gameworld for the purposes of this study.12  
 
2.3.3 The gameworld and the ludic subject 
There is one final restriction which a game legislates upon the freedom of play in the 
interest of granting it structure and form. Once the first two restrictions have led to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 The term is one out of which multiple significations can be unfolded: I refrain from expanding upon the 
term here only in anticipation of a fuller development of the senses of ’gameworld’ which shall be 
incorporated into the phenomenological account of gameworld experience I shall put forward in Chapter 
3. In particular, there I shall specify the distinction between what I have been referring to as the ludic 
heterocosm and what I am now referring to as the gameworld. To anticipate this, in short: gameworld refers to 
the spatiotemporal arrangement of entities addressed by the game system and, hence, modeled 
computationally, while the ludic heterocosm is the represented textual world supported by the gameworld 
but extending beyond it.  
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establishment of an ordered, coherent and bounded gameworld, what is left is for the 
player to be given a defined role within this world. In a variety of ways, which I shall 
elaborate upon in Chapter 7 – for instance, through the definition of a lexicon of 
possible actions, and the setting of a goal towards which these actions are to be directed 
– the player is subjectively positioned in a more-or-less fixed relation to the gameworld: 
in other words, as a particular ludic subject.  
 Such an understanding requires this investigation to take a stand in opposition to 
the idea, expressed by Kristine Jørgensen, that games can be “understood as subsets of 
the real world, delimited by a conceptual and elastic boundary that defines what should 
be understood as part of the game and not” (2009, 1) – a point echoed by Leino’s 
argument that the term gameworld is best understood “a signifying shorthand […] for a 
subset of the actual world” (2010, 177).  
Instead, then, a ‘game,’ in experiential terms for the player, constitutes a discrete 
lifeworld (Husserl 1970[1936]) in miniature – ‘world’ being understood here in the 
phenomenological sense as lived-world, that is, a world as it appears to a subject through 
her existential practice. It is for this reason that the establishment of the gameworld as a 
distinct ontic and experiential domain is inseparable from the establishment of the ludic 
subject as the ‘I’ identified by the player in relation to this domain. As Sebastian Möring 
puts it, “existential phenomena are repeated in play, as if they were from a world in a 
world or a life in a life” (2014, 2). Playing a game thereby involves enacting a being-in-
the-(game)world whose mode and disposition is, to a great extent, determined by the 
parameters of the game (recall here Gadamer’s point about the “comportment” 
particular to every game). Moreover, following the implications of the representational 
quality I have traced in play through Fink and Gadamer, and anchored in the structure of 
the play-frame, one can conclude that this mode of being-in-the-gameworld is not only 
adopted and enacted by the player, but also, through its status as play, reflected and 
brought forth into presentation: to paraphrase Bateson, the being-in-the-gameworld 
denotes a being-in-the-world. In the aesthetic mode, then, a game reveals both a lived 
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world and a subjective being towards that world, united in the form of an existential 
being-in-the-world that is both lived and presented.  
 
2.4 The double perspectival structure of ludic engagement 
 
Starting with the investigation into the play-act as aesthetic action, it became evident that, 
insofar as the player is the agent of the ludic action, her relation to the action is not 
aesthetic, but, rather, teleological: it is not the action itself that concerns her but the 
achievement of the game’s task. At the same time, the fact that both her ludic actions and 
the task towards which they are directed are caught within the ludic frame grants the 
practice as a whole a self-presentational orientation.  
 Speaking not on the level of the individual action, but that of the player’s 
engagement with the game as a whole, one can say that the player simultaneously plays 
out her experiential and existential being-in-the-gameworld and perceives it from a point 
of view outside the game, from which her own being-in-the-gameworld is seen as an 
intrinsic part of the game’s textual and aesthetic unfolding. The conceptualization of the 
aesthetic nature of games has thereby led this investigation to the threshold of a crucial 
insight: the player’s experience of a game is determined by her simultaneous inhabitation 
of two distinct phenomenal standpoints: a perspective internal to the gameworld, from 
which ludic actions are taken in a teleological orientation towards the task set by the 
game, and an external perspective from which the game – and the player’s own actions 
within it – is viewed in the aesthetic mode defined by critical distance.  
It is around the internal perspective that the domain of play coalesces into a lived 
world, and it is here that the ludic subject finds its place, as the subjective existence the 
player takes on in relation to this ludic domain (as, in Fink’s example, the girl takes on 
the role of mother towards the child that the doll represents in the play-world). At the 
same time, the player also engages with the game, as a game, from a perspective that can 
be considered external in relation to the gameworld. 
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This is by no means a novel suggestion. Marie-Laure Ryan, for instance, makes a 
distinction between internal and external interactivity within the form of what she terms 
“digital narrative”. As she explains this distinction: 
In the internal mode, the user projects himself as a member of the fictional world, 
either by identifying with an avatar, or by apprehending the virtual world from a 
first person perspective. In the external mode, the reader situates himself outside 
the virtual world. He either plays the role of a god who controls the fictional 
world from above, or he conceptualizes his activity as navigating a database. 
(2001b) 
Setting aside the question of Ryan’s invoking of the notion of fiction – a point I have 
already mentioned in section 1.5 – there are two salient points here which I shall be 
returning to during the course of this investigation. First is the point that, a Ryan has also 
observed, the conceptualization of such a perspectival structure is not new to games – in 
fact, she argues, Western approaches to the reception of art have for a long time 
theorized a distinction between immersion in the heterocosm established by an artwork 
and the standpoint of critical distance (2001a, 2-6).13 Second is the point, which is of course 
central to this investigation’s primary focus on the ludic subject, that the internal mode 
requires the recipient of the work to become a member of the domain in question – and 
which, as I shall argue in Chapter 4, is what makes the matter of ‘being-in-the-
gameworld’ fundamentally different, in both phenomenological and ontological terms, to 
the sense of immersion or transportation the reader might feel in relation to the world of 
a novel, or the film viewer towards a cinematic world.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 A particularly influential example of this distinction is Schiller’s articulation of the difference between the 
“naïve” and the “sentimental” poet, with the former being immersed in the work and the latter exhibiting a 
self-consciousness in artistic creation (1993[1800]). A more contemporary example is Umberto Eco’s 
argument for the distinguishing between two different Model Readers of a literary text: “a mystery tale 
displays an astute narrative strategy in order to produce a naive Model Reader eager to fall into the traps of 
the narrator (to feel fear or to suspect the innocent one) but usually wants to produce also a critical Model 
Reader able to enjoy, at a second reading, the brilliant narrative strategy by which the first-level, naive 
reader was designed" (1991, 55). These two examples by no means exhaust the manifestations of this 
distinction in critical discourse, and are merely meant to illustrate the wide application and enduring 
popularity of this conceptualization of the relation between the recipient and the artwork. 
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Of course, what Ryan describes is an either/or distinction, while, as will become 
apparent, the double perspectival structure of ludic engagement implies an interrelation 
between both perspectives, held concurrently. According to the aesthetic approach to 
play I have followed to get to this point, such a double perspective is a basic quality of 
the activity of play. Moreover, it is my argument that the figure game form that I have 
taken as my focus for this investigation foregrounds this formal structure of play in a 
particularly pointed manner. Recall that, in section 1.3, I defined the criteria delineating 
this genre for the purposes of this study as being, first, the establishment of a ludic 
heterocosm, and, secondly, the placing of a playable figure in this ludic heterocosm, 
which the player takes up as ‘I,’ and around whom, subsequently, the ludic heterocosm 
can be gathered into a meaningful existential sphere. It is by its very definition, then, that 
the figure game doubles the player, setting her up as a ludic subject inside the gameworld 
while she remains a player outside the gameworld.     
 This notion of the double perspective of play is fundamental to understanding 
the player’s experiential engagement with the game, and, as such, it is one that will, to a 
great extent, shape the approach that this investigation as a whole shall adopt towards the 
ludic subject. Getting to grips with the idea of the double perspective and its 
implications, then, is crucial. In order to do so, I shall first survey of a number of 
approaches within game studies that have sought to articulate the basic 
phenomenological distinction between experience in the gameworld and experience of the 
game artifact. Secondly, I shall offer a synthesis of the insights gained through this survey 
in the form of a conceptualization of the double phenomenal structure of the player’s 
relation to the game in its multiple levels. 
 
2.4.1 “Game as an experiential route” versus “game as a map or system” 
Torben Grodal makes the suggestion that engagement with a game admits to two 
possible approaches: the perspective of the “game as an experiential route” and that of 
58	  	  
the “game as a map and as a system”, 14 framing the move between the first and the 
second perspective as being the result of the player’s drive towards mastery: 15   
When starting a new game we may follow different routes and have an 
experience of controlling many options. But when we gain mastery we may not 
only experience the game as a series of routes that we may follow but also create 
a total “map” of the game and realize that we have a set of limited options. In 
this stage, the game is more likely to be experienced as a “message” from the 
game producers […] Experienced players may get to that stage sooner and shift 
more often between experiencing the game as an interactive world and reasoning 
about the possible intentions laid down by the producers. (2003, 144) 
The experiential difference between the two perspectives is encoded by means of spatial 
metaphors. An “experiential route” describes presence at a sequence of spatiotemporal 
points connected in a path of traversal: in other words, it implies a situated subject 
following the route in question. On the other hand, the reader of a map stands in a 
detached perceptual position, relating not to the space directly from a point of presence 
within it, but to a representation (or, we might say, an interpretation) of it. In this much, 
Grodal’s distinction between the framing of the game as an experiential route and that of 
the game as a map or system parallels the distinction between the internal and the 
external perspective. This impression is reinforced when an echo of Grodal’s distinction 
can be identified in the course of Alison Gazzard’s study of maze structures in 
videogame spaces, in which she notes that “the maze can be viewed as a design or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 It might be argued that an alternative way of framing the two perspectives would be to fall back on one 
of the stock notions of the game studies repertoire – namely, the distinction between the perspective of the 
‘game as object’ and that of the ‘game as process’. Of course, this latter dichotomy is nowhere near as rigid 
as the opposition of the two term might imply: if a game is an object, it is one that exists to set in motion a 
process; if it is a process, it is one that is determined by an object. ‘Object’ and ‘process’ are two sides of 
the same coin, and, as much as they might be separable on a purely conceptual level, one cannot be 
understood without the other. To an extent, the same is true of Grodal’s account of the two perspectives, 
which does not position them as mutually exclusive alternatives. 
15 A more fully developed working-through of this notion can be found in Arsenault and Perron (2009), 
where gameplay is understood as an interpretative process consisting of three nested heuristic spirals 
identified respectively as the gameplay, narrative and hermeneutic cycles.  I shall return to Arsenault and 
Perron in section 3.4.2 when the model they propose shall prove instrumental in answering the need for a 
“real-time hermeneutics” (Aarseth 2003, 5) that bridges the gap between the player’s subjective experience 
of the game as a lived world and her understanding of the gameworld as a cosmos, or definite, ordered 
system. 
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understood as an experience, and […] the experience of being in the maze is markedly 
different from that of viewing the maze from above” (2013, 17-18).    
While Grodal suggests that the two points of view on the game both come into 
play at different stages of the player’s engagement with a game, Bernard Perron 
repositions them as alternative critical frames upon the game as an object of study. The 
difference between the two perspectives, in this case, would be epistemological: on a 
basic methodological level, the former implies an engagement with the player’s moment-
to-moment “online perception” of the game in the act of playing,16 while the latter 
requires a “leisurely analysis” at a critical distance (Perron 2012, 3).  
Perron draws on the distinction in the context of a description of a scene in Silent 
Hill 2 (Konami 2001), in which he recounts the experience of exploring the dark interior 
of the Wood Side Apartments. The darkness of the scene makes it difficult to see one’s 
way and impossible to read the in-game map, leading, Perron writes, to a sense of 
disorientation and fear that gives way to relief when, in one of the rooms she wanders 
through, the player finds a flashlight. This experiential account frames the sequence in an 
entirely different manner to how it would be perceived if “we know the flashlight is in 
Room 205 (and we know that we will find this flashlight based on our previous playing 
of [Silent Hill (Konami 1999)] and from the manual” (ibid.): that is, if the extent of our 
knowledge and our mental conception of the game as a whole were not linked to our 
situated experience as players within the gameworld.   
For the purposes of his analysis, Perron privileges the experiential perspective as 
giving a more accurate account of the game in its affective dimension. This redeployment 
of Grodal’s distinction to highlight an analytical dichotomy, as well as the valorization of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Perron’s commentary introduces an echo of an earlier distinction made by James Newman between “on-
line” and “off-line” engagement (2002). On-line engagement refers to “the state of ergodic participation”, 
that is, “playing the game”; off-line engagement, on the other hand, refers to “periods where no registered 
input control is received from the player,” resulting in instances of “non-ergodicity” (2002). During on-line 
engagement, then, the game is being played, while, during off-line engagement, it is being watched. It is 
evident, firstly, that the modes of engagement Newman highlights are not coterminous with the two 
perspectives outlined by Grodal. The equation of the perspective of the ‘game as an experiential route’ to 
on-line engagement certainly holds, at least insofar as both describe the in-the-moment experience of 
active participation in a game. However, while Grodal contrasts this to the objective perspective detached 
from moment-to-moment subjective experience of the game, the other term of Newman’s oppositional 
pair, “off-line engagement,” simply refers to non-ergodic sections in games, such as cut-scenes.  
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the experiential perspective as being more fundamental to an understanding of what 
games are, can be aligned with Jon Peterson’s suggestion that there are “two distinct 
voices for describing games […] the immersed voice17 and the detached voice” (2013, 402). 
Peterson, however, does not go into detail regarding the implications of the two voices. 
A more fully developed articulation of the same notion of a double perspective can be 
traced in the distinction, developed by Leino (2009; 2010) and modified by Möring 
(2013), between the first-person perspective and the third-person perspective.  
 
2.4.2 First-person perspective versus third-person perspective 
In articulating the novelty of the first-person perspective he proposes as the necessary 
corollary of the framing of the game as played, Leino’s strategy is, firstly, to unite the 
poles of critical game analysis he attributes, following Aarseth (2007, 131), to the “critical 
player-theorist” and the “ethnographic player-observer”, under the common banner of 
what he terms the “third-person perspective”. The former approach, indebted to 
humanistic disciplines such as literary theory and cultural studies, takes as its object of 
study the game as text, and the latter, locating its methodological paradigm in the social 
sciences, shifts the focus onto the player. Nonetheless, Leino equates the two by 
reducing them to their common denominator: namely, that “they share the ‘objective’ 
scientific third-person orientation toward their object of study” (2009, 3). This allows 
Leino to position his conceptual development of the notion of the first-person 
perspective as a radical alternative that is more attuned to the “experienced significance 
of in-game events and objects” as directly figured for the player (Leino 2010, 95). 
As with Perron’s appropriation of Grodal’s notion of the two perspectives, these 
are competing critical and analytical standpoints, not dimensions of the player’s 
experience. To wit, the third-person perspective is articulated precisely as a pointed 
analytic disavowal of the player’s subjective experience (Leino 2009, 3). In other words, 
critical projects adopting the third-person perspective fail to account for what it feels like 
to play a game, that is, for “gameplay as the player experiences it” (ibid., 82). Conversely, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 I shall be focusing on the notion of immersion as it relates to the internal perspective in section 4.2. 
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it is precisely to this subjective experience that the first-person perspective – which Leino 
conceptualizes by means of a phenomenological approach to player experience – is 
attuned.  
Taking up both Leino’s dichotomy of perspective and a number of his 
conclusions regarding their implications, Möring argues that, with respect to a game, “it 
is possible to take either of two points of view: the first-person player of a game or the 
third-person observer of a game” (2013, 302). In Möring’s project, what is brought to the 
fore is the fact that these standpoints determine, not only the way in which the game 
comes to appear, but also the role it is necessary to perform in engaging with the game, 
and, therefore, the nature of the activity in question.  
 At the core of the distinction, Möring argues, is the difference between playing 
the game, and thereby experiencing it in the first person, and ‘merely’ observing, which 
implies taking the game textually, as representation: 
…the interplay of play and representation always refers to the distinction 
between a first-person player and a third-person observer – or, in other words, 
between play as doing and play as representation […] In this regard, for a first-
person player play is primarily a doing, and, as such, a praxis, whereas for a third-
person observer play as representation becomes important for its meaning. (ibid., 
161)18 
From the point of view of a first-person engagement with the game, the process of play 
is seen as a “praxis,” an active doing. From the third-person perspective, on the other 
hand, the same process gains significance through being taken in a representational 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Two points should be made here: first, as his usage of the term ‘play’ (as opposed to ‘game’) implies, 
Möring is operating with a different frame of reference to Grodal, Perron and Leino, all of whom explicitly 
position their theory as an approach to the computer game artifact. Instead, Möring’s argument is 
constructed with a view towards the notion of ‘play’ in a more abstract, general sense. This fact should not 
be ignored: however, if the argument is initially developed with respect to ‘play’ in general, there is, on the 
face of it, no reason it cannot be applied to games, and, in fact, Möring goes on to put his conceptual 
model in the service of an analysis of specific computer game examples. Second, what is revealed here is 
Möring’s anchoring of his notion of a double perspectival structure in Fink’s conceptualization of play as a 
self-reflexive existential sphere that represents being-in-the-world by means of enacting it – a notion I have 
already invoked in section 2.2.1 as the basis for the approach I am adopting towards games as aesthetic 
objects. It is, as such, hardly surprising that Möring’s articulation of the two perspectives hews the closest, 
out of the approaches I have surveyed, to my own derivation of the double perspective. 
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function. This observation is also at the core of Möring’s distinction between the role 
demanded of the user by each of the two perspectives: where the first-person 
perspectives requires the user to face up to the responsibilities of being a “player,” the 
third-person perspective relegates the user to being a ‘mere’ “observer”. Another way of 
phrasing this - by interweaving it with a different theoretical strand within the game 
studies discourse – is to say that the first-person perspective and the third-person 
perspective imply different user functions. What is being invoked here is Aarseth’s typology 
of user functions, already touched upon in section 2.2: unlike the purely interpretative 
function offered to recipients of the traditional literary text, the function expected of the 
recipient of the ergodic19 text can also be exploratory (if the user is given a choice of path), 
configurative (if the elements of the underlying textual engine can be configured by the user 
to form new semiotic sequences) or textonic (if the user has the capacity to modify the 
textual engine itself) (1997, 64). 
Subsequent work in game studies has tended to follow Markku Eskelinen in 
collapsing this typology of user functions into a binary either/or distinction between a 
configurative and an interpretative user function, with the former – in a formulation that 
bears a revealing similarity to the philosophical theory of action sketched out in section 
2.2.1 – leading to an understanding of the gaming situation as “a combination of ends, 
means, rules, equipment, and manipulative action” (2001).20 With games as examples of 
cybertexts, it is the configurative user function which is granted primacy:  
… literature is a dominantly interpretative practice, unlike games that are 
dominantly configurative or manipulable practices. To generalize: in art, we might 
have to configure in order to be able to interpret, whereas in games, we have to 
interpret in order to be able to configure. (Eskelinen 2012, 42) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 The etymology of Aarseth’s term is, of course, particularly apt in the context of the current investigation. 
Deriving from “the Greek words ergon and hodos, meaning “work” and “path”” (Aarseth 1997, 1), the term 
describes the fact that, in the cybertext, the user is required to work out her own path of traversal. That 
this aligns nicely with Grodal’s notion of the game as an “experiential route” should, at this point, go 
without saying.  
20 The congruence this framing bears to the schema of action outlined in section 2.2.1 above should not go 
unremarked. Eskelinen’s characterization of what he terms the gaming situation relates very much to what I 
have identified as the internal perspective, from which the player perceives the game as a lifeworld within 
which existential projects can be set in motion through the taking of action in the view of a goal. 
63	  	  
Möring appears to subscribe to a similar conclusion. His argument is presented in 
relation to thematic ‘readings’ of games, exemplified by Janet Murray’s interpretation of 
Tetris (Pajitnov 1984) as “the perfect enactment of the overtasked lives of Americans in 
the 1990s” (Murray 1998, 144) and Ian Bogost’s analysis of Tax Invaders (Republican 
National Committee 2004) as a procedural representation of conservative Republican 
perspectives on taxation (Bogost 2007, 105). These, Möring argues, “are actually text 
interpretations, since a gameplay experience is retrospectively constructed as a text” 
(2013, 227). The point being stressed here is not that this renders these readings invalid, 
but that they are extraneous to the actual process of engagement with the game as played 
– in short, “this sort of interpretation is not necessary for playing the game” (ibid.).  
 Perhaps not by way of coincidence, Eskelinen also preceded Möring in engaging 
with Murray’s reading of Tetris, and was harsher on the subject:  
Instead of studying the actual game Murray tries to interpret its supposed 
content, or better yet, project her favourite content on it; consequently we don’t 
learn anything of the features that make Tetris a game. (Eskelinen 2001) 
However, Eskelinen’s argument that a textual reading such as Murray’s ignores the ludic 
nature of both the object and the experience at hand makes little sense once we realize 
that, as Möring notes, a third-person reading of the game is based on, and presupposes, a 
first-person experience of playing the game. As such, what is read as a commentary on 
the busy lives of contemporary Americans is not some hypothetical version of Tetris 
shorn of its ludic aspects (it is hard to imagine what would be left) but the experience of 
Tetris as played. Specifically, what is read as an analogical signifier for overtasked 
contemporary American lives is the player’s eventually inevitable sense of being unable to 
keep up with the constant flow of Tetris blocks - an experience determined, to a great 
extent, by the same temporal qualities – such as random order of events and accelerating 
speed – that Eskelinen highlights in the “phenomenology of Tetris” he offers as a more 
ludically-oriented alternative to Murray’s reading. Thus, while Möring may be right to say 
that Murray’s reading is irrelevant to the experience of playing Tetris, Eskelinen is 
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certainly mistaken to say that the experience of playing Tetris is irrelevant to Murray’s 
reading. 
 
2.4.3 The implications of the dual perspectival structure 
Given the basic similarities in the structural distinctions being drawn, it is inevitable to 
reach the conclusion that these various developments of the idea of two distinct 
perspectives upon the game object open onto a fundamental structure of ludic 
experience – one, moreover, which this investigation already shed light on through the 
engagement with Fink’s ontology of play.  
 Having performed this survey, I am now in a position to build on the 
achievements of these earlier approaches, by proposing an understanding of the 
phenomenal structure that emerges in the duality between the internal and the external 
perspective, together with its experiential and aesthetic implications. The approach I shall 
take is that of unfolding a cluster of binary oppositions organized around the distinction 
between the internal and the external perspective across the multiple levels over which 
the distinction applies, each level already containing within it the implication of the next. 
The two perspectives shall be contrasted in terms of the experiential subject to which 
experience from the perspective pertains, the field of knowledge it delimits, the object of 
perception upon which it is trained, the mode of actuality in which the game is perceived, the 
frame it places upon the game, and the mode and order of experience associated with it.  
 - Experiential subject. Implicit in all of the approaches surveyed in the preceding 
sections is a mutual exclusivity to the two perspectives: one is either a player or a critical 
observer, or, in Grodal’s case, a novice or an expert. Such an understanding is not 
adequate to address the fact that the character of ludic experience depends on the player 
being simultaneously situated in both an internal and an external standpoint with respect to 
the gameworld. However, even with both of these perspectives being attributed to the 
player, it is still necessary to distinguish, on some level, the subject of internal experience 
from the subject of external experience. For this reason, the structure of a double 
phenomenology implies a distribution of the player-as-subject between two, inevitably 
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linked, but fundamentally distinct, subject-positions. The internal perspective, necessarily 
belonging as it does to an entity that inhabits the ontic domain of the gameworld, can be 
attributed to the ludic subject: indeed, to a great extent, the standpoint for the internal 
perspective can be directly identified with what I have termed the ludic subject-position. 
On the other hand, the external perspective belongs to the player as an individual outside 
the game. More specifically, insofar as this perspective is given shape by the game object 
itself – and is as much an element of its formal structure as the internal perspective of the 
ludic subject – the external perspective can be attributed to the implied player.21  
- Knowledge. This is most explicit in Grodal’s account of the dual perspectives, and 
Perron’s example from Silent Hill 2 serves as the perfect illustration. When the player 
inhabits a subjective standpoint internal to the gameworld, her field of knowledge is 
limited to some degree by this standpoint: the player of Silent Hill 2 cannot know, from 
her internal perspective, that there is a flashlight in Room 205 before she has been to the 
room in question. From an external perspective, on the other hand, there is no such 
necessary limitation of knowledge, and, at least in theory, total knowledge of the 
gameworld can be obtained.  
- Object of perception. What is the object of the player’s act of perception – or, what 
does the player see from this perspective? This is inevitably related to the question of 
knowledge, and refers back again to the situatedness of the player’s perspective. The 
limited perspective of an internal standpoint cannot encompass the game as a whole – as 
such, the object of any given act of perception will be this or that individual game 
component, as one of the things in the gameworld.  The point I am making here is 
similar to the one Iser proposes within literary theory regarding the viewpoint of the 
implied reader as a textual function within the signifying structure of the text: “instead of 
a subject-object relationship, there is a moving viewpoint which travels along inside that 
which it has to apprehend,” meaning that “the reader’s wandering viewpoint is, at one 
and the same time, caught up in and transcended by the object it is to apprehend” (1980, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 One should here recall the distinction made between the ludic subject and the implied player in section 
1.5.1. 
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109). In other words (and returning to a ludic domain of reference) the player’s 
subjective (hence, first-personal) standpoint constitutes a part of the game as a whole, 
which, by the same token, cannot be encompassed in its totality from the same 
standpoint. On the other hand, from the external perspective, the game itself, as a whole 
constituting one of the things in the player’s world, can be encompassed in an act of 
perception. This point shall be discussed at greater length in Chapter 3, but, for now, it is 
enough to keep in mind this distinction: from the external perspective of the implied 
player, it is perfectly possible to say, “I see Minecraft”; from a perspective internal to the 
world of Minecraft, on the other hand, such a statement would be impossible. Instead, a 
statement describing the player’s perceptions from this standpoint would refer to 
perceived things in the Minecraft world, such as, “I see a tree,” or “I see a creeper.”  
This is not to say that the external perspective cannot be focused upon one 
element or other of the game whole; nor that no extrapolation towards the whole can be 
made on the basis of the restricted viewpoint relating to the internal standpoint. In the 
former case, however, the cognitive movement is top-down, that is, from the whole to 
the part, while, in the latter case, it is bottom-up – starting with the perception of the 
individual game component.  
- Mode of actuality. For something to be actual, simply enough, means for it to exist 
in fact; but the determination of actuality depends upon the position from which the 
subject is speaking. This is the indexical definition of actuality proposed by Lewis, who 
writes: “‘actual’ is indexical, like ‘I’ or ‘here’, or ‘now’: it depends for its reference on […] 
the world where the utterance is located” (1973, 69).22 Actuality depends on the subject 
for whom a thing is actual, and her worldly standpoint: something is actual if it exists in the 
world from which I speak. By this indexical concept of actuality, the gameworld is only actual 
from the internal perspective – that is, from a perspective placed upon the same ontic 
plane as the things of the gameworld. This is what allows Fink to claim that the things of 
what he terms the playworld are, in a sense, both actual and non-actual, depending on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 The notion of the indexical definition of actuality is taken up by Ryan in her examinations of the 
mechanisms of subjective “recentering” in relation to textual worlds (2001a, 103). I shall return to this 
point in Chapter 5. 
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whether or not one has stepped into the ludic domain. A better way of phrasing this, 
however, is that, from the respective perspectives, the objects in play are actual in 
different ways: as existents in the gameworld from the internal perspective, and as game 
components (aspects of the game artifact) from the external perspective.  
- Frame. If the individual game component is isolated as an object of perception, 
the horizon it is perceived against is that of the gameworld; conversely, if the external 
perspectives frames the game as a whole as a distinct object of perception, it does so 
against the background of the player’s actual world, within which the game thereby 
comes to appear as one of the things in the world. From the internal perspective, then, 
the game is experienced as an experiential and existential lifeworld, through phenomenal 
mechanisms I shall explore in Chapter 3. At the same time, from the external 
perspective, the game as a whole is perceived as an artifact, one among the things in the 
world of the player as “an individual who, among other activities, also plays” (Gadamer 
1989[1960], 107). This is the basis of Grodal’s distinction between the “game as an 
experiential route” and the “game as a map or system,” as well as Möring’s point that the 
double structure of play refers to the fact that the things relating to the play-act are both 
“objects from within the world” and “the totality of things in play” (2013, 119). 
If, from the external perspective, the game is encountered as a thing in the 
player’s world, it is still necessary to ask: as what manner of thing is it encountered, and, 
relatedly, in what mode is it encountered? The answer is already prefigured in Grodal’s 
argument that, from the external perspective, the game is “experienced as a “message” 
from the game producers” (2003, 144), as well as in Möring’s assertion that the product 
of the third-person perspective is “text interpretations” of games, such as Murray’s and 
Bogost’s. From the external perspective, the game is encountered in the mode of 
textuality, as an artifact that is amenable to semiotic engagement on any of the levels 
upon which a game can be ‘read’.  
The fact that the double perspectival structure allows for a game to appear to the 
player as both a world for her and a textual artifact is crucial. Perhaps as a counterpoint to 
a tendency towards rather facile and uncritical applications of the idea of games 
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transporting the player into a wholly other realm, game studies has tended to resist to the 
idea of immersion and of the sense of being-in-the-gameworld as being somewhat naïve. 
Thus – to mention only some examples - Salen and Zimmerman reject the  “immersive 
fallacy” (2004, 450); Peter Bayliss criticizes Geoff King and Tanya Krzywinska (2006) for 
adopting a perspective that “assumes a player who uncritically accepts the depicted game-
world is in some way real or unmediated, and presumes that the primary value of playing 
a videogame arises from the impression of being transported into the world of the 
videogame” (2007a, 4); and Paul Martin writes that, “any sense of presence in the game 
environment is weak and fleeting at best” (2012, 2). The double perspectival structure of 
ludic engagement presents us with a way to circumvent this difficulty, allowing for the 
conception of the player’s sense of being-in-the-gameworld as being the primary 
dimension of ludic experience, but, at the same time, being bracketed and qualified by its 
simultaneous capture and textualization from the external perspective.  
- Mode of experience. It follows from the observations that have been made so far 
that the mode of experience pertaining to each of the two viewpoints is different: that, in 
fact, they constitute two simultaneous, interlinked but distinct streams of conscious 
experience. The internal perspective, through the frame of the game as world, provides 
the player with gameworld experience – as I shall discuss in developing a phenomenology of 
the gameworld in Chapter 3, this implies having experiences of things in the game against 
the ground of the gameworld as the world in which they are. At the same time, the 
external perspective grants the player artifactual experience of the game – that is, experience 
of the game as an artifact, a thing against the horizon of the player-world.  
- Order of experience. According to the understanding reached by this pojnt, then, 
the internal perspective determines a subjective process whose mode is that of doing, 
while the external perspective, on the other hand, constructs a subject whose disposition 
is receptive, and whose task can be understood as a reading or an interpretation. As such, 
it is evident that the internal perspective frames a first-order, direct experience, while the 
external perspective captures a second-order experience whose object is the first-order 
experience resulting from the internal perspective.  
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 Internal perspective External perspective 
Experiential subject Ludic subject Implied player 
Knowledge Situated Omniscient 
Object of perception Game component Game object (as a whole) 
Mode of actuality Actual as world Actual as artefact 
Frame Game as world Game as text 
Mode of experience Gameworld experience Artifactual experience 
Order of experience First-order Second-order 
  
Figure 2.1 The double perspective of ludic engagement  
 
Given the focus of this investigation as a whole, my primary interest in developing this 
conceptualization of the double perspectival structure of ludic engagement is in how it 
determines the approach to the ludic subject. As such, I shall now address this point, 
explaining in more concrete terms the implication of the fact that the interrelation of the 
two perspectives allows for a relation to the ludic subject that is at the same time 
subjective and objective.  
 
2.4.4 The dual perspectival structure and the ludic subject 
I have already attributed the internal perspective to the ludic subject, insofar as it belongs 
to an entity existing within the ontic domain of the gameworld. From this, it follows that, 
from the internal perspective, the ludic subject is not itself viewed as an object of 
perception. To paraphrase Aarseth (2004a, 138), on a point I shall return to at greater 
length, the gameworld is seen through the ludic subject. The player has an experience of 
the gameworld, perceives the things of the gameworld as meaningful, and can direct her 
actions in the service of her existential project within the gameworld, because she has 
taken on the ludic subject-position as her own.  
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At the same time, however, the player does not entirely ‘disappear’ into the ludic 
subject-position: she retains her external standpoint as a player engaging with a game 
artifact, being, in the act of playing, both ludic subject and player. From this external 
perspective, as I have observed, the game can be perceived as a unified textual or 
artifactual whole, at a remove from the direct, first-person engagement that characterizes 
the internal perspective. Moreover, an intrinsic part of this whole is the ludic subjectivity 
the player has enacted through her engagement with the gameworld from the ludic 
subject-position that determines the internal perspective. In other words, the same ludic 
subjectivity which constitutes the player’s gameworld-internal subjective standpoint is 
itself the object of the player’s perception from the external standpoint.  
I have already drawn attention to the fact that the formal structure of the figure 
game brings to the fore this fundamental distinction between the ludic subject and the 
player, at the same time as both continue to be perceived, by the player, as ‘I’. There is 
another point to add: it is that, in one way or another, every figure game provides the 
player with a representation of her own enacted ludic subjectivity. This is the insight that 
is hinted at in Ryan’s observation that “players are not only agents but also spectators of 
their own pretended actions” (2006, 190),23 and in Emma Westecott’s argument that the 
screen-based mediality of the videogame means that “the player is always audience to her 
own play act” (2009, 2). As the example of Adventure (Crowther and Woods 1976) with 
which I introduced this study can reveal, this is true even of games with a non-graphical 
mode of presentation; the same can also be said, for example, of the verbal account of 
the player’s actions given by the games master in a session of Dungeons & Dragons.  
This returns the argument to the point I introduced in section 1.3, namely, that 
there are two senses in which it is possible to speak of ludic subjectivity: firstly, as a 
subjective standpoint inhabited by the player in relation to the gameworld, a sense 
encapsulated by the term ludic subject-position, and, secondly, as a distinct identity emerging 
from the player’s engagement with the gameworld through the frame of the ludic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Of course, as the conceptualization of the ludic action which I have just performed has made clear, to 
describe such actions as ”pretend” is a distortion of their experiential character. With this qualification 
being made, however, Ryan’s observation remains valid. 
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subject-position, an identity we can identify as the ludic subject proper. In section 1.5, I 
drew a parallel between these senses of the ludic subject and Dan Zahavi’s distinction 
between the two senses in which the individual subject can be construed – as a minimal 
or core self, the first-personal bearer of experience,24 and the “narrative self” as an 
identity that emerges a posteriori, in the individual’s second-order contemplation of her 
own first-order experiences and actions (2008, 8). In this sense, the mechanisms of ludic 
subjectivity, and the emergence of self-awareness as a ludic subject in the midst of the 
gameworld, mirror the phenomenal structures of subjectivity and of being-in-the-world. 
However, what is particular in the case of ludic engagement, in the specific form 
of the figure game, is that this mechanism is explicitly foregrounded through the 
mediation of a presentation of this subject back to the player – and, moreover, a 
presentation that is caught up as an element of the game as a signifying textual unity.  It 
is precisely thanks to this double perspectival structure, then, that games have the 
capacity to formally enshrine an aesthetic mechanism of “autoscopy” - a literal viewing of 
the self (Mishara 2009). It is not just that I, as a player, play out a ludic subject, an ‘I’ in 
the gameworld bearing experiences and taking actions I identify as ‘mine,’ but that, at the 
same time, this ludic subjectivity is textualized and presented back to me, causing me to 
relate aesthetically to my own lived subjectivity within the gameworld (see Fig. 2.2).  
A precedent to this insight can be identified within the field of digital art theory. 
In developing a poetics of interactive art, Katja Kwastek identifies a dialectic of 
absorption and aesthetic distance that tellingly reflects the double perspectival structure 
of ludic engagement outlined in this chapter: the perspective of critical distance, she 
writes, “is not only possible in the experience of interactive art, but is an essential 
counterpart to absorption” (2013, 163). Moreover, the conclusion Kwastek reaches on 
this basis is identical to the point being made here – namely, that “one’s own actions 
become available as an object of reflection” (ibid.). The actions performed by the 
recipient of the interactive art work while absorbed in its mechanisms are inscribed into 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 The constitution of the subject in experience, as the first-person ’I’ to whom the experience pertains, 
shall be considered in Chapter 4 below.  
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the aesthetic whole which the same recipient interprets from her position of distance. It 
is in precisely the same way that the double perspectival structure of ludic engagement 
results in the possibility for the presentation of the player’s own enacted ludic subjectivity 
as an element of the game’s aesthetic unfolding. 
 
 
Figure 2.2. The double perspectival structure of ludic engagement.  
 
2.5 Conclusions 
 
In this chapter, I began by enumerating the implications that an aesthetic approach bears 
upon games as objects of study. Four key dimensions of aesthetics as a path towards the 
art object were isolated as being of special relevance to the investigations to come: that 
the aesthetic object is a concretization in the recipient’s experience resulting from the 
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encounter with a material object; that the shape of this concretization is determined by 
the formal specificity of the medium in which the art object operates; that this structure 
of experience constitutes a formal unity, and invites interpretation as such; that it is 
related to from a standpoint of disinterested contemplation. 
 Upon this basis, I then proposed an aesthetic understanding of games founded 
upon the play-act as aesthetic action, for which two theorizations were tested out. First, 
the notion that an aesthetic action was differentiated from the general range of actions by 
virtue of not being directed towards a final purpose was rejected due to its inability to 
account for ludic actions which are, in fact, geared at achieving an outcome within the 
game. Instead, an alternative was proposed – that of considering ludic actions as 
possessing the same teleological structure and qualities of general actions, within the 
confines of a ludic domain set apart from the player’s everyday lived-world.  
While the notion of the play-frame, as suggested by Bateson and Goffman, 
allowed for an articulation of this basic aesthetic quality of ludic actions, it lacked a 
framework for speaking of the ontology of the ludic domain, or by extension, of the 
phenomenology of the player’s experience of it. This necessity of an ontology of the 
sphere of ludic actions – including the tasks towards which they are oriented, the objects 
they address, and the horizon against which these appear – led directly to the notion of 
the gameworld, as referring to an ontological domain separate from the player-world within 
which the ludic significance of the things in play holds as actual.  
This led to the observation that a double perspectival structure holds sway over 
ludic engagement. In engaging with a game, the player is required to take on an 
experiential standpoint internal to the gameworld. At the same time, the player retains 
her own standpoint in the player-world, from which the game appears not as an 
experiential world but as an artifact within the world. Crucially for the purposes of this 
investigation as a whole, this is the point at which the ludic subject comes into view, as 
the subjective ‘I’ established for the player within the gameworld that is, both 
ontologically and experientially, distinct from the ‘I’ of the player’s own identity within 
the player-world.    
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I have observed that the games that are the focus of this investigation accentuate 
this basic phenomenal quality of play in two ways. Firstly, their nature as “games in 
virtual environments” (Aarseth, Smedstad and Sunnanå 2003, 48; Calleja 2011, 14) 
provides a ready-made, material distinction between the ludic domain and the player’s 
actual world. Secondly, the medial structure of the figure game results in a re-
presentation of the player’s own enacted ludic subjectivity being presented back to her as 
an intrinsic element of the game’s textual unfolding, and hence being transformed into an 
object of aesthetic contemplation.   
I have, for analytical purposes, presented the two perceptual standpoints as being 
entirely distinct. In practice, the distinction is in no way so clear-cut. On a basic level, the 
two standpoints are united in being both inhabited by the player in the act of engaging 
with the game. For this reason, on a number of the levels across which I have traced the 
distinction, there will necessarily be a degree of ‘bleed’ between the two perspectives. 
This observation is not a liability for the claim that the double perspectival structure is a 
fundamental quality of ludic experience. On the contrary, it is precisely in this 
interrelation between the two perspectives that much of the idiosyncratic experiential and 
aesthetic qualities of games can be identified.  
Having made an argument for the necessity of considering games as separate 
‘worlds,’ or domains of lived experience, and having traced the implications of this in 
terms of the double perspectival structure resulting from the player’s simultaneous 
inhabitation of the gameworld and the player-world, the parameters have now been set 
for a direct engagement with the fundamental structure of ludic experience. Given the 
primacy I have already attributed to internal experience of the gameworld, it is this 
dimension of ludic experience that I shall focus on first; not coincidentally, this is also 
the dimension of ludic experience that pertains to the ludic subject. 
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Chapter Three 
The phenomenology of the gameworld 
 
If the discussion on the aesthetic perspective presented in Chapter 2 can be reduced to a 
single insight, it is that, in order to understand the shape taken by games as aesthetic 
objects, it is imperative to investigate their nature in terms of how they are given form in 
the player’s experience. Accordingly, this chapter shall now be dedicated to establishing a 
conceptual foundation for understanding the structure of player experience of, and in, 
the gameworld. 
This task necessitates an analysis that identifies not only the basic unit of ludic 
experience, but also the grammar according to which these units combine into 
experiential unities and, as a result, significant forms, such as that of the ‘gameworld’. 
The approach to player experience I propose to take in this chapter, then, is a radical 
one, in the sense of being concerned with establishing the basic principles governing 
ludic experience and underlying higher-level phenomena conceptualized under such 
labels as immersion, presence, agency, embodiment and incorporation. Shining a 
spotlight on the fundamental conditions of ludic experience that remain at the level of 
unexamined assumptions in the latter notions shall allow me, in later chapters, to re-
examine these concepts upon a more solid foundation.  
  The questions I shall tackle, then, are: what is the object of ludic experience? In 
what manner is this object grasped in consciousness? What is the horizon against which 
the objects of ludic experience emerge as figures? How are the disparate experiences of 
distinct objects within the ontological domain of the game united in the form of an 
experiential world? Who is the subject of experience of the game, as identified as the 
first-personal pole or ‘I’ to whom this experience belongs?   
In adopting an experiential perspective on games, my epistemological approach is 
that of “the game as played, as referring to the object of study for game studies from the 
player’s perspective” (Leino 2010, 6). Accordingly, my analysis is heavily indebted to Olli 
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Tapio Leino’s phenomenological account of player experience; however, I shall 
eventually have to part ways with Leino’s project at the point at which he characterizes 
the player’s perspective as a singular first-person perspective, which he opposes to the 
distanced third-person perspective of the detached critical observer (2009, 5). Instead, my 
approach shall be informed by my observation, in section 2.4, that the player 
simultaneously adopts two distinct subjective perspectives. With an eye to their 
respective standpoints in relation to the gameworld, I termed these the internal and the 
external perspective, and suggested that their duality represents the primary axis of the 
structure of ludic experience, standing in suspension at every moment of the player’s 
engagement with a game and thereby providing her simultaneously with gameworld 
experience and artifactual experience. It is the first of these that is to be the theme of the 
analysis I am undertaking in the current chapter.   
It might be asked what relevance an account of the structure of experience of the 
gameworld bears upon the investigation of the ludic subject that constitutes this study’s 
primary task. The step, however, is a crucial one, in that the question of subjectivity and 
that of experience are so closely intertwined as to be, for all intents and purposes, 
inextricable: it is hard to conceive of a ‘subject’ except, in one way or another, as the 
bearer of an experience, and, likewise, an experience without a subject as its bearer is 
scarcely thinkable. As Dan Zahavi writes, “an understanding of what it means to be a self 
calls for an examination of the structure of experience, and vice versa” (Zahavi 2007, 5). 
Starting upon a consideration of the perception of a thing-in-the-gameworld as 
the basic unit of ludic experience, I shall draw on the phenomenological notion of the 
intentional structure of consciousness (Brentano 1973[1874]; Husserl 1973[1900/01]; 
2012[1931]), which leads to a conceptualization of experience in which perceiving subject 
and perceived world are united in the intentional act. This conceptual move will highlight 
two related paths of analysis in investigating gameworld experience: one leading in the 
direction of an analysis of the gameworld as a phenomenal world, that is, as it is given 
structure and meaning in the player’s experience, and another which traces a route from 
gameworld experience to the ludic subject as the first-personal pole of this experience.  
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In preparation for the turn towards the subject of gameworld experience that this 
investigation shall trace in later chapters, it is the former path which I shall follow in this 
chapter. I shall suggest that a phenomenology of the gameworld needs to include three 
components: the gameworld as a lifeworld, the practical world of prereflective experience, 
the gameworld as a cosmos, an ordered sphere of meaning extrapolated on the basis of 
direct experience, and the gameworld as earth, the experiential mark of its contingent 
materiality. Taken together, these three aspects define the phenomenal structure of the 
gameworld as an experiential domain, against which, in subsequent chapters, the ludic 
subject can be thematized as the subject for whom the gameworld takes this form in 
experience.   
 
3.1 An intentional structure of ludic experience 
 
In attempting to identify the basic structure of experience of the gameworld, the logical 
starting-point is that of the basic unit of experience: that is, the single act of perception. 
The first question that needs to be asked, then, is: what does the player perceive when 
she engages with a game? Having taken the internal perspective as the focus of the 
current analysis, the question, put differently, is: what is the object of an act of 
perception of the gameworld?  
On the basis of this perspective, it is evident that the answer cannot be ‘the 
game’. By way of example, consider a new player of Minecraft (Mojang 2011) exploring its 
procedurally-generated landscape. The player does not, during the act of playing, perceive 
the game of Minecraft, in the sense that “Minecraft” could be identified as the object 
grasped by her consciousness - any more than, in my stream of experience of the world, 
any single act of perception can be identified that has ‘the world’ as its object, rather than 
one of the things in the world: say, the glass of wine on the table, or the precarious pile 
of books teetering at the side of my desk. 
The reason for this is that my experiences are always already experiences in the 
world, and, as such, take shape against the world as their ground: to have an experience 
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of “the world”, that is, to form it as the object of a thought, I would need to take a step 
back from it and perceive it from the outside, which, of course, is impossible except by a 
transcendental conceptual leap. By the same logic, a subjective standpoint internal to the 
game cannot provide a viewpoint upon the game as a whole, given that it is itself 
contained within it. I shall again draw a parallel to Wolfgang Iser’s theory of the “moving 
viewpoint” of the implied reader in literary works, which “travels along inside that which 
it has to apprehend,” and which, as a result, “is, at one and the same time, caught up in 
and transcended by the object it is intended to apprehend” (1980, 109).  
Of course, the double perspectival structure of games means that an external 
perspective is, in fact, enshrined through which ‘the game’ is made available as an object 
of perception. However, as I have already pointed out, this second-order experience 
requires first-order experience of the gameworld as its prerequisite, and, as such, it is 
upon this experiential plane that an investigation into ludic experience must be founded.    
 
3.1.1 Perception of things-in-the-gameworld 
Although, in section 2.3, I discussed the notion of the a game as representing an ordered 
unity of play – ordered in terms of spatiotemporal form as well as in the constitution of 
the system of objects to which it refers – when the player engages with a game, she does 
not start off by directly encountering the logical layout of an ordered system. However, 
neither is it accurate to say that what the player consciously experiences is a barrage of 
audiovisual information delivered through the game’s medial apparatus. Just as in our 
perception of the actual world, the sphere of perception is prereflectively parcelled out 
into distinct figures that are discrete (emerging as a distinct figure against the 
undifferentiated ground of perception) and persistent (remaining recognizably the same 
object across the moment-to-moment stream of experience). Perception is “not a passive 
receptivity […] but already gives us meaning which is generated through a creative 
capacity for selection and differentiation” (Coole 1984, 513). As Maurice Merleau-Ponty 
writes, “I do not look at a chaos, but at things” (1968, 133). The individual does not first 
see raw sense data – she is intuitively aware of seeing tree, house, man, car and so on. 
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The same is true of the player and her perceptions of the gameworld. Even if she 
might not, initially, be aware of the ludic significance, or even the basic nature, of any of 
these objects,1 she will be conscious of perceptually encountering discrete things. Thus, a 
tree in Minecraft can be the object of perceptual focus, as can, in the very next moment, 
the creeper that emerges from behind it. It is as a set of such distinct objects of 
perception, rather than as a single, unified entity, that a game appears from the ludic 
subject-position.  
 What is framed in each act of perception of the gameworld, then, is a game 
component – an integral element of the game which can be identified, isolated and 
described as a distinct entity. However, to identify the objects the player perceives as 
‘game components’ is to jump the gun. The term already goes beyond the instance of 
perception of the object – in this case, the Minecraft-tree – by attributing to it a 
significance determined by a top-down frame of reference: namely, the idea of the game 
as system. Before the object encountered in the player’s experience of the gameworld as 
a ludic subject can be perceived in its game-systemic significance as a game component, 
it is, first and foremost, simply that – a thing in the gameworld. What is needed, then, is 
an approach that allows for an articulation of the structure of the basic experience of a 
thing-in-the-gameworld, and phenomenology suggests itself as the methodology best 
suited to this task. 
 
3.1.2 Phenomenology, intentionality, world and subject 
As an epistemological approach to the study of games, the choice of phenomenology is 
hardly unprecedented. Leino suggests that “looking at games from the player’s 
perspective can be facilitated by, or perhaps even already implies, a phenomenological 
orientation towards games” (2010, 95); one can also list Rune Klevjer’s application of the 
embodied phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty to his studies of avatar-play (2006; 2012), 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Even games whose representations tend towards the abstract – for instance, Rez (United Game Artists 
2001) or Antichamber (Bruce 2013) – usually present the player with a set of clearly recognizable objects; 
that is, although the player might not even be able to determine precisely what a paticular object is, she is 
still able to break the game’s audiovisual presentation down into discrete and persistent objects, rather than 
remaining at the level of undifferentiated perceptions.   
82	  	  
which I shall consider at length in subsequent chapters, and Espen Aarseth’s argument 
for the necessity of considering “the phenomenology of the game object” (2011, 65). 
The term ‘phenomenology’ encapsulates a range of divergent approaches: 
between Edmund Husserl’s transcendental idealist phenomenology and Merleau-Ponty’s 
embodied phenomenology, for instance, there are as many radical incompatibilities as 
points of encounter. What links these disparate approaches under the aegis of a common 
term is that they all take, as their object of study, the “phenomenon” - the object as 
construed in experience. Phenomenology is “the study of structures of consciousness as 
experienced from the first-person point of view” (Smith 2013), a formulation which 
emphasizes the grounding of phenomenological inquiry in subjectivity. 
In this regard, the starting-point of phenomenology as a method is the intentional 
model of consciousness. It should be pointed out that the sense in which the term 
‘intentionality’ is used in phenomenology is different from, and should not be confused 
with, the notion of ‘intention’ as it is advanced in the analytic philosophy of action which 
I drew upon in section 2.2. In its phenomenological sense, intentionality is initially put 
forward in the writings of Franz Brentano, before being taken up as the foundational 
notion of phenomenology by Husserl. The insight upon which intentionality, as a 
concept, is founded, is a simple one: every act of consciousness has, as its object, some 
thing which it is about. In Brentano’s words: 
Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although 
they do not do so in the same way. In presentation, something is presented, in 
judgment something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire 
desired and so on. (1973[1874], 88) 
If I stand in a field and see a tree in front of me, then the tree is the intentional object of 
my act of perception. Thought cannot but be intentional, in the sense that every act of 
consciousness must be a consciousness of something, that is, have something as its 
object. A phenomenological analysis of the game as played, then, would proceed in the 
mode of an interrogation of the way(s) in which the game and its components are 
intended for the player in the act of playing the game.  
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It is important to clarify that this focus upon the content of the intentional act 
does not render phenomenology a purely subjective philosophy. The intentional model 
of consciousness suggests that it is a basic element of the nature of my subjective being 
that “I am aware of a world” towards which my being is oriented (Husserl 2012[1931], 
51), and defines the subject’s mode of being as a being-in-the world: 
I find continually present and standing over against me the one spatio-temporal 
fact-world to which I myself belong […] this “fact-world”, as the word already 
tells us, I find to be out there, and also take it just as it gives itself to me as something that 
exists out there. (ibid., 55-6)  
Even if the phenomenological approach requires us to bracket the question of the 
ontological nature of the world,2 asking instead only how it is constituted in experience, 
the intentional structure of consciousness not only preserves, but highlights as 
fundamental the essential connection of the subject to the fact-world in which she 
experientially finds herself. Paul Ricoeur observes that, for Husserl, “the transcendental 
subject is not at all outside the world but is, on the contrary, the foundation of the 
world” (1996, 49). Phenomenology, then, does not isolate “consciousness from its 
relation to sensible and material phenomena” (Sobchack 1992, 33), which, as much as 
they are determined by subjective perception, nonetheless relate to (or, to keep to the 
same parlance, intend towards) their concrete object. As such, though we may bracket 
any claims as to the objective reality of the world, it remains true to say that “the world is 
not in consciousness but rather is always already extant for consciousness that intends 
towards it” (ibid., 35). 
The intentional model of consciousness therefore enshrines not only the 
mutually determining relation between the intentional object and the subject for which 
the object is intended – united in the synthetic nature of the intentional act – it also 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 In this regard, Husserl defines the phenomenological method as being dependent upon an epoché or 
“bracketing” (2012[1931], 59) – a setting-aside, not a refutation – of the natural attitude towards things, 
and a subsequent focus on the experience itself, in all its varying qualities, attributes and modes of 
givenness. Unlike the radical doubt of the Cartesian cogito, however, this is, as Ricoeur notes, “a suspension 
compatible with certainty” (1996, 88), precisely due to the implication of both world and subject in the 
intentional act. 
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serves as a guarantee of both subject and world. An object is intended in every 
experience; at the same time, “every experience belongs to a subject” (Zahavi 2008, 46). 
The intentional act, therefore, is fundamentally double-sided: to differentiate its two 
facets, Husserl coins the terms noesis and noema. In short, noesis refers to the intentional 
act as act of consciousness, while noema denotes the object or content of the intentional 
act (2012[1931], 182-203). Following Jean-François Lyotard:  
…we can speak, with Husserl, of an inclusion of the world in consciousness, 
since consciousness is not only the I-pole (or noesis) of intentionality, but equally 
the object-pole (or noema) […] on the one hand, the object is a Gegenstand, a 
phenomenon, leading back to the consciousness to which it appears; while on the 
other hand, consciousness is consciousness of this phenomenon. (1991, 55)  
It is precisely this capacity to thematize the relation of conscious subject to experienced 
world – via the foregrounding of the intentional structure of consciousness as 
consciousness of – that makes phenomenology the obvious route towards understanding 
the structure of gameworld experience, and, fundamentally, of the nature of the ludic 
subject as the bearer of this experience. 
 
3.1.3 The ludic subject-position and the ludic subject 
An intentional understanding of consciousness makes us aware of the object of 
consciousness in view of the subject for whom it is intended, and for whom, as I shall 
argue in section 3.4, it exists, as an actuality, in the mode of facticity (Sartre 1966[1943], 
131). The necessary corollary is that, at the same time, we are also made aware of the 
subject in relation to the object in its intentional grasp. Husserl emphasizes the nature of 
the subject (what he terms the ‘Ego’) as a necessary element of the intentional act: 
The “being directed towards”, “the being busied with”, “adopting an attitude 
[towards]”, “undergoing or suffering from”, has this of necessity wrapped in its very 
essence, that it is just something “from the Ego”, or in the reverse direction “to 
the Ego.” (2012[1913],163) 
As Zahavi puts it: “the sensory experience contains two dimensions, namely one of the 
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sensing and one of the sensed […] when we investigate appearing objects, we also disclose 
ourselves as datives of manifestation, as those to whom objects appear” (2008, 123). It is 
not enough, then, to ask, How does the gameworld appear? It is also necessary to ask, Who does 
the gameworld appear to? Nor is it enough to answer this with, “the player,” given that, as I 
have argued in section 2.4, the fundamental structure of ludic experience is of a 
distribution of the player’s subjectivity across two subjective standpoints, resulting in the 
playing-out of two distinct subjectivities. Since the theme of this current stage of my 
analysis is the structure of gameworld experience, the subject of the experience in 
question is the subject to whom a perspective internal to the gameworld has been 
attributed – that is, to the ludic subject that constitutes the theme of this investigation.  
 The shape that a phenomenological study of the ludic subject is to take can now 
be clarified. Such a study shall be concerned with tracing the vectors of intentionality that 
connect the ludic subject and the gameworld. It shall be sensitive to which objects are 
brought to the fore as distinct figures or objects of perception against the general ground 
of the gameworld. It shall pay attention to what perspectives the ludic subject-position 
enshrines upon these objects – and, therefore, what meanings these objects are invested 
with. Finally, it shall trace these vectors back to their point of origin in the ludic subject-
position, identifying the ludic subject as an opening onto the gameworld that, in 
gathering the gameworld around itself in a particular meaningful form, reveals its own 
particular character.   
 
3.2 The twofold phenomenological structure of subjectivity 
	  
Before this can be accomplished, however, it is crucial to note an additional dimension of 
complexity to the phenomenological understanding of subjectivity. We have already 
noted that the relation between subject and the world of experience is a mutually 
determining one, and that, as a result, “the investigations of self and experience have to 
be integrated if both are to be understood” (Zahavi 2008, 106). At this point, it is 
necessary to make the observation that the subject’s phenomenal relation to the world 
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(and, inseparably, to herself in the world) operates according to a twofold structure. This 
twofold structure of subjectivity already came into view in section 1.5, when the 
parameters were being set for a theoretical approach to the question of ludic subjectivity. 
Now, however, it is time to engage more fully with the nature, and the implications, of 
this twofold structure of subjectivity. I shall consider the operations of this twofold 
structure in two directions – in the direction of the subject’s phenomenal relation to the 
world, and in the direction of her relation to her own subjectivity.  
 
3.2.1 The twofold structure of the subject’s relation to the world 
Husserl identifies a duality in the relation of the subject to the world of experience. The 
world that is intentionally given “is continually “present” for me, and I myself am a 
member of it” (2012[1913], 53). It is “the world in which I find myself and which is also my world-
about-me” (ibid., italics in original). In other words: it is the world of which I exist as a 
member, as a thing among things, but it is also the perceptual world which extends 
outwards, organizing itself around my own subjective standpoint as its centre. 
 Conceiving of the world as my perceptual world-about-me, to stick to Husserl’s 
term, implies adopting a first-personal perspective on the world of experience: I am, 
before anything else, aware of the world as it exists for me, with the sphere of intentional 
experience extending outwards from my own subjective standpoint at its centre. Thus I 
experience a thing as near or far, to the left or to the right, big or small, as it relates to the 
subjective position I inhabit, rather than according to any absolute or objective qualities 
of the thing itself. And what I see when I direct my attention to an object in the world is 
not the thing in its objective being, but merely my experience of that thing: not a tree, but 
the view of the tree that is available to me from the point at which I stand, and as it 
appears in the light of the hour of day in which I happen to be in view of it. 
 This is what Husserl refers to as the immanent character of intentional acts, which 
describes the fact that “their intentional objects […] belong to the same stream of experience as 
themselves” (ibid., 71). All we are aware of immanently is the experience of objects – in 
which both the perceiving and the perceived disappear.   At the same time, however, it is 
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possible, through a reflexive act, to transcend the experience, either in the direction of 
the perceived object or the perceiving subject. This is not an ‘optional extra,’ but a 
necessary moment of the phenomenal act that constitutes the means by which direct, 
present experience is made available to consciousness. As Mikel Dufrenne writes, 
conscious perception engages in a constant movement “from the lived to the thought, 
from presence to representation” (1973, 345). A perception can only become one we are 
conscious of (one that is thought) if it is represented in reflection; at the same time, for 
an object to be thus re-presented to us, it must first be present to us, in the sense of 
unmediated, prereflective presence. 
This implies a necessary cognitive shift in the form of a transcendence of the 
first-person perspective in which all experience originates, and the adoption of what can 
be characterized as a third-person perspective whose reflective distance allows for the 
possibility of an objective framing of “the world” as a transcendental object of thought – 
even if this must always be accompanied with the caveat that all such knowledge is the 
result of a reflective operation, an abstraction on the basis of subjective experience.  
 
3.2.2 The twofold structure of the subject’s relation to herself 
This shift into a third-person perspective also grants an approach to the subject as she 
appears to herself. In being the ground of the first-person perspective, the perceiving 
subject is not itself an object of direct experience – Ricoeur writes that the world-about-
me, as Husserl conceives it, consists of “everything which in some way exists for me, and 
by its intuitive presence, at the same time conceals from me my transcendental and 
constitutive subjectivity which still functions in this very presence” (1996, 87). In the 
third-person perspective, however, the subject is, in a sense, objectified, becoming 
perceptually available to herself. It is no accident that, in the passage quoted above, 
Husserl defines the world as seen from this third-person perspective as “the world in which 
I find myself”. As Merleau-Ponty writes, “the positing of the object [independently of our 
perception of it] therefore makes us go beyond the limits of our actual experience,” and 
this same shift in perspective leads me to “regard my body, which is my point of view 
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upon the world, as one of the objects of that world” (2002[1945], 81). 
 This highlights the second avenue by which a twofold structure to phenomenal 
subjectivity comes into view. Husserl argues that intentional consciousness, in its 
grasping of the objects of the world towards which its attention is directed, is also aware 
of the very same grasping: the intentional act of consciousness, “no matter what else it 
may be intrinsically conscious of, is, at the same time, consciousness of itself” (1969, 
273). As such, this is an understanding of consciousness that identifies a twofold 
structure within every intentional act: “Every experience is ‘consciousness’, and 
consciousness is consciousness of…But every experience is itself experienced, and to that 
extent also ‘conscious’” (1991, 91). Or, even more succinctly, “every act is consciousness 
of something, but there is also consciousness of every act” (ibid., 126). 
This is the phenomenological mechanism by which the possibility for self-
consciousness – the experience of the self – is established. The duality in the subject’s 
perspective on the world, in its subjective first-personal givenness and in the objectivity 
of the detached third-personal act of reflection, is therefore the result of the same 
twofold structure of the intentional act by which the subject is both the first-personal 
ground of experience and the object of perception that emerges as part of the intentional 
act when, in an act of reflection, an intentional act is itself taken as the object of a second 
intentional act (that is, when I reflect about my own thoughts, thereby making my own 
thinking self the object of my reflective intentional act). This is a point I shall return to in 
section 8.2.1, in mapping out the phenomenological move between ludic subjectivity as 
consciousness of the gameworld, and the resulting ludic self as the ‘I’ that is brought into 
the player’s consciousness as a self-perception.  
 
3.2.3 The twofold structure as applied to games 
This twofold phenomenal structure of subjectivity cannot but find a reflection in an 
approach to ludic experience. The intentional structure I have used to conceptualize the 
player’s experience of the game – by which the gameworld and the ludic subject come 
into view at opposite ends of the vector of intentional experience – already implies a 
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transcendental leap beyond the pure phenomenal fact of the experience in both 
directions; as soon as we speak of either the ludic subject or the gameworld as actual 
entities existing independently of the player’s experience, we are already in the third-
person perspective. 
 However, to stop here would be simply to suggest that the normal 
phenomenological structure of experience applies to the player’s experience of the 
gameworld just as it applies to any other category of experience. While this is undeniably 
true, it also reveals little about the specific phenomenal character of ludic experience. The 
claim I wish to make is that, thanks to the double perspectival structure of ludic 
engagement which I outlined in section 2.4, this general twofold structure of subjective 
experience is captured by, and enshrined within, the formal structure of the game. It shall 
be my argument that games enact this twofold structure in a particularly foregrounded 
manner. Games re-present to the player her own subjective existence in the gameworld, 
establishing an experiential structure that crystallizes this twofold phenomenal 
perspective as the governing formal organization of player engagement, thereby not only 
operating in congruence with the general twofold phenomenal structure I have outlined, 
but also enshrining this double perspective on the world and the self as a significant 
aesthetic element.  
This, in turn, shall serve as one of the cornerstones of the model I shall propose 
for the player’s subjective engagement with games, insofar as it enables a relation 
between the player and the ludic subject which I shall define as being simultaneously 
subjective and objective. In section 8.2, I shall return to the question of consciousness of the 
self as it has been tackled in phenomenology, using this as the foundation for an 
argument that the player’s relation to the ludic subject presents us with a foregrounded 
awareness of precisely this phenomenological mechanism. 
First, however, it is necessary to anchor a conceptualization of ludic experience in 
a rigorously worked-through understanding of direct, first-order experience – that which, 
within the double perspectival structure, pertains to the internal perspective, and thus to 
the ludic subject. As the demonstration of the intentional structure of consciousness has 
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made apparent, such an understanding needs to be the product of two lines of analysis: 
one investigating the perceiving subject, and the other the perceived world. The first of 
these – the conceptual analysis of ludic subjectivity – is the overarching theme of this 
study as a whole, and shall be tackled methodically over the course of the chapters to 
follow. In order to provide the necessary context for it – by clarifying the opposite pole 
of intentional experience - I shall, over the remaining sections of this chapter, lay out the 
multiple interlocking dimensions of the gameworld as a phenomenal world.  
 
3.3 The gameworld as lifeworld 
 
Though phenomenology is the study of consciousness, it does not, as I have already 
observed, frame the conscious subject as a radically isolated Cartesian cogito. On the 
contrary, consciousness is grasped in its engagement with a world it is consciousness of – 
as Ricoeur writes, Husserl’s subject “is not at all outside the world but is, on the contrary, 
the foundation of the world” (1967, 49). We might even go so far as to reframe 
phenomenology as the study of the manner in which a perceptual world is established. 
Husserl explicitly states as much:  
Elucidating in their entirety the interwoven [Ineinander] achievements of 
consciousness which lead to the constitution of a possible world – a possible 
world: this means that what is at issue is the essential form of world in general 
and not just our factual, actual world – this is the comprehensive task of 
constitutive phenomenology. (Husserl 1973[1939], 50) 
The notion of the ‘world,’ then, is clearly foundational for phenomenology’s grasp of the 
subject. It is on the foundation of this aspect of Husserl’s thought that Martin Heidegger 
would go on to define human Being, the particular mode of being that pertains to 
humanity, as Dasein (Being-there), or, even more tellingly, “Being-in-the-world” 
(2008[1927], 78[H.53]. The mode of existence that pertains to us as sentient beings is 
characterized by a “geworfenheit” (thrownness) into the world (ibid., 174[H.135]): we 
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cannot choose but be worldly beings, finding ourselves always already, prior to any 
reflective or critical thought, oriented towards the world we are members of.  
 
3.3.1 ‘World’ as the ground of perception 
The world that phenomenology is concerned with, then, is the world as it exists for a 
subject. However, this still requires us to clarify what the world is for a subject: in other 
words, to identify the formal and experiential structures of ‘worldness’ as a sphere of 
intentional consciousness. Husserl offers a clarification we can use as a starting-point: 
“the World is the totality of objects that can be known through experience (Erfahrung), 
known in terms of orderly theoretical thought on the basis of direct present (aktueller) 
experience” (2012[1931], 10).  
 This framing reveals a fundamental interrelation of perceived world and 
perceiving subject, to the extent that one cannot be thought without the other: the world 
only exists as world insofar as it constitutes an experiential unity for a subject, while – 
given that, for phenomenology, there is no such thing as an empty, or objectless, thought 
– subjective consciousness can only be thought insofar as it intends the objects of a 
world. Moreover – as would be rendered more evident by Merleau-Ponty (2002[1945]), 
and as I will discuss at greater length in Chapter 5 - the subject is not a free-floating 
consciousness but an embodied one, and it is the body that defines the subject-position 
around which one’s world is perceptually brought into being: “perception is the bodily 
perspective or situation from which the world is present to us and constituted in an 
always particular and biased meaning” (Sobchack 1999, 40).  
 The world, then, is what the subject always finds around herself.  It emerges as a 
synthesis of the subject’s individual intentional acts of perception, and subsumes the 
objects intended by these acts into a spatially and temporally ordered, unified whole 
(hence Husserl’s reference to “orderly theoretical thought” in the above quote), 
providing the ground by which separate intentional acts can open onto the same, 
continuous (in both spatial and temporal dimensions) arrangement of objects: 
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I find myself at all times, and without my ever being able to change this, set in 
relation to a world which, through its constant changes, remains one and ever the 
same. It is continually “present” for me, and I myself am a member of it. 
(Husserl 2012[1913], 53) 
The individual intentional act – which, by its nature, intends one definite object – 
therefore opens onto the world; but the divide between the object(s) of perception and 
the perceptual world they constitute is not bridged simply through an aggregation of 
individual intentional perceptions. It is not the case that the subject first has an intuition 
relating to an isolated, unworlded object, and then another such intuition, and another, 
until enough has been intuited to somehow coalesce into a world. On the contrary, from 
the very start, our experiences are of objects in a world. If I am perceptually aware of the 
Minecraft-tree as it stands before me, I have focused on the tree and isolated it as a 
discrete object of perception. However, I do not, no matter how focused I am in my 
intentional gaze, perceive the tree in isolation, but always as occupying a particular 
spatiotemporal location within the Minecraft-world. This is not to say that my experience 
intends the tree and, at the same time, intends the world in which the tree is located as a 
simultaneous, definite intentional object. Rather, it is an intrinsic aspect of my experience 
of the tree that I experience it as a thing in the world – Merleau-Ponty terms this the 
“object-horizon structure” of perception (2002[1945], 79). The subject’s intentional 
experiences are always already worldly experiences – any experience of an object is always an 
experience of an object-in-the-world, and it is only against the always-already-there 
ground of the world, as the accretion of prior experiences and knowledge into a broad 
cognitive field, that an object can emerge to perception as a distinct figure. 
 
3.3.2 ‘World’ as lifeworld 
Having already established the link between individual intuition and world in one 
direction (by showing how the subject’s intuition of things leads to an intuition of the 
world), this would appear to also make a case for the reverse: that is, for the idea that 
intuitions of things are in fact conditioned by their context within the world (or the 
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specific perspective on the world) as it always already exists for the subject. This is a 
notion Husserl considers through a modification of the experiential world into the 
notion of the Lebenswelt, or lifeworld (Husserl 1970[1936]).  
As Zahavi notes, “Husserl’s concept is equivocal, and the precise meaning of the 
term depends on the context” (2003, 129). At points it seems to refer simply to the first-
personal world of direct intentional experience that we have already identified; in this 
sense, lifeworld refers to the world of lived experience, the sphere of perception and of 
existential praxis within which the subject’s being takes place as a being-in-the-world. At 
a base level, then, lifeworld refers to the world as lived, the horizon against which all things 
gain their meaning within the practices of a lived existence. In experiential terms, this is 
the primary dimension of ‘worldness,’ in that it refers precisely to the world as it appears 
as the ground for all experience from what Husserl terms the “natural standpoint” of 
everyday life (2012[1931], 51). The framing of the gameworld as a lifeworld for the 
player, then, refers to this basic experiential and existential sense of ‘world,’ which 
involves the inextricable intermeshing of subject and world that characterizes the 
phenomenal understanding of consciousness. As Merleau-Ponty writes, the subject, 
conceived as a being-in-the-world: 
…constructs or constitutes this world itself […] since the transactions between 
the subject and the things round about it are possible only provided that the 
subject first of all causes them to exist for itself, actually arranges them about 
itself. (2002[1945], 431) 
It is for this reason that the investigation of the ‘world’ in the phenomenal sense is the 
necessary first step in arriving at the ‘being’ that has ‘in-the-world’ as its character. As 
such, the investigation into the game as a lifeworld shall prove inseparable from the 
investigations into ludic subjectivity that shall take place in later chapters. 
However, Husserl also adds a crucial dimension that modifies our understanding 
of the lifeworld through highlighting its social and historical dimensions (1970[1936], 
108-109). This enrichment of the concept accounts for the fact that our subjective 
understanding of the world is not a product of ‘pure’ intentional experiences (if such a 
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thing were even thinkable), but is instead shaped by our situatedness – the reference I am 
making, with this term, to Jean-Paul Sartre’s notion of situation (1966[1943, 619) is 
intentional, and will be picked up on in section 5.3.3. The way in which we perceive 
things – even what things we perceive – is determined by the particular and biased 
perspective formed by our previous experience, as well as by the social conventions and 
the historical episteme within which we exist.   
A mundane example can illustrate the point. I perceive a knife, intuitively and 
unreflectively, as a knife – I do not first have a sensory perception of an object with a 
certain shape, etc., and then, in reflection, attribute a purpose to it and therefore classify 
it under the concept of ‘knife,’ but rather intuit it immediately as a knife. However, even 
such an unremarkable intuition is only possible because ‘knife’ is something for which 
my lifeworld provides me with a ready concept, placing it in various kinds of relation to 
other defined things in the world (a relation of shared membership of the ontological 
category ‘cutlery’ with forks, spoons, etc.; a functional relation to an object such as bread, 
which it is used to slice, etc.) and thereby locating it within the fabric of the lifeworld.    
 All of this indicates that, as much as the lifeworld constitutes the prereflective 
world of lived, first-person experience encountered out there, direct, present intentional 
experience cannot be divorced from the systems of knowledge that give it shape. This 
requires us to look at another sense of ‘world’ that emerges from a phenomenological 
investigation of the concept: that is, the ordered, logical system I shall term the cosmos.  
 
3.4 The gameworld as cosmos 
 
It is vital to stress the point that, as the “prescientific world of experience” (Zahavi 2003, 
125), the lifeworld is not itself available as an object of thought. It is not an ordered, 
theoretical abstraction, nor even a distinct perceptual whole around which borders can be 
drawn. As mapped out by the praxis of prereflective existence, it remains not an 
intuition, but the background that gives shape and context to our intuitions.  
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At the same time, it is certainly possible for me, for instance, to think to myself, 
“What a wonderful world” – which implies an intentional act which intends the world (as 
object) for me, as a distinct thing which has the quality of being wonderful. This is 
already enough to reveal the fact that the world can, itself, become the object of a 
reflective act, thereby being granted shape, form and quality. It also hints at the necessary 
shift into a reflexive, third-person perspective that implies a detachment from the first-
personal stream of lived experience – a point I have already discussed in considering the 
twofold structure of subjective experience. In short, what I am judging here as 
“wonderful” is my experience of the world, from which, in making it the object of a 
reflexive intentional act, I am detached. 
 But an objective grasp of the world does not stop at merely attributing this or 
that quality to it. Rather, what it represents is the possibility to move into the register of 
ontology. Taken to the extreme, it results in the positing of a cosmos – which, traced to its 
ancient Greek root as κόσμος, refers to “a complete, integrated system of phenomena 
governed by some coherent scheme of rules” (Nash 1987, 8). 
 Such is the shape taken by the ‘world’ if it is represented as an object of thought, 
that is, as the object of an intentional act in itself, rather than as the ground for the 
perception of a thing-in-the-world. How can such an intentional representation of the 
‘world’ be achieved? In order to answer this question, I shall return to a point of 
Husserl’s which I have already drawn attention to – namely, that the world emerges as a 
distinct figure only through “orderly theoretical thought on the basis of direct present 
(aktueller) experience” (2012[1931], 10). Direct, first-personal experience of the world, 
bearing the intentional structure I have laid out in the analysis of the perception of the 
thing-in-the-world, is primary: the world as cosmos, as an ordered, meaningful sphere, can 
only be given to the subject by means of “orderly theoretical thought” working on the 
raw material of direct, first-order experience of the world. Cosmos, then, emerges in a 
transcendental leap from the experiential lifeworld in which it is rooted.   
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3.4.1 Cosmology as an ontology 
The cosmos is a closed set – a complete, bounded arrangement of constituent entities. 
Moreover, these entities – and the relations between them – are governed by a unifying 
principle of order or logos.3 Such, for instance, is the world as it is framed by science, 
where, at the limit point, everything can eventually be reduced to an explication in the 
language of physics. Such is also – to stick to a philosophical register – the ‘world’ as 
understood as a conceptual entity within analytic philosophy, where the notion of cosmos 
comes to the fore (Lewis 1986). 
  A cosmic representation of the world – that of science as much as that of 
religion or myth – has little to do with the world of lived experience, claiming to describe 
a more fundamental order of reality. However, it is in the nature of the cosmos to shape 
the lifeworld against which it sets itself. As Zahavi notes, “science is founded on the 
lifeworld, and will sink down into the ground it is standing on […] theoretical 
assumptions are assimilated into daily praxis, becoming part of the lifeworld” (2003, 
130). If my scientific knowledge has led me to include bacteria and other germs within 
my cosmic understanding of the world, for example, I am likely to be suspicious of the 
water of a clear mountain spring I encounter while walking, even if it appears perfectly 
clean and no germs are given to me in direct intentional experience. In such a case, the 
nature of my direct, first-order intentional experience of the spring water – as ‘potentially 
dangerous’ rather than ‘clean and safe’ – would have been shaped by my cosmic 
understanding of the world. 
 This suggests a more complicated perspective on the relation between lifeworld 
and cosmos: it is not simply a case of the lifeworld being represented as cosmos, but, at the 
same time, cosmos is what shapes the experience of the lifeworld: “in order to conceive an 
object one must rely on a previously constructed ‘world of thought’”(Merleau-Ponty 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 It should not escape attention that this notion of cosmos aligns with the understanding of the artwork 
under the “representative regime of art” as defined by Rancière (2009). In section 2.1.3, I made the 
observation that, under this regime, the artwork is both the product and expression of a logos that serves as 
its organizing principle. A cosmic understanding of world and of the artwork, then, are closely linked, as 
shall become more evident when we move on to a consideration of the heterocosm, or the world of the 
artwork.    
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2002[1945], 158). I have addressed the lifeworld as primary, and the point needs to be 
stressed: in constituting that which is immediately available to direct intuition, the lifeworld is the 
world for us, the world we encounter as ‘world’. At the same time, at the moment when a 
reflective distance is taken from our first-person experience of the world and a cosmos 
established in order to explain that world of experience, this cosmos sinks back into, and 
becomes inextricable from, our lifeworld as experienced.   
‘World,’ then, is revealed in its essential paradox. It encompasses both the closure 
and totality of the ordered system and the openness of the indefinite ground, both cosmos 
and lifeworld. More accurately, it is what emerges in between the two: both the existential 
sphere mapped out through the prereflective praxis of being-in-the world and the 
formally ordered sphere of transcendental reflection. Cosmos and lifeworld are, in fact, 
interlinked, and should be thought of in unison, two sides of the same coin.  
 
3.4.2 The interpretation of the gameworld 
If direct experience of the gameworld, as resulting from the player’s existential praxis as a 
ludic subject within it, coalesces into the form of the lifeworld, and if, following the 
phenomenal mechanisms I have just outlined, it is by an interpretative movement 
founded upon this direct experience that a cosmology can be arrived at, then the next 
task that presents itself is that of accounting for the operations of such an interpretative 
movement in relation to the player’s lived experience of the gameworld. In other words: 
by what process does the player’s subjective experiential engagement of the gameworld 
lead her to form transcendental, objective knowledge of the gameworld?  
 In the development of the double perspectival structure of ludic engagement in 
section 2.4, it became apparent that the move between the internal and the external 
perspective implied, on one of its levels, precisely such a shift between a worldly 
perspective on the game (a perspective we have now concretized into the notion of the 
game as lifeworld) and an artifactual perspective according to which the game is 
understood as a bounded object with a defined structure and formal properties – one, 
moreover, that can be approached textually. Torben Grodal’s distinction between the 
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perspective of the “game as an experiential route” and that of the “game as a map or 
system” (2003, 144) is particularly indicative here: the move between the two is 
accomplished through the player’s drive towards mastery, in the sense of total knowledge 
obtained through play.  
 As such, tracing the move toward a cosmic understanding of the gameworld 
requires a theory built around Espen Aarseth’s observation of a “real-time hermeneutics” 
at work in games, consisting of “analysis practiced as performance, with direct feedback 
from the system” (2003, 5). This has been the starting-point for a number of approaches 
towards a hermeneutics of games (Arjoranta 2011; Karhulahti 2012). The most rigorous 
development of the idea, however, can be found in Dominic Arsenault and Bernard 
Perron’s proposal of a heuristic “magic cycle” of ludic engagement (2009, 113). The 
development of the model starts with the observation that, at a radical level, ludic 
engagement can be understood as a feedback loop, a notion they trace across a number 
of earlier writings (Crawford 2003; Heaton 2006; Cook 2007). In short: the player 
perceives the game’s audiovisual output and, on this basis, builds a mental model of the 
inner workings of the game; acting upon this model, she then provides her input to the 
game, which, in turn, generates new audiovisual output, which gives her more 
information about the game, which allows her to improve her mental model and provide 
better input, and so on.  
 Arsenault and Perron frame the magic cycle as consisting of three interlocking 
heuristic spirals. The first, and primary spiral is that of gameplay: this relates to knowledge 
of the game system itself (2009, 115-117). Second, the narrative spiral describes the 
player’s piecing-together of information regarding the game’s diegetic (or, to retain the 
term I have been using, heterocosmic) dimension. Finally, the hermeneutic spiral refers to 
the player’s efforts to interpret an overall thematic significance to the experience of the 
game – it is telling that the example Arsenault and Perron provide is the same reading of 
Tetris (Pajitnov 1984) by Janet Murray (1998, 144) that, as I noted in section 2.4, was also 
discussed by Markku Eskelinen (2001) and Sebastian Möring (2013, 229).  
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 The hermeneutic spiral, describing, as it does, a textual mode of engagement, 
relates to the artifactual dimension of ludic experience associated with the external 
perspective, and, as such, I shall not tackle it at this juncture of the investigation. The 
first two spirals, on the other hand, are embedded in gameworld experience – as Möring 
notes, they describe “a kind of existential hermeneutic which is concerned with being in 
and coping with a world in a Heideggerean sense,” and which, as a result, “does not 
make the process of playing its object but is the process of playing the game” (ibid., 305). 
Two directions in which gameworld experience can open onto a cosmic understanding 
are thereby revealed in the gameplay and narrative spirals – firstly, in the direction of the 
understanding of the gameworld as operating according to an underlying game system, 
and, secondly, in the framing of the gameworld as a window onto a heterocosm or 
represented textual world.  I shall not cover these in detail – each could be the basis of an 
investigation of much greater scope than the current one. However, given that both of 
these are essential to understanding not only ludic experience, but also, as a consequence, 
the ludic subject, I shall present a brief summary of how the player’s lived experience of 
the gameworld is interpreted into, and, in turn, is shaped by, these two cosmological 
frames. 
 
3.4.3 The gameworld and the game-system 
The notion of games as systems represents arguably the dominant line of thought in 
discussing the ontology of games within game studies. Katie Salen and Eric Zimmerman 
argued that “all games can be understood as systems” (2004, 50), with system being 
defined as “a set of parts that interrelate to form a complex whole” (ibid, 55). A distinct 
analytical paradigm has emerged within game studies that takes up Salen and 
Zimmerman’s suggestion and adopts a perspective according to which, as Miguel Sicart 
observes, “formal [game] analysis is understood as descriptions of game components that 
can be discerned from others by means of their unique characteristics and properties” 
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(2008) – a representative, but by no means exhaustive, list would include Zagal et al. 
2005; Consalvo and Dutton 2006; Bogost 2006;4 and Järvinen 2008.5 
While these game-ontological approaches present us with a way of 
conceptualizing the gameworld as an ordered system, they do not account for the 
cognitive processes by which direct gameworld experience can open onto such an 
understanding. The gameworld is not intended in the player’s direct consciousness of it 
in the form of such a system. As noted in section 3.1.1 above, the perception of the 
thing-in-the-gameworld is the basic unit of gameworld experience which any 
phenomenological account must take as its starting-point. Extending such a 
phenomenology in the direction of a cosmic understanding of the game-as-system 
requires an answer to the question of how the player takes the leap from a cognition of 
the thing-in-the-gameworld, such as the Minecraft-tree and the Minecraft-creeper, to a 
conception of these things as components of an overarching game system.  
I shall proceed by way of an example. As her first night in Minecraft falls, a novice 
player might see a creature approaching to which she cannot yet give the name ‘creeper’. 
Given the fact that the player always brings a ready-made set of preconceptions and 
expectations to bear upon her experience of a new game, she is likely, at first sight, to 
make a set of assumptions regarding this entity. The zombielike appearance of this 
strange creature – again, drawing on the player’s pre-existing familiarity with the genre of 
zombie fiction in general, and the appropriation of this generic iconography by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 I must justify the inclusion of Bogost’s theory within a roll-call of systemic approaches to game analysis 
when it is in fact explicitly positioned as an alternative (and a corrective) to such approaches. In contrast to 
existing perspectives that subsume the individual components – or “units”, in Bogost’s term – to the 
operations of an overarching system, Bogost argues that our perspective should be bottom-up rather than 
top-down: “unit operations are modes of meaning-making that privilege discrete, disconnected actions 
over deterministic, progressive systems” (2006, 3). However, the extent to which this constitutes a break 
with the systems-theoretical approach to game ontology is perhaps overstated, and seems to imply more of 
a shift in focus than a radical ontological overhaul: there seems to be little to separate Bogost’s description 
of the text as a set of discrete units from Salen and Zimmerman’s framing of the game system as being 
composed of “a set of parts that interrelate to form a complex whole” (2004, 55). 
5 In the form of “proceduralism,” the game-ontological approach has also encroached onto what Arsenault 
and Perron would identify as the domain of the hermeneutic cycle, insofar as the approach of 
proceduralism which takes the game-ontological understanding as its ground frames the systemic ontology 
of games “not just as an ontological marker of computer games, but as the specific way in which computer 
games build discourses of ethical, political, social and aesthetic value” (Sicart 2010).   	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videogames in particular (Backe and Aarseth 2013) – is likely to mark its belonging to the 
category of entities in the gameworld that can be grouped under the label ‘enemy’. 
According to her expectations of how ‘enemies,’ as a general category of game 
components, function in games, the player thereby supposes that this creature poses a 
threat, but also that it can be fought and destroyed. More specifically, applying the 
paradigm of ‘zombie’ nuances this preconception, suggesting what kind of an ‘enemy’ 
this entity is going to be in terms of its patterns of behaviour – which appears to be 
corroborated by the player’s observation of its slow movement and relentless, straight-
line march towards her.  
 Having just crafted herself a basic wooden sword, the player might decide to test 
out these hypotheses by running up to the creature and attacking it with her sword. Here, 
the player will find some of her preconceptions confirmed: for instance, she perceives, 
on the basis of visual feedback that, again, she is able to interpret in the context of her 
pre-existing knowledge of videogame conventions (the strange creature flashes red for a 
brief span of time after being hit), that her sword-swings are causing damage to the 
strange creature. At the same time, she might be surprised to find that other expectations 
are not met: namely, that the creature, initially, does not appear to retaliate. In the next 
moment, then, something happens for which the player’s preconceptions did not prepare 
her: namely, the strange creature explodes, catching the playable figure in its blast radius 
and resulting in a great deal of damage being dealt. 
 The player might be lucky enough to survive the encounter, albeit with a severely 
depleted health bar. Following the structure of the heuristic feedback loop of Arsenault 
and Perron’s gameplay spiral, it can be said that the player’s action – that of engaging the 
creeper in melee combat – has resulted in extremely negative feedback; nonetheless, this 
feedback is instructive. On the basis of this encounter, the player redraws her conception 
of the creeper as a game component – that is, of the role it plays within the game system. 
Retaining its categorization as an ‘enemy,’ her understanding of the creeper-as-game-
component will include the fact that it detonates if in close proximity to the player, that, 
as a result, it is best avoided or engaged with ranged attacks, and so on.   
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Of course, to make a point which might sound obvious, but which is nonetheless 
crucial, game-systemic interpretation can only happen against the background of the 
player’s preconception that what she is seeing is in fact governed by an underlying game 
system. I shall give an example from Proteus (Key and Kanaga 2013). While wandering the 
landscapes of Proteus’ gameworld, the player will encounter a variety of creatures: flocks 
of chicken-like birds, gatherings of crabs, and so on. At this point, the player, expecting 
some form of consequence to these creatures as game components – perhaps granting a 
collectible item or some other form of reward if caught, or, at the very least, giving some 
visual feedback to being interacted with – the player is likely to attempt to interact with 
these creatures. She might, for example, try walking up to them, chasing them, or 
standing in their proximity. Eventually, however, she will be forced to conclude that the 
creatures are of no relevance to the game system of Proteus. However, the expectation 
that the creatures should afford some kind of interaction – that there should be some 
game mechanic related to them, or that they should have some form of significance in 
the game system – is not something that is suggested by the creatures themselves, in their 
phenomenal appearance as things-in-the-gameworld, but is the result of the presumption 
that there is in fact a game system, and that all the objects and entities encountered in the 
game should be members of this system, subsumed to its logic.  
 The notion of the ‘game component,’ then, accounts not only for the shape that 
the thing-in-the-gameworld is given when direct, first-order experience of it is worked 
upon through the interpretative frame of the game-as-system, but also, in the opposite 
direction, for the way in which this cosmic understanding is recaptured within the 
gameworld-as-lifeworld. To return to the Minecraft example, once the player has, based 
upon her direct experience of one or more creepers, interpreted a particular game-
systemic understanding of the creeper, she is likely, upon encountering more creepers in 
her further engagement with the game – in Arsenault and Perron’s parlance, in further 
iterations of the heuristic gameplay spiral - to frame her perceptions through her 
understanding of this game component, and to shape her behaviour towards it 
accordingly.  
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At the same time, there is also a danger attendant upon the attempt at 
incorporating the notion of the game as system into a phenomenology of the gameworld 
– this is what might be termed the representational fallacy. By this understanding, the 
gameworld comes to be taken merely as a surface representation to be ‘read through’ in 
order to arrive at a glimpse of the underlying system. A link can be made between this 
position and Jesper Juul’s argument that the game’s representational dimension (what 
Juul calls, problematically, its “fiction”)6 plays the role of making the game system 
comprehensible to the player (2005, 163). Kristine Jørgensen makes a similar point when 
she says the gameworld is: 
…the interface between the player and the game system and for this reason is 
also a representative of the game system […] The gameworld integrates the 
abstract game rules into an environment where they may be contextualized 
spatially, and it allows the player to think about the game in terms of a rule 
system. (2013, 57) 
However, such a Platonism of the gameworld is not compatible with an epistemological 
focus on the game as played. At the basis of the player’s experience of the gameworld as 
world is the fact that the things of the gameworld appear to her precisely as things with 
which she shares a world. Since it is never the game system itself which is framed as the 
intentional object of the player’s act of perception, it is only on the basis of a second-
order, transcendental deduction on the basis of lived experience of the gameworld that 
such a game-systemic understanding can be posited. As such, given that it is the first-
order perception of the game-as-lifeworld that constitutes the primary dimension of the 
player’s experience, the cosmology of the game-system can only form part of a 
phenomenology of the gameworld in a way which does not frame it as superseding first-
order experience of the gameworld, but, rather, allows it to be reincorporated into the 
lived experience of the gameworld upon which it was, in the first place, established.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Recall here the point made in section 1.5 – and also raised by Aarseth (2014a) that it is a mistake to 
equate a game’s representational dimension with fictionality, when it can equally be used for documentary 
or otherwise non-fictional representation. 
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 Such an understanding is also what allows for the linking of multiple cosmic 
frames of reference in the common denominator of the player’s gameworld experience. 
The player’s intuition of the Miencraft creeper will, as I have noted, inevitably be shaped 
by her understanding of it as a game component operating within the logic of a game 
system; but, since it is the perception of the orc as a worldly entity that remains primary, 
this perception can also admit to other significations. As such, it is time to move to the 
other cosmic frame through which the gameworld can be interpreted – that of the game 
as a heterocosm. 
 
3.4.4 The notion of the heterocosm 
The link between the notion of cosmos as an ordered, formal sphere, and that of the 
textual heterocosm is a crucial one. Marie-Laure Ryan suggests that for the “semantic 
domain” of a text to cohere into a world, it needs to be perceived precisely in the form a 
cosmos (2001a, 91). Christopher Nash has noted the extent to which conventional, 
mimetic poetics in the Aristotelian tradition depend upon precisely such a notion of the 
textual world as a cosmos (1987, 8). 
 It is this understanding which defines the notion of the heterocosm. The idea was 
first introduced in the writings of Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, where it referred to 
situations in which the artist’s act of “secondary creation” veered away from 
representation of the “primary world” and towards the construction of a markedly 
different new world (1954[1735]). Later critics, particularly in the field of literary theory, 
have extended its usage to refer to any textually-established ‘second nature’, no matter 
what truth-claim it makes or refuses to make in relation to the actual world of experience 
(Abrams 1971a; Ruthven 1984; Doležel 1998; Ryan 1991; 2001a).7 
Theorizations of the textual heterocosm have emphasized its cosmic character – 
that is, in the words of the Earl of Shaftesbury, the fact that the world of the text “forms 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Here, we can trace a line back to Cicero’s claim that, through the imposition of work upon the world, “by 
means of our hands we essay to create as it were a second world within the world of nature” (1933, II.60, 
271) – and indeed an alternative term for the same phenomenon within literary criticism is “secondary 
world” (Tolkien 1964; Auden 1968). I choose to privilege the term heterocosm over this alternative because it 
avoids the subordinating ontological hierarchy implicit in the usage of the world “secondary”.	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a whole, coherent and proportioned in itself” (1773, I, 207). Even more explicitly, Johan 
Wolfgang von Goethe suggested that the artwork “creates a little world of its own, in 
which all proceeds according to fixed laws, which must be judged by its own laws, felt 
according to its own spirit” (1845, 122).8 Just like the game system, then, the heterocosm, 
contained as it is within the text by which it is upheld, is met with the expectation that its 
disparate elements cohere into a meaningful whole according to the conventionalized 
rules of narrative, representation and form,9 and that the heterocosm constitutes a 
comprehensible unity for the recipient of the artwork.  
As a basic point, it is in the nature of the heterocosm that it is a textual world, 
and, as such, it is “accessed through semiotic channels” (Doležel 1998, 20). Upon this 
foundation, attempts at setting up ontologies for textual worlds, such as that proposed by 
Thomas Pavel (1986), have expressed the position that such worlds can be understood as 
being constituted of a set of textual propositions. The reader’s understanding of, for 
instance, the heterocosm of Susan Hill’s The Woman in Black (2011[1983]) is generated 
through the gradual accumulation of factual propositions about that world. For example: 
1. Alice Drablow lived in Eel Marsh House. 
2. Eel Marsh House stands at the end of Nine Lives Causeway. 
3. Nine Lives Causeway is only usable at low tide.  
…and so on. It should be immediately evident that calling such an accumulation of 
textual propositions a ‘world’ implies some form of major cognitive – not to mention 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 In this light, Kristine Jørgensen’s assertion that gameworlds cannot be equated to the worlds established 
by narrative texts because the former “follow the logics of specific game mechanics” rather than accurately 
representing the physical laws we recognize as pertaining to the actual world (2013, 60) comes to seem 
particularly dubious. 
9	  This is of course not to say that this expectation cannot be frustrated by works that refuse to adhere to 
this understanding of the coherent heterocosm. Nash has highlighted a tradition of what he terms 
“anticosmic” literature, typified by the works of Samuel Beckett and Alain Robbe-Grillet, which pointedly 
refuse to engage in the establishment of a coherent textual domain (1987, 98). An interesting project for 
future work would be that of attempting to identify games operating in a similar anticosmic mode, that is, 
breaking down the expectation of an ordered cosmos they themselves establish. One might be tempted to 
think, for instance, of sequences in games such as Max Payne (Remedy Entertainment 2001), Eternal 
Darkness: Sanity’s Requiem (Silicon Knights 2002) or Batman: Arkham Asylum (Rocksteady Studios 2009) that 
are specifically coded as ‘hallucinations’ (incidentally a point which I shall return to in section 7.2.8, in 
establishing ‘character perspective’ as a dimension of the ludic subject-position as the perspective the 
player is granted upon the gameworld), and in which the order of the game’s cosmos is temporarily 
suspended.	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ontological - leap. The Woman in Black tells us nothing about its world outside of precisely 
three geographical loci – the manor house Monk’s Piece (its precise location is never 
specified), London and the market town of Crythin Gifford. Even these locations are 
hardly presented in minute and complete detail. As a world, then, the heterocosm is 
ontologically limited - both in the sense of occupying restricted bounds, and of not being 
mapped, even within these narrow confines, in maximal detail. This makes textual 
worlds, to quote Umberto Eco, “‘small worlds’ which bracket most of our competence 
of the actual world and allow us to concentrate on a finite, enclosed world, very similar 
to ours but ontologically poorer” (1994, 85). 
However, it is in the nature of the heterocosmic work to establish a fundamental 
distinction between its own textuality and the heterocosm upon which it throws open a 
window. As Ryan writes: 
…the text is apprehended as a window on something that exists in time and 
space well beyond the window frame. To speak of a textual world means to draw 
a distinction between a realm of language, made of names, definite descriptions, 
sentences and propositions, and an extralinguistic realm of characters, objects, 
facts and states of affairs serving as referents to the linguistic expressions. (2001a, 
91)  
In the reception of the work, the heterocosm extends beyond the limited view the work 
provides: the landscape goes on beyond the frame of a painting, things happen in 
between the chapters of a novel, and so on. The recipient is always an active interpreter 
of the heterocosm: to make the world of The Woman in Black appear as a world on the 
basis of the scant information presented above, the reader needs to fill in the gaps, by 
drawing on her knowledge of the real world, as well as of the cultural and generic 
contexts within which the work locates itself (Ryan 1991, 54) – in the case of The Woman 
in Black, the Edwardian ghost story. This requirement that the recipient fill in the gaps 
resulting from the nature of the text as a “mixture of determinacy and indeterminacy” 
(Iser 1980, 24) renders the heterocosm a particularly foregrounded example of Roman 
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Ingarden’s point regarding the status of the aesthetic object as a “concretization” of the 
artwork in the mind of the recipient (1985, 93).   
 Ryan frames this concretized heterocosm, in its reception, as having four 
dimensions: “connected set of objects and individuals; habitable environment; reasonably 
intelligible totality for external observers; field of activity for its members” (2001a, 91). 
The first of these dimensions, connected set of objects and individuals, can be taken to relate to 
the ontology of the heterocosm insofar as it delineates it as consisting of a defined set of 
existents. The second and fourth dimensions, meanwhile, draw upon a 
phenomenological perspective in explaining the senses in which this set of existents can 
be perceived as a ‘world’ from an internal perspective. Finally, the third dimension 
describes the cosmic character of the heterocosm when perceived from an external 
perspective, that is, in the mode of textuality. 
 Aarseth draws a connection between such conceptualizations of the textual 
heterocosm and the worlds established by games, arguing that “games and stories seem 
to share a number of elements, namely a world, its agents, objects and events” (2012, 2). 
Just like the interpretation of gameworld experience into a cosmic understanding of the 
game-as-system, then, achieving a heterocosmic viewpoint upon the gameworld is the 
result of attaching a specific domain of significance to the things encountered in 
gameworld experience, taking each experience as a proposition regarding a represented 
world and filling in the gaps as required in order to concretize a heterocosmic domain.  
An important observation to be made is that, although both ‘game as system’ and 
‘game as heterocosm’ are ordered cosmoi that take root in direct experience of the 
gameworld, the terms are in no way coterminous. One way of framing the distinction 
between the heterocosmic and the game-systemic senses of the gameworld has been to 
think of the two as inherently separate, albeit potentially overlapping, spaces. In this vein, 
Juul argues that “a video game may project a world and the game may be played in only a 
part of this fictional world” (2005, 163). Aarseth writes that “a game can contain two types 
of space, the ludic and the extra-ludic, the arena of gameplay, and the surrounding non-
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playable space” (2012, 3). Jørgensen, similarly, argues that “the fictional world of a game 
must always be considered larger than the gameworld” (2013, 69).10  
 In all these cases, the picture that is painted is one of a central core of ludic space 
surrounded by an indeterminate fringe of ‘merely’ represented space, with the separation 
and organization of the two being entirely a matter of spatiality. The paradigmatic 
structure of such a bifurcated model of the ludic space would follow the lines of, for 
example, a 2D platform game such as Super Mario World (Nintendo 1990), where the 
single, two-dimensional plane of gameplay is shadowed by multiple parallax-scrolling 
layers of background scenery that give the represented heterocosm (but not the virtual 
environment) an implied three-dimensionality.  
 However, such a rigid spatial distinction is untenable: the ‘merely’ represented 
can infuse the virtual at every level. Aarseth observes of Return to Castle Wolfenstein (Gray 
Matter 2001) that the gameworld includes both doors that can be opened and walked 
through (in other words, that are modelled as elements of the game system), and doors 
that are only textures on the wall (that is, in a manner of speaking, only pictures of doors) 
(2007a, 3). While this might appear to be a small detail, it is in fact indicative of a 
fundamental ontological duality of the gameworld: once we start noticing such ‘merely’ 
represented elements in the gameworld, and using an analytical razor to sever them from 
the properly virtual, it is hard to know when to stop, or upon what level of granularity to 
operate. The door that opens, for example, is virtual, or to use another phrase Aarseth 
employs, “simulated” (ibid.), but the wood-grain texture on it (and, by extension, the 
door’s ‘woodenness’) is only represented – meaning that the door will be just as 
impervious to explosives as the concrete wall surrounding it. Moreover, though only the 
first door can be considered part of the game system, the doors have equal ontological 
status within the heterocosm. 
Instead of attempting to draw boundaries, then, it is more accurate to consider 
‘game as system’ and ‘game as heterocosm’ as superimposed ontological frames. Through 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 I shall again make the observation that it is more accurate in this situation to speak of ‘representation’ 
rather than ‘fiction.’ 
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the frame ‘game as system,’ one door is figured as an actual entity, while the other 
recedes into the background; through the frame ‘game as heterocosm’, both are actual 
doors, one unlocked, one locked. It is upon such a conceptualization of the relation 
between the two that they can be integrated on the level of direct lived experience of the 
gameworld. 
  
3.4.5 Integrating the systemic and the heterocosmic framings of the gameworld 
Contrary to the possibility of such an integration, game scholarship has tended to portray 
the two framings of the gameworld as standing in opposition. This has been evident as 
early in the history of the field as Thomas W. Malone’s distinction between intrinsic and 
extrinsic fantasy in computer games (1980, 56), as well as Gary Alan Fine’s suggestion that 
the tabletop role-playing activity could alternately be keyed through a “gaming frame” or 
a “fantasy frame” (1983, 205). 
 The problem with such an argument is that it succumbs, again, to a 
representational fallacy. Just as the understanding of the game as system that is relevant 
to ludic experience is not one in which the perceived thing-in-the-gameworld becomes 
transparent in the direction of the game component it represents, the heterocosmic 
frame should not be brought to bear upon gameworld experience in a way that renders it 
a mere prop in a game of make-believe (Walton 1990).  
In other words, the opposition of game system to ludic heterocosm is one which 
occurs at the level of second-order experience. However, to return to the plane of first-
order experience of the gameworld, which is that upon which this investigation is taking 
place, is to find that these two dimensions are not as experientially distinct as this 
conceptualization would suggest. Writing in the context of an analysis of Resident Evil 
Code: Veronica X (Capcom 2003), Susana Pajares Tosca argues: 
Once the game starts, we work at two levels […] Our mind is busy with the plot 
level and the action level at the same time. The first one, that we experience on 
the fly, can be narrated afterwards (it is tellable) and makes sense as a story 
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(complete with character motivation and feelings); the second is about solving 
action problems. (2003b, 211) 
Crucially, she adds, “when we say that both levels are “active” in our minds at the same 
time, we don’t mean that they are as clearly separated as here” (ibid.). A different way of 
stating this would be to say that, in the internal perspective – from the point-of-view of 
the ludic subject – the game system and the heterocosm both shape, and are 
experientially united in, the gameworld as lifeworld.  
As an example, consider the fact that, at higher difficulty levels, a number of 
missions in Thief: The Dark Project (Looking Glass Studios 1998) place a restriction upon 
the player: that of not murdering any civilian witnesses, or, in some cases, that of not 
murdering anyone at all, and using only non-lethal takedown methods. The significance 
of this in terms of the game system is clear: as an artificial restriction upon the 
affordances available to the player, it adheres to the understanding that the imposition of 
“less efficient means” is one of the essential characteristics of games (Suits 1990, 54-
55). It would be easier for the player to complete the mission by using lethal force – say, 
using an arrow to kill a witness before they can raise the alarm, or bring out a sword 
when cornered by a guard. Restricting these options increases the challenge by forcing 
the player to use more difficult methods of achieving her goal: for instance, instead of 
killing the witness with an arrow, she might have to time a series of dashes between 
shadowy alcoves just as the witness looks the other way in order to escape unnoticed.  
And yet, this explanation of the events in question, without the support of the 
heterocosmic frame, is inadequate. To state the obvious: even the basic distinction 
between lethal and non-lethal methods of incapacitating a non-player character 
represents a departure from purely ludic signification. For the term ‘murder’ to even be 
comprehensible in this context, it is necessary to maintain the pretense that this game 
component before us is a representation of a human individual in a represented world, 
and that certain ludic actions performed upon this game component in order to change 
its state represent murder while others - such as using a blackjack to deliver a blow to the 
back of the head - represent ‘mere’ non-lethal violence.  
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It is amply clear that ‘game as system’ and ‘game as heterocosm’ are not to be 
understood as alternatives, but as complementary interpretative frames that can be 
brought to bear upon the player’s gameworld experience. Both imply a second-order 
artifactual framing of this experience and, as such, a stepping-back into the external 
perspective; however, at the same time, both also bleed back into, and determine, the 
form the game takes as a lifeworld for the player, which remains the primary dimension 
of ludic experience. While choosing which sniper rifle to equip during a mission in Mass 
Effect (Bioware 2007), a player might decide on the Naginata rather than the Equalizer, on 
the basis that, while the Equalizer has a higher damage rating, the Naginata’s higher 
accuracy rating makes it more effective in use. For the same mission, the player might 
have opted to choose Liara as one of her two squad mates out of the range of possible 
party members, taking this decision purely on the basis that she likes Liara as a character 
and enjoys her company. In analytical terms, the first decision can be said to be taken 
through the frame of the game as system, while the second is taken through the frame of 
the game as heterocosm. In practice, however, both are decisions taken on the 
experiential plane of the game-as-lifeworld. On this plane, ludic and extra-ludic 
considerations intertwine within the network of significations and motivations that give 
shape and meaning to the existential sphere to which the player relates from the 
standpoint of the ludic subject-position.  
Lisbeth Klastrup writes that games: 
…conjure up a fictional universe that we take as a reference point for the 
understanding of our actions within the world (killing a dragon is interpreted as 
the act of ‘killing a dragon’, not as the continuous clicking of the mouse on some 
darkly-coloured pixels). Hence, what we do as avatars is not interpreted as events 
with real-world “value” or reference, on the contrary, our actions are interpreted 
as meaningful within the given universe which, during the act of playing, serves 
as the actual world reference to us. (2003, 102) 
As Rune Klevjer notes, the suggestion here is that “it is not the actions that project a 
fictional world (through interpretation), but it is rather the fictional actual world that 
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makes our actions meaningful in the first place” (2006, 71). I would argue with the use of 
the notion of ‘fiction,’ which, as I have pointed out, is not a necessary complement of the 
heterocosm, and which also risks distorting the fundamental insight that is to be gained 
here. In Chapter 2 I made the point that a ludic action is, first and foremost, an action in 
the general sense, or, to put it differently, a ‘real’ action pertaining to a ‘real’ sphere of 
action. It is only thanks to the top-down demarcation of this sphere as an ontic domain 
in its own right that the ludic action is keyed as ludic, and as thereby having an aesthetic 
or representational, rather than practical, significance. This is the structure that both of 
the cosmic frames I have outlined – the game as system and the game as heterocosm – 
fit into, contra the representational fallacy operating in the direction of either frame. Just 
as the understanding of the game as system is not something to be extracted from the 
player’s experience like a seed from a husk as the ‘true meaning’ of a game, it is not the 
case that the player brackets her actual experience of the gameworld as a means of 
supporting a heterocosmic reference – as a prop in a game of make-believe. At the 
fundamental level of ludic experience, which is that of direct gameworld experience, both 
frames serve to structure the lifeworld, as a sphere of experience and of action, 
constituting the domain of the game, granting specific meanings to what the player 
perceives and to what she does.  
 
3.5 The game as ‘earth’ 
 
I have discussed the lifeworld as the world as it is given in direct, first-personal 
experience: it is, in fact, characterized precisely as the world as constituted as a world for 
the subject, that within which my being is a being-in-the-world. I have also considered 
the cosmos as referring to a representation of the world as an ordered system, born, in a 
transcendental movement, out of a reflective operation upon the initial experience of the 
lifeworld – while allowing for the fact that, as soon as it is established, the cosmos then 
comes, in turn, to colour and shape the lifeworld.   
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There is, however, a third sense of ‘world’ that phenomenology brings to our 
attention, one which shadows the lifeworld and acts as its foundation just as the ordered 
system of the cosmos is superimposed upon it. Recall how, in the discussion on the 
lifeworld, the point was made that it does not constitute an aggregate of pure, 
unconditioned intuitions, but is itself already the product of an (unconscious) process of 
worldmaking. It already presents some form of order, and is already a figure emerging 
against a ground: which leaves us with the question, what is the nature of this ground? 
 
3.5.1 Husserl and the limits of the perceptual field 
That there is a necessary coefficient of the unknown and the occluded to any act of 
worldmaking in the phenomenological sense was something that Husserl understood. He 
argues that “what is actually perceived […] is partly pervaded, partly girt about with a 
dimly apprehended depth or fringe of indeterminate reality” (2012[1931], 52). This is apparent in 
two directions, as is made evident in Husserl’s usage of both ‘depth’ and ‘fringe’. To start 
with the latter: let us take the simple intentional act of perception of a mundane object, 
say, a teaspoon. In focusing our attention on the teaspoon, the saucer on which it rests, if 
we are aware of it at all, is relegated to background in our perception. Should I shift my 
intentional focus to the saucer in order to perceive it – and hence bring it into my 
lifeworld – the surface of the table on which the saucer rests still remains at the border of 
my perceptions: should I then focus on the table, the tiles of the floor, the surrounding 
café tables, and the rest of the scene will continue to provide an indeterminate ground 
that sets off the clarity of this intentional perception. Thus, though the horizon can be 
pierced, to some degree, by “the illuminating focus of attention”, the sense of that which 
remains stubbornly at the bounds of perception, shadowing but excluded from 
intentional consciousness and the lifeworld, remains: “the misty horizon that can never 
be completely outlined remains necessarily there” (ibid.). 
The second dimension in which this is true is even more radical. In grasping the 
object at hand and saying, “This is a teaspoon,” one specific quality – its adherence to the 
idea of a spoon, its teaspoonness – is brought to the fore, and its place in the lifeworld is 
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determined by the relations this quality positions it in with regards to other objects: the 
teaspoon belongs to the same ontological category as the knife in the earlier example, it 
can be picked up and used to stir coffee, etc. At the same time, any other qualities of the 
object itself, such as its metallic texture, its weight or its reflective quality, are obscured. 
At the risk of oversimplification, one can say that what remains concealed is the 
materiality of what is perceived, in the sense of the sheer, undeniable actuality which 
grants it an independence and an ontic status which, going beyond our experience of it as 
an element of the world-for-us, makes it intrinsically ungraspable in thought.  
What is being spoken of here is an intrinsic dimension of worldness in the 
phenomenal sense – as such, what is at stake is still a dimension of experience, not a 
supposition regarding what might lie beyond it: there is no Kantian positing of an 
unknowable domain of noumenal things-in-themselves ‘beyond’ their phenomenal 
appearance. Instead, this dimension of worldness, just like the cosmic aspect of the 
world, is one that exists in a constant relation to the lifeworld as the primary domain of 
experience. 
 
3.5.2 Heidegger and the opposition of ‘world’ to ‘earth’ 
The clearest philosophical elaboration of this aspect of worldness can be found in 
Heidegger’s distinction between what he terms “world” and “earth”. Here, “world” is 
used – very similarly to Husserl’s later development of the notion of the lifeworld – to 
describe the meaningful sphere that constitutes the subject’s existential locus, the ‘there’ in 
the “Being-there” (Dasein) that is the essential character of human existence. As such, it 
stands in explicit contrast to the “earth” – the material substrate which is the ground 
against which the world emerges as a meaningful figure, but which by its continuing 
existence threatens the stability of the world: 
The world grounds itself on the earth and the earth juts through the world […] 
The world, in resting upon the earth, strives to raise the earth completely [into 
perception]. As self-opening, the world cannot endure anything closed. The 
earth, however, as sheltering and concealing, tends always to draw the world into 
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itself and keep it there. (Heidegger 2004[1936], 174) 
In Heidegger’s terms, then, the world is not the totality of objects that actually exist, but 
the totality of what has been brought forth into “unconcealment” (ibid., 161), that is, a 
configuration of only those objects, and, again, only those aspects and attributes of those 
objects, which are revealed through the practices of Dasein’s existential project. The 
world, then, is the ordered sphere that is constantly in the process of being brought forth 
by consciousness out of the undefined ground of the earth, a humble, tightly fenced-in 
circle of consciousness against a horizon of the unconscious (literally, that which we are 
not conscious of). So much so, in fact, that consciousness can be understood precisely as 
this activity of constantly establishing and maintaining its own world, through the 
bringing of things into conscious perception (or, in Heidegger’s term, unconcealment).  
But this lived (hence experienced) world – though it is what the subject’s being is 
oriented towards, that which is directly ‘grasped’ in intentional consciousness – continues 
to be shadowed by the sense of what remains unconcealed, and must, therefore, exist in 
an ongoing dialectical relation with the ‘earth,’ which is only “perceived and presented as 
that which is essentially undisclosable” (ibid., 172).    
Finally, it is no accident that the language Heidegger uses to speak of this 
concealed primordiality is that of hard materiality: earth and rock. What this aspect of 
‘world’ recognizes is the sheer basic fact of an encounter between the conscious subject 
and a material realm that stands apart from her, as Other: an encounter across a chasm 
which intentional consciousness struggles to bridge, in a gesture which sets the 
foundation for the lifeworld.  
 
3.5.3 The difficulty of materiality in games 
The introduction of the phenomenological notion of the ‘earth’ as a shadow 
underpinning the lifeworld and the ordered cosmos therefore leads to a foregrounding of 
the question of materiality in relation to the gameworld. Keeping in mind that this 
investigation’s prevailing epistemological perspective remains that of the game as played, 
it is crucial that materiality is considered only in the manner in which it is intended in the 
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player’s experience: any other perspective would be irrelevant in terms of an engagement 
with the phenomenal character of the gameworld.  
 Of course, in a way it seems strange to attribute great significance to the material 
dimension of the ludic domain. I have already remarked, in Chapter 2, upon Eugen 
Fink’s distinction between the “piece of material and wire” that the doll is in material 
terms and the child it constitutes from a perspective internal to the play-world 
(2012[1958], II). Taken to its logical conclusion, this idea takes the form of Juul’s 
argument that an understanding of games as “a rule-based formal system […] does not 
tie games to any specific medium, and games are therefore transmedial” (Juul 2005, 6-7). 
Leino, however, makes the case that materiality plays a pivotal role in the player’s 
experience of the videogame, and transmediality arguments, which might be valid for 
other categories of games, do not hold here. The reason for this is that while with – for 
instance – chess there is an external, codified frame of reference to which a given 
material manifestation can be compared, there is, in most cases, no such pre-existing 
conceptual object against which the accuracy of a videogame component as a 
technologically material object can be judged: as a result, it is the object itself that must 
act as its own yardstick. Leino’s example serves to highlight this point: 
…no matter what I think about an NPC [non-player character] in [Fallout: New 
Vegas (Obsidian Entertainment 2010)], the NPC will remain on my screen as an 
NPC attending to NPC business, traceable down to materiality; pixels on the 
screen, memory register allocations, current fluctuations on the motherboard, 
quarks, strings, etc, […] To explain an NPC as the NPC, there is neither place nor 
need for “rules” in between process and materiality: both process and materiality 
are firmly rooted in data. There is no “material” NPC separate from the NPC-in-
the-process-of-play like there is the red piece of plastic separate from a hotel in 
Monopoly […] materiality and process are weaved together so tight that from the 
player’s perspective they are inseparable as the run-time behaviour of the 
software. (2012) 
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The conclusion Leino arrives at is echoed by Graeme Kirkpatrick, who similarly argues 
that videogames should be understood “in light of their properties as plastic objects that 
are physically manipulated” (2011, 17). However, in opposition to Leino and Kirkpatrick, 
I shall stress an observation made by Arsenault and Perron: 
When […] the gamer finds out that an enemy in Quake (Id Software 1996) will 
always appear from the left, he still only witnesses the repetitive result of the 
computer’s response to his action. He does not, per se, discover the game’s 
algorithm which remains encoded, hidden and multifaceted. (2009, 110) 
In short, “the gamer never has access to the game’s algorithm under the surface” (ibid., 
123). Leino is correct to say that, in the absence of an external frame of reference, the 
game component is defined by the complete set of observable properties it possesses as an 
intentional object. However, he goes on to state, as we have seen, that “from the player’s 
perspective they [the observed properties of the game component] are inseparable as the 
run-time behaviour of the software” (2012). Clearly, there remains a chasm between the 
complete set of observable properties of a game object and the computational materiality 
underpinning these properties – requiring, in Husserlian terms, a transcendental leap 
from the player’s immanent intentional experience to an ontological claim. In taking this 
leap, then, Leino unwittingly leaves behind the perspective of the game as played. 
 
3.5.4 The actuality of the game component and facticity 
In disentangling the phenomenal game component from its materiality – computational 
or otherwise – one should not make the mistake of turning it into an entirely subjective 
construction. The danger is that of succumbing to “ludic solipsism” (Leino 2010, 81) – 
that is, to the idea that, unfettered from any material constraints, play becomes a 
freewheeling, unbounded mental activity, taking as its raw material pliant conceptual 
objects that, having no existence outside the player’s consciousness, maintain no 
intersubjective verifiability. 
Ludic solipsism, however, is far from the essential character of play. Even if Fink 
dissociates the child that the doll stands for in the play-world from the material object 
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representing the child, he also notes that “the play-world is not suspended in a mere 
realm of thought; it always has a real setting […] it necessarily requires real things in 
order to have a foothold in them” (2012[1958], II). The things of the gameworld are 
possessed of actuality, which identifies them, not as mental objects, but as objects to be 
encountered out there amongst the things in the world. In this way, Fink argues, “playing 
is always a confrontation with beings” (ibid.). Recall the point made in section 2.1.1 that, 
although the object of aesthetic contemplation is to be identified with the concretization 
in the mind of the recipient, the foundation for this concretization remains the encounter 
with an actual object: precisely the same is true of the phenomenal game object. 
Since it is the notion of actuality that has now revealed itself in its centrality, I shall 
pause upon the significance of the term. The notion of actuality I am drawing on here is 
the indexical definition outlined by David Lewis, which I have already discussed in 
section 2.4: briefly, for something to be actual means for it to exist in fact, but the 
determination of this actuality depends on the intending subject for whom a thing is actual, 
and the worldly standpoint this subject inhabits: something is actual if it exists in the world 
from which I speak (1973, 69).11  
A thing-in-the-gameworld is actual from the perspective of the game as played: 
another way of saying this is that the ludic subject-position is that which, through 
granting the player an experiential standpoint internal to the gameworld, renders these 
gameworld as an ontic domain actual for her, and allows her to relate to it directly. The 
Minecraft-tree represents an actual affordance; the Minecraft-creeper constitutes an actual 
danger. The actuality of the game component, then, is a direct coefficient of the ludic 
subject-position. 
For this reason, if we are to speak of a foundational materiality of the gameworld, 
it needs to be a purely ludic materiality that we have in mind, as a concept that refers to the 
pure fact of the actuality of the game component in all of the aspects and properties (and 
in only those of its aspects and properties) which impact upon the player’s existential 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 The notion of the indexical definition of actuality is taken up by Ryan in her examination of the 
mechanism of subjective “recentering” in relation to textual worlds (2001, 103). I shall return to this point 
in Chapter 4. 
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praxis as a ludic subject. In the case of games in virtual environments, a computational 
materiality underwrites every detail and property of every component of the game system 
– not to mention keeping a total and infallible record of every action undertaken by these 
components and change in state which might result in any of them, or in the game 
system as a whole, as a result of these actions. This is Leino’s point when he writes that 
“the game artefact […] has the ability to change its material properties as a consequence 
of my actions” (2010, 129). It is also the reason why Aarseth stresses the ontological 
reality of game objects and actions, falling back on Philip K. Dick’s definition of ‘reality’ 
as “that which, when you stop believing in it, doesn’t go away” (Aarseth 2007a, 1). While 
playing Minecraft, I cannot argue over how much redstone I have in my inventory – at 
least, no more than I can argue over how much money I have in my wallet. Any time I 
wish, I can check my inventory, and if I only find two units of redstone in my inventory, 
it is no use my insisting on believing there should be twenty – the game is still only going 
to let me actually use two.  
To understand the phenomenological implications of this, let us recall that 
Husserl characterizes the world as that set of things which are “for me simply there […] 
whether or not I pay them special attention” (2012[1913], 51), gathered in consciousness 
into a “fact-world” which  “I find continually present and standing over against me” 
(ibid., 55). I have already shown how Leino uses this undeniability as the justification to 
laminate the phenomenal game component to its computational materiality, arguing that 
there are no grounds for insisting on a distinction between the two. However, as I 
argued, this approach faces the problem of being divorced from the player’s perspective. 
The notion of ludic materiality, conversely, provides us with an understanding of 
the thing-in-the-gameworld that links its ontological nature directly to the player’s ludic 
subjectivity, in a relation of mutual determination: the actuality of the game component 
emerges only in relation to the ludic subject, which, in turn, is only determined in relation 
to the set of actual game components. Following Sartre’s existential phenomenology, this 
can be conceptualized as the facticity of the gameworld as a contingent actuality 
constituting the ludic subject’s situation (1966[1943], 131), thereby laying the ground for 
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the formation of the gameworld as a meaningful world of subjective experience. It is 
here that we begin to grasp the nature of the ludic subject as the subjective being – the 
being-for-itself, in Sartre’s term (ibid., 120)12 that emerges in relation to the facticity 
established for it by the system of game components, and that, through the intentional 
experience and existential praxis rendered possible by this factical situation, gathers these 
components around itself in the form of a meaningful world. A consideration of the 
actuality of the ludic materiality of the game as object has therefore led us inexorably to a 
consideration of the individual subject for whom this material actuality constitutes a 
facticity and an existential situation: it is, in fact, precisely this facticity that establishes the 
conditions by which the ludic subject can exist as a subject. 
 
3.6 Conclusions 
 
Following on from the identification, in the previous chapter, of the dual perspectival 
structure of ludic experience, the aim of this chapter has been that of fleshing out the 
notion of the internal perspective as the experience of the game as a world. I began by 
taking the player’s perception of a thing-in-the-gameworld as the fundamental unit of 
ludic experience. According to an intentional understanding of consciousness, this 
perception was revealed to be open in two directions: in its reference to a perceiving 
subject and to the world which is the domain of the subject’s experience. 
 Upon this foundation, the notion of ‘world’ as it is articulated in phenomenology 
was outlined into three distinct senses, in order to set up a framework upon which to 
develop a notion of the gameworld as an experiential world for the player. First, and 
most fundamentally, ‘world’ was considered in the sense of a lifeworld, the prereflective 
world which in which we always already are, which is the ground of all perception and 
which represents the basic sphere of experience against which an existential praxis can be 
played out.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Sartre’s fundamental ontological distinction between being-in-itself and being-for-itself, as well as the notion 
of facticity, will be discussed at greater length in section 5.2.1. 
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Second, the notion of cosmos was introduced to account for the idea of the world 
as an ordered schema of phenomena – an understanding which is the result of a second-
order reflective operation upon direct experience of the lifeworld. I argued that the two 
cosmic frames available to the player are those of the game as system and of the game as 
heterocosm. Both are rooted in lived experience of the gameworld, and constitute 
complementary frames of interpretation. Crucially, while both can only be grasped 
through a second-order reflective turn upon direct experience of the gameworld – and, 
as such, are associated with the external perspective – the resulting interpretations will 
sink back into the player’s experience of the gameworld, shaping it into new forms.  
Finally, Heidegger’s notion of ‘earth’ was used to conceptualize the continuing 
presence of the material contingency upon which any notion of the world is founded, but 
which resists inclusion within the order of a ‘world.’ This contingency was taken up as 
the support for the actuality of the things in the gameworld, manifesting in the form of a 
ludic materiality which is taken up in the player’s experience as the factical situation 
against which her efforts gain meaning.  
 At the basis of all of these phenomenological senses of ‘world,’ however, is the 
presupposition that all of them relate to the world in which the experiential subject is. The 
phenomenal world is a lived world, encountered in the mode of being-in. In the next 
chapter, I shall therefore turn to an examination of precisely this sense of being-in-the-
gameworld. In demonstrating the importance that this phenomenal character of 
gameworld experience has been granted, I shall follow a path through the notions of 
focalization, immersion, presence, agency and recentering as they have been articulated in the game 
studies discourse, thereby paving the way by which, in Chapter 6, I shall be able to 
deploy a phenomenology of the body in order to consider the playable figure as the ontic 
anchoring for the ludic subject within the gameworld.  
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 Chapter Four 
The sense of being-in-the-gameworld 
 
 
By this point in the investigation, the idea of the ‘gameworld’ has been unfolded into its 
multiple senses as it emerges in the player’s experience. In Chapter 3, I discussed the 
ludic materiality of the game insofar as it represents a factical situation for the player, 
thereby providing the foundation upon which an experiential world can be established. I 
also surveyed the hermeneutic mechanisms by which first-hand perception of the 
gameworld in this first-personal experiential sense is transcended in the understanding of 
the game as an ordered cosmos – as computational system and as represented, textual 
heterocosm – which, in turn, sink back into, and shapes, the lived gameworld. Crucially, 
all of this has been framed through an awareness of the complex, dual perspective 
inhabited by the player in relation to the gameworld, which is consequently grasped both 
as a lifeworld gathered around an internal perspective, and as an ordered, textual whole 
from an external perspective.  
This chapter is now poised to pick up the argument at a crucial juncture. It is the 
aim of this study to attempt to understand the nature of the entity within the gameworld 
that the player identifies as ‘I’ within the gameworld, and to map out the relationship 
between this ‘I’ in the gameworld and the ‘I’ outside it – or, in the terms we have since 
established, between the ludic subject and the implied player, as formal elements of the 
game’s aesthetic structure. Already, in Chapter 2, we began to glimpse a clearer idea of 
this in-game ‘I’. The internal perspective that establishes the phenomenal conditions 
making it possible for the player to experience the game as an experiential world is 
dependent upon the player’s taking a perspectival standpoint within the gameworld. This 
standpoint – which I have termed the ludic subject-position – is not simply a geometric point 
defining the player’s co-ordinates within the game space, although it is also that; as I shall 
argue in Chapter 6, it is to be understood in a wider sense, as formally enshrining the 
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attitudes and relations the player is to adopt towards the gameworld. Furthermore, the 
ludic subject-position implies the entity I have termed the ludic subject, a subjective 
interiority played out in the course of the player’s engagement with the gameworld from 
the point-of-view of the ludic subject-position. It is the ‘I’ that emerges as the first-
personal pole around which the accretion of the player’s experiences of the gameworld 
can be bestowed with the unity of a subjective identity.  
Against the background of the formal structure of ludic experience and the multi-
dimensional understanding of the gameworld which have been developed in earlier 
chapters, this chapter is poised to begin the approach to the ludic subject through a 
consideration of the fundamental sense of being-in-the-gameworld that is the 
precondition for ludic experience to take the form of experience of a lived world. The 
question that shall be addressed here, then, is: What does it mean for the player to ‘be’ 
experientially in the gameworld? It should be stressed that, up to this stage, the investigation is 
still operating on the level of phenomenology: what is at stake here is not yet the 
ontology of the player’s being within the gameworld, but rather her experience of being in 
the gameworld. 
I shall approach this question by means of an engagement with a set of 
interrelated terms that have been used to conceptualize this dimension of player 
experience. Opening with some remarks on the question of perspective and point-of-
view in heterocosmic representation, I shall pause upon the notion of focalization, tracing 
its origin and deployment in the field of literary theory (Genette 1980; Bal 1980; Margolin 
2009), before highlighting its application to the discussion of perspective in games 
(Neitzel 2002; Nitsche 2005; Arjoranta 2013). From here, I shall move on to a 
consideration of the terms immersion (Murray 1998; Ryan 2001a; Ermi and Mäyrä 2005; 
Thon 2008), presence (Lombard and Ditton 1997; McMahan 2003) and telepresence (Minsky 
1980; Steuer 1992; Taylor 2003). Following Gordon Calleja (2011), I shall argue these 
terms overlap to a great degree and, despite granting significant insights into what it 
means for the player to be in the gameworld, ultimately prove unsatisfactory for the 
purpose of conceptualizing this experiential structure. I shall then consider the notions of 
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agency (Murray 1998; Mateas and Stern 2005; Wardrip-Fruin et al 2009) and recentering 
(Murray 2001), which, from separate directions, will reveal the necessary foundation of 
the sense of being-in-the-gameworld in the player’s ontic inhabitation of the domain of 
the gameworld. This will then allow me, in Chapter 5, to move on to the next stage of 
the investigation, in which, through the theoretical frame of embodied phenomenology, I 
shall examine the role of the playable figure in the establishment of ludic subjectivity.  
 
4.1 Subjectivity, perspective and the heterocosm 
 
In a number of crucial ways, the ludic subject-position, as a formal construct, builds on 
aesthetic structures related to the construction of subjectivity and the determination of 
perspective deployed in non-ludic heterocosmic works. Of course, this should not be 
surprising – videogames, as cultural objects, draw on the techniques and formal 
structures of other media, even to the extent that it might be better to conceive of them 
as “integrated crossmedia packages” that incorporate film, text, music and visual art as 
well as games (Aarseth 2012, 2). In this regard, it is helpful to contextualize a theory of 
the ludic subject-position as a perspective upon the gameworld within a wider view of 
the matter of perspective as it pertains to heterocosmic representation.  
 
4.1.1 A noetic mode of presentation 
Inevitably, a heterocosmic work in whatever medium not only establishes its textual 
domain, but also enshrines a specific perspective (or set of perspectives) upon it – it is, 
after all, impossible to think of a world that is represented from no perspective. This is 
true even of works that adopt the approach of “illusionism” (Belsey 1997[1985], 664), 
which describes the work that attempts to conceal its own perspectival stance. 
Conversely, other heterocosmic works embrace the capacity to present, not simply 
representations of objects, but representations of perceptions of objects - put differently, 
of associating perceived textual objects with a perceiving textual subject, united in the 
representation of the intentional perception. As Carl Friedrich Graumann notes, “the 
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‘subject-object relationship’ merges into the perspective way of representation” (cited in 
Iser 1980, 38).  
Though the terms most often used to discuss this phenomenon – terms like 
perspective, point of view or focalization – employ a visual metaphor, the first point to make is 
that, in Vivian Sobchack’s words, “the mathematical term point of view must be broadened 
and grounded – literally and empirically incorporated and lived as a “situation of being”” 
(1992, 81). We might, to frame this discussion within the phenomenological method 
guiding this study, speak instead of a noetic mode of heterocosmic presentation, to suggest 
an understanding of the signified being not the objects and events constituting the 
heterocosm, but these objects and events as intended within the noesis or intentional acts 
appertaining to a conscious heterocosmic subject.  
Broadly speaking – and bracketing the cases where the perspective that is 
established is one that occupies a standpoint external to the heterocosm – there are two 
strategies that can be adopted in this regard. The first approach is for a perspective to be 
established which is attributed to the recipient of the work, while the second strategy is 
for the heterocosmic work to recapture the perspective of its representation within the 
structures of the represented cosmos itself, by attributing it to one or more of the 
individuals inhabiting the heterocosmic domain. Both of these, in a sense, invite the 
recipient into the heterocosm; either by granting her her own viewpoint upon it, 
essentially making her an honorary member of the heterocosm, or by inviting her to 
share that of a heterocosmic individual. 
The distinction between these two approaches is not as clear-cut as it may 
appear, and they might, in fact, be best understood as two sides of the same coin, either 
of which might be emphasized in a given work. The establishment of a heterocosmic 
perspective that the recipient is invited to adopt requires the attribution, on some level, 
of an ontological status to the bearer of the experience within the heterocosm. 
Conversely, a perspective associated with a heterocosmic individual distinct from the 
recipient – that is, with a character – will nonetheless be a perspective through which the 
recipient gains access to the heterocosm.  
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It is beyond the scope of this analysis to offer an exhaustive engagement with 
either the history or the theory of perspective in the various medialities of heterocosmic 
presentation. As such, I am not aiming for a comprehensive survey, but only highlighting 
a set of insights against which the specific character of the sense of being-in-the-
gameworld can be compared and contrasted. With this aim in mind, I shall briefly 
consider three forms of heterocosmic subject-positioning, each of which will be 
contextualized by means of a relevant example, and each of which will reveal an insight 
that will shed light on the formal mechanisms underpinning ludic subject-positioning. 
Firstly, a reflection on perspectival presentation in painting, framed through the case of 
Diego Velázquez’s painting Las Meninas (1656), will serve to illustrate how the formal 
establishment of a phenomenal standpoint for the viewer to inhabit in relation to the 
heterocosm simultaneously sets up a heterocosmic subject that is distinct from the 
viewer. Secondly, an engagement with the notion of focalization in literary theory will 
highlight the possibility of representing the phenomenal consciousness of a character 
within the heterocosm – this will be contextualized by means of a passage from Charlotte 
Bronte’s Jane Eyre (1985[1847]). Finally, I shall pause upon the cinematic convention of 
the subjective point-of-view shot, which shall serve to bring into focus the tension 
between the perspective of the heterocosmic subject internal to the represented world 
and that of the viewer perceiving the mediated representation of this perception.  
 
4.1.2 Painting and the viewer’s perspective 
Oliver Grau argues that, in addition to its representative function, an image also has a 
second meaning: a “constitution of presence” which establishes “the quality of 
apparently being present in the images” (2003, 14). This is a point Marie-Laure Ryan 
expands upon with specific reference to the geometric techniques of perspective: 
…projection opens up a depth that assigns spatial coordinates – the center of 
projection, or physical point of view – to the body of the spectator. Perspective 
painting immerses a virtual body in an environment that stretches in imagination 
far beyond the confines of the canvas. From its spatial point of view the 
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embodied gaze of the spectator experiences the depicted objects as virtually 
present, though the flat surface of the painting erects an invisible wall that 
prevents physical interaction. (2001a, 3) 
Perspectival representation thereby establishes a phenomenal structure which implicates 
the viewer as a presence within the perceptual field it establishes: 
In a perspective scheme the eye is the point toward which all the objective lines 
converge. Thus the perceptive field refers to a center objectively defined by that 
reference and located in the very field which is oriented around it. Only we do not 
see this center as the structure of the perceptive field considered; we are the center. 
Thus the order of the objects in the world perpetually refers to us the image of 
an object which on principle can not be an object for us since it is what we have to 
be. (Sartre 1966[1943], 419) 
In the Western art canon, Diego Velázquez’ painting Las Meninas (see Fig 4.1) represents 
perhaps one of the most striking – and one of the most thoroughly examined – examples 
of this form of subject-positioning: standing in front of it, the viewer finds herself 
interpellated, her presence acknowledged, wherever she looks. Firstly, a number of the 
figures in the courtly scene depicted in the painting – Velázquez himself, in self-portrait, 
and the Infanta Margarita, the princess whose figure constitutes the focal point around 
which the elements of the composition are arranged – gaze outwards, their lines of sight 
converging at the point occupied by the viewer in front of the picture. In his gloss on the 
painting, Michel Foucault writes: 
From the eyes of the painter to what he is observing there runs a compelling line 
that […] runs through the picture and emerges from its surface to join the place 
from which we see the painter observing us; this dotted line reaches out to us 
ineluctably, and links us to the representation of the picture. (1970, 4) 
Nor is this the end of Las Meninas’ interpellation of its viewer. A mirror hangs on the 
chamber’s far wall, prominently located at the precise centre of the painting. Not only 
does the mirror establish yet another “compelling tracer line, joining the reflection to that 
which it is reflecting” (ibid., 10) – it does this in a particular way. The image the viewer 
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sees reflected in the mirror is not her own – rather, the mirror throws back to the viewer 
an image of two individuals: King Philip IV and Mariana of Austria. What this 
establishes, Foucault argues, is a reciprocity of perceived scene and perceiving subject: 
The face reflected in the mirror is also the face that is contemplating it; what all 
the figures in the picture are looking at are the two figures to whose eyes they too 
present a scene to be observed. (ibid., 14) 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Las Meninas (Diego Velázquez, 1656, Museo Nacional del Prado, Madrid) 
 
The position in which the viewer is placed is not only one of visual perspective 
determined by the intersection of geometric lines. It is also a position that interpellates a 
very particular subject at its locus, one who stands as a model to Velázquez-in-the-painting 
and as a parent to the infanta. The viewer is aware that this subject is herself, but that it is 
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also not herself: that it is, in fact, the king, and that it is in his position that she stands, and 
through his eyes that she sees the scene.  
 Here, the line between the two strategies of the heterocosmic perspective that I 
outlined above is blurred. Though it is the viewer herself who is placed in a geometric 
relation to the heterocosmic space of the painting thanks to the establishment of a 
perspectival standpoint in purely visual terms, this standpoint is also identified as 
belonging to a heterocosmic individual distinct from the viewer. As a consequence, it is 
not only a matter of the viewer being granted a presence within the heterocosmic domain 
– or, in Sartre’s terms, that the viewer’s body becomes the perceptual centre around 
which the heterocosm is gathered as a world – but also, at the same time, that the viewer 
identifies this perspective, which is her own, with a heterocosmic individual, and, hence, 
as not her own, even if she inhabits it in the act of perceiving the represented milieu.   
 
4.1.3 Focalization in literature 
That the matter of perspective or subject-positioning is similarly inherent to literary 
narrative is clear: “the sentences of a text are always situated within the perspective they 
constitute” (Iser 1980, 114). The literary notion of point of view becomes concrete in 
opposition to that of point of narration, to which it is often erroneously linked. To prise 
the two apart, Henry James introduced the notion of the “reflector” to refer to the 
character who is the one who sees (1972[1908], 247), not the ‘speaker’ of a first-person 
narration but the object of a third-person narrative whose perspective the reader is made 
privy to. 
This distinction between “who sees?” and “who speaks?” in the literary text is 
more systematically developed in the work of Gérard Genette through the notion of 
focalization – a neologism coined in response to a perceived need for a better term than 
“point of view” or “perspective,” primarily in order to avoid the “too specifically visual 
connotations” of these terms (1980, 189).1 As Genette understands it, focalization 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Along the same lines, Genette also argues that it is more accurate to phrase the question as 
“Who perceives?” rather than “Who sees?” (1988,64). It is, of course, debatable how far 
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primarily refers to a “restriction of field” (ibid.) in terms of what information is made 
available to the reader and what remains, so to speak, unseen. It occurs in three 
fundamental modes: non- or zero focalization, in which the narrating voice grants the reader 
more information than is available from the perspective of the protagonist, as is typical 
of the “omniscient narrator” of the classic realist novel; internal focalization, in which the 
information presented to the reader is filtered through the consciousness of the 
protagonist; and external focalization, in which “the hero performs in front of us without 
our ever being allowed to know his thoughts or feelings” (ibid., 189-190). 
It is what Genette terms internal focalization that is most relevant to the 
purposes of this investigation. In this regard, it is pertinent to note Genette’s observation 
regarding the difficulty of locating a ‘pure’ internal focalization: “the very principle of this 
narrative mode implies in all strictness that the focal character never be described or even 
referred to from the outside, and that his thoughts or perceptions never be analyzed 
objectively by the narrator” (Genette 1980, 192). As such, the only theoretically 
unadulterated examples of internal focalization are those which can broadly be 
characterized as “internal monologue” – whether this is established thanks to the 
protagonist being the autodiegetic (ibid., 245) narrator of their own story, as in Jane Eyre, or 
through the deployment of a stream-of-consciousness technique as mediated through a 
heterodiegetic narrator external to the textual heterocosm, as in the interlocking 
internally focalized perspectives of Virginia Woolf’s The Waves (2011[1931]). 
 That focalization can be understood in phenomenological terms is hinted at by 
Uri Margolin (2009, 47). A starting-point in unpacking the implications of such an 
understanding can be identified in Mieke Bal’s distinction between the focalizer (who is 
perceiving?) and the focalized (who/what is perceived?) (1985, 102-110). In cases of 
internal focalization, each linguistic proposition that constitutes the narrative sequence 
contains both a focalizer/intending subject (the character whose perspective is 
presented) and a focalized/intended object (the thing, person or event framed through 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
‘focalization,’ as a term, is any less dependent upon a visual metaphor. Besides, Genette himself 
often resorts to using “point of view” interchangeably with “focalization” (1980, 190; 191; 194) 
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this perspective). Margolin goes even further in expanding the notion of focalization into 
a determinate structure, identifying five linked constituent elements: 
(1) the story-world state or event focalized; (2) the focalizing agent and its make-
up; (3) the activity of perceiving and processing this object-focalization as nomen 
actionis; (4) the product of this activity, that is, the resultant take or vision and (5) 
the textualization of all of the above, which is the only thing directly accessible to 
the reader and not requiring his imaginative reconstruction. (2009, 42) 
Rendered in phenomenal terms, these can be characterized as (1) the intentional object 
(what is perceived); (2) the intending subject (who is perceiving); (3) the intentional act 
(act of consciousness) or noesis; (4) the intentional content or noema (the object as it 
appears within the act of consciousness); (5) the representation of the act of perception 
in a textualized form in which it can become the object of an intentional act of 
perception on the reader’s part. Consider, by way of example, this passage from 
Charlotte Brontë’s novel Jane Eyre: 
There was a candle burning just outside, and on the matting in the gallery. I was 
surprised at this circumstance: but still more was I amazed to perceive the air 
quite dim, as if filled with smoke: and, while looking to the right hand and left, to 
find whence these blue wreaths issued, I became further aware of a strong smell 
of burning.  (Brontë 1985[1847], 179) 
The passage presents a sequence of clearly-defined intentional acts, each linked to the 
next through signposted shifts of attention: upon looking out of her room, Jane first 
notices the burning candle; then, she is struck by a dimness in the air; she intends the 
dimness as ‘smoke’; finally, she senses a smell of burning. Clearly, these are acts of 
perception that belong, proprioceptively, to a perceiving consciousness; they can 
therefore be taken to point, simultaneously, both towards what is experienced and 
towards the experiencing character. The prepositions in the passage – outside, to the right 
hand and left – define the perceived objects in relation to Jane’s subjective standpoint 
(outside the room in which she stands, to the right and left of the point she occupies). 
Moreover, in Husserlian terms, we learn not only the matter of these intentional acts, but 
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also their quality, that is, not only what is intended but also how it is intended: the 
perception of the burning candle strikes Jane with surprise, and that of the dimness of 
the air with amazement. 
 
4.1.4 Focalization and games 
It is pertinent to draw a parenthesis here and note here that the notion of focalization has 
already been applied to game analysis; however, theoretical development in this direction 
has presented a number of conceptual difficulties. Britta Neitzel draws on Genette’s 
distinction between “Who sees?” and “Who speaks?” to ground a distinction between 
the formal ludic structures she terms, respectively, point of view and point of action (2002). In 
brief – I shall have occasion to return to Neitzel’s suggestions in Chapter 7, when I shall 
more fully develop the formal structures constituting the ludic subject-position – Neitzel 
uses ‘point of view’ in a strictly spatio-visual sense, specifically in terms of the relation of 
this viewpoint to the playable figure; ‘point of action,’ meanwhile, “describes the position 
from which action can be taken” upon the gameworld (ibid.).  
While this is, in its own right, a useful distinction that has been taken up and 
developed by later theorists (for instance, Thon 2009), its founding on Genette’s 
narratological model misinterprets the notion of focalization. Neitzel argues that “Who 
speaks?” finds no direct equivalent in most games – hence the observation above 
regarding games not being a diegetic medium – and that, as such, “to adopt this for the 
analysis of computer games the question must be reformulated as “Who acts?”” (2002), 
with the answer being found in the concept of point of action. Meanwhile, Genette’s 
“Who sees?” can be unproblematically translated to visual perspective, and, hence, to 
point of view.  
However, for Genette the answer to the question “Who sees?’ is the focalizing 
character, as a member of the textual world, while the answer to the question, “Who 
speaks?” is the narrator, as an element of the text’s presentation of its heterocosm. In 
other words, “Who sees?” – which Genette pointedly dissociates from the visuality 
introduced by the metaphor of seeing – is a question relating to an internal subject-
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position through which the heterocosm is experienced, while “Who speaks?”, in 
addressing the telling of this subjective perspective, relates to the discourse of 
presentation. In the case of videogames, it is the screen-based audiovisual mediality that 
functions as the mode of presentation, and the ludic subject established through the 
player’s active engagement with the gameworld that constitutes the ludic subject-position 
in relation to the gameworld. To equate, as Neitzel does, the focalizer with the camera, 
and the narrator with the playable figure, is therefore to turn Genette’s model upside-
down, and to confuse focalization as heterocosmic perspective with the discursive 
strategies of textual presentation.  
Michael Nitsche’s proposal for a theory of focalization in videogames is initially 
founded on a reading of Super Mario 64 (Nintendo 1996), specifically focusing on its 
usage of a free-roaming third-person camera perspective. On the heterocosmic level, this 
perspective is identified as belonging to Lakitu, a tiny creature following Mario around 
on a floating cloud and recording his adventures with a camera. In Nitsche’s argument, 
Lakitu comes to stand, metonymically, for the typical detached perspective of the third-
person adventure game as an external focalizer of the protagonist’s actions. Like Neitzel, 
then, Nitsche initially adopts an understanding of focalization that equates it to visual 
perspective – a problematic literalization of the question, “Who sees?” However, Nitsche 
then goes on to consider cases such as American McGee’s Alice (Rogue Entertainment 
2000) and the dream sequences in Max Payne (Remedy Entertainment 2001), in which, 
though a similar third-person perspective is deployed, the ludic heterocosm depicted is 
evidently a manifestation of the protagonist’s subjective mental state. In these cases, 
Nitsche suggests, “as part of the overall game setting the focalization is very much 
internal” (2005). It is unclear whether, by “game setting,” Nitsche is referring to the 
represented heterocosm, the experienced gameworld or the game system; moreover, it is 
even less clear how focalization – a formal structure of presentation – can be part of any 
of these.  
These difficulties in Nitsche’s treatment of focalization arise from a fundamental 
misinterpretation that is similar to Neitzel’s. In its literary usage, focalization is 
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distinguished from narration, and the focalizer from the narrator: in Prince’s terms, the 
narrator “is an element of discourse and not story (of the narrating and not the narrated) 
whereas focalization is an element of the latter” (2001, 46). In this light, it is clearly a 
mistake to equate the camera – evidently an element of presentation rather than of what 
is presented – with the focalizer. In all of Nitsche’s examples, it is the protagonist and 
player-character – Mario no less than Max or Alice – that, in serving as the ludic subject, 
acts as the focalizer, the possessor of the experiences constituting the scenes of the game. 
Applying Genette’s tripartite taxonomy of focalization to games, Jonne Arjoranta 
argues that it is external focalization that “is typical in video games: the story is told from 
the perspective of a central protagonist, but […] without access to character 
consciousness” (2013, 6).  Games’ capacity for internal focalization, he writes, is limited, 
and mostly achieved through non-ludic means such as “spoken internal dialogue” 
(presumably Arjoranta has in mind examples such as Thief: The Dark Project (Looking 
Glass 1998) and Max Payne (Remedy Entertainment 2001)) or the presentation of 
character action in cutscenes. In a game such as Half-Life (Valve 1998), the protagonist 
does not speak, and the only actions we perceive are the ones the player performs: ergo, 
Arjoranta argues, there is no basis upon which his internal consciousness can be inferred.  
This approach mostly avoids Nitsche’s error of equating focalization with visual 
perspective. However, it is problematic in another direction. During the course of the 
argument, Arjoranta switches indiscriminately between speaking of player-characters as 
focalizers (as when he speaks of “the perspective of a central protagonist”) or as 
focalized (as when he says the character is “portrayed on screen”). Admittedly, this is also 
a difficulty with Genette’s original development of focalization, as Bal has demonstrated 
(1985, 101). It is also true that a subject/object duality within the playable figure - as both 
perceiving (ludic) subject and perceived in-game object – is, as I shall argue in Chapter 6, 
essential to its aesthetic and phenomenal nature. However, the confusion resulting from 
leaving this distinction unthematized inevitably prevents Arjoranta from developing his 
observations into a coherent model of perspective in relation to player-characters. 
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Interestingly, however, Arjoranta then concludes by arguing that games have 
access to a mode of focalization that is not available to non-ergodic media: this embodied 
focalization, as he terms it, “places the player in control of the actions of a character […] 
and places the physical perspective inside the body of the character,” essentially locating 
the player in the position of the focalizer (ibid., 9). This insight is not taken any further, 
but what is described here is something akin to the idea of the ludic subject-position 
itself, as shall become more apparent in Chapter 7. 
 
4.1.5 The filmic subject and the viewer 
So far, I have considered mechanisms of subject-positioning in painting and literature. It 
is arguably in cinema, however, that one finds the most pointed manifestation of the 
phenomenal relation between the perceiving subject in the heterocosm and the 
perceiving viewer outside it. In one of the earliest instances of proto-film-theory, Hugo 
Münsterberg writes, “the photoplay tells us the human story by overcoming the forms of the outer 
world, namely, space, time, and causality, and by adjusting the events to the forms of the inner world, 
namely, attention, memory, imagination, and emotion” (1999[1916], 402, italics in original). In the 
light of the current investigation, this statement invites a phenomenological study of the 
cinema, taking the images of the medium not as direct representations of objects in the 
(heterocosmic) world, but as representations of phenomena, that is, of the intentional acts 
of a perceiving subject.  
Edward Branigan explains this through applying the theory of focalization to 
cinema, using the term to refer to “a character neither speaking (narrating, reporting, 
communicating) nor acting (focusing, focused by), but rather actually experiencing 
something through seeing or hearing it” (1992, 101). He distinguishes between external 
focalization – which refers simply to a given character’s visual or aural awareness (or lack 
of awareness) of narrative events, and internal focalization, which refers to the 
character’s experiences as filtered through their subjective perspective (ibid., 103).  
The most extreme form of what Branigan would identify as cinematic internal 
focalization is the first-person subjective shot that literally adopts the character’s optical 
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perspective upon the filmic heterocosm. In this regard, Genette gives Robert 
Montgomery’s Lady in the Lake (1947) – filmed almost entirely in the first-person 
perspective of its protagonist, the private eye Philip Marlowe – as the example par 
excellence of what internal focalization would mean in the cinema (Genette 1980, 193ff.). 
However, much as the cinematic subjective image might purport to align the 
viewer’s intentional consciousness with that of the perceiving character – as Lady in the 
Lake promised to, with a tagline on its original poster reading “YOU and Robert 
Montgomery solve a murder mystery together!”2 – it actually does no such thing. The 
core of the problem, as Jean Mitry observes, is that “the impressions called subjective are 
given to me, just like all the others […] the camera conducts me, guides me; it 
communicates to me impressions that were not born from me” (1965, 67).3 Or, as 
Sobchack puts it: 
Although we, as spectators, may be sympathetic to cinematic perception and, 
indeed, may intentionally parallel the film’s and/or character’s bodily position 
and perceptual bias as it intends towards and inhabits a world, we physically and 
materially occupy our own bodies and space. The perception whose intentional 
interest we share belongs always to another perceiving and embodied subject, no 
matter how introceptively it is visibly presented as visual for us. (1992, 234) 
To illustrate this point, I shall consider a shot from Maniac (Khalfoun 2012), which, along 
with Lady in the Lake, is one of the rare feature-length films that sustains the first-person 
subjective perspective for virtually its entire duration. In this first-person subjective shot 
(see Fig 4.2), Frank (Elijah Wood) is looking at the kitsch dolphin ornament he has 
found in Lucie (Megan Duffy)’s bathroom, immediately following the scene in which he 
murders her. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The prefiguration of the second-person address common in early videogames, which I 
commented on in the introduction, should not go unnoticed. 
3 “Les impressions dites subjectives me sont données, tout comme le reste […] la caméra me 
conduit, me guide; elle me communique des impressions qui ne sont pas nées de moi.”	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Figure 4.2: Maniac (Khalfoun 2012) 
 
The ornament is placed dead centre in the frame, and is the point of optical focus. 
However, the viewer might not even notice the ornament at all: her attention might be 
drawn to the reflection of Frank’s face in the side-mirror glimpsed in the top right corner 
of the frame. This is, after all, one of the earliest glimpses of the protagonist in a film that 
has, up to this point, not left his first-person perspective. This reveals two things: first, it 
confirms the claim that, in the noetic mode of presentation, it is the perceiving subject, 
rather than the perceived object, that is the terminus of representation. Secondly, it also 
makes apparent the detachment of the viewer’s phenomenal standpoint from that of the 
cinematic perceiving subject. From the centrality of its framing, as well as the angle of 
Frank’s gaze in the mirror, the viewer can tell that it is the ornament that has him 
transfixed: perhaps it is making him reflect on the life he has just taken. He is paying no 
attention whatsoever to his own reflection, whereas the viewer is likely to be entirely 
focused on it, trying to gain an insight into how the murder has emotionally affected 
Frank. In this instance, though the viewer is ostensibly sharing in his subjective 
perspective, Frank and the viewer therefore perform entirely different noetic acts that 
intend different objects: in fact, Frank’s act of perception, far from being shared by the 
viewer, is translated into the object of the viewer’s own, separate act of perception. 
Sobchack’s observation regarding Lady in the Lake, that “the film is intent not only upon 
seeing as Marlowe sees but also upon seeing Marlowe introceptively seeing”(1992, 241), is just 
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as relevant here. 
 What is revealed in this shot, then, is the productive tension between the two 
subjective perspectives that the cinematic form establishes: on the one hand, Frank’s 
perceptual standpoint as a character within the heterocosm, and, on the other hand, the 
viewer’ perceptual standpoint which intends Frank’s perception as its object.  
 
4.1.6 Heterocosmic subject-positioning and ludic subject-positioning 
These cursory glances in the direction of painting, literature and film have highlighted the 
various techniques by which, firstly, the presentation of the textual heterocosm is 
structured according to a subjective perspective internal to the heterocosm; secondly, this 
subjective perspective is foreground as belonging to a heterocosmic individual; and, 
thirdly, the operations of this internal subjective perspective are captured by means of a 
mediating discourse operating from an external perspective that marks the perceptions 
being represented as belonging to a subject distinct both from the recipient and the 
discourse of presentation.    
This would appear to be very similar to the double perspectival structure I have 
identified as pertaining to ludic engagement, by which the player inhabits both an internal 
perspective within the gameworld from which direct first-person experience of the 
gameworld as world is intended (the ludic subject-position), and an external perspective 
on the game as textual artefact (the implied player position), which also frames, in a 
second-order movement of self-reflexivity, the first-order intentional acts pertaining to 
the ludic subject-position.  
This is not surprising: given that, as I argued in section 3.4.4, the gameworld can 
be framed as a ludic heterocosm, then one of the crucial dimensions of the ludic subject-
position is precisely its status as a heterocosmic perspective. In this regard, it is inevitable 
that the ludic subject-position will operate according to formal structures that, in many 
ways, echo those at work in other modes of heterocosmic presentation. At the same 
time, any comparison between ludic subject-positioning and the modes of heterocosmic 
perspective I have outlined can only be taken so far. Beyond a certain point, the 
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instructive comparison will have to be qualified with the observation of a revealing 
contrast. Thus, when Alexander Galloway makes the case that a line can be drawn 
between the cinematic first-person subjective shot and the visual language of the first-
person shooter (FPS) game genre, going so far as to argue that FPS games are “the visual 
progeny of subjective camera techniques in the cinema” (2006, 57), he is careful to point 
out that the player is located in a different relation to the represented subjective 
perspective. Galloway’s suggestion is that this is due to the “fully rendered, actionable space” 
that lies behind what he terms gamic vision (ibid., 63). Similarly, Grant Tavinor writes that 
“videogames expand on this representation of a perceiving self within the fictional world, 
also allowing the subject to act” (2009, 70) – a point which invokes the matter of agency, a 
topic I shall address in section 4.4 below. 
Taking a step further, one can say that the difference rests, not simply on the 
modelling of a virtual space, nor even on the player’s being given the capacity to act 
within this space, but rather on what results from these conditions: namely, that, as I 
have already argued in Chapter 3, the game comes to constitute the phenomenal world of 
experience in which the player finds herself and that makes up the world that is actual 
from her subjective standpoint. It is clear, then, that, as much as games are capable of 
drawing on the representational techniques of literary narrative, painting and film in their 
constructions of subjective perspective, it is the establishment, for the player, of this 
basic sense of being-in-the-gameworld, with all its phenomenological and ontological 
implications, that is the defining quality of ludic subject-positioning. As such, though we 
can certainly take up Bob Rehak’s suggestion that “games, as a cultural form, are 
produced and consumed in phenomenological accord with preexisting technologies of 
representation” (2003, 104), it is only with an awareness that the deployment of the 
techniques we have outlined is inevitably recontextualized in the service of constructing 
and enforcing the ludic subject-position and its attendant sense of being-in-the-
gameworld.  
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4.2 Immersion, presence and telepresence 
 
It is an established commonplace that the experience games provide can accurately be 
described as granting the player a sense of inhabiting another world. That, after all, is the 
implication in the opening lines of Adventure (Crowther and Woods 1976) with which I 
introduced this study: despite all appearances to the contrary, these lines insist, you, the 
player, are not sitting at home in front of your computer, but “standing at the end of the 
road before a small brick building”; moreover, the heterocosmic entity standing at the 
end of the road is not an Other whose subjective perspective the player is invited to 
share, but, rather, is to be taken as “you” – that is, from the player’s perspective, as “I”.   
 Of course, it is much too simple to state that the player simply exchanges one 
experiential world for another and finds oneself entirely absorbed by the gameworld: as I 
noted in section 2.4, the sense of being-in-the-gameworld, pertaining as it does to the 
internal perspective of ludic engagement, is itself ‘bracketed’ through being framed in the 
external perspective. Nonetheless, that such a sense exists, and that it is a foundational 
element of the player’s experience, is clear, and should serve as the baseline of our 
investigation: witness, for instance, the games journalist Kieron Gillen’s influential New 
Games Journalism manifesto, a call for a more subjective idiom of games criticism which 
argued that, in emphasizing the player’s experience, it was the role of games critics to be 
“Travel Journalists to Imaginary places” (2004).  
 
4.2.1 The experience of immersion 
The notion of immersion – a term which invokes the metaphorical image of diving into, 
and being enveloped by, a foreign body – is one of the ideas most commonly employed 
to explain this sense of experiencing the gameworld internally, as another world within 
which one is made present. As Gordon Calleja has observed (2011, 18), the application 
of the term to games follows a long tradition of its being used to describe the reception 
of non-ergodic media. Grau, for instance, makes extensive use of the term to refer to the 
effect of virtual art (2003, 13-18). So conventionalized is its usage, in fact, that, as Ryan 
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points out, it has solidified into a dead metaphor – statements like, “I was lost in a book” 
are made unthinkingly, and reveal a commonplace usage of the term that does not do 
justice to the complexities of the experiential phenomenon being addressed  (2001a, 93). 
 Ryan argues that, within the Western critical tradition, immersion has repeatedly 
been identified in opposition to a standpoint of critical distance in terms of the possible 
attitudes structuring the recipient’s engagement with the text (ibid., 9-14). In the mode of 
immersion, the argument goes, the recipient effaces the textuality of the work in order to 
engage with the heterocosm through an illusion of non-mediation; thus, immersion has 
been characterized as a naïve, passive and uncritical mode of reception.4 Ryan counters 
this prejudice, arguing that immersion does not entail the forfeiting of one’s critical 
apparatus, but, rather, “requires an active engagement with the text” (ibid., 15).  
Many usages of the term in relation to the player’s engagement with games rely, 
in perhaps too uncritical a fashion, on precisely this general understanding. Tracing the 
usage of the term in relation to “games of simulation,” Jon Peterson – highlighting how 
pivotal the notion has been throughout the tradition of games in virtual environments – 
defines immersion as the “experience of surrendering oneself to an imaginary game 
environment” (2012, 15) and as “the state in which the player experiences the game in a 
vivid, impactful manner comparable to real environments” (ibid., 375). Within the field 
of game studies, the term finds its defining usage in the work of Janet Murray,5 who 
describes it as “the sensation of being surrounded by a completely other reality, as 
different as water is from air, that takes over all of our attention, our whole perceptual 
apparatus” (1998, 98). She explains the process explicitly as one of transportation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The fact that these two alternative perspectives on the text recall – and, in fact, can be equated 
with – the internal and the external perspectives upon the game outlined in section 2.4 should 
not go unremarked. What is emphasized, again, is this adherence of the double perspectival 
structure of games to the modes of heterocosmic presentation and engagement they adopt and 
modify.  
5 This is not to say that Murray was the first to employ the term to speak about videogames. 
Brenda Laurel, for instance, also spoke about the role played by “sensory immersion” (1991, 21) 
in what she terms virtual “representational worlds”; but she does not thematize the notion to the 
extent that Murray does. The term had also been used extensively within the virtual reality (VR) 
literature of the 1990s – as a representative example, we can take Pimentel and Teixeira’s 
definition of VR as an “interactive, immersive experience generated by a computer” (1993, 11). 
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between one world or experiential domain and another: “we enjoy the movement out of 
our familiar world” and the subsequent sense of “being in a new place” (ibid., 98-99). 
Immersion, then, refers not to any property of the game object or any of its 
components, but to the phenomenal experience of being-in-the-gameworld which I have 
taken as my theme at this stage of the investigation. The question that needs to be asked, 
then, is whether the term is of use in expanding our understanding of this phenomenon.  
 
4.2.2 The problems with immersion 
Any attempt at deploying the notion of immersion within a conceptual arsenal, however, 
will hit a stumbling-block, which is that, as Calleja has argued (2011, 17-34), the term has 
been weakened through being used in an indiscriminate fashion. Here, I shall defer to 
Calleja’s comprehensive engagement with the term, and, rather than retracing his 
arguments in full, I shall limit myself here to pointing out the two primary conceptual 
difficulties facing the concept of immersion as it has been used: I shall term these medial 
and phenomenal indeterminacy.   
 i) Medial intedeterminacy. After presenting her concept of immersion in relation to 
videogames, Murray goes on to argue that immersion is not a sensation specific to 
engaging with videogames, or even with virtual environments – a film viewer, or a music 
listener, can receive an equally powerful sensation of immersion through a focusing of 
attention that matches her perceptual field to the confines of the screen, or to the play of 
sounds that envelops her. However, as became apparent in section 4.1, the sense in 
which I, as a player, feel myself to be present in the land of Hyrule when playing The 
Legend of Zelda: A Link to the Past (Nintendo 1991) is not at all the same as the sense in 
which I, as a film viewer, might have the sensation of, say, being on the neon-lit streets 
of a futuristic Los Angeles while watching Blade Runner (Scott 1982) in a cinema theatre. 
As Calleja argues, “immersion in ergodic and immersion in non-ergodic media are simply 
not the same thing” (2011, 33) – if ‘immersion’ labels a concept that applies equally well 
to games, cinema and even recorded music, then it can tell us very little about the 
specificities of games. 
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 ii) Phenomenal indeterminacy. The primary difficulty Calleja identifies with 
immersion, however, is that at least two entirely separate cognitive mechanisms have 
grown conflated within the same term (ibid., 26-27). He distinguishes the two senses of 
the term as it has been applied to games as immersion as absorption and immersion as 
transportation. Immersion as transportation accounts for the sense in which, following Murray 
and Ryan, we have been using the term: that is, “the idea of being present in another 
place” (ibid., 27). Immersion as absorption, on the other hand, refers to the sensation of 
being entirely caught up in an activity that demands one’s full concentration and 
cognitive engagement. By this understanding, immersion can be used to describe the mode 
in which the player engages with games – such as Tetris (Pajitnov 1984) – that are not 
immersive in the sense of transportation. It is in this sense that Laura Ermi and Frans 
Mäyrä argue that immersion is founded on “challenge” as much as on sensory reception of 
the gameworld (2005, 8). Similarly, Jon Dovey and Helen Kennedy write that “the quality 
of immersion or engagement within the game world may account for the ways in which a 
sense of time or physical discomfort may recede as the player’s skill develops” (2006, 8): 
a phrasing which reveals the proximity (one can almost say the overlap) between this 
second understanding of immersion and notions such as engagement or flow 
(Csikszentmihalyi 1990), a parallel Jan-Noël Thon makes explicit in his discussion of 
what he terms “ludic immersion” (2008, 37).6 
Clearly, as Calleja writes, “the terms might be the same, but the experiential 
phenomenon they are investigating is not” (2011, 32). The perceptual modes referred to 
by transportation and absorption refer to entirely separate qualities of experience that are 
both, in their distinct ways, key to understanding player experience. Calleja makes the 
point that what ultimately separates the two is that, in the case of absorption, “the player 
remains in conceptual rather than inhabited space” (ibid., 28). It is for this reason that 
“the absorption sense of immersion jettisons a history of application in the context of virtual 
environments” (ibid., 27).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 As an interesting aside, we might pause for a moment and reflect on the fact that many of these 
metaphorically-motivated concepts – certainly immersion, absorption and flow – draw from the same 
source domain, invoking imagery of water and human being’s negotiations with it. 
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4.2.3 Presence (or telepresence) 
In this light, Alison McMahan’s statement that “immersion has become an excessively 
vague, all-inclusive concept” (2003, 67) and that a new term is therefore required, would 
seem hard to disagree with. As an alternative, McMahan suggests the notion of presence. 
As a formalized concept, presence owes its origin to Marvin Minsky’s coining of the term 
telepresence in 1980, to refer to the sense of inhabiting a space from which one is physically 
removed that results from remotely operating machinery (Minsky 1980). In the literature 
on VR, Jonathan Steuer defined the term as “the experience of presence in an environment by 
means of a communication medium” (1992, 76), differentiating it from ‘normal’ presence, 
which describes “the natural perception of an environment” (ibid.). Thomas Sheridan 
(1992) further distinguished between telepresence and virtual presence, that is, presence in 
virtual environments, but this (not insignificant) distinction was soon largely dropped: as 
Calleja notes, “later, articles in presence theory dropped “telepresence” altogether and 
used “presence” to refer to experiences in both virtual and actual environments” (2011, 
19). It is even the case that telepresence has been used specifically to refer to engagement in 
virtual environments: Laurie Taylor, for instance, writes that “the telepresent state is 
based on existing in multiple conceptual spatial domains,” and that the notion is thereby 
key to understanding player experience of being-in-the-gameworld (2003). Similarly, 
Peter Bayliss (2007) makes a case for the continued distinction between presence and 
telepresence, arguing that the latter term is a better fit for the aesthetic mechanism at work 
in games in virtual environments.    
The distinction between presence and telepresence is therefore rather hazy – 
moreover, that between presence itself and the notion of immersion against which it has 
been defined is no clearer. For her definition of the concept, McMahan draws primarily 
on the work of Matthew Lombard and Theresa Ditton, who themselves define presence as 
“the artificial sense that a user has in a virtual environment that the environment is 
unmediated” (Lombard and Ditton 1997, 9). This understanding of presence, resting, as 
Lombard and Ditton stress, on “the perceptual illusion of non-mediation” (ibid.), brings 
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the notion of presence into close proximity with the idea of immediacy, the supposed 
disappearance or complete transparency of the medium of presentation and the 
subsequent impression of that which is presented as being “really there” – witness, for 
instance, Jay David Bolter and Richard Grusin’s suggestion of the notion of transparent 
immediacy (1999, 23).7  
Far from offering a distinct conceptual alternative to immersion, presence seems to 
cover very similar ground. We might even say that “immersion and presence do not 
actually fall very far from each other, and are in fact often used as synonyms” (Ermi & 
Mäyrä 2005, 4). Such is the case, for example, when Geoff King and Tanya Krzywinska 
write that “games create for the player an impression of virtual presence within the 
gamescape, a mediated sense of spatial immersion within the on-screen world” (2003, 
108). Not only do Lombard and Ditton list ‘transportation’ as one of the key aspects of 
the sensation of presence, as it was for immersion, but immersion itself is listed as one of 
the constitutive factors of presence. McMahan follows the same path, listing “the degree 
of immersiveness generated by the interface” (2003, 72) as one of the factors that 
contribute to a sense of presence. Immersion and presence continue to circle the same 
aesthetic structure and to bleed into each other.  
 
4.2.4 Immersion reconsidered? 
It might appear that the only possible conclusion is that the notion of immersion can 
only take this investigation so far. This is certainly the position Calleja takes, suggesting 
that “any treatment of the experientially complex phenomenon of presence in virtual 
environments must first consider the structure of its key prerequisite: involvement” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  The framing of videogames through the notion of immediacy is questionable, especially given 
the extent to which many videogames foregrounded their formal, generic and stylistic codes of 
representation, whether these are adopted from other media or endemic to videogames: a game 
such as Jet Set Radio (Smilebit 2000), whose cel-shaded graphics reference comics and hand-drawn 
animations and interlace these influences with an aestheticized foregrounding of its ludic 
interface elements, is a perfect example of this. Crucially, however, this does not in any way mean 
that Jet Set Radio does not generate a sense of being-there for its player. This sense, then, appears 
not to be as tightly linked to a ‘transparent’ mode of representation as it has been made out to be. 
I shall return to this point in section 8.3.	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(2011, 34). Despite the evident problems with immersion as a working concept, and 
despite the undoubted usefulness of the seven-dimensional player involvement model 
Calleja goes on to develop, his stance here is problematic. The multi-dimensional model 
of involvement Calleja suggests appears to more adequately describe, to use his own 
terms, the player’s sense of absorption rather than transportation. As such, in proposing 
involvement as an alternative to immersion, Calleja seems to fall into the same trap he 
identifies – that of conflating the senses of immersion as absorption and as 
transportation. 
Before discarding the concept out of hand, it might serve us well to reconsider 
the term in order to unpack the assumptions it conceals regarding the player’s 
engagement with the gameworld. The key insights into the nature of the player’s sense of 
being-in-the-gameworld that we can extract from the notion of immersion – both as 
expressed in Murray’s admittedly under-theorized usage of the term, and in the 
theoretical work that has followed in its wake – can be summarized in two points that I 
shall take as the first steps towards achieving a concrete understanding of the structure of 
the ludic subject-position: a sensory engagement with the gameworld as world, and a 
capacity to take action upon the objects of the gameworld. In another indication of the 
congruence between the discourse of immersion and that of presence and telepresence, it 
bears pointing out that these two criteria into which Murray’s understanding of 
immersion can be broken down are perfectly aligned with the two criteria determining 
telepresence as theorized by Steuer – vividness, which “refers to the ability of a technology 
to provide a sensorially rich mediated environment” and interactivity, which “refers to the 
degree to which users of a medium can influence the form or content of the mediated 
environment” (1992, 80). I shall look at each of these two criteria in turn below, using, in 
order to overcome the limitations of the term immersion, the respective terms recentering 
and agency, and aiming to demonstrate that the aspects of being-in-the-gameworld the 
two terms describe both directly imply the presence of the ludic subject.  
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4.3 Recentering 
 
I have already noted that, for Murray, immersion is defined as the takeover of one’s 
“whole perceptual apparatus” by sensory intuitions that relate to the gameworld. In this, 
Murray echoes Brenda Laurel’s discussion of “sensory immersion” (1991, 21), and is in 
turn followed by Ermi and Mäyrä’s listing of “sensory immersion” as one of the key 
dimensions of the phenomenon (2005, 7). As simple a formulation as this may seem, a 
consideration of its implications reveals a number of difficulties. These are, in order: the 
tendency towards technological determinism, the untenability of the claim to total 
sensory immersion, and the lack of an engagement with the phenomenal structure of 
sensory experience.  
 
4.3.1 The conceptual difficulties with sensory immersion 
The first difficulty we encounter if we adopt the sensory understanding of immersion is 
that it paves the way for the tendency towards “technological determinism” that Calleja 
identifies as being inherent to discussions of immersion (2011, 33), which suggests a 
relation of direct proportionality between the degree of immersion and the fidelity of 
representation achieved by the technological apparatus of the medium. Steuer’s 
discussion of the criterion of vividness in VR is indicative here – the degree of vividness is 
theorized as depending on sensory breadth (the number of senses engaged) and depth 
(the resolution of each sensory channel) (1992, 81). Murray herself cautions against this 
misinterpretation of the sensory dimension of immersion in her later writing (2012, 101), 
but it is to this conclusion that the notion, unless properly qualified, would lead.  
 The argument for technological determinism (that higher technological fidelity leads 
to greater immersion) cannot remain so simple once the unspoken middle term in the 
equation – the matter of realism of representation – is brought to the fore. A look at the 
history of the term realism in representational art – whether in the visual arts, literature, 
drama or cinema – reveals a vexed, shifting term, whose meaning changes with the 
fashions and conventions of the cultural milieu within which it is uttered (Auerbach 
149	  	  
1953). For this reason, associating fidelity of representation with realism and realism with 
a sense of immersion is untenable: neither of these connections holds, the first because 
realism is a matter of convention and not of fidelity, the second because realism remains 
a function of mediation rather than immediacy, albeit one that enacts a conventionalized 
effacement of its own process of representation.  
The other problems underlying the notion of sensory immersion are even more 
fundamental. One which is brought to the fore in Murray’s definition can be identified in 
the suggestion that immersion depends on the takeover by the game of the player’s “whole 
perceptual apparatus”- in other words, entirely obscuring the player’s awareness of, and 
engagement with, the actual world in which she is present as a player. That this is the 
logical end point of an unexamined notion of sensory immersion is also evident in 
Steuer’s assertion that “it is possible that we will some day have systems capable of 
passing a “perceptual Turing test”,” thanks to “media systems whose representations are 
perceptually indistinguishable from their real-world counterparts” (1992, 84) – moreover, 
it is precisely this impetus towards the all-encompassing simulacrum that drives the 
tradition Grau (2003) identifies under the name of virtual art.  
This is what Salen and Zimmerman rightly critique as the “immersive fallacy” 
(2004, 450), and it is open to criticism from a number of directions. At the risk of stating 
the obvious, if applied to existing games and game medialities, the claim is demonstrably 
false. In almost any imaginable physical situation of engagement with a game, the game 
will only occupy a portion of the player’s perceptual field: the borders of the screen 
remain visible at all times, and, even if the player is entirely focused on the sensory datum 
of the screen, this must inevitably be perceived as a figure against the ground of the 
player’s physical situation. In this matter, we can adopt, mutatis mutandis, Sobchack’s 
observation regarding the cinema: 
Materially embodied, particularly situated, and informed by an intending 
consciousness that has its own “projects” in the world, I am never so vacuous as 
to be completely “in-formed” by even the most insinuating or overwhelming 
film. (1992, 24) 
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No matter how little it may be the object of intentional focus, the darkened living room 
continues to constitute the background to the player’s experience of the game. Even in 
cases of engagement with a game by means of VR technology, which would appear 
better positioned to actuate a takeover of the player’s entire perceptual apparatus, the 
player is still privy to bodily sensations (cold, hunger, uncomfortable itches, etc.) that 
intend phenomena which cannot be attributed to the domain of the gameworld. These 
are not difficulties waiting to be overcome by Steuer’s putative future media systems as 
they gain in the breadth and depth of their representative capacity, but symptoms of the 
fundamental fact that immersion – or (tele)presence – understood thus is not possible so 
long as, as the film viewer or game player receiving these sensory intuitions, I retain my 
subjective cognitive standpoint as a viewer or a player in my world, thereby integrating 
these intuitions against the wider horizon of my intuition of my world as a whole.    
This should not be taken to mean that to speak of immersion at all – or, at least, 
to speak of the sense of being-in-the-gameworld that the term ‘immersion’ addresses – is 
to speak in error. Instead, it should serve to recall the discussion in section 2.4 regarding 
the dual structure of the player’s perspectival situatedness towards the game, according to 
which the player engages with the game both from the internal perspective resulting from 
a subjective standpoint located within the gameworld, and, simultaneously, from an 
external perspective upon the game as a discrete, textual artefact. Thus, while the external 
perspective gives the lie to any notion of ‘total’ immersion in the gameworld, what it 
frames in the form of first-order experience from the internal perspective is, in fact – 
thanks to the establishment of a standpoint internal to the gameworld – 
phenomenologically characterized by the sense of being-in-the-gameworld that can be 
termed ‘immersion’. Ludic experience is a much more complicated, multi-layered affair 
than any notion of total immersion can account for, involving multiple levels of 
engagement and awareness and overlapping framings of the status of the gameworld and 
of the player’s existence both within and outside it.   
The final problem with the notion of sensory immersion relates back to the 
investigation into the phenomenology of gameworld experience in Chapter 3. As the 
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datum of intentional perception, sensory experience implies not only that which is given, but 
also the perceiving subject to whom it is given, and, finally, the manner in which it is given. To 
treat the sensory dimension of immersion simply as a matter of what is presented on 
screen and through the speakers – besides being the starting-point for the slide into 
technological determinism – is therefore not sufficient. Before this audiovisual data can 
be understood in terms of the sensory experiences it constitutes, it is necessary to couch 
it in terms of the relation between it and the subject for whom it is to be given as an 
experience. This crucial question is one that the notion of immersion does not tackle. 
 
4.3.2 The notion of recentering 
Is it possible to avoid these issues while extracting a useful conceptual kernel from the 
sensory understanding of immersion? I would argue that the way to do so is to 
understand the player’s sensory engagement with the gameworld in more strictly 
phenomenological terms. This is not such a leap to take: Ryan writes that “the 
phenomenological idea of consciousness as a sense of being-in-the-world – or, in this 
case, a simulated world – is at the core of the theory and poetics of immersion” (2001a, 
14). The key to understanding immersion as a phenomenal structure, Ryan argues, is the 
aesthetic mechanism she terms recentering. Ryan founds the notion on an engagement with 
David Lewis’ development of an indexical definition of actuality, which I have already 
drawn on in section 2.4, and which refers to the idea that “‘actual’ is indexical, like ‘I’ or 
‘here’, or ‘now’: it depends for its reference on the circumstance of the utterance, to wit 
the world where the utterance is located” (Lewis 1973, 69). Or, in Ryan’s words, ““to be 
actual” means: “to exist in the world from which I speak”” (1991, 18). By this 
understanding, the heterocosmic work: 
…is characterized by an open gesture of recentering, through which an APW 
[actual possible world] is placed at the center of the conceptual universe. This APW 
becomes the world of reference. (ibid., 26) 
In Lewis’ original formulation, the indexical definition of actuality is a conceptual tool to 
be deployed in operations of modal logic: it is what allows a statement such as, “Had 
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Hamlet married Ophelia, they would have lived happily ever after” (Pavel 1986, 34) to 
make sense. Imagining a possible world in which Hamlet marries Ophelia as a modal 
offshoot of the textual actual world in which Hamlet’s rejection of Ophelia drives her to 
madness and death is only rendered possible on the basis of the fact that, “for the 
duration of our immersion in a work of fiction, the realm of possibilities is […] 
recentered around the sphere which the narrator presents as an actual world” (Ryan 
1991, 22).  
Ryan, however, extends the idea of recentering by means of a “space travel” 
metaphor (recalling, of course, the figuration of immersion as transportation, which we 
have already discussed), taking the idea of “the world from which I speak” in its full 
perceptual and subjective implications. Recentering, then, is an aesthetic process by 
which “consciousness relocates itself to another world and, taking advantage of the 
indexical definition of actuality, reorganizes the entire universe of being around this 
virtual reality” (2001, 103). What is implied in the concept of recentering is the idea of 
the recipient of the work – for Ryan, the reader, and for our current purposes, the player 
– being conscious of the heterocosm from a subjective standpoint internal to it. From 
this internal subject-position, the external view of the text as a unified artefact is 
suspended; instead, vectors of intentionality can be drawn connecting the recipient of the 
work as perceiving subject to the entities of the heterocosm, and it is by virtue of this 
intentional connection that the work can, in the recipient’s experience, come to be 
constituted as a lifeworld, that is, a world in the sense of an experiential dimension.  
 This is not uncharted territory: I am merely restating what I have already noted 
when, in attempting to pin down the meaning of the term ‘gameworld’, the ludic subject-
position came to the fore as the necessary corollary of the sense of the game as an 
experiential domain. Moreover, it also aligns with the discussion of the intentional 
structure of consciousness in section 3.1. Recall that this understanding is founded upon 
an essential inseparability of perceiving subject and perceived world: as Edmund Husserl 
wrote, the world is brought forth into consciousness as “my world-about-me”, as an 
experiential structure that exists for me, organized around my subjective standpoint within 
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it, and, inseparably, becoming also “the world in which I find myself”, that is, the world 
against which I can come into view as a subject (2012[1913], 53). 
 
4.3.3 Recentering and the ludic subject 
The idea of immersion as sensory engagement, then, needs to be reformulated to account 
for the structure of subjective recentering. It is too simple to say that receiving sensory 
impressions relating to the gameworld gives the player the sense of being-in-the-
gameworld; such a statement tells us something about what is seen, but nothing about who 
it is seen by, and, hence, nothing about the nature of the seeing. In order to describe the 
experiential structure of being-in-the-gameworld, then, we must flesh out Ryan’s notion 
of recentering by considering the manner in which acts of perception, by which sensory 
intuition is given to the perceiver, are determined bilaterally, containing within them 
reference both to the object and subject of perception.  
To illustrate this point, I shall return to the example I used in Chapter 3 to 
portray the perception of a game component as the minimal unit of experience in the 
gameworld: the perception of a tree in Minecraft (Mojang 2011). In this case, it is simple 
to say that the Minecraft-tree is the object of the player’s intentional act of perception, and, 
as such, constitutes the act’s noematic content. However, it is not enough to say that the 
Minecraft-tree is the content of the act of perception (its “intentional matter,” to use 
another of Husserl’s phrases). As Husserl writes, the matter of an intentional act is: 
…that element in an act which first gives it reference to an object, and reference so wholly 
definite that it not merely fixes the object meant in a general way, but also the precise way in 
which it is meant. (1973[1900], 589, italics in original) 
In other words, the matter of a particular act is not simply the object that is intended, but 
also the specific manner in which it is intended. Let us imagine that the tree is of a new kind 
that the player has never seen; conversely, let us imagine that the very same tree is of a 
kind the player has already encountered hundreds of examples of. Or, alternatively, we 
might posit a situation in which the player is desperate for wood in order to complete a 
crafting project, and, being in a tree-scarce mesa biome, this same tree is the only tree in 
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sight. We can keep going: we can think of a situation where the player glimpses the tree 
in the distance, or, alternatively, a situation where the player emerges from a cave right in 
the tree’s shadow and perceives it looming overhead.  
In all these cases, the tree, as object intended for the player, is one and the same; 
however, in each of these cases, we encounter a different intentional act bearing a 
different matter. In the first case, the matter of the act of perception is the tree-as-novum, 
striking in its novelty as a new element that needs to be added to the player’s 
understanding of the gameworld. In the second case, the tree is intended as a 
manifestation of a familiar category, and is, in fact, unlikely to hold the player’s attention 
long. In the third case, it is the tree-as-standing-reserve,8 as a repository of wood that can 
be put towards a desired purpose. In the fourth and fifth cases, the focus is on the tree’s 
visual qualities, but seen through divergent framings: in one case, as distant, small, visible 
perhaps only as a dark shape against the horizon, and, in the other case, as large, close, 
presenting to perception details such as the textures of its bark and foliage, as well as the 
precise number of wood-blocks of which it is constituted. 
Dan Zahavi observes that “different act-matters can very well intend the same 
object” (2003, 24). Moreover, it is immediately evident that the manner in which the 
intentional object is constructed as the matter of a particular act is determined in the 
encounter between the intending subject and the intended object. In none of these cases 
does the tree, as intentional object, manifest any change in its materiality or the form of 
its presentation. Rather, what changes is the context the perceiving subject brings to it: as 
the matter of the player’s intentional act, it is given shape and texture according to how it 
is figured in the light of the player’s experience (or lack of it), of her goal-oriented 
projects of play, of her embodied position at a point she identifies as ‘here’: in short, 
according to the parameters of her ludic subject-position.  
It is not even enough to say that the gameworld is given from such and such a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Here, I am invoking a term proposed by Martin Heidegger to refer to the way in which 
industrial technology enframes the world (2004[1956]). This is a term I shall bring to bear upon a 
more detailed engagement with Minecraft as an example of ludic subject-positioning in section 7.3, 
and, a such, I shall not linger on the term at this point.  
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perspective. The establishment of an intentional mode of consciousness by which the 
gameworld is intended for the player as the world in which she is (and the objects in the 
gameworld, as the objects in her intentional grasp, being perceived as the constituents of 
this world) is inseparable from the establishment of a ludic subjectivity which is brought 
into view along with the gameworld – indeed, which is an irreducible constituent element 
of the gameworld insofar as it represents the centre and organizing principle of the 
gameworld as an ordered, meaningful form.  
The recentering of consciousness to a position from which the textual 
heterocosm – in our case, the gameworld – is perceived as actual, as we have seen, 
amounts to the establishment of a subject-position around which the world is organized 
as a meaningful world. Moreover, this subject-position cannot be understood simply as 
an empty ‘position,’ a set of co-ordinates marking a clearing into which the player can 
step. At this position, indicated by all the ways in which every perception of the 
gameworld is determined by it – and, in what Jean-Paul Sartre calls a “reflux” 
(1966[1943], 429) refers back to it, as the example of the Minecraft-tree has demonstrated 
– a figure emerges, an entity possessing an ontic existence within the gameworld, that is, 
an existence within the domain of the gameworld as an entity of the same ontological 
status as the entities taken as the things-in-the-world. As such, an understanding of the 
player’s being-in-the-gameworld needs to take into account the being that the player is in 
the gameworld. 
This being is the ludic subject, the subjectivity that is played out in the course of 
the player’s engagement with the gameworld from the perspective of the ludic subject-
position. In the games under consideration in this study, the ludic subject is ontically 
manifested in the form of the playable figure under the player’s direct control – a liminal 
entity that is upheld by the game system, and is hence granted the status of a member of 
the set of objects constituting the gameworld, but that is identified by the player as ‘I’ 
and is taken up as the standpoint around which an embodied ludic subjectivity is 
gathered.  
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4.4 Agency 
 
If the first criterion that could be distilled from the discourse of immersion is that of a 
sensory engagement with the gameworld, the second is that the sense of immersion in 
games is dependent upon the capacity to take action upon the objects of the gameworld. Though, as 
we have seen, Murray extends the concept of immersion to cover engagement with non-
ergodic as well as ergodic works, she writes that, in the case of games, the player 
experiences “immersion as a participatory activity,” enjoying the capacity “to do the 
things that the new environment makes possible” (1997, 99) – and, moreover, that this is 
the factor which is specific to the immersive operations of games. 
 
4.4.1 Immersion and the capacity of taking action 
To illustrate this criterion, Murray draws a comparison between the player’s sense of 
immersion in Star Trek The Next Generation: Interactive Technical Manual (Simon & Schuster 
Interactive 1994), a CD-ROM-based “virtual tour” of the starship Enterprise from the 
titular TV series, and Star Trek The Next Generation: A Final Unity (Spectrum Holobyte 
1995), a point-and-click adventure game. Murray contends that, despite the former 
offering a far superior sensory presentation of the starship Enterprise and the objects 
within it, it is the latter that generates the greater sense of immersion. This, she argues, is 
because it allows the player to make use of the objects she encounters in order to achieve 
her goals: “it is the experience of using the objects and seeing them work as they are 
supposed to in our hands that creates the feeling of being a part of the Star Trek world” 
(1997, 112).  
Again, Murray’s formulation here echoes Steuer’s discussion of telepresence. In 
addition to vividness, Steuer stipulates interactivity as a criterion for telepresence, defining 
it as “the extent to which users can participate in modifying the form and content of a mediated 
environment in real time” (1992, 84). Inherent to both Murray’s and Steuer’s definition, then, 
is the importance of feedback from the gameworld, a point identified as central by 
Calleja, who points out the fact that, unlike other forms of heterocosmic engagement, 
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“game environments afford extranoetic habitation by recognizing and reacting to the 
presence of the player” (2011, 29). 
Calleja’s elaboration highlights two implications for the nature of the player’s 
being-in-the-gameworld. Firstly, setting the capacity to take action upon the gameworld 
as a criterion for immersion establishes a direct link between immersion and the notion 
of agency, a link Murray herself stresses, writing that “agency and immersion are mutually 
reinforcing” (2012, 102). The second, related implication is revealed by Calleja’s point that 
this sense of agency is dependent upon an “extranoetic habitation” of the gameworld 
that sets ludic immersion apart from the mode(s) of immersion at work in non-ergodic 
media. Calleja frames this extranoetic status – what I have been calling the ontic status – 
granted to the player in terms of the demonstrable results of the player’s actions upon 
the objects of the gameworld, but, recalling the centrality that philosophy of action grants 
to the intention behind the action (Anscombe 1979[1957]; Davidson 1980), it is clear that 
we can extend this insight, tracing these lines of action backwards from the perceived 
results in the gameworld to the point of origin at which all these intentional vectors 
intersect, and thereby bringing us back, once again, to the centrality of the ludic subject. 
This continues to point to the fact that the relation between the player and the 
figure is central to understanding the player’s being-in-the-gameworld. It is the player’s 
capacity to identify an entity that forms part of the gameworld as ‘I’ that establishes the 
conditions for her to achieve a sense of habitation, of being perceptually located within 
the gameworld – even if, as I shall go on to argue, this identification is only one aspect of 
a more complex network of relations between the player and the figure.  
In order to advance further, then, we need to move beyond immersion and 
presence, to look at concepts that make explicit the implication the two terms contain: 
that the sense of being-in-the-gameworld we are grasping at is dependent upon the 
player’s existence as, in some sense, a being in the gameworld. First, however, I shall 
consider the usage of the term agency in game studies, in order to consider what it can add 
to our understanding of being-in-the-gameworld.       
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4.4.2 Theorizations of agency 
As applied to videogames, agency is already present as a crystallized concept in the work 
of Brenda Laurel, who defines it simply as “the power to take action” (1991, 117). Laurel 
does not explicitly link the concept to the term immersion, but she does, crucially, argue  
that “agency is a key component of first-person experience” (ibid.,116). Murray takes it 
further, explicitly linking agency to immersion as one of the primary aesthetic functions 
defining the interactive medium. Later writers follow in her footsteps in linking the two – 
King and Krzywinska, for example, write that “a sense of agency in the game-world […] 
can be a major source of impressions of embodied presence” (2003, 118).9   
In a formulation that encapsulates and expands upon Laurel’s, Murray defines 
agency as “the satisfying power to take meaningful action and see the results of our 
decisions and choices” (1997, 126). Putting aside the problematic usage of the term 
“satisfying” – too equivocal and subjective a value judgment to serve as a useful 
definitional criterion – this definition can be broken down into two constituent parts. 
First, Murray’s understanding makes agency dependent on the capacity for “meaningful 
action.” This is a vague term, requiring us to define the context against which an action is 
judged to be “meaningful.” The latter half of the definition also proposes a second 
criterion for agency: that perceptible results are attached to the player’s actions. 
After this initial working-out of the concept of agency, Murray's chapter 
purportedly on the topic deviates into other considerations. As Noah Wardrip-Fruin et al 
point out, “agency itself remains an enticing, underdeveloped concept” in Murray's 
application, with the implications latent in her definition remaining largely unexplored 
(2009, 2).  It is necessary to look elsewhere for a more fully-developed theorization of 
agency in games. 
 Michael Mateas and Andrew Stern (2005) develop a theory of agency by linking 
the notion to that of affordances. In its original formulation in the work of the 
psychologist James J. Gibson, affordance refers to an “action possibility” that an object 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 The prefiguration, in this quote, of the notion of embodiment – which shall prove central to our 
consideration of the ludic subject, and shall be taken up as a theme in Chapter 5 – should not be 
overlooked. 
159	  	  
grants an agent (1977), and is therefore established by means of a congruence between 
the properties of the object and the capabilities of the agent. Furthermore, an affordance 
is also dependent on being visible: if it does not announce itself to the agent as a 
possibility, it can hardly be considered an affordance at all (Norman 2013[1988]). 
Mateas and Stern’s deployment of the concept of affordances to explicate player 
agency is founded on a distinction between formal affordances and material affordances. The 
latter is the easiest to explain: material affordances are the mechanical, game-systemic 
possibilities for action available to the player: that is, the complete set of game actions 
systemically available to the player at any given point. Formal affordances require more 
explanation. The use of the term ‘formal’ follows on from Mateas and Stern’s adoption 
of Aristotelian poetics, as filtered through Laurel’s earlier deployment of Aristotle. For 
Aristotle, the formal cause refers to the overarching thematic or structural patterns that 
motivate lower-order elements (1992[350BC], II, 2). Thus, the requirements of plot 
structure might be the formal cause for a character behaving in a particular way in the 
final scene of a tragedy.10 As Mateas and Stern paint it, formal causation in traditional 
drama rests on “the authorial view of the play”(2005, 3).11 This inferred authorial 
intention remains present in interactive drama, in the form, Mateas and Stern argue, of 
top-down plot structures that provide the player with an idea of the role and actions she 
is expected to perform in the gameworld: “the understanding of the formal causation 
from the level of plot to character […] helps the player to have an understanding of what 
to do, that is, why they should take action within the story world at all” (2005, 4). 
However, there is an additional layer of complication: in Mateas and Stern’s words, “the 
player’s intentions become a new source of formal causation” (ibid.) that must be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 This is, of course, a simplified depiction of Aristotle’s poetics. However, a more detailed engagement is 
beyond the scope of this study.  
11 Mateas and Stern’s formulation here appears to subscribe to the “intentional fallacy” (Wimsatt and 
Beardsley 1987[1946]) that interprets texts according to the assumed authorial intentions they answer. The 
problems with such an approach are far too numerous to go into here; it is enough to mention the obvious 
fact that, as recipients of texts, we never have objective access to the author’s intentions, and can, at best, 
only form an educated guess at these intentions through a hermeneutic engagement with the text – which, 
of course, reinforces the primacy of “the text itself” over any unfounded extrapolations as to authorial 
intent. However, for the purposes of the argument here, we can give Mateas and Stern the benefit of the 
doubt on this point, and understand this formulation as referring to the inferred formal, thematic and 
structural patterns that the recipient can read into a text.	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integrated into the overarching structures of formal causation of the work. In effect, by 
his definition, these two strands of formal causation are already linked: the player’s 
intentions are, after all, shaped by the expectations instilled by the plot. When acting, in 
other words, the player is only taking up the suggestions of the plot.  
What is the link, then, between formal and material affordances? Mateas argues: 
Players will experience agency when there is a balance between the material and 
formal constraints. When the actions motivated by the formal constraints 
(affordances) via dramatic probability in the plot are commensurate with the 
material constraints (affordances) made available from the levels of spectacle, 
pattern, language and thought, then players will experience agency. (ibid.) 
 In other words: when what the player wants to do (established by means of the dramatic 
role or position within which the player is located in the interactive drama) matches what 
the player can do (as determined by the game system) a feeling of agency is established. 
Building on, and clarifying, this definition of agency, Wardrip-Fruin et al. define it as “a 
phenomenon, involving both the game and the player, that occurs when the actions 
players desire are among those they can take as supported by an underlying computational 
model” (2009, 7, italics in original). By this definition, the sensation of agency in games is 
the result of “interacting with a system that suggests possibilities through a 
representation of a fictional world and the presentation of a set of materials for action” 
(ibid.), and the sensation is upheld if the possibilities that are suggested to the players 
match up to the possibilities afforded by the mechanics of the system. 
A crucial observation to be made regarding this conception of agency comes into 
view once one considers the implications of understanding agency as emerging as a result 
of “both the game and the player” being subject to “an underlying computational model”. 
There are questionable distinctions being made here: insofar as the player, as implied 
player, is a necessary element in a game’s formal structure, it makes little sense to 
distinguish between the game and the player. It makes even less sense to make a 
distinction between the game and the “underlying computational model” – if this is not, 
intrinsically, part of the game as the ontological guarantee of its actuality, then what is it? 
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Perhaps, though, what we should understand by the term ‘game’ here is the set of entities 
and objects of the gameworld that are distinct from, and that stand against, the ludic 
subject-position – the “in-itself” standing against the “for-itself,” to use Sartre’s 
terminology. Putting aside the inadequacy of ‘game’ as a term in this construction, such 
an understanding would grant the formulation a stronger phenomenological and 
existential meaning, insofar as it hints at a relational structure between the player (as agent 
or subject) and the world towards which her subjectivity is oriented.  
 
4.4.3 Agency and the ludic subject 
This formulation, then, strengthens the link between a player’s agency and her sense of 
being-in-the-gameworld, and we might be tempted to say that the relation now emerges more 
fully as a fundamentally reciprocal one. It is not only the case, as Murray argued through 
the analysis of A Final Unity, that immersion (understood as a sense of being-there) 
depends upon a sense of agency. The reverse also appears to be true: a sense of agency, 
we might say, depends upon the player’s being-in-the-gameworld. 
The argument is a tempting one, but it is fundamentally mistaken. Not only does 
it establish a closed loop (agency is the cause of immersion, and immersion is the cause 
of agency) with no point of entry, but it also makes the mistake of confusing two senses 
of ‘being-in-the-gameworld’. I have argued that immersion refers to the sensation of being-
in-the-gameworld: it is this sensation that a feeling of agency contributes towards. On the 
other hand, the sense of ‘being-in-the-gameworld’ that acts as a condition for player 
agency is an ontic one. In other words, it refers to the fact of the player’s being made 
present as an entity within the domain of the gameworld.  
To think in concrete terms, I shall consider an example. In Pac-Man (Namco 
1980), the player’s agency is determined by the entity in which the player is made present 
in the gameworld, which, in this case, happens to be the bright yellow, wide-mouthed 
disc that gives the game its name. Pac-Man represents a particularly interesting test case 
for the study of agency, due to the fact that all the factors the player has to weigh in her 
relation to the gameworld are condensed into a single mechanical choice. The only 
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available input is a four-directional movement command. Since Pac-Man exists in a state 
of constant, automatic forward motion, agency is limited to making a directional choice 
whenever this forward motion brings Pac-Man to a fork in the path, or of reversing 
direction while travelling along a given path. Each choice is made as a response to a 
complex set of interrelating motivations, being determined not only by the spatial 
structure of the gameworld but also by the constantly changing spatial relations between 
Pac-Man and the other entities populating it. 
The relation between the player and these entities – and, as a result, the 
motivation for making one choice over another – is determined by the particularities of 
the player-entity. The maze that the player finds herself in is full of ‘pac-dots’ that Pac-
Man automatically consumes if he coincides with their spatial coordinates. Since the 
objective of the game is to consume all the pac-dots in a given level, at every crossroads 
the player will make the directional choice that will lead Pac-Man towards any remaining 
pac-dots. At the same time, Pac-Man is vulnerable to being consumed himself if his path 
is crossed by one of the four ghosts – as such, avoiding the ghosts might take precedence 
over reaching any remaining pac-dots in the player’s process of decision-making. 
The final factor determining the player’s choice of path is the presence of four 
‘powerpills’ in the corners of the map; consuming one of these has the effect of reversing 
the paths of the four ghosts on the map, and of temporarily giving these ghosts the 
property of being edible in the same way as the pac-dots are (that is, being consumed if 
their spatial coordinates coincide with Pac-Man’s). An experienced player will not 
necessarily guide Pac-Man to consume the powerpills at the earliest available 
opportunity, but might choose to delay their consumption to the most advantageous 
moment. Effectively, this results in a second conscious choice – and hence, a further 
instance of agency – encountered by the player in the course of a game of Pac-Man: the 
choice of when to consume a powerpill.     
The example of Pac-Man demonstrates, firstly, that, on a basic ontological level, 
agency is only possible at all thanks to the presence of an entity belonging to the 
gameworld that acts as a manifestation of the player and allows her to encounter the 
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other entities in the gameworld at their own level. Secondly, it also becomes apparent 
that the specific contours of player agency in a given game are a direct result of the 
particular nature of the ludic subjectivity she takes on – which, in the case of figure 
games, is determined by the nature of the playable figure. It is, as such, impossible to 
think of player agency in the abstract without thinking of how it is determined by the 
playable figure. 
 
4.5 Conclusions  
 
Wherever the analysis has turned in considering the player’s sense of being subjectively 
located within the gameworld, it has come face-to-face with the same implication: that 
this sense of being-in-the-gameworld needs to be established upon an ontological 
foundation. Interrogating this sense of being-in-the-gameworld, variously termed 
immersion or presence, revealed its dependence upon a phenomenal mechanism of recentering, 
which requires the establishment of a ludic subject-position for the player to adopt 
within the gameworld. This is the standpoint of the internal perspective, which allows the 
gameworld to be experientially available to the player as the world that is actual for her. 
An elaboration of the idea of recentering by means of a bringing-to-bear upon it of the 
intentional model of consciousness led to a shift in emphasis in the direction of the 
subject of experience of the gameworld: an experience of the gameworld as actual, that 
is, as the world in which one is, implies, as its necessary corollary, an existence, on an 
ontological level, as a subject within the domain of the gameworld. 
 Next, as a component of the sense of being-in-the-gameworld, the capacity to act 
upon the gameworld was considered under the name of agency. Again, a survey of the 
theorizations of gameworld agency revealed the dependence of this sensation upon the 
ontic existence the player is granted as a ludic subject within the gameworld. The 
adoption of the ludic subject-position therefore implies, and depends upon, the granting 
of an ontic status to the player, a manifestation in the form of an entity belonging to the 
gameworld and the ludic heterocosm.  
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 My investigation shall now proceed from a consideration of the sense of being-
in-the-gameworld to a direct engagement with the being that the player is in the gameworld – 
that is, with the playable figure as the form of the player’s ontic existence in the domain of 
the gameworld. Chapter 5 shall be dedicated to an analysis of the implications of the 
figure for our understanding of how the player comes to feel a sense of presence in the 
gameworld, drawing on the notions of embodiment, as it has been articulated within the 
game studies discourse (Taylor 2002; Grodal 2003; Klevjer 2006; 2012; Bayliss 2007a; 
2007b;; Gee 2008; Leino 2010; Calleja 2011; Gazzard 2011a; 2011b; Norgård 2011), and 
incorporation, as defined by Calleja (2011), and linking this to a phenomenology of the 
embodied subject as it emerges in the work of Sartre (1966[1943]) and Merleau-Ponty 
(2002[1945]; 1968). This shall then serve as the springboard towards a consideration, in 
Chapter 6, of the multiple aspects of the relation between the player and the figure. 
165	  	  
 
166	  	  
 
167	  	  
Chapter Five 
Embodiment in the gameworld 
 
Over the course of the investigation to this point, I have approached the ludic subject 
tangentially, by means of a focus on the gameworld as the experiential domain towards 
which it grants the player a subjective standpoint. Such a circuitous route was imposed 
upon the analysis by the phenomenal nature of subjectivity – which, as I pointed out in 
the unfolding of the intentional model of consciousness in section 3.1, cannot be 
thought of in isolation, but only in relation to its world. 
 However, having laid out the multiple dimensions of the gameworld as a 
phenomenal domain, and having explored the player’s sense of being-in-the-gameworld, 
the next step is to engage directly with the ludic subject itself. Moreover, the findings of 
the previous stage of the investigation have also marked out the avenue by which we can 
gain entry to the network of formal and experiential structures constituting the ludic 
subject. Moving beyond the ideas of immersion and presence, which, due to a number of 
conceptual difficulties, proved inadequate for the purpose of theorizing the sense of 
being-in-the-gameworld, I expanded upon the notions of recentering and of agency to 
demonstrate how the insights they revealed pointed to the realization that it is impossible 
to consider the phenomenal dimension of being-in-the-gameworld independently of its 
ontic dimension. 
 This chapter shall take up the task of theorizing what it means for the player to be 
in the gameworld as a being in the gameworld. Even if it shall not be taken up as the 
direct theme of investigation in the current chapter, it becomes opportune, then, to 
finally bring back into the frame the playable figure – the entity which, in Chapter 1, was 
first encountered in the form of the “you” addressed in Adventure (Crowther and Woods 
1976), and which is here revealed as the vehicle for the ludic subjectivity that the player is 
granted in the gameworld to be an embodied subjectivity. As a caveat, I should note that 
much of the critical work I shall be quoting in this chapter uses either the term ‘avatar’ or 
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‘character’ to refer to what I have been calling the playable figure. I justified my 
terminological choice in section 1.2, arguing that the terms ‘avatar’ and ‘character’ refer 
to aspects of an entity whose ontology and role in the phenomenal structure of ludic 
engagement is more complex than either can capture. I shall expand on this in Chapter 6, 
where the playable figure in its own right shall come to the fore of my analysis; however, 
during the course of this chapter, where quoted sources make reference to the “avatar” 
or the “character” as the locus of embodiment, I shall – while keeping this caution in 
mind – go along with the term used in the source material.  
 In section 1.3, when I earmarked the ‘figure game’ as this investigation’s domain 
of study, I defined this broad genre by the twin criteria of the establishment of a ludic 
heterocosm and the player’s assumption of a subjective position within this heterocosm 
in the form of an entity taken up as ‘I’. I also claimed that these two criteria, taken in 
unison, result in a sense of being-in-the-gameworld that constitutes arguably the genre’s 
defining aesthetic quality. What I shall undertake in this chapter, then, is the grounding 
of the sense of being-in-the-gameworld in an embodiment in the form of the playable 
figure.   
 I shall begin by considering the notions of the point of action (Neitzel 2002; Thon 
2009), the locus of manipulation (Zagal et al. 2005; Bayliss 2007a) and the Game Ego 
(Wilhelmsson 2008), arriving at the conclusion that, though useful insights can be 
gleaned from each of these concepts, none is satisfactory to address the nature of the 
being that the player is in the gameworld. 
 This shall lead me to a survey of the applications of the notion of embodiment 
within the discourse of game studies (Taylor 2002; Grodal 2003; Klevjer 2006; 2012; 
Bayliss 2007a; 2007b;; Gee 2008; Leino 2010; Calleja 2011; Gazzard 2011a; 2011b; 
Norgård 2011), finally arriving at Gordon Calleja’s notion of incorporation (2011, 169). 
This shall serve to underline the necessity of wedding an analysis of subjective 
gameworld experience – and of ludic subjectivity – to an investigation of the playable 
figure, the ontic entity that the player is in the gameworld, combining the two in a study 
of the anchoring of ludic subjectivity in an engagement with the playable figure. 
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 In order to arrive at rigorous conceptualization of what, in experiential terms, is 
entailed in the notion of embodiment, I shall then trace the development of a 
phenomenology of the body through the work of Jean-Paul Sartre (1966[1943]) and 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty (2002[1945]; 1968), distilling from this a set of salient 
observations regarding the nature of embodied being-in-the-world that can serve as a 
framework to scaffold a phenomenological approach to the playable figure. In this way, 
the ground will have been cleared for Chapter 6 to offer a direct engagement with the 
ontology and phenomenology of the playable figure, culminating in a mapping-out of the 
multiple dimensions of the relation between the figure and the player. 
 
5.1 Point of action, locus of manipulation, Game Ego 
 
Before engaging directly with the notion of the playable figure, in its various dimensions 
and configurations, as the being that the player is in the gameworld, I shall consider a 
number of alternative conceptualizations of the player’s subjective anchoring in the 
gameworld as an ontic domain. The concepts I shall consider here are those of point of 
action (Neitzel 2002; Thon 2009), locus of manipulation (Zagal et al. 2005; Bayliss 2007a) and 
Game Ego (Wilhelmsson 2008). The sequence I have chosen to tackle them in is one that 
traces a movement of increasing corporeality in the entity addressed by the concept. 
‘Point of action’ relates the player’s presence in the gameworld to a disembodied point of 
being. ‘Locus of manipulation’ does the same, though in this case this point of being is 
more closely attached to a playable figure. ‘Game Ego’ appears to move closer to the idea 
of a bodily presence in the gameworld, but it stops short, as I shall demonstrate, of 
providing a solid concept for the ontic or phenomenal character such a presence would 
take. As such, each of these concepts – though, individually, they fail to answer to the 
task set forth in the introduction to this chapter – shall serve as a stepping-stone on the 
way to a reflection on the idea of the player’s embodiment in the gameworld, which I 
shall undertake in the subsequent sections of the chapter.   
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5.1.1 Point of action 
The term “point of action” is one that has already come up in the course of this 
investigation. In section 4.1.4, I noted that the term was proposed by Britta Neitzel to 
“describe the position from which action can be taken” by the player upon the 
gameworld (2002). Neitzel argues for a typology of points of action organized around the 
intersection of three variable qualities. Thus, a point of action can be intradiegetic or 
extradiegetic,1 depending on whether or not the point of action is rendered as an entity 
within the heterocosmic dimension of the game (as is the case with games featuring a 
playable figure, but also, Neitzel argues, of a game like Civilization II (MicroProse 1996), 
where the player’s active presence in control of a complete society is motivated by the 
heterocosmic figure of the ruler she is ostensibly playing). The point of action can also be 
concentric – that is, focused entirely on one location within the gameworld – or ex-centric, 
when action can be “executed at multiple locations in the virtual world,” as in the case of 
a strategy game or a team sport game.2 Finally, the point of action can be direct or indirect: 
if player input is translated immediately into action, we are dealing with the former, 
while, if there is a layer of abstraction, it is the latter.    
 Taking up the concept of point of action, Jan-Noël Thon examines Neitzel’s 
model, concluding that a simpler, one-dimensional model is sufficient to explain different 
structures of the point of action. Accordingly, he distinguishes between subjective, semi-
subjective and objective points of action. In games with a subjective point of action, “the 
action position of the player coincides with the player’s avatar” (2009, 290), with the 
player having direct control of the playable figure. When a semi-subjective point of 
action is present, “the interaction with the game world is connected to an avatar, but the 
player also has to interact with the game space” (ibid.). Finally, an objective point of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Of course, Neitzel is here drawing on Gérard Genette’s narratological terminology, and, as I 
observed in section 4.1.4, Neitzel’s adoption of Genette’s models is highly problematic. This 
needs to be borne in mind, particularly in terms of how it undermines the structure of Neitzel’s 
distinction between point of view and point of action; however, for the sake of argument, this 
conceptual difficulty can be bracketed in considering the notion of point of action in its own 
right.   
2 Neitzel’s formulation here can be equated with the distinction made in section 1.3 between a 
distributed and a transcendent ludic subject.  
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action obtains when “the interaction with the game world is not connected to a single 
avatar” (ibid.).    
The playable figure would therefore represent a particular configuration of the 
point of action. In Neitzel’s classification, the point of action associated with a playable 
figure is, by definition, intradiegetic (in that the playable figure cannot but be granted 
status within the ludic heterocosm) and concentric (in that the playable figure constitutes 
the single point in which the player’s capacity for action is concentrated). It can, 
however, be both direct (as it is, to stick to Neitzel’s example, in Tomb Raider (Core 
Design 1996)) and indirect (as it is in Diablo (Blizzard 1996), where the player’s 
commands to the playable figure are communicated via the cursor). 
There are useful distinctions being made here, but, taken as a whole, Neitzel’s 
classification presents us with a number of difficulties. Firstly, there are some localized 
points of contention with the distinctions being made in the classification. If an ex-
centric point of action describes a situation in which the player can act upon “multiple 
locations in the virtual world,” for instance, it is hard to see how this can still be 
considered in the light of a singular point of action or “position from which action can be 
taken” – both terms which imply a fixed standpoint which the idea of an ex-centric point 
of action undermines. Moreover, it is hard to conceive of what an entirely extradiegetic 
point of action would look like. If the results of the actions have heterocosmic relevance 
– that is, are manifested as events within the spatiotemporal order of the ludic 
heterocosm – then there must clearly be an agent implied by these actions, even if this 
agent is not visible except in her actions. Unlike SimCity’s mayor or Civilization II’s faction 
leaders, for example, FTL: Faster than Light (Subset Games 2012) does not give an 
identity to the ‘point of action’ from which the player controls the crew and systems of a 
spaceship fighting its way across the galaxy. Nonetheless, the actions the player performs 
are actual within the heterocosm: the crew is being given orders; energy is being diverted 
from the engine to the shields. These qualify as events within the ludic heterocosm, 
rearranging its existents into new states: to say that the point of action from which they 
originate is extradiegetic is to suggest that the line of intentionality connecting the action 
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and the result crosses the ontological boundary marking out the heterocosm as an 
ordered, discrete domain. This would, effectively, erase its status as a heterocosm 
entirely, thereby breaking down the intra/extradiegetic distinction Neitzel draws.     
More fundamental than such specific stumbling blocks with the classification, 
however, is the fact that, in its blanket application to every possible form of player 
engagement, the notion of point of action is made to cover so many different 
configurations that it is divested of any specific meaning. The ex-centric, indirect point of 
action of FTL and the concentric, direct point of action of Tomb Raider represent such 
radically divergent modes of relating to the gameworld, with so little in common, that to 
refer to both of these as ‘point of action’ reduces the term to the level of a vague 
umbrella notion, not specific enough to be deployed in any concrete analytical situation. 
 
5.1.2 Locus of manipulation 
An alternative term referring to what is arguably a very similar concept is locus of 
manipulation. The notion is first proposed within the Game Ontology Project developed 
by Zagal et al. (2005, 9). In this attempt at developing “a game ontology that identifies 
the important structural elements of games and the relationships between them” (ibid., 
2), “locus of manipulation” forms one of the entries under the top-level category of 
Interface and the sub-category Input Methods. In this original proposal, no direct 
definition of the term is forthcoming. It is only specified that the locus of manipulation 
can be determined as single entity or multiple entity, and, as such, it is easy to surmise that 
the concept has a significant overlap with the concentric/ex-centric dimension of Neitzel’s 
typology of point of action.   
Since then, the term has been adopted by Peter Bayliss in his analysis of the 
relation between the player and the playable figure. He uses the term to refer to “the in-
game position of the player's ability to assert control over the game-world, whether this 
is a visible character, an implied avatar, or a graphical user interface cursor” (2007a, 1). It 
would initially appear, then, that Bayliss is introducing the concept in order to make an 
analytically indispensable distinction between it and the playable figure. Discussing the 
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nature of the locus of manipulation in this sense might, for instance, provide us with an 
excellent critical tool for describing the difference between what Klevjer, echoing 
Neitzel, terms direct and indirect manipulation (2006, 118) – that is, between the player’s 
relation to the playable figure in platform games such as Super Mario World (Nintendo 
1991), where the locus of manipulation is coterminous with the playable figure, and the 
one in point-and-click adventure games such as The Secret of Monkey Island (Lucasfilm 
Games 1990), where, although there is a playable figure, the locus of manipulation is 
detached from it, occupying the location of the cursor that the player can move around 
the screen independently of the movements of the figure.3 
However, it rapidly becomes apparent that Bayliss is, in fact, making no such 
distinction: he does not consider the locus of manipulation an abstract ‘point’ (as of 
course is implied in the term locus) that can attach itself firmly to a single game 
component, or move between different components, or not be identified with a game 
component at all. Instead, Bayliss still firmly identifies the locus of manipulation with the 
figure over which the player is given control – this is specified directly when he argues 
that “the terms avatar and character are often used interchangeably to describe the 
player’s locus of manipulation” (ibid.). The only reason the term ‘locus of manipulation’ 
is introduced at all, opting against using the more established terms avatar or character, is 
as a convenient neutral term: “establishing a meaningful difference between what the 
terms avatar and character refer to” necessitates “a third term that refers to both” (ibid.). I 
agree with Bayliss on the requirement for such a neutral term, which is why I have 
continued to use the term ‘playable figure’ rather than privilege either ‘avatar’ or 
‘character’. However, using the term ‘locus of manipulation’ for this purpose erases the 
useful analytical distinction between playable figure and locus of manipulation, and 
proves untenable when faced examples of games – such as the aforementioned The Secret 
of Monkey Island – where the playable figure as concrete existent and the locus of 
manipulation as implied formal structure do not overlap.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 In his 2012 paper “Enter the Avatar: The Phenomenology of Prosthetic Telepresence in Computer 
Games,” Klevjer appears to shift terminology for this distinction, referring instead to tangible and symbolic 
interaction. It is in these terms that I shall return to this distinction in section 6.3.1. 
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5.1.3 Game Ego 
A final term to consider is Ulf Wilhelmsson’s proposal of the notion of a “Game Ego,” 
which he defines as “a bodily based function that enacts a point of being within the game 
environment through a tactile motor/kinaesthetic link” (2008, 61). Like the notions of 
point of action and locus of manipulation, the Game Ego is aimed at addressing the fact 
that “the player does not only see and hear but is enacting a point of being” (ibid.). What 
sets the notion of the Game Ego, as defined here, apart from the two earlier concepts is 
that it is not conceived of as an abstracted point, but as relating to an actual existent in 
the gameworld – as Wilhelmsson writes, “the Game Ego provides presence within the 
game environment” (ibid., 68).  
For this reason, this definition would seem to give the notion a narrower, more 
focused reference than either point of action or locus of manipulation, in that it appears to 
refer exclusively to a subjective investment in the form of a playable figure. However, the 
examples Wilhelmsson chooses reveal that the concept is intended to have a wider 
reference, somewhat contradicting its definition. Tetris (Pajitnov 1986), for example, 
would not seem to fit the criteria, in that there is no singular “point of being” to which 
the lines of the player’s agency can be traced back. Much less can we speak of a “bodily 
based function” here. In spite of this, Wilhelmsson argues, “there is still a Game Ego 
function within this environment that allows control in the audiovisual field of the game 
player” (ibid., 63). Meanwhile, it would seem that the prescription of a necessary “tactile 
motor/kinaesthetic link” between player and Game Ego would preclude discussions of 
interactive fiction on this front; and yet, Wilhelmsson extends the concept to the playable 
figure encountered in such games, even if here “the Game Ego is only manifest through 
words and the process of typing and the player will need to imagine him or her self 
within the environment as the agent performing the actions” (ibid.). Wilhelmsson’s 
concept, then, lacks the rigour and specificity required to offer a cogent definition of the 
entity that the player is in the gameworld, and its role in structuring ludic subjectivity. 
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5.2 Embodiment and games 
 
A more satisfying account can be arrived at by considering the application of the notion 
of embodiment to the analysis of being-in-the-gameworld. There is no shortage of 
critical work in game studies that, directly or otherwise, addresses the question of 
embodiment – a representative, but by no means exhaustive, list could include Taylor 
2002; Grodal 2003; Klevjer 2006; 2012; Bayliss 2007a; 2007b; Gee 2008; Leino 2010; 
Calleja 2011; Gazzard 2011a; 2011b; Norgård 2011.  
It is pertinent to note, however, that no single understanding of ‘embodiment’ 
emerges when taking this body of work as a whole: any deployment of the notion of 
embodiment to the study of games needs to be accompanied by a qualification regarding 
what sense the term is being used in. Accordingly, I shall begin by presenting the 
development of the idea of the playable figure or avatar as a ‘virtual body’ for the player 
in the gameworld, which finds its culmination in Rune Klevjer’s theory of the avatar 
(2006; 2012). I shall then contrast this to the other dominant usage of the notion of 
embodiment in game studies – that which focuses on the player’s own physical body and 
the role it plays in shaping gameplay. Finally, Calleja’s notion of incorporation (2011, 169) 
shall be used to cement the link between embodiment and the sense of being-in-the-
gameworld, thereby establishing the starting-point for my own development of a theory 
of the embodied ludic subject in the subsequent sections of this chapter.  
 
5.2.1 A “virtual body”  
T.L. Taylor writes that, “users do not simply roam through the [game] space as “mind”, 
but find themselves grounded in the practice of the body, and thus in the world” (2002, 
42). The possession of a body is what makes it possible for the player to encounter the 
gameworld in the mode of being-in: 
…presence enacts itself as an embodied activity. It is through a performance of the 
body, in this case via the avatar, that one is rooted in the virtual environment. 
There is a material thing (albeit a digital one) that finds itself located in a space 
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and moves through it, engaging in some way with objects and with others it 
encounters. (ibid., 44) 
In a similar vein, Torben Grodal’s 2003 essay “Stories for Eye, Ear and Muscles: Video 
Games, Media and Embodied Experiences” starts with the seemingly straightforward 
assertion that “video games and other types of interactive virtual reality are simulations 
of basic modes of real-life experiences” (2003, 129): a statement which hides the radical 
assumption that the player’s experience of the gameworld is, at least in some senses, 
analogous to her experience of her actual world, and, consequently, that the player’s 
being-in-the-gameworld operates according to the same (or analogous) structures that 
shape her being-in-the-world as an embodied being.  
It is on this basis that Bernard Perron argues that what sets the videogame apart 
from the cinematic modes of heterocosmic subject-positioning I covered in section 4.1.5 
is that the game performs “an operation which returns a virtual body to the viewer, now 
transformed into a gamer” (2009, 121), when compared to the purely audiovisual 
subjectivity of the film viewer. The result of this, Perron continues, is that the player’s 
experience of the gameworld is entirely reframed, opening not only onto the 
representation of bodily existence and perception, but onto that experience itself, as it 
manifests in the form of movement within the gameworld: 
Since the exploration of that world is not under the total control of an obliging 
assistant wheeling and flowing the gamer around through the time and space of 
the fictional world as in film but depends upon the movement of the player 
character, the narrative architecture of videogames needs to be gone through – 
what the expression “walkthrough” refers to. The audiovision of the gamer is 
transformed into a walk, a run, a flight. (ibid., 131) 
This allows us to expand upon the remarks made by Alexander Galloway and Grant 
Tavinor regarding the difference between the subjectivity that is granted to the player in 
relation to the gameworld and non-ludic modes of heterocosmic subject-positioning. 
Recall that Galloway’s point is that what sets “gamic vision” apart is that it frames a “fully 
rendered, actionable space” (2006, 63), while Tavinor argued that videogames expanded on 
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the construction of a “perceiving self” within the heterocosm by “also allowing the subject 
to act” (2009, 70). These statements can be taken as two sides of the same coin: an 
actionable space can of course be perceived as such only by a subject who has the 
capacity to act within it. Moreover, I already remarked, in section 4.1.6, that what is 
implicit, but unthematized, in both approaches is the notion of the ludic subject as the 
player’s subjective existence internal to the gameworld that allows it to be brought forth 
to the player’s consciousness as the world in which she is. Perron’s remarks highlight the 
necessity of taking this a step further, pointing out that the intuition of the gameworld 
does not occur only through the sensations of “seeing” or “hearing,” but through the 
experience of bodily kinaesthetic functions (walking, running, etc.) which I recognize, as 
a player, as mine, and which can only be the result of some level of an identification with 
a body in the gameworld that is equally taken up as mine. 
It is Rune Klevjer, however, who goes to the greatest lengths in developing the 
notion of embodiment in games. In his project, Klevjer states that the playable figure – 
he uses the term avatar - “acts as a mediator of the player’s embodied interaction with the 
gameworld,” in that “it gives the player a subject-position within a simulated 
environment, a vicarious body through which the player can act as an agent in a fictional 
world” (2006, 10). The thesis upon which such a statement is founded is the idea that 
“one of the reasons why avatar-based games appeal to us is precisely because the 
principle of the avatar is grounded in, and plays with, the general phenomenology of the 
body” (2006, 9). From this premise, and building upon the scaffolding of Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenology of the body (2002[1945]), Klevjer develops a theory of avatar-
play which I shall be drawing on heavily in my own theorization of the embodied ludic 
subject and the playable figure. What is expressed here, then, is the key insight which the 
notion of embodiment allows us to add to an understanding of the player’s being-in-the-
gameworld. It lets us talk more concretely about how the conditions for the experiential 
effects which have been classed under immersion or presence are established by the player’s 
involvement with the playable figure. What these earlier formulations missed – and what 
embodiment acknowledges – is that being-in-the-gameworld is not purely an experiential 
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phenomenon. On the contrary, the player’s experiential – and hence, phenomenal – 
sense of being-in-the-gameworld is dependent on an ontological being in the gameworld, 
on being embodied as an entity that belongs to the gameworld. 
 
5.2.2 An opposing understanding of embodiment 
Before proceeding with my argument, it is necessary to pause to point out an alternative 
application of the concept of embodiment in game studies. This will allow me to bracket 
this understanding and keep it to one side – acknowledging it and drawing on it as and 
when necessary, but making a distinction between it and the primary sense in which 
embodiment is understood in this study.  
This second understanding of embodiment is, in a sense, a reversal of the first. 
Alison Gazzard articulates its starting-point by stating that “we have our own spatial 
awareness outside of the screen through our body schema, but this is not replicated 
within the gameworld” (2011b). As a result, rather than the playable figure being 
understood as an embodiment of the player within the gameworld, the focus is shifted 
onto how ludic engagement is embodied in the player’s physical, bodily being. 
Embodiment, in other words, happens on this side of the screen, not on the “elsewhere” 
the screen opens onto – or, in Peter Bayliss’ words, “rather than the player being 
transported into the world of the game, the game itself is instead drawn out into the 
player’s” (2007b, 99), meaning that it can be considered as a “playing through” the 
playable figure, which “highlights the player’s own embodiment outside of the game-
world” (Bayliss 2007a, 3). As Paul Martin puts it, this involves looking “not at a player’s 
sense of presence in the game environment but rather presence in the play space,” which 
involves a focus on the “playing-body,” that is, the player’s body in the situation of ludic 
engagement (2012, 2). 
This notion of embodiment brings into focus aspects of player experience that 
are occluded by the other understanding of the term. It lies at the basis of theories such 
as Graeme Kirkpatrick’s argument that “gameplay is a physical activity that involves our 
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hands using the buttons and levers and triggers on the controller” (2011, 111)4, as well as 
projects such as Rikke Tøft Norgård’s consideration of the player’s bodily performance 
in videogame play (2011).  
I do not wish to dismiss this understanding of the term or the validity and 
indispensability of the insights that can be gained by adopting the perspective it 
represents.5 The player’s existence as an actual embodied human being in the playing 
situation plays a crucial role in the schema of ludic engagement: it is, after all, the seat of 
the external perspective which, in section 2.4, I highlighted as being as crucial an element 
of the double perspectival structure of ludic engagement as the gameworld-internal 
perspective of the ludic subject. As a consequence of this, in section 4.3.1, I criticized the 
“immersive fallacy” (Salen and Zimmerman 2004, 453) by pointing out that – as Vivian 
Sobchack argues with respect to the film viewer (1992, 24) – the player does not entirely 
conceal her embodied subjective standpoint as a player sitting on the couch in her living 
room. Having said that, the usefulness of embodiment as a conceptual term depends on 
preserving a clear meaning for it, and multiplying its references only serves to weaken its 
conceptual sharpness. This already becomes evident in Bayliss’ expansion on his 
understanding of embodiment. Avatar-play, he writes, establishes “a feedback loop 
between the embodied player embodying the avatar whose perceived limitations and 
capabilities are then embodied in the conduct of the player” (2007a, 3). Embodiment here 
is used to refer to three different processes in both a literal and a metaphorical sense. 
Firstly, the player is embodied, as a bodily entity “situated in the particular context of their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 As a side note, one could remark that Kirkpatrick’s attempt to shift the focus of an aesthetics of 
videogames upon the player’s bodily activity in this manner betrays an unacknowledged bias 
towards action or rhythm-based games, where such a approach can prove fruitful, as opposed to, 
say, point-and-click adventure games. 
5 Nor is the distinction between the two positions necessarily as clear-cut as this might present it 
to be. Kirkpatrick, for instance, goes on to say that, despite the fundamental physicality of the act 
of videogame play, “we prefer to talk about what we do with games as if we were ‘in’ them and 
not holding the controller at all” (2011, 111). In the same vein, Bayliss distinguished “playing 
through” from “playing as”, even if he links the latter notion, problematically, to “the narrative and 
fictional possibilities presented by the character” (2007a, 3). On the other side of the fence, 
Klevjer’s notion of the avatar as a “prosthetic extension” (2006, 93), which I shall discuss at 
some length in section 5.4.1, attempts to graft the playable figure onto the player’s own 
embodied situation.  
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own experience” (Bayliss 2007b, 96). Secondly, the avatar is in turn embodied by the player, 
in the sense that the player internalizes the capabilities and limitations of the avatar – 
resulting in the curious inversion I have described, whereby it is the player that functions 
as an avatar of the figure, rather than vice-versa. Finally, the player’s performance of play 
constitutes an embodiment – in the sense of a giving of physical form to – these 
capabilities and limitations – in that these defining qualities of the playable figure, having 
been internalized by the player in Bayliss’ second sense of embodiment, themselves 
“become embodied in the intentions and actions of the player” (ibid.).     
In this passage, Bayliss makes a number of extremely valid observations I shall 
have occasion to discuss in later sections. At the same time, however, the stretching of 
the notion of embodiment to refer to multiple processes and different facets of the player-
figure relation robs the term of the specific meaning it has for questions regarding the 
player’s subjective experience in the gameworld. For this reason, unless otherwise 
specified, it is the first understanding of embodiment – embodiment as referring to the 
player’s being granted a bodily presence in the gameworld in the form of the playable 
figure – that I shall use the term for in this study. Accordingly, it is to Calleja’s notion of 
incorporation that I shall turn to highlight the challenges that need to be met by a theory of 
embodied being-in-the-gameworld.  
 
5.2.3 ‘Incorporation’ and the ludic subject 
In response to the inadequacies he identifies in the terms immersion, presence and telepresence, 
which I have already outlined in section 4.2, Calleja proposes the concept of incorporation 
(2011, 169) as a better formulation of the phenomenal mechanism responsible for the 
player’s sense of being-in-the-gameworld. Incorporation is defined as “the absorption of a 
virtual environment into consciousness, yielding a sense of habitation, which is supported by the 
systemically upheld embodiment of the player in a single location, as represented by the avatar” (ibid., 
italics in original). As this definition makes clear, incorporation, unlike the unidirectional 
movement implied by the ‘transportation’ sense of immersion, is to be understood as a 
two-way process: it “operates on a double axis: the player incorporates (in the sense of 
181	  	  
internalizing or assimilating) the game environment while simultaneously being 
incorporated through the avatar into that environment” (ibid.). 
 I shall take the opening lines of Adventure, with which I introduced this study, as 
an example. The player’s investment in the playable figure addressed as “You,” which the 
player takes up as “I,” is what allows the gameworld to be incorporated into the player’s 
consciousness as the world in which she is – that is, for the player to accept as actual that 
she is standing at the end of a road, that there is a small brick building before her and a 
forest around her, and so on. At the same time, it is only possible for her to incorporate 
the gameworld into her subjective consciousness in this way on the precondition that she 
has been incorporated into the gameworld in the form of this “I” which, on the ontic 
dimension of the gameworld, is actually present as a being standing at the end of a road 
before a small brick building. 
In other words, it is here that a term emerges that includes within it the dual 
aspect of being as both verb and noun. If immersion and presence describe only the 
experience of being-in-the-gameworld, incorporation, in its double movement, laminates 
this experiential sense of being-in-the gameworld to an ontic sense. It is through being 
incorporated as an entity within the gameworld that the gameworld is incorporated into 
the player’s consciousness as the domain towards which that consciousness is oriented. 
In Calleja’s words, “incorporation occurs when the game world is present to the player 
while the player is simultaneously present, via her avatar, to the virtual environment” 
(ibid.). Incorporation, then, can be understood as the phenomenal consequence of 
embodiment. 
Adopting the notion of incorporation also highlights the investment of ludic 
subjectivity in, and its determination by, the playable figure, whether this is as simple as 
the barest suggestion of a figure inherent in Adventure’s second-person pronominal 
address, or as elaborate on both a game-systemic and a heterocosmic dimension as Joel 
from The Last of Us (Naughty Dog 2013). It is thanks to the player’s investment in the 
playable figure that ludic subjectivity takes the form of an embodiment. However, the 
caution I made in section 1.5 bears repeating: this should not be taken to suggest that the 
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terms ‘ludic subject’ and ‘playable figure’ are interchangeable. I will engage in more detail 
with the necessity of keeping the two terms separate in section 6.1; for now, however, I 
can put the matter succinctly by saying that the playable figure is an entity in the 
gameworld, both an avatar (through a game-systemic frame of reference) and a character 
(through a ludic-heterocosmic frame), while ‘ludic subject’ refers to the subjectivity 
enacted in the player’s first-personal engagement with the gameworld and shaped 
through an embodiment in the form of the playable figure.     
Nonetheless, the point remains that it is thanks to this incorporation in the form 
of the playable figure – to put it differently, it is in the playable figure being taken up as a 
body for the player’s ludic subjectivity – that the sense of being-in-the-gameworld 
structuring the player’s experience of the figure game is established and given its 
idiosyncratic character. Given that what gives both the gameworld and the experience of 
being-in-the-gameworld the specific character it takes in the player’s consciousness is that 
the player encounters it as a being who has a body within it, the notion of incorporation 
provides us with a structure for conceptualizing the phenomenal relation between the 
ludic subject as an embodied subject in the gameworld and the gameworld as it emerges as 
a lived bodily space for the ludic subject. In what remains of this chapter, then, I shall take 
up precisely this task of developing a phenomenology of the embodied ludic subject.  
 
5.3 The phenomenology of the body 
 
If we are to agree with Klevjer’s assertion that a phenomenological accord exists between 
embodied experience of the gameworld through the intermediary of the playable figure 
and being-in-the-world as an embodied subject (2006, 90), then it is in conceptualizations 
of the latter that the former must be founded. In this section, then, I shall ground an 
approach to the embodied ludic subject by engaging with the phenomenology of the 
body espoused in the work of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, thereby setting the scene for a 
direct engagement with the embodied ludic subject in the final section of this chapter.  
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5.3.1 The ontological necessity of the body 
At a basic level, the foregrounding of the body as the foundation of being-in-the-world 
emerges as an ontological necessity. Put simply: for a subject to encounter the things of a 
world, she must have an existence on the same ontological level as the things she is 
encountering. She must be incarnated as an embodied subject, being a body that is a thing 
among the things of the world.   
To expand upon this point, I shall introduce Sartre’s division of being into being-
for-itself and being-in-itself. Developing the basic phenomenological notion of the relation of 
the subject to the world, and specifically echoing Heidegger’s earlier division between the 
self-contained being-in-itself of things in the world and human beings or Dasein, as 
entities that “in their Being, comport themselves towards their Being,” and “are delivered 
over to their own Being” (20081927, 67[H.42]), ‘in-itself’ refers to inanimate objects that 
simply are in the world, while ‘for-itself’ refers to the human subject that, in having 
consciousness of itself, can be a being for itself (that is, can be present to its own 
consciousness) in a way that the in-itself cannot. The distinction between the two can 
therefore be characterized as being that between perceived object and perceiving subject; 
the in-itself is the mode of being that pertains to things that merely are, and can be 
encountered as such in the world of experience (Sartre 1966[1943], 28-29), while being-
for-itself is the mode of being that defines human consciousness, which, through being 
consciousness, must necessarily be consciousness of something,6 and therefore “does not 
coincide with itself” – even when, in a reflective act of self-consciousness, it takes itself 
as its object, and thus becomes a being for itself (ibid., 120).7 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 This is an extremely simplified presentation of Sartre’s discussion on the in-itself and the for-
itself, omitting such basic elements as the role played by the concept of “nothingness” in the 
constitution of the for-itself. Still, to go beyond this basic sketch, which suffices for the purpose 
of establishing a phenomenology of the body that can be deployed for an analysis of the playable 
figure, would be to go beyond the scope of this investigation.  
7 Here, needless to say, is revealed the fundamental ontology of the subject which rendered it 
necessary to approach the ludic subject by means of a long detour through the analysis of its 
perceptual world – that is, the gameworld. This clarification of the for-itself and its relation to the 
in-itself lends more conceptual heft to the point I have already stated, in the unfolding of the 
intentional model of consciousness in section 3.1, that it is impossible to think of subjectivity 
except insofar as it is conscious of a world. 
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Though the in-itself and the for-itself constitute different modes of being, the 
two are, necessarily, bound in a primordial relation:  
We know that there is not a for-itself on the one hand and a world on the other 
as two closed entities for which we must subsequently seek some explanation as 
to how they communicate. The for-itself is a relation to the world. (1966[1943], 
405) 
This, of course, already became apparent, in Chapter 2, on the level of the intentional act 
of consciousness, where the phenomenon, the thing as it is available to thought, 
combines within itself a noetic and a noematic dimension – that is, the experience for a 
subject or for-itself, and an object or in-itself of which it is an experience. The question, 
then, is to determine the plane of encounter upon which the two orders of being can 
engage in their relation. 
In attempting to answer this question, Merleau-Ponty starts from the simple 
observation that sense experience involves a communion of the sensing and the sensed – 
a tangible point of encounter. He proceeds to make the case that this necessarily implies 
an ontic equivalence between the perceiving subject and the perceived object; that is, a 
presence of the for-itself within the ontological domain of the in-itself:  
…between my movements and what I touch, there must exist some relationship 
by principle […] This can happen only if my hand, while it is felt from within, is 
also accessible from without, itself tangible, for my other hand, for example, if it 
takes its place among the things it touches, is in a sense one of them, opens 
finally upon a tangible being of which it is also a part. (1968, 133) 
There is no reason to make a distinction between the senses, and if this is true of touch, 
it is equally true of vision: “he who looks must not himself be foreign to the world that 
he looks at” (ibid., 134). Again, the import of Merleau-Ponty’s observation is clear: an 
encounter with the things of the world can only occur on a shared ontological ground. 
The encounter of for-itself and in-itself, subject and world, is therefore 
dependent upon the for-itself’s embodiment in the ontological domain of the in-itself, 
that is, the subject’s presence as a body in the world. Sartre was aware of this, writing 
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that, “to say that I have entered into the world, come into the world, “come to the 
world,” or that there is a world, or that I have a body is one and the same thing” 
(1966[1943], 419). 
In ludic terms, this means, as I have already noted, that the player needs to be 
granted an ontological status in the ludic domain. This, of course, is the idea that is at the 
core of Calleja’s notion of incorporation as an “extranoetic habitation” (2011, 29) of the 
gameworld. In this regard, it is striking to note that Merleau-Ponty describes the 
phenomenal role played by the body in terms that closely parallel those used by Calleja to 
define incorporation in the gameworld: the body, Merleau-Ponty writes, “incorporates 
into itself the whole of the sensible and with the same movement incorporates itself into 
a “Sensible in itself”” (1969, 138).  
In other words, the phenomenology of embodiment is defined by a double 
movement, operating simultaneously in two directions. First, the body subsumes the 
phenomenal world into itself, as an ordered arrangement of relations and organizations 
of which it is the centre. In this sense the world as an experiential domain is incorporated 
into the body through which it is experienced. Secondly, and by the same token, the 
body is itself a sensible thing-in-the-world, and, as such, is incorporated into the world, 
in the mode of being-in-itself. 
 
5.3.2 The body as ‘first co-ordinates’ 
The foregrounding of the body as the for-itself’s seat in the world, already present as a 
crucial dimension in Sartre’s existential phenomenology and elevated to the level of a 
primary theme in Merleau-Ponty’s project, identifies the question of embodiment as the 
necessary baseline of any engagement with existential questions of being-in-the-world. 
According to this understanding, in fact, body and world are inextricable on the 
phenomenal plane:   
Our own body is in the world as the heart is in the organism: it keeps the visible 
spectacle constantly alive, it breathes life into it and sustains it inwardly, and with 
it forms a system. (Kockelmans 1970, 235) 
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My body constitutes the centre of the world as an existential sphere for me: the shape of 
the world is traced out with perceptual lines that inevitably originate from, and return to, 
my body as the zero point. Merleau-Ponty writes that “the word ‘here’ applied to my 
body does not refer to a determinate position in relation to other positions or to external 
co-ordinates, but the laying down of the first co-ordinates,” and it is for this reason that 
the spatiality of the body is not “a spatiality of position, but a spatiality of situation” (ibid., 
115). Where my body is, must for me always be the ‘here’ around which my bodily space 
is organized: as Edward S. Casey writes, if I am in a room, “no matter where I am in 
relation to the precise layout of the room, I remain just here and not there,” and “it is by 
my body – my lived body – that I am here” (1993, 50-51). As such, the body lays down 
the indexical point relative to which the lived world is organized. In purely spatial terms, 
‘left’ or ‘right’, ‘near’ and ‘far’, ‘in front of’ and ‘behind’, are deictic terms, being 
determined in relation to the body as standpoint. By this understanding, the body is the 
origo, the central point of reference for the system of deictic relationships that gives 
structure to the world as my world-about-me.  In this sense, as Sartre writes:  
…my body is everywhere in the world; it is over there in the fact that the lamp-
post hides the bush which grows along the path, as well as in the fact that the 
roof up there is above the window of the sixth floor or in the fact that a passing 
car swerves from right to left behind the truck or that the woman who is crossing 
the street appears smaller than the man who is sitting on the sidewalk in front of 
the cafe. My body is co-extensive with the world, spread across all things, and at 
the same time it is condensed into this single point which all things indicate and 
which I am, without being able to know it. (Sartre 1966[1943], 419-420) 
To return once again to Adventure, it is noteworthy that it is precisely by means of the 
delineation of such a spatial origo, and the unfolding of a scene relative to it, that the ludic 
subject-position is established: “you” are standing in front of a small brick building, around 
“you” is a forest, and so on. I have described the ludic subject-position as a standpoint the 
player inhabits in relation to the gameworld, and, on this level, the term is literal. 
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   Given the importance that spatial considerations have been granted within game 
studies – which I have already remarked upon in Chapter 1 – it is not surprising that this 
establishment of a spatial origo and the subsequent gathering of the world into a relative 
spatial situation has received considerable attention. In this vein, Stephan Günzel writes 
that “the player becomes involved in the game by being in the position of the character 
who acts” (2005, 8), and it should not escape attention that Calleja’s definition of 
incorporation specifies that the “systematically upheld embodiment” of the player fixes 
her “in a single location” in the gameworld (2011, 169).  
That this spatial standpoint is the first step in the organization of the player’s 
spatial situation in the gameworld is evident in Anita Leirfall’s application of a Kantian 
approach to space to a study of directionality in videogames, where she argues that “we 
have a capacity for exercising powers […] that exhibit a system of directions (from our 
vantage point as “origo”) which make orientation in both physical and virtual space 
possible” (Leirfall 2013, 7). This also becomes apparent in Christian Elverdam and 
Espen Aarseth’s articulation of relative game space organizations as opposed to absolute 
ones (2007, 7), which I shall return to in section 7.2.1. 
However, it is not only as a spatial first position, imposing an organization upon 
the world as a spatial arrangement relative to its standpoint, that the body gathers a 
meaningful world around itself. To more fully conceptualize the relation between the 
embodied subject and the world, it is necessary to invoke the idea of the facticity of the 
for-itself, and of embodied being.   
 
5.3.3 Facticity and situation 
I have already touched upon the notion of facticity in section 3.5.4. At that earlier stage of 
the investigation – when it emerged in the context of the discussion regarding the ludic 
materiality of the gameworld – I invoked the concept to describe the fundamentality of 
the encounter between the ludic subject and the ludic materiality that serves as the 
guarantee of the actuality of things-in-the-gameworld.  
188	  	  
   However, it is in the context of an engagement with the phenomenology of the 
body that the question of facticity, and its implications upon ludic subjectivity, can be 
unfolded in its full complexity. Though it is first coined in the writings of the 
philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1982[1794/5]),8 the term ‘facticity’ as Sartre uses it 
follows the meaning the term has accrued within the phenomenological tradition. In 
short, having already noted that Sartre characterizes the for-itself as “a relation to the 
world,” facticity can be defined as the name Sartre gives to this relation. 
At the initial level, the for-itself is in the simple fact of “its presence to the world” 
(1966[1943], 127): upon this basis, the for-itself’s being-in-the-world can be understood 
as its facticity, the situation in which it finds itself and which determines the possibilities 
and parameters of its free being. It is that contingent actuality which the for-itself takes 
on as the ground of its being and the horizon against which its freedom is measured:    
…the for-itself is sustained by a perpetual contingency for which it assumes the 
responsibility and which it assimilates without ever being able to suppress it. This 
perpetually evanescent contingency of the in-itself […] is what we shall call the 
facticity of the for-itself. It is this facticity which permits us to say that the for-
itself is, that it exists, although we can never realize the facticity, and although we 
always apprehend it through the for-itself. (1966[1943], 131)   
The for-itself can be said to exist, to be, precisely because it finds itself in relation to its 
factical situation: that is, it finds itself always already inextricably a part of being, located 
in a contingent actuality – which brings with it an echo of the notion of Geworfenheit (or 
“thrownness” into the world) which Heidegger identified as a basic quality of Dasein’s 
being, and which he in fact defined precisely as “the facticity of its being delivered over” 
(2008[1927], 174[135]). We can only apprehend the in-itself as it plays out as facticity for 
the consciousness of the for-itself: that is, as it manifests itself phenomenally for the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 In Fichte’s writing, unlike in Sartre or Heidegger, ‘facticity’ is framed as the material 
contingency that the individual subject is to overcome in a transcendental leap into idealism. This 
is a radical distinction that emblematizes the distinction between Fichte’s post-Kantian idealism 
and Heidegger and Sartre’s existentialist phenomenology; however, a commentary on this 
philosophical opposition in the approach to facticity is outside the remit of this current study.	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experiencing subject. Once again, world and subject (and gameworld and ludic subject) 
prove to be inextricable. 
It is on this basis that Olli Tapio Leino argues for an understanding of games as 
“extended facticities, extensions of the “concrete details against which our freedom exists 
and is limited”” (2010, 11). The facticity established by the gameworld’s ludic materiality 
serves as the foundation for the establishment of what he terms the gameplay condition 
(2009, 12; 2010, 101) – the condition of responsibility for one’s freedom of action 
resulting from the game’s material upholding of the consequences of the player’s choices. 
Leino elaborates on this point against the background of Hans-Georg Gadamer’s 
philosophical treatment of play – most salient is Gadamer’s observation that the player, 
as the subject of the game, “enjoys a freedom of decision which at the same time is 
endangered and irrevocably limited” (2001[1960], 106). 
At the limit of this resistance, Gadamer stresses the factor of “risk” as a 
structuring element in play, noting that it is the coefficient of any project of play: “even 
in the case of games in which one tries to perform tasks that one has set oneself, there is 
a risk that they will not ‘work’, ‘succeed’, or ‘succeed again’, which is the attraction of the 
game” (2001[1960], 106). It is against this risk of failure that the player’s efforts gain 
significance, and it is due to the ludic subject’s relation to the contingency of the 
gameworld that this risk is upheld: as Leino writes, “the gameplay condition is 
manifested in concrete aspects of the experience” (2010, 218). 
 
5.3.4 Contingency, purpose and resistance 
However, it is not simply as pure contingency that the for-itself’s finding itself in the in-
itself is given the shape of a factical situation, and hence of a meaningful existential 
world. For the purposes of a theory of the ludic subject, likewise, it is not enough to say 
that the embodied ludic subject finds itself as a thing among the things of the 
gameworld; while this simple fact of ontic incorporation is the necessary starting-point 
for a phenomenological understanding of embodiment in the gameworld, the 
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investigation must go further in determining how, on this basis, the embodied ludic 
subject can gather a meaningful existential world around itself. 
 Key to this is Sartre’s observation that “there can be a free-for-itself only as 
engaged in a resisting world” (1966[1943], 621). It is not enough simply to consider the 
contingency of things-in-themselves as “an unnamable and unthinkable residuum which 
belongs to the in-itself” (Sartre 1966[1943], 620): that is, as pure, material Other in the sense 
which, in section 3.5.2, I argued, following Heidegger, constitutes the “earth” against 
which the world emerges (Heidegger 2004[1936], 174). This contingency can only 
manifest itself as meaningful within the field determined by the for-itself’s existential 
project insofar as it is revealed as an obstacle or an affordance in relation to the working-
out of this project. As such, the factical nature of the for-itself’s being-in-the-world 
depends precisely on the encounter between its projects and this resistance: 
…it is by us – i.e., by the preliminary positing of an end – that [the] coefficient of 
adversity arises. A particular crag, which manifests a profound resistance if I wish 
to displace it, will be on the contrary a valuable aid if I want to climb upon it in 
order to look over the countryside. In itself – if one can even imagine what the 
crag can be in itself – it is neutral; that is, it waits to be illuminated by an end in 
order to manifest itself as adverse or helpful. (Sartre 1966[1943], 620) 
Merleau-Ponty draws on, and expands upon, this observation of Sartre’s, even going so 
far as to use Sartre’s example as a starting-point:  
An unclimbable rock face, a large or small, vertical or slanting rock, are things 
which have no meaning for anyone who is not intending to surmount them, for a 
subject whose projects do not carve out such determinate forms from the 
uniform mass of the in itself and cause an orientated world to arise – a significance 
in things. (2002[1945], 507) 
The crucial insight these passages reveal is the central role played by the embodied 
subject’s purposes in determining the character things-in-themselves are given when they 
are incorporated into its bodily lived-world. It is only as they relate to my purposes – the 
goals which give my existential being its teleological orientation – that the things I 
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encounter can be given a specific meaning for me – as an obstacle to be overcome, an 
affordance towards my goal, and so on – and hence take their place in the sphere of the 
bodily lived world. 
An example will serve to illustrate this point. If a Minecraft player takes on the 
project of building a hilltop stronghold, this is only rendered possible by the facticity of 
the player’s situation within the game’s virtual landscape. It is only thanks to the actual, 
undeniable ludic materiality of the stone blocks as game components, for example, that 
they can be grasped as an element of the in-itself encountered by the player: that they 
both limit the player’s free movement (by standing in her way) and make it possible in 
the first place (by acting as ground to walk on). The player, as a subject in the Minecraft 
world, exists in a relation to the stone block that allows it to be brought forth, within the 
subject’s factical situation, as something that can be quarried. It is this possibility that, in 
the first place, renders the building of a stronghold conceivable as a project.  
At the same time as they establish the conditions of possibility for the project, 
the stone blocks also embody the element of resistance that is an equally intrinsic 
element of facticity. The player, having taken on the project of building the stronghold, 
cannot simply will the stone blocks of the hillside into the configuration she desires. The 
ludic materiality of the stone blocks inflexibly upholds their contingent actuality at a 
given coordinate within the game space, and the player is required to work in order to 
overcome this resistance, expending time in quarrying each stone block, transporting it to 
its desired new location and placing it there. It is this resistance which structures the 
effort that can be understood as constituting gameplay.9  
If the player realizes her designs for her stronghold have been in error, and the 
two walls she has busied herself with constructing for the past hour do not intersect at 
the desired angle, the ludic materiality of the stone blocks as game components imposes 
upon her the consequences of her choices: she cannot simply choose to retroactively 
rethink her actions and build the walls at a different angle, because the actual 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 By the same token, then, gameplay can be understood as the effort required to overcome the 
resistance put forward the ludic material to actualization of the player’s project. 
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arrangement of stone blocks stands as an undeniable testament to her choices and 
actions, one which she has no choice but to accept. In an extreme case, this results in the 
limit point of the gameplay condition as Leino defines it: a particularly pronounced or 
repeated failure of the project of play can lead to the enforcement of a “tangible limit” to 
the freedom to play (2010, 217). If the walls of the player’s stronghold, unfinished at 
nightfall, provide no shelter from the various monsters that come out at night, it is likely 
that, unless the player takes other precautions, the death of the playable figure is the 
outcome. In this manner, the player is made responsible for her own ludic being.  
A central element in the embodied phenomenology of the world, then, is the 
organization of the world in the light of the embodied subject’s purposes within it. 
Merleau-Ponty takes the point further: it is not only the world that is given form and 
meaning by my orientation towards my purposes, but, inseparably, also my body itself. 
The body schema, my body as it appears to me as the fulcrum of my world, is a “collecting 
together of itself in pursuit of its aims,” and, as such, “if my body can be a ‘form’ and if 
there can be, in front of it, important figures against indifferent backgrounds, this occurs 
in virtue of its being polarised by its tasks, of its existence towards them” (2002[1945], 115).  
 
5.3.5 The instrumental complex and the ‘I can’ 
Before we can even talk about the question of tasks and purposes – or about affordances 
and obstacles – an additional step is required. Sartre argues – extending his example – 
that it is only against the background of the instrumental capabilities of the individual’s 
embodiment in the world that the factical situation can gain meaning as affordances and 
limitations towards the individual’s projects: 
…it can manifest itself in one or the other way only within an instrumental 
complex which is already established. Without picks and piolets, paths already 
worn, and a technique of climbing, the crag would neither be easy nor difficult to 
climb; the question would not be posited, it would not support any relation of 
any kind with the technique of mountain climbing” (Sartre 1966[1943], 620). 
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The notion of the “instrumental complex” that Sartre invokes here is a crucial one that 
deserves to be unpacked. What is meant by this term is an understanding of the world-
about me as a structured form determined by the lines of instrumentality extending along 
possible paths of action – as Sartre puts it, in a memorable image, “the world as the 
correlate of the possibilities which I am appears from the moment of my upsurge as the 
enormous skeletal outline of all my possible actions” (ibid., 425). It is within a world 
understood in these terms that things-in-themselves can be brought into view as 
significant, one way or another, to the for-itself’s existential project: “it is in relation to an 
original instrumental complex that things reveal their resistance and their adversity” 
(ibid., 428). 
 This highlights the necessity of taking a step back, and of anchoring both the 
framework of the instrumental complex and the teleology of purposes it is oriented 
towards in a fundamental bodily capacity for action. If, as Merleau-Ponty argues, the 
fundamental tenet of the phenomenology of the embodied subject is that “consciousness 
is being-towards-the-thing through the intermediary of the body” (2002[1945], 159-160), 
then it stands to reason that “consciousness is in the first place not a matter of ‘I think 
that’ but of ‘I can’” (ibid.).  
As such, it is the body as an “I can,” a range of bodily capabilities that it affords 
in relation to the world, that is the point of origin of the vectors of action that constitute 
Sartre’s instrumental complex: “there is a world for a subject just insofar as the body has 
capacities by which it can approach, grasp, and appropriate its surroundings in the 
direction of its intentions” (Young 1980, 145). The “I can” is foundational: Ricoeur 
writes that “the “I can” […] does not derive from the “I want” but provides a ground for 
it” (1992, 324). It is what is presupposed in the conscious or unconscious positing of any 
project: 
Merleau-Ponty claims that all these projects presuppose that man is able to move 
his body, to act, to perceive. […] The fact that a human being is able to 
accomplish all these different tasks involves no problems only and exclusively on 
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the presupposition that man’s capacity of moving his body and his ability to 
perceive are self-evident. (Kockelmans 1970, 275) 
The inverse is also true: if the range of bodily capabilities for action determine the 
meaning given to the world as an existential situation for the subject, then the lack, or, to 
put it differently, the exclusion of bodily capabilities that are not granted to the subject are 
just as important in determining the specificity of an embodied subject. As is revealed in 
Iris Marion Young’s feminist reading of Merleau-Ponty, in which she explores the 
restrictions placed upon women’s bodily comportment by the social conventions shaping 
the perception of femininity, if one’s body schema precludes certain bodily actions 
towards the world, this is experienced as a pointed “I cannot” (1980, 146), binding the 
subject to a limited corporeal vocabulary in the enactment of her being-in-the-world.  
Returning to the example from Minecraft, it is immediately evident that the pattern 
of obstacles and affordances into which the Minecraft landscape is resolved is determined 
by the “I can” the player is granted within this landscape (see Fig. 5.1). The stone-blocks 
are only revealed in their character as “standing-reserve” (Heidegger 2004[1953], 322), 
waiting to be put to use towards the end of a building project, because the player is 
granted the bodily capacity to quarry the stone. The player is granted enough inventory 
space to carry a certain number of quarried blocks in one go: this is both an affordance 
(in that the ability to transport blocks from place to place is what allows for the project 
of building the stronghold on top of the hill to be conceivable in the first place) and an 
obstacle (in that no more than this number of blocks can be carried in one go, thereby 
requiring the player to make multiple trips up and down the hill). On this latter point, the 
fact that climbing to the top of a hill takes more time and effort than traversing level 
terrain establishes a resistance to be overcome towards the end of building the hilltop 
stronghold which emerges entirely from the player’s bodily situation in relation to the 
Minecraft landscape. 
 
 
195	  	  
“I can” Affordance Obstacle 
Digging ability Stone can become building 
material 
Stone takes time to be 
quarried 
Inventory space (carrying 
capacity) 
Stone can be carried Only a certain amount of 
stone can be carried 
Motility Movement in space is 
possible 
Movement in space 
expends time and effort 
 
Figure 5.1 The bodily determination of affordance and obstacle in Minecraft 
 
This understanding of the embodied ludic subject intersects with Jonas Linderoth’s 
application of ecological psychology to the study of the avatar (2010; 2013), founded 
upon James J. Gibson’s conceptualization of the notion of affordance (1977). I have 
already discussed the matter of affordance in the context of the theorization of agency in 
section 4.4.2; here, however, it is now possible to emphasize the fundamentally corporeal 
nature of the concept, and the proximity it bears to the conceptual schema of the 
facticity of the embodied subject. In fact, I shall argue that, within this conceptual 
schema, the term ‘affordance’ can be used to refer to a point of encounter between a 
specific thing-in-itself, a bodily “I can”, and an existential purpose. 
In Gibson's original usage of the term, an affordance is an “action possibility” 
that an object grants an agent. The handle of a teapot, for example, affords being 
grasped. This might suggest that an affordance is a property of an object – in this case, of 
the teapot. However, an object can only grant an agent a particular affordance if the 
agent has the necessary capabilities to make use of that affordance. The teapot provides 
the affordance of holding to a human agent with a hand with which to do the holding; it 
would provide no such affordance, however, if the agent before which the teapot were 
placed was an infant who had not yet developed the motor skills to close his hand 
around the handle, or a blue whale with no hand with which to do the holding. The 
unfortunate whale, whose flippers lack the capability of grasping to which the teapot 
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handle is addressed, has to resign itself to the fact that it cannot use the teapot to pour 
itself a cup of tea. The teapot grants the blue whale no affordance. 
If a thing-in-the-world can present an affordance only if it is met by the right “I 
can” in the embodied subject’s body schema, it is also true that an affordance will not 
reveal itself unless it can be oriented towards a purpose or goal the subject recognizes as 
her own. If the human agent before which our teapot is placed has no taste for tea, she 
will have no intention or desire to use the teapot to pour herself a cup, and will, as such, 
not perceive the handle of the teapot as providing her with a useful affordance. 
 
5.4 The phenomenology of the ludic body 
 
The observations I have made up to this point can therefore be summarized in three 
points that identify the senses in which, thanks to its status as an embodied subject, the for-
itself carves out a meaningful world, as an existential sphere with the body at its centre:  
1. The body establishes an origo around which a relative bodily space can be 
organized. 
2. The purposes towards which the embodied subject is directed make contingent 
things-in-themselves appear as obstacles or affordances. 
3. The bodily ‘I can’ reveals possibilities for actions, gathering the world into an 
instrumental complex of such possibilities radiating outwards from the body. 
At heart, this is a more specific expression of the fundamental phenomenological tenet, 
which I have already explored at length in Chapter 3, of the inextricable intermeshing of 
perceived world and perceiving subject, understood as mutually implicating poles of 
intentional experience – we should here recall Husserl’s statement that the world is 
brought forth into consciousness as “my world-about-me”, as an experiential structure that 
exists for me, organized around my subjective standpoint within it, and, inseparably, 
becoming also “the world in which I find myself”, that is, the world against which I can come 
into view as a subject (2012[1913], 53)).  
197	  	  
I have laid out the phenomenological implications of an embodied understanding 
of the subject in the world, and contextualized my argument by tracing out these 
implications in practice in the player’s engagement with Minecraft. However, in arguing 
that embodied ludic subjectivity operates according to the same experiential and 
existential structures as those Sartre and Merleau-Ponty identify as determining human 
being-in-the-world as embodied, I have so far largely omitted any discussion of the 
specificities of the former. The danger in this is that of making a glib equation between 
the phenomenal nature of the embodied subject’s being-in-the-world and the embodied 
ludic subject’s being-in-the-gameworld, setting aside the matter of any specificities that 
might inhere to the embodied ludic subject and its attendant aesthetic mechanisms. 
 It is time, then, to move in the direction of a unified theory of the embodied 
ludic subject, one that, while being grounded in the general phenomenology of the body 
whose salient points I have just outlined, is geared towards investigating the way in which 
the phenomenological mechanisms I have presented are manifested in ludic engagement.  
In this regard, two existing theoretical developments announce themselves as 
being particularly noteworthy: namely, Klevjer’s phenomenological theory of the avatar 
(2006; 2012) and Leino’s conceptualization of the gameplay condition (2010), both of 
which have already played a significant part in the discussion to this point. I shall begin 
by making the case that Klevjer and Leino’s perspectives both bring into view what can 
be termed an extensional theory of embodiment in the gameworld, according to which the 
bodily space of the playable figure is understood as a extension of the player’s own 
embodied facticity. I shall argue that the extensional theory suffers from a number of 
conceptual difficulties, which I shall present. Finally, building upon certain observations 
in both Klevjer’s and Leino’s writing that already demonstrate the necessity of moving 
beyond the extensional theory, I shall propose an alternative understanding, returning to 
Sartre and Merleau-Ponty to highlight the two-sided phenomenology of the body that 
emerges as a direct consequence of embodied subjectivity, and linking this to the double 
perspectival structure of play as a foundation for a theory of the embodied ludic subject.     
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5.4.1 The extensional theory 
The starting-point for Klevjer’s theory is the claim that, “in the phenomenological sense 
[…] the avatar should be understood as a prosthetic extension of the body-in-the-
world”(2006, 93). Here, Klevjer leans on Merleau-Ponty’s observations on bodily 
extension, which is developed in the example of the blind man who makes use of a stick to 
feel his way in such a way that the stick stops being a thing for him and becomes an 
extension of the body schema, a part of the ‘I’: 
The blind man’s stick has ceased to be an object for him, and is no longer 
perceived for itself; its point has become an area of sensitivity, extending the 
scope and active radius of touch, and providing parallel to sight. (Merleau-Ponty, 
2002[1945], 165-166) 
Extension implies addition; it suggests that a new element is added to the bodily totality, 
such that the body is itself kept in play, as it were, and only modified by means of the 
supplement of the prosthetic extension. What we are left with is our existing body plus 
the prosthesis; in Merleau-Ponty’s example, the blind man feeling out his way with the 
stick uses the stick as an extension of his bodily sensorial complex. He might, in a 
moment of focus, concentrate his perceptual attention on the feel of the cobblestones 
over which the stick has moved: in the next instant, he might shift his attention to the 
sound of footsteps he hears behind him; and, in the next moment, to the weight of the 
briefcase whose handle he is grasping in his left hand. In each of these intentional acts of 
perception, as, indeed, with any act of embodied perception, there is a point of contact 
between his bodily, perceiving ‘I’ and the perceived world: respectively, the end of the 
stick, his ears, and his left hand. Of course, in their allegiance to the body as for-itself, to 
the perceiving-I rather than the perceived-I, none of these are themselves the object of 
his intentional perception; instead, they are all taken up into the same gestalt of the body-
schema, in which, then, the stick takes its place alongside the ear and the left hand.    
By the notion of a prosthetic avatar, Klevjer invites an understanding according 
to which the playable figure is similarly incorporated into the player’s body schema, 
thereby allowing us to “extend our bodies across a material divide, into screen space” 
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(2012, 24). What this might mean for an understanding of ludic subjectivity and a linked 
phenomenology of the gameworld becomes apparent in Leino’s notion of games as 
“extended facticities” (2010, 220) established for the benefit of the player. With the example 
of Grand Theft Auto IV (Rockstar Games 2008), Leino highlights the artifactual nature of 
the game object, arguing that “we could describe GTA IV and other similar game 
artefacts as extending their players’ facticities” (2010, 218): “as GTA IV affords certain 
things while not affording others, there is a finite repertoire of things which I can choose 
to do […] the artefact ultimately dictates what is possible and what is not” (ibid.). 
The underlying assumption behind Leino’s framing here is that “game artefacts 
have concrete and actual existence in the world,” and that, in this sense, they “do not, by 
default, stand out in any particular way” (ibid., 219). The implication is that the game, as 
an object that is encountered within the world of the player as an in-itself, embeds itself 
within the player’s factical situation – not, in other words, in the sense of establishing a 
new factical situation into which the player is able to project herself as a ludic subject, but 
in the sense of extending the factical situation in which she already is by virtue of being 
embodied in the world. In this sense, the origo or starting-point of the bodily instrumental 
complex whose lines of action find their terminus within the objects encountered in the 
game (such as the Minecraft stone-blocks) remains the player’s own body seated on the 
sofa in front of the television screen, or at her desk in front of the computer. By the 
same token, the Minecraft stone-blocks would thereby be incorporated into the same 
instrumental complex (and, by extension, the same lifeworld) as the coffee-cup on the 
player’s desk that she can reach out, grasp and sip from.  
While this would not erase the playable figure, it would certainly reframe the role 
it plays in determining the player’s phenomenal relation to the gameworld, bringing it 
much closer in line with the idea of the figure as a tool or instrument. More radically, 
following such an understanding, it would not make sense to speak of the ludic subject as 
a pole of subjective experience distinct from the player’s own standpoint, and, in fact, the 
concept of the ludic subject would become unnecessary, if not an outright distortion of 
the structure of ludic experience. 
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5.4.2 The problems with the extensional theory 
However, a number of objections need to be put forward in relation to such a framing. 
The first objection is an ontological one: the body that is present in and to the gameworld 
is the playable figure. The player’s own body has no ontic existence within the 
gameworld, and it is only by means of a relation to the playable figure that the player can 
be granted the “extranoetic habitation” that Calleja grasps as being central to the player’s 
experience of being-in-the-gameworld, and to meet the contingency of the in-itself that 
constitutes it as, to return to Merleau-Ponty’s phrase, a “thing among things”. 
 This objection rests on an even more fundamental one: suggesting an integration 
of the gameworld into the player’s factical situation, in the vein of an ‘add-on’, ignores 
the fundamental ontological distinction between the gameworld and the player-world, 
which I already stressed in section 2.3. On the basis of this observation, other objections 
to the extensional theory make themselves apparent. The lack of spatial contiguity 
between the player’s bodily situation and the gameworld, for instance, renders it 
problematic to think of these as forming a single spatial extension: to retain the same 
example, it is impossible to think of the Minecraft stone-block and the coffee-cup on my 
desk as existing within the same bodily space, definable in their deictic relationship 
relative to the same bodily origo.  
 In the same vein, making the instrumentality of the player’s body and that of the 
playable figure coalesce into a single, coherent unified instrumental complex, according 
to the logic of the playable figure as prosthesis, needs to be put into question. When 
engaging with the playable figure, the “I can” that this figure affords is not added to the 
player’s existing set of bodily capabilities, such that this latter “I can” also remains in 
play. Instead, the relation is one of substitution: the player’s bodily capabilities, as an 
embodied being-in-the-world, are bracketed, and, instead, she takes on those of the 
playable figure as her own in the gameworld. 
 Having made this observation, then, how should we frame our approach to the 
question of player freedom differently? The answer is that we must reconsider the “who” 
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that the question of freedom relates to. The for-itself that encounters the components of 
the game and gathers them around itself in a factical situation against which it can enact 
its project – and, hence, play out its freedom – is not the player in her embodied 
existence in the player-world. Rather, it is the ludic subject, which is not to be equated 
either with the player in one direction, nor with the playable figure in the other: instead, 
it is to be understood as the existential subjectivity taken on by the player in relating to 
the game (and giving it the experiential form of a gameworld) through the playable figure 
as an embodied phenomenal standpoint.  
 
5.4.3 Leino and “hybrid intentionality” 
Leino and Klevjer both anticipate a number of these observations. In Leino’s case, this 
comes due to the necessity of accounting for a problematic case of intentional experience 
of the gameworld. In Far Cry (Crytek 2004), if a flashbang grenade explodes in close 
proximity to the playable figure’s location in the gameworld, a particular set of 
audiovisual stimuli is generated. This, Leino rightly observes, can be described either 
through such statements as “sounds are replaced with a high-pitched noise” or “the 
image on the screen is replaced with a semi-transparent snapshot,” or, alternatively, by 
saying “I can’t see and hear properly,” which is more closely aligned with the intentional 
character the perceptions are given in the stream of gameworld experience (2010, 172).10 
 The problem, Leino notes, emerges when trying to determine the identity of the 
“I, who could not hear anything after the explosion” (ibid., 175). Clearly, this ‘I’ cannot be 
taken in isolation from Far Cry: this leads Leino to draw on the notion of hybrid 
intentionality suggested by Peter Paul Verbeek, which refers to situations “in which the 
human and the technological actually merge” into a new, cyborg intentional standpoint 
(Verbeek 2008, 391). On this basis, Leino speaks of “the unitary whole of the playing 
“I”” (2010, 227) constituted of an amalgamation of the player and the interface 
mechanisms of the game, including “avatars, minimaps and toolbars.” The subject of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 I shall return to this example in section 7.2.2, when discussing the relation between visual 
perspective and the ludic subject. 
202	  	  
experience at hand – the subject whose vision and hearing are impaired by the flashbang 
grenade – is rendered by the formula “(Player/Far Cry)” (ibid., 176). 
This, however, is a formulation which faces a number of problems. First, 
retaining for a moment Leino’s artifactual perspective on the game, which is the context 
in which the observation is made, this requires a line to be drawn, internal to the game 
object, between “the world of Far Cry” which is the domain of intentional experience for 
the subject in question (ibid., 177), and the aspects of the game that are incorporated, in a 
quasi-cyborg relationship, into the player’s body-schema to give rise to the hybrid 
intentionality that perceives the gameworld. It is easy enough to include interface 
elements like “minimaps and toolbars” on the side of the hybrid subject, given that these 
are not entities within the gameworld, but are rather constitutive of the player’s 
perceptual ‘openness’ onto it. The playable figure, or avatar, which Leino also includes in 
his list, however, is a much harder case, in that, while it certainly belongs to the 
subjectivity in play, in being taken up as ‘I,’ it is also an existent in the gameworld.  
A second difficulty is that the domain this “playing “I”” intends continues to be 
“my facticity as extended by Far Cry” (ibid.), and the intentional structure Leino sketches 
out remains fundamentally one that locates its subjective and objective poles on opposite 
sides of the divide between the gameworld and the player-world: a point which is only 
not a problem for Leino because, as has already come up in section 2.3.3, he understands 
“gameworld” not as referring to a distinct ontological domain, but “as a signifying 
shorthand […] for a subset of the actual world” (ibid.). Leino’s adherence to the 
extensional theory, then, remains unchallenged despite its modification through the 
grafting-on of the notion of hybrid intentionality.  
The final difficulty with Leino’s formulation is that it does not account for a 
second line that needs to be drawn – namely, precisely the distinction between the 
subjective aspect of ludic experience that belongs to the gameworld, and the player 
outside the game. Not having a concept of the ludic subject as a distinct subjective 
standpoint that stands against that of the player renders it difficult, if not impossible, to 
make such a distinction, and hence, to explain why, in Leino’s example, I can “see my 
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blindness” and “hear my deafness” from the outside.   
 
5.4.4 Klevjer and the “prosthetic marionette” 
Klevjer goes further in proposing an alternative understanding of the phenomenal 
structure established by means of the player’s engagement with the playable figure. 
Referring to Merleau-Ponty’s framing of bodily being-in-the-world as an “I can” wielded 
in the direction of things-in-the-world, Klevjer writes that “the defining appeal of games 
like Super Mario 64 [Nintendo 1996] or Grand Theft Auto III [Rockstar Games 2001] is that 
we get to be a different I can, stepping into the shoes […] of another body, in another 
world” (2012, 22). Crucially, then, this understanding of the ludic subject as a subjectivity 
that is distinct from the player’s own does not entail considering it as an Other: in the act 
of playing, the experience of the ludic subject is received by the player proprioceptively, 
that is, as mine; the ludic subject is essentially – and prior to the opening up of any 
objectifying distance – experienced as “I” while engaging with the gameworld. In a 
passage which deserves quoting at length, Klevjer goes a long way towards mapping out 
the implications that such an understanding would have upon the phenomenal nature of 
the player’s engagement with the gameworld. 
…unlike an instrumental extension (a tool), the avatar does not expose our actual 
bodies to the environment; it only exposes itself, as a vicarious body. In contrast, a 
walking stick, a tennis racket or a car extends the functioning of the body directly 
and sets up a new bodily space which could potentially hurt it. Perceptual tools 
do extend and transform the ‘incarnated mind’ of the body, but they do not 
themselves mimic the position and destiny of an incarnated mind. In contrast, the 
avatar […] has the capacity to project around itself its own bodily space. 
Therefore, while it does mediate the agency and perceptions of the body (and as 
such functions as an extension), it does not subject the actual body to the aerial 
ecology that it mediates […] the whole point of engaging with an avatarial 
extension is that it is subjected to and resides in its environment on behalf of the 
player. (2006, 96) 
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This framing appears to stand in direct opposition both to the idea of games as extended 
facticities and to the notion of the playable figure as a prosthesis, which, as we have seen, 
is based on much the same underlying principle of an extension of the player’s factical 
situation. Rather than setting this up as an alternative to the extensional theory, Klevjer 
attempts to merge the two, aiming for a dual understanding of the avatar as both prosthetic 
embodiment and as vicarious embodiment by means of their synthesis in the image of the 
“prosthetic marionette” (2012, 27). Lacking an ontology of ludic subjectivity, however, 
the acknowledged paradox at the heart of this conceptualization remains unresolved. 
 An alternative way of framing this is to highlight the double intentional structure 
that emerges in the player’s relation to the game in the mode of figure-based play. The 
player engages with the gameworld from the perspective of the ludic subject as for-itself; 
at the same time, the player does not abandon her own factical situation outside the 
gameworld. From this intentional perspective, the game object appears, as Leino 
observes, in its artifactual nature, as in-itself – and, crucially, this includes the playable 
figure and, by extension, the ludic subject. 
 This points the way towards a theory of embodied ludic subjectivity that is 
positioned to work through the paradox Klevjer observes, and thereby to account for the 
duality between the playable figure as a thing that is picked up and wielded by the player, 
and its being taken up as the body of the ludic subject, gathering the gameworld around 
it as its bodily space. To anchor this theory, I shall begin by returning to Sartre and 
Merleau-Ponty – specifically, in order to highlight the fact that the phenomenology of 
embodiment implies two phenomenological ‘faces’ to the body. 
  
5.4.5 The two phenomenological aspects of the body 
While, as Sartre and Merleau-Ponty observed, the body establishes an opening through 
which the for-itself can gain access to its situation, there is a problem that comes into 
view: namely, how is it possible to reconcile the status of the body as it is lived, that is, as 
the embodiment of the for-itself in the world, with its simultaneous status as a thing in 
the world – that is, as an in-itself?  
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…if man were a pure consciousness (for-itself) or a mere thing among others (in-
itself) he could not be “in” or “toward” the world. Man is not a pure 
consciousness because a pure consciousness is a gaze which can unfold 
everything and for which everything lies already in the open, whereas man’s 
experience must be characterized fundamentally by the idea of resistance, which, 
in turn, implies complications, obstacles, and ambiguities. Man is not a thing 
either. For although it is true that a thing can be said to coexist with other things, 
it certainly cannot transcend them, since it does not have a horizon, it is not “in” 
or “toward” the world. (Kockelmans 1970, 274) 
This problem can be considered one of the key difficulties of the phenomenological 
approach to consciousness: “understanding the way in which our body is at once a body 
like any other (situated among other bodies) and an aspect of the self (its manner of 
being in the world) is a problem of vast proportions” (Ricoeur 1992, 33). At stake is the 
risk of an unwitting slide into a Cartesian dualism of cogito and body, which can only be 
avoided through a successful integration of these two phenomenal dimensions within a 
unified phenomenology of the body. 
The difficulty was already tackled by Husserl, who argued that, while I do indeed 
encounter my body as one of the things in the world, I encounter it in a mode of relation 
which marks it out as different from all the other things-in-the-world:   
Among the bodies belonging to this ‘Nature’ and included in my peculiar 
ownness, I then find my animate organism as uniquely singled out - namely as the 
only one of them that is not just a body but precisely an animate organism: the 
sole object within my abstract world-stratum to which, in accordance with 
experience, I ascribe fields of sensation (belonging to it, however, in different 
manners – a field of tactual sensations, a field of warmth and coldness, and so 
forth), the only object ‘in’ which I ‘rule and govern’ immediately. (1969[1929], 97) 
What makes my body stand out among the things in the sensible field of my world is, 
firstly, the ascription to it of the fields of sensation which are the world to me, and, 
secondly, my simultaneous proprioceptive identification of these sensations – and, 
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inseparably, of the body – as mine, as that which “is most originally mine and of all things 
that which is closest” (Ricoeur 1992, 324).  
In the same vein, Sartre acknowledges that the for-itself, as an embodied being in 
the world, is possessed of the same ‘thingness’ as the in-itself it encounters: “it is as pure 
contingency inasmuch as for it as for things in the world, as for this wall, this tree, this 
cup, the original question can be posited: “Why is this being exactly such and not 
otherwise?”” (1966[1943], 127). It is for this reason that the body can itself be 
encountered as a thing-in-the-world: I can examine my own hand, and, in the 
detachment of this perspective, my relation to my hand is much the same as would be 
that of a physician who might be treating it.  
However, Sartre argues, this is not the way in which our body exists for us in the 
mode of the for-itself: “my body as it is for me does not appear to me in the midst of the 
world” (ibid., 402). If I see my hand holding an inkwell, Sartre writes, then “I unfold a 
distance between it and me” (ibid.), objectifying it and turning it into just as much of a 
pure in-itself as the inkwell it is holding. The body, as for-itself, is the sensing; it is only 
as in-itself that it enters the domain of the sensible in which Husserl in the first place 
locates it. The two aspects of the body are, for Sartre, incongruous: “either [my body] is a 
thing among other things, or else it is that by which things are revealed to me. But it can 
not be both at the same time” (ibid.).   
Sartre’s understanding of the body as “a living dialectic between the body-as-
instrument and the body-taken-as-bare-fact […] allows us to understand how an ek-
sisting consciousness can inhere in the world and, at the same time, be a project of that 
same world” (Kockelmans 1970, 276). However, the strict division Sartre delineates 
between the two senses of the body is problematic, given that “this ontology is 
essentially built upon the radical and irreconcilable opposition between the “for-itself” 
and the “in-itself” in which the Cartesian dualism of the res cogitans and the res extensa is 
not only restored, but even aggravated” (ibid). 
Merleau-Ponty’s response to this difficulty is to intertwine the two aspects of the 
body: to find, in fact, in this dual nature the essence of its character as body.  
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We say therefore that our body is a being of two leaves, from one side a thing 
among things and otherwise what sees them and touches them; we say, because it 
is evident, that it unites these two properties within itself, and its double 
belongingness to the order of the “object” and to the order of the “subject” 
reveals to us quite unexpected relations between the two orders. (1968, 137) 
Merleau-Ponty illustrates this double-sidedness of the body by means of a meditation on 
the hand as both an instrument of touch and as being itself open, through the touch of 
the other hand, to being encountered as a thing-in-the-world: “in a veritable touching of 
the touch, when my right hand touches my left hand […] the “touching subject” passes 
over to the rank of the touched” (ibid., 134). 
The body, then, becomes the site of a duality that lies at the heart of the question 
of subjectivity and the self – namely, the distinction between ‘I’ as perceiving subject and 
as perceived object. Ricoeur, in making the argument that otherness is “constitutive of 
selfhood as such” (1992, 3), makes the case that the body is the site of the original 
otherness that is ‘closest’ to the self. By virtue of being a body, my body is one body 
among the many bodies making up the world: it is, as Husserl argues, primordially of the 
world. At the same time, however, it is also of the self: it is the only body to which I relate 
with a sense of ‘mineness’. The distinction between these two impulses in the body – 
mineness and foreignness, self and other, is established at the same time that “one’s own 
body is revealed to be the mediator between the intimacy of the self and the externality 
of the world” (ibid., 322). In Ricoeur’s account, then, the body becomes the symbol for 
the “primary otherness” (ibid., 327) that lies at the heart of selfhood: “I, as this man: this 
is the foremost otherness of the flesh” (ibid., 324).11 From my perspective as a subject, 
my body is indivisibly mine, it is the thing which I am; and yet it is also me in a sense I can 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Ricoeur’s formulation here is particularly astute, in that “this man” that I can designate as “I” 
unfolds multiple levels of signification: “this man” is not only the body which I am, but also, as 
Sartre argues, my historical situation, the fact that I exist in a particular socio-historical situation 
as a person of a particular gender, ethnicity, social class, family background, etc. All of these are 
facts about me that determine the facticity of the situation in which I find myself as a for-itself; 
but, precisely in saying that “I find myself” in this situation, in these facts, it becomes apparent 
that these are facts that belong to the ‘I’ that is found, rather than the ‘I’ that is doing the finding: 
that is, to ‘I’ as an in-itself, not a for-itself. 
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dissociate from as a subject, a thing I can think of independently of the standpoint of my 
subjective consciousness. This is not to be interpreted as a simplistic dichotomy between 
flesh/body and mind/soul, which at its limit would take the form of the Cartesian 
dualism I have already cautioned against. The dichotomy that is revealed in the body cuts 
to the core of the subject that I am, as an ‘I’: it represents, in Ricoeur’s term, the 
otherness I am to myself, that which Sartre was equally aware of in saying that the for-
itself “does not coincide with itself” (1966[1943], 120).  
 
5.4.6 The embodied ludic subject and the ludic self 
I am here both anticipating a discussion that I shall bring to the level of a primary theme 
in Chapter 8, and returning to an insight I have already gestured towards twice in the 
earlier stages of this investigation. Firstly, in section 1.5, following Dan Zahavi (2008), 
the distinction between the subject as the ‘I’ that marks experience in its first-personal 
givenness and the self as an identity that emerges in self-reflection was cast as the 
defining duality of subjectivity. Secondly, in section 2.4.4, I returned to the issue, making 
the argument that this twofold structure of subjectivity is crystallized in, and 
foregrounded by, the double perspectival structure of ludic engagement. To recapitulate 
the point in brief: the ludic subject as the first-personal ‘I’ whom the player is, to whom 
the internal perspective and, as a result, gameworld experience pertains, is also perceived 
as an object from the implied player’s external perspective.   
To hint at the shape that would be taken by an integration of the insight of the 
two-sided phenomenology of the body to the double perspectival structure of ludic 
engagement, and therefore to the study of the ludic subject, I shall return again to the 
discussion of Minecraft and the project of the hilltop stronghold. The activity of building 
the stronghold is mine, meaning that, in the striving that accompanies the taking of an 
action, “I feel myself active,” and the attendant sensations of being active belong “to no 
object that stands apart from me” (Lipps 1962[1903], 376). At the same time, the ‘I’ that 
is taking the action is an ‘I’ that stands apart from me, insofar as it is the ‘I’ that emerges 
from a contingent situation it is thrown into. This facticity results not only from the 
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arrangement of things-in-themselves encountered in the gameworld, but also from the 
conditions of its own embodiment: that is, its status as a thing among the things 
encountered by the for-itself as its situation.  
If matters were to stop here, however, it could only be said that the embodied 
ludic subject exhibits precisely the same two-sided phenomenology as the embodied 
subject. What makes the case of the ludic subject unique, as I have already argued, is the 
capture of these two phenomenal sides of the embodied subject by the double 
perspectival structure of ludic engagement. It is, ultimately, the same playing individual 
who performs the actions of building the Minecraft stronghold and who watches the 
actions; crucially, however, it is the same individual subjectively distributed across two 
standpoints. What is vital to observe is that, firstly, the ludic subject and the implied 
player are played out as different subjectivities, and, secondly, they belong to the same 
person. It is revealing that Merleau-Ponty writes that: 
I observe external objects with my body, I handle them, examine them, walk 
round them, but my body itself is a thing which I do not observe: in order to be 
able to do so, I should need the use of a second body which itself would be 
unobservable. (2002[1945], 104) 
 In the duality of subjectivities it sets in relation, this is precisely what the double 
perspectival structure of ludic engagement establishes, setting up the player-outside-the-
gameworld as the “second body” that can frame the embodied ludic subject in its 
perception: as Kelly Boudreau notes, “the avatar performs a dualistic role of being the 
virtual body of the player within the gameworld while simultaneously existing wholly 
external to the physical body of the player” (2012, 85). It is this mechanism of 
“autoscopy” (Mishara 2009) which allows the formal structure of ludic experience to 
reflect, and to aestheticize, the “dialectic of self and the other than self” that Ricoeur 
identifies as being at the core of selfhood (1992, 3).  
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5.5 Conclusions 
 
This consideration of the implications of embodiment has redrawn our understanding of 
the ludic subject as an embodied subjectivity, and, relatedly, that of the ludic lifeworld as a 
bodily space. Following the survey of the notions of point of action, locus of manipulation and 
Game Ego, as well as of the various senses attributed to the notion of embodiment in 
game studies, I engaged with the phenomenology of the embodied for-itself articulated 
by Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, identifying three fundamental mechanisms by which the 
body shapes the subject’s being-in-the-world: its demarcation of a spatial origo relative to 
which a bodily space can be organized for it, its orientation towards its existential project 
which makes things-in-the-world come into view as obstacles or affordances, and the “I 
can” which it allows the for-itself to wield in the direction of the world. This allowed me 
to propose a phenomenology of the embodied ludic subject positioned against what I 
termed the extensional theory of ludic embodiment encountered in the work of Klevjer 
and Leino, and built upon the lamination of the two-sided phenomenology of the body 
to the double perspectival structure of ludic engagement.  
On this basis, Chapter 6 can now proceed to engage directly with the playable 
figure in its ontological and phenomenal dimensions, and thereby to establish a model by 
which the multiple, seemingly paradoxical dimensions of the relation between the player 
and the playable figure can be brought together into a unified aesthetics of subjectivity.   
In a sense, this chapter has drawn to a close the first movement of this 
investigation: that in which a theoretical and philosophical framework for engaging with 
ludic subjectivity and its role in ludic experience was constructed. This has involved 
specifying the nature of games as aesthetic objects, which, on the basis of an engagement 
with the aesthetics of the play-act, led to an uncovering, both of the necessity of the 
notion of the ‘gameworld’, and of the double perspectival structure according to which 
ludic experience is distributed across both a perceptual standpoint internal to the 
gameworld and a standpoint external to it. This was followed by a development of the 
phenomenology of the gameworld, as it is gathered in the player’s experience around the 
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ludic subject-position as an internal standpoint; this, in turn, revealed the necessity of 
theorizing the sense of being-in-the-gameworld, which, finally, in this current chapter, 
was revealed to be the embodied being-in-the-gameworld of an embodied ludic subject.  
 Upon this foundation, this study can now proceed towards an engagement with 
the aesthetics and poetics of ludic subjectivity in practice, focusing on the formal 
techniques and structures by which it is established and enacted, and contextualized 
within close critical analyses of specific game examples.  
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Chapter Six 
The playable figure 
 
In the introduction to this study, which began with a foregrounding of the “you” the 
player encounters in the first lines of Adventure (Crowther and Woods 1976), I made the 
point that, although this second-person pronominal address interpellates the player, who 
takes it up as an ‘I-in-the-gameworld’ and thereby establishes a ludic subjectivity, it also, 
simultaneously, delineates an entity that stands apart from the player.  
This entity, which I termed the playable figure, is, as I pointed out in section 1.5, 
not to be confused with the ludic subject, or even, more narrowly, with the embodied 
ludic subject. It is, in the Sartrean terms I deployed in Chapter 5, an in-itself that stands 
against the ludic subject as a for-itself, an object rather than a subject. And yet, without 
the playable figure, there would be no embodied ludic subject, in that, in being adopted 
as ‘I-in-the-gameworld,’ it acts, in phenomenological terms, as the ludic subject’s body.     
As became apparent in the discussion on the phenomenology of embodiment in 
Chapter 5, not only is the body, as thing-in-the-world, the necessary ontic foundation of 
a for-itself’s being-in-the-world, it also structures and determines the subject’s worldly 
being. Accordingly, this chapter shall be dedicated to an engagement with the playable 
figure itself, and with the multiple dimensions of the relation between it and the player.  
In order to establish the basis for the development of a conceptual model of the 
player-figure relation, I shall begin by providing an outline of the ontology of the 
playable figure as the being that the player is in the gameworld, focusing on the distinction 
between the two primary terms that have been used to conceptualize the playable figure 
within game studies – avatar and player-character – and the divergent perspectives on the 
figure they open onto, which I shall consider in terms of the interrelation between the 
‘game as system’ and the ‘game as heterocosm’ framings discussed in section 3.4.  
 This shall allow me to move on to a consideration of the phenomenological distinction 
that is also implied in the opposition of ‘avatar’ and ‘character.’ Here I shall argue that a 
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simple binary distinction cannot satisfactorily address the complexities of the player’s 
relation to the playable figure; instead, I shall propose a model of the player-figure 
relation that is structured as an intersection of two phenomenological dualities 
determining the relation between the player and the playable figure. I shall describe these 
as an identity distinction between the playable figure’s status as self and other, and a perspectival 
distinction between a subjective and objective relation to the playable figure. In the second half 
of the chapter, I shall then provide an illustration of these multiple modes of relation at 
work by means of a close analysis of Act 1 Scene 2 of the point-and-click adventure 
game Kentucky Route Zero (Cardboard Computer 2013-).  
 The development of this model, and its being brought to bear upon this formal 
analysis, shall not only render concrete a conceptualization of the mechanisms by which 
ludic subjectivity operates through the player’s engagement with the playable figure. It 
shall also bring into view the ways in which the player-figure relation sets in motion an 
aesthetics of subjectivity, as well as grant a glimpse into what such an aesthetics would 
look like in practice. As such, the analysis that concludes this chapter shall prefigure the 
investigations that shall be undertaken over the course of the remaining chapters, which 
shall be devoted precisely to the mapping out of the structure and movements of the 
aesthetics of subjectivity pertaining to the embodied ludic subject.  
 
6.1 The ontology of the playable figure 
 
As befits a focus on ludic subjectivity, the overarching epistemological approach I have 
adopted in this investigation is that of the game as played – as a result, its constitutive 
analyses have been conducted on the plane of ludic experience. However, given the 
conclusion of the previous chapter – where it became apparent that the emergence of an 
embodied ludic subjectivity as a being-in-the-gameworld must occur on the basis of an 
ontic existence within the domain of the gameworld, of a being that the player is in the 
gameworld – it becomes necessary to shift, for a moment, into the register of ontology. 
The aim of the current investigation is to determine the multiple dimensions of the 
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relation between the player and the playable figure; this, however, can only be done on 
the basis of what the playable figure is – in other words, to account for how the playable 
figure grants the player an ontic existence (what Gordon Calleja terms an “extranoetic 
habitation” (2011, 29) within the gameworld.   
 
6.1.1 The ontological and phenomenological dualities of the playable figure 
Within the considerable body of work on the question of the playable figure in game 
studies, it is impossible to find any clear consensus, even regarding the basic ontological 
nature of this figure or the term to be used to refer to it. Broadly speaking, the two terms 
most commonly employed to refer to the entity that the player takes on as ‘I’ in the 
gameworld are avatar and player-character (Boudreau 2012, 71). This is not an 
inconsequential terminological schism. The terms reveal opposing understandings of the 
nature of the figure – which is not to say, as I shall demonstrate, that they have not often 
been used indiscriminately or interchangeably, or that there is not a significant overlap in 
their implications to a unified ontological and phenomenological understanding of the 
playable figure. Nonetheless, Rune Klevjer argues, “it is important to emphasise that the 
notion of the avatar […] is distinct from the notion of playable character,” and “there is, 
for analytical purposes, a lot to gain from keeping ‘character’ and ‘avatar’ distinct (2006, 
116). Klevjer makes the implications of the terms, and the conflicting positions they 
represent, clear when he writes that “we must make a distinction between ‘avatar’ 
understood as a playable character (or persona), and ‘avatar’ understood as a vehicle 
through which the player is given some kind of embodied agency and presence within 
the gameworld” (2012, 17).  
Game studies has tended to identify the nature of the figure as being determined 
by precisely this essential duality, even in cases where the terms ‘avatar’ and ‘character’ 
are not invoked directly. Peter Bayliss defines the figure as one that can be “considered 
to be co-temporously an independent entity embodied by its own constitution as well as 
a surrogate that embodies the intentions and actions of the player” (2007a, 4). Similarly, 
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speaking of Lara Croft in Tomb Raider (Core Design 1996), Jon Dovey and Helen 
Kennedy write that: 
Lara is simultaneously replete with meaning in terms of the construction of her 
physique and the availability of a coherent biography through which to make 
sense of her subjectivity and her actions, but also empty enough to enable the 
player to inhabit her (2006, 91). 
Again, the same duality can be seen emerging in practice in Kristine Jørgensen’s 
empirical study of the relation players of the first-person shooter Crysis (Crytek 2007) 
developed with the game’s avatar. Initially, the impression is that “seeing the gameworld 
through the eyes of the avatar creates the feeling that the player becomes the avatar” (2009, 
2). However, when this avatar suddenly speaks in its own voice, it “gives the impression 
of suddenly turning from being completely controlled by the player into being an 
individual and autonomous being with a will of his own” (ibid., 3).  
 The problem, however, is that a survey of the relevant literature reveals that a 
cluster of divergent significances have been subsumed to the single binary distinction 
between ‘avatar’ and ‘character’. At a minimum, it is necessary to highlight two separate 
distinctions being made in the opposition of ‘avatar’ and ‘character’. 
 The first – as Klevjer suggests in his demarcation of the concepts – is an 
ontological distinction. By this understanding, ‘avatar’ refers to the status of the playable 
figure as a game component, while ‘character’ refers to its status as a represented 
individual on the game’s heterocosmic dimension. Secondly – as is brought to the fore by 
both Bayliss and Dovey and Kennedy – is what can be termed a phenomenological distinction, 
according to which ‘avatar’ refers to the playable figure in its ‘I’ dimension, and 
‘character’ describes its paradoxical status as simultaneously “a different entity.” These 
two distinctions are evidently not parallel, and the fact that they have been conflated is 
one of the primary difficulties with the discourse of ‘avatar’ and ‘character’. In the 
interests of clarity and terminological rigour, I shall reserve the usage of ‘avatar’ and 
‘character’ to the delineation of the two ontological dimensions of the playable figure. 
 Dealing, as it does, with the playable figure as it determines – and as it is given in 
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– ludic experience, it is the phenomenological distinction which shall allow me to map 
out the structure of the player-figure relation, and, as such, it is this second distinction 
which shall constitute the primary focus of this investigation. However, it is only upon 
the foundation of an ontological understanding of the playable figure that such an 
analysis can be articulated, and, as such, it is towards this task that I shall turn first. 
This analysis does not send this investigation into uncharted territory. In section 
3.4, a consideration of the cosmological dimension of the experiential gameworld led to 
the identification of ‘game as system’ and ‘game as heterocosm’ as the two frames of 
ontological interpretation applicable to the player’s lived experience of the gameworld.  
The notions ‘avatar’ and ‘character’ fit neatly into these respective frames. ‘Avatar’ 
describes the playable figure as a game-systemic entity – in other words, a game 
component. “Character,” on the other hand, describes the playable figure as a 
heterocosmic entity. By extension – keeping in mind the fact that the playable figure is 
taken up as the body that lets the ludic subject be an embodied subject – it can also be said 
that ‘avatar’ is the form in which the ludic subject is embodied in relation to the game 
system, while ‘character’ refers to the ludic subject in its heterocosmic dimension. 
 
6.1.2 Avatar 
As with most interrogations of critical concepts, it is appropriate to start at the level of 
etymology. Souvik Mukherjee has explored the history of the adoption of the term 
‘avatar’ from its source domain in Hindu philosophy, where it refers to the incarnation of 
a deity in a human manifestation on Earth. As Mukherjee writes, in the original Sanskrit, 
“‘avatar’ comes from the words ‘ava’ and ‘tri’ meaning ‘below’ and ‘crossing’ respectively 
– thus an avatar is the ‘crossing-down’ of a god to free humanity from evil” (2012, 1).  
 Keeping its etymology in mind, the term describes a move across ontic domains: 
more specifically, it refers to the material manifestation, within a subordinate ontic realm, 
of a consciousness belonging to a higher domain. In other words, what is entailed in the 
original concept of ‘avatar’ bears a close affinity to the second half of the double 
movement Calleja identifies within the mechanism of incorporation, that is, “the 
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systematically upheld embodiment of the player in a single location” (2011, 169).  
 If ‘avatar’ refers to an incarnation within an ontic domain as an entity belonging 
to this domain, it is necessary to consider the ontological character of the avatar-entity –
what kind of a being is it, and how does it fit into the domain to which it belongs? 
Adopting the frame of the ‘game as system’, the most basic answer to the question, 
“What is the playable figure?” is to say that it is a game component, one of the set of 
interrelated entities constituting the game system.1 This still leaves the matter of defining 
the playable figure against the other components of the game system. One way to do so 
is to describe the playable figure as, to borrow a term from Aki Järvinen, a “component-
of-self” as opposed to a “component-of-other,” belonging to an opposing player, or a 
“component-of-system,” belonging to the game system itself (2008, 64). However, 
component-of-self is a broad category. In a strategy game such as Civilization II (MicroProse 
1996), for example, the category of components-of-self includes all of the military and 
civilian units that the player can move around the map, the cities belonging to the 
player’s civilization, and so on. These are all components-of-self, but they are not 
playable figures. Similarly, it is much too broad to say, with Daniel Kromand, that “an 
avatar will be any game-unit that has action possibilities and that answers to the player” 
(2007, 400).  
In addition to this mineness, the playable figure gains a particular privilege through 
being the only component, in games operating through an embodied ludic subjectivity, 
that responds directly to player input, translating this into output in the form either of a 
change in its own state, or in that of one or more of the other elements of the game 
system. This does not mean that the playable figure is necessarily the only component-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 In some cases, it might be necessary to speak, not of a single component, but of a group of 
components grasped by the player as a single component through a Gestalt of the playable figure. 
Such might be the case with the first-person shooter genre, for instance, where what is grasped as 
the playable figure – say, Gordon Freeman in Half-Life (Valve 1998) is actually a composite of 
several systemic elements: a camera position, a hit-box determining the figure’s susceptibility to 
attack, a hand and gun visible on screen, etc. Nonetheless, these elements coalesce, from the 
player’s perspective, into the form of a unified figure – “players do not even see Gordon 
Freeman […] but still, they seem to form an attachment to him” (Lankoski 2011, 291). It is of 
such a figure, then, that I shall continue to speak. 
	  219	  	  
of-self. In a role-playing game such as The Elder Scrolls V: Skyrim (Bethesda Game Studios 
2011), for instance, the player might have an inventory full of weapons, armour, 
jewellery, keys and so on, all of which, by simple virtue of being the player’s, are just as 
much components-of-self as the playable figure itself. However, these are all integrated 
into the instrumental complex whose centre is the playable figure: it is the playable figure 
that wields the weapons, wears the armour, receives a statistical boost from the jewellery, 
uses the key in a lock, and so on.2 What makes the playable figure an avatar, in purely 
game-systemic terms, is that all the player’s interactions with the gameworld are 
structured through it. The player acts on the other components of the game system 
through the avatar, making it the singular point of origin of all the lines of action the 
player directs towards the components of the game system.3 
 The corollary to this observation is that the avatar must, under normal 
circumstances, maintain constant responsiveness to the player’s input.  At every moment 
of ludic engagement, the avatar must present the player with the possibility of taking 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 It is certainly possible to identify games with what might be called a hybrid ludic subject-position 
– one that is fundamentally embodied within a single playable figure, but that also transcends this 
playable figure and allows the player to exert indirect control over other components-of-self. 
Mass Effect (Bioware 2007) is an example here: during missions, the playable figure, Shepard, is 
accompanied by two squad members whom the player cannot control in the same direct, 
embodied fashion as Shepard – and who therefore cannot, strictly speaking, be considered 
playable figures – but who can be given orders through a pause-time interface. In many such 
cases, and Mass Effect is emblematic here, it remains possible to conceptually integrate this 
indirect control over other entities within the instrumental-complex of the avatar: for instance, by 
interpreting the player’s usage of the pause-time interface to instruct a squad member to switch 
weapons as the action ‘giving an order’ performed through Shepard. 
3 It might be objected that it is, in fact, possible to identify games that feature more than one 
playable figure: squad-based action games such as Hidden & Dangerous (Illusion Softworks 1999), 
for example, allow the player to switch at will between multiple playable figures. This objection, 
however, can be countered by stating that, even if the player can switch between playable figures, 
she is only ever, at any given instance of ludic engagement, playing through a single playable 
figure. If I am playing Hidden & Dangerous, I might be controlling a four-man SAS squad, and, 
unlike in Mass Effect, I might be able to switch between the members of the squad and control all 
of them directly, but it remains the case that, at any moment, I am only directly controlling one 
member of the squad as a playable figure, and giving orders to the other three squad members 
indirectly. Having said this, it is also important to acknowledge the considerably more marginal 
cases in which the player is, in fact, required to operate more than one playable figure 
simultaneously: Brothers: A Tale of Two Sons (Starbreeze Studios 2013) can stand as an example of 
this. Such exceptional cases construct a structure of ludic experience that is so different to the 
embodied ludic subjectivity that is the focus of this investigation that it must be thought of as 
something else entirely: an example of the transcendent ludic subjectivity to which embodied 
ludic subjectivity was contrasted in section 1.3. 
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action – it must establish for the player a constant “disposition and readiness to act” 
(Calleja 2011, 41). Loss of control of the avatar in the act of playing (as opposed to clearly 
marked instances of “off-line” engagement such as cut-scenes (Newman 2002)) tends to 
be a dramatic event: Olli Tapio Leino discusses, as an example of this, the traumatic 
experience of being ‘captured’ by a roof-barnacle’s tentacle appendage in Half-Life (Valve 
1998), and finding oneself unable to do anything as Gordon Freeman is pulled up into 
the barnacle’s hungry mouth (2010, 39). This also implies that the playable figure as 
avatar cannot act of its own accord:4 Diane Carr writes that “Lara [Croft] is a vehicle, and 
she will only move if, as and when the player compels her to” (2002, 173).5  
It might appear that this framing of the avatar is not far from James Newman’s 
argument that the playable figure is not primarily a distinct figure at all, but simply “sets 
of capabilities, potentials and techniques offered to the player” (2002). This purely 
instrumental perspective on the playable figure, the idea that it “is to be understood as 
more of a tool than as a subject-position” (Klevjer 2006, 62), finds an echo in Jonas 
Linderoth’s understanding of the figure as “a piece of equipment, a tool that extends the 
player’s agency” (2005). Klevjer defines this as the “cursor theory” of the playable figure, 
drawing on Mary Fuller and Henry Jenkins’ suggestion that the figure “is little more than 
a cursor that mediates the player’s relationship to the story world” (1995) – which, 
incidentally, is repeated in Gonzalo Frasca’s assertion that the figure “just becomes a 
“cursor” for the player’s actions” (2001). 
 The problem with this approach, Klevjer argues, is that, “a mouse cursor does 
not make the player belong to or be in the game environment,” whereas this is precisely 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 As with any rule, there are exceptions to this. For instance, in a particular moment in The Curse 
of Monkey Island (LucasArts 1997) the player-avatar, mild-mannered pirate Guybrush 
Threepwood, is having a conversation with a gang of particularly disreputable and intimidating 
low-lives. When Guybrush is asked by the gang leader whether or not he trusts him, the player is 
given the choice of a number of withering remarks answering the question in the negative. 
Whichever option the player chooses, however, what Guybrush actually says is a glib, cowardly, 
“Of course I trust you!” Of course, Guybrush – as with many point-and-click adventure game 
avatars, leans heavily towards the ‘character’ side of the equation, and such a blatant declaration 
of independence as refusing to carry out the player’s instructions is a particularly marked 
demonstration of this. I shall return to this point, and this example, in section 9.5.1. 
5 It is interesting to note the extent to which Lara Croft seems to be the go-to exemplification of 
a playable figure for game studies, both when discussing ‘avatar’ and ‘player-character’. 
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what a playable figure does (Klevjer 2012, 18). As such, the cursor theory “tends not to 
focus so much on the question of being in a gameworld” (ibid., 19) which this 
investigation has repeatedly stressed as being key to ludic subjectivity as founded in the 
playable figure. The cursor remains ontologically distinct from the realm upon which it 
inscribes the user’s actions. 
Conversely, the playable figure is not only the player’s means of acting upon the 
other components of the game system, it is also her means of being acted upon. “If we 
recognize that Lara Croft is indeed an “embodiment” of the player, this would imply not 
only that she mediates the player’s ability to jump or walk, but also that she embodies the 
player’s risk of falling down the ravine” (2012, 18). Such a two-way relationship between 
the playable figure and the things of the gameworld is a result of the encounter 
happening on a single ontological plane to which both the figure and the things-in-
themselves of the gameworld belong: recall Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s point that it is only 
by virtue of the fact that my body “takes its place among the things it touches,” and 
opens itself up to the possibility of being touched in turn, that it can be, for me, my body 
in the world (1968, 133).6  
This congruence between this conceptualization of the avatar and the 
phenomenological account of the body-subject articulated in section 5.3 is by no means 
an accident. I have already made the claim that the playable figure is the ontic foundation 
for the ludic subject, granting it a foothold in the gameworld as an embodied subject. 
What has become apparent in this consideration of the playable figure as ‘avatar,’ then, is 
that the reason it is possible for the player to adopt the playable figure as ‘her’ body, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 This interrelation of the playable figure and the game system can be given a different slant if its 
contextualized in the implications of the ‘game as system’ idea as a cosmological frame as discussed in 
section 3.4.3. Speaking, again, of Lara Croft – who seems to be the go-to exemplification of a playable 
figure for game studies – Peter Bayliss observes that, “the game-world of Tomb Raider is constructed in 
‘Lara Units’, gaps between the platforms are either standing jump or running jump distances, or otherwise 
impassable […] the game-world of Tomb Raider is designed so as to offer affordances that fit the 
locomotive abilities of Lara Croft” (2007a, 2). As a game component, the playable figure is integrated into 
the game system according to the rationale of the logos manifested in the system. To retain Bayliss’ example, 
if the Tomb Raider player encounters a gap that is wider than the distance Lara Croft can jump, the player 
will conclude that she is not ‘supposed to’ take that route, and it is possible to progress through a different 
route – a judgment that is a product of the expectation of order that characterizes the ‘game as system’ 
frame. 
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to gather in her lived experience the elements of the game system into a bodily lifeworld 
relating back to, and organized according to, this embodied ludic subject-position, is 
precisely because, in its formal qualities as a game component, the playable figure 
structures the player’s relation to the game system in a form which, in the crucial senses I 
have outlined, is analogous to the embodied subject’s bodily engagement with the world. 
It is on this basis that a sense of being-in-the-gameworld can be compared, in 
phenomenological terms, to the subject’s being-in-the-world, and that, inseparably, the 
playable figure can be taken as ‘avatar,’ as the being that the player, as ludic subject, is in 
the gameworld.  
 
6.1.3 Player-character 
However, this is only half the story. If the ‘avatar’ side of the duality between ‘avatar’ and 
‘character’ refers to the playable figure as articulated through the frame of reference of 
the game as system, then it is easy to surmise that the ‘character’ side of the duality 
describes the aspect of the playable figure that comes to light when examined through 
the frame of the game as heterocosm. 
The opening of the playable figure, and, by association, that of ludic subjectivity, 
onto a poetics of character, as a unity of textual signification coalescing into the 
representation of a heterocosmic individual, is one of the most crucial moments of the 
aesthetics of the ludic subject: it represents the point at which the ludic subject, having 
been enacted by the player, is inscribed into the textuality of the game and presented to 
the player as an ordered unity according to the formal principles of mimetic and narrative 
representation. As such, it warrants a focused engagement, and, to this end, Chapter 9 
shall take the intersection of the notion of character and the ludic subject as its theme. 
For now, then, I shall not engage with the notion of character in depth in its own right, 
focusing instead on the role in which the term has been used to oppose ‘avatar’ in the 
conceptualization of the playable figure.    
As I shall point out in Chapter 9, it is hard to define precisely what a character is, 
though, paradoxically, we do not have any trouble recognizing one when we see one. It is 
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perhaps for this reason that there is a relative paucity of direct analytical engagement with 
the notion of the player-character, especially in comparison to the wealth of material 
available regarding the avatar – it is, in fact, hard to find a concrete definition of the 
notion of the ‘player-character’. This is not to say that the term itself is infrequent in the 
relevant literature; however, very often, despite the term ‘character’ being used, what is 
referred to is in fact more akin to the idea of the avatar than to any notion of the 
textually-determined representation of a heterocosmic individual.  
Thus, for instance, Espen Aarseth writes that, in the adventure game, “the user 
assumes the role of the main character and, therefore, will not come to see this person as 
an other, or as a person at all, but rather as a remote-controlled extension of herself” 
(Aarseth 1997, 113). James Paul Gee similarly describes the “virtual character” as “the 
player’s surrogate” (2008, 259), and as the vehicle for her embodiment in the gameworld. 
Such a usage of the term ‘player-character’ bears no functional difference from ‘avatar,’ 
and indirectly suggest a bracketing of the ‘character’ dimension of the playable figure as 
being, if not irrelevant, then certainly secondary to its ‘avatar’ dimension. This is certainly 
the conclusion reached within the ‘cursor theory’ of the playable figure which I have 
already outlined, as typified by Newman’s statement that ludic engagement “disregards 
representational traits in favour of the constitution of character as sets of capabilities, 
potentials and techniques offered to the player” (2002). 
 This is enough to demonstrate that the duality of avatar and player-character has 
often been construed as a tense co-existence. Jørgensen makes this explicit, arguing that 
it is, if not impossible, at least extremely difficult to reconcile the fixed nature of 
character to the free possibility of action afforded by the avatar in a satisfactory manner. 
Using Red Dead Redemption (Rockstar North 2010) and Heavy Rain (Quantic Dream 2010) 
as examples for the respective situations, she suggests any attempt at such a 
reconciliation can only hope for one of two unsatisfying outcomes. First, a schism might 
result between the avatar that acts according to player input during play and the character 
that acts according to its fixed qualities in non-ludic sequences such as cut-scenes. 
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Alternatively, a drastic restriction might be placed on the avatar’s capacity for action in 
order to ensure it remains in step with the character (Jørgensen 2010). 
 Where a concrete impression of what is meant by ‘character’ as opposed to 
‘avatar’ does emerge, it is to suggest that ‘character’ addresses the status of the playable 
figure as an entity distinct from the player. Thus, Tronstad writes that the term ‘avatar’ 
should be reserved for situations in which “the character functions as a representative of 
the player in the game” and “has no perceptible identity of its own” (2008, 258), while 
‘player-character’ should refer to situations in which “it takes on an identity separate 
from our own, in the sense that we can clearly identify the character separate from 
ourselves (ibid., 259). Seeming to operate according to this dichotomy, Bayliss writes that 
“the avatar is also a character, that is, an entity constituted separately from the player” 
(2007a, 2). Implicit in this is the matter of identity: Gee, for instance, contrasts the 
“virtual identity” of the “virtual character in the virtual world” to the player’s “real-world 
identity” (2004, 54). In the same vein, Clara Férnandez-Vara writes that the identity of a 
defined player-character “sets them apart from the player, emphasizing the gap between 
character and player” (2011, 13).     
 This still leaves unaddressed the question of what a character is. In Chapter 9, I 
shall take on this question as a focus, drawing both on investigations into the nature of 
character in game studies (Lankoski, Heliö and Ekman 2003; Lankoski 2011; Fernández-
Vara 2011), and in literary theory (Price 1983; Margolin 1986; 1990; Phelan 1989; Palmer 
2004; Heidbrink 2010). For now, I shall merely draw attention to the status of ‘character’ 
as referring to a “possible non-actual individual” (Margolin 1990, 844) – that is, to a 
heterocosmic individual represented as a textual construct.   
 The duality inherent in the term ‘player-character’ is no terminological accident: 
despite referring to an individual in the heterocosm, and therefore to someone who, 
from the player’s perspective, is “not-I,” the ‘character’ dimension of the playable figure 
is nonetheless subsumed into the ludic subject: just as the avatar is taken up as ‘I’ on the 
level of the game system, the character is taken up as ‘I’ on the level of the ludic 
heterocosm.    
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6.2 The phenomenology of the playable figure 
 
On the basis of this understanding of the playable figure as both ‘avatar’ and ‘character,’ 
I can now engage with the task of conceptualizing the relation between the player and 
the playable figure. The starting-point for this, as I have already noted, is a phenomenological 
distinction highlighting the fact that the playable figure, as it appears to me in ludic 
experience, is both ‘I’ and ‘not-I,’ both ludic subject from whose internal standpoint the 
player perceives the gameworld and a distinct figure from whom the player is distanced 
in inhabiting the external perspective.  
However, this distinction is not singular, but, rather, a composite of two 
distinctions which constitute the two primary axes of the player-figure relation. I shall 
term these the identity distinction, referring to the fact that the figure is granted the status of 
both ‘self’ and ‘other’, and the phenomenological distinction, which describes the fact that the 
player relates to the figure in both a subjective and an objective mode. Though these two 
are closely intertwined, there is much to be gained from keeping them conceptually 
separate in terms of a theorization of the player-figure relation. As such, I shall elaborate 
on each of these distinctions in turn, before bringing them together into a two-axis 
model that can provide a more nuanced understanding of the player-figure relation than 
that resulting from the duality of avatar and character. 
 
6.2.1 The identity distinction 
The fact that the playable figure is simultaneously attributed the status of both ‘self’ and 
of ‘other’ is not new to this investigation. It was already amply apparent in Chapter 1, 
when considering the entity addressed as “you” in the IF adaptation of The Hobbit (Beam 
Software 1982). There, I noted that the interpellation of the player inherent in the 
second-person pronominal address alternates with the reference to the entity as “Bilbo 
Baggins,” a represented individual distinct from the player.  
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It might appear as if this is merely a restatement of the distinction between 
‘avatar’ and ‘player-character’ which I have just surveyed. However, to equate ‘self’ and 
‘other’ with ‘avatar’ and ‘character’ respectively is a mistake: instead, the distinction 
between ‘self’ and ‘other’ cuts across both ontological dimensions of the playable figure. 
I shall demonstrate this by looking at how the play of ‘self’ and ‘other’ occurs upon both 
aspects of the playable figure in turn.  
I have argued that, as a game component – an entity within the ontic domain of 
the gameworld – the playable figure is defined as an avatar in its being taken up as the 
body of the ludic subject. It is in this sense that the avatar becomes the player’s ‘I-in-the-
gameworld’. However, even without the question of character having been broached, an 
element of otherness is just as intrinsic to the avatar as the element of selfhood: 
Appearing on screen in place of the player, the avatar does double duty as self 
and other, symbol and index. As self, its behavior is tied to the player’s through an 
interface […] its literal motion, as well as its figurative triumphs and defeats, 
result from the player’s actions. At the same time, avatars are unequivocally other. 
(Rehak 2003, 106) 
Just as surely as the avatar is taken up by the player as ‘I,’ it is also an entity which stands 
against her as a thing in the gameworld. Conversely, it is certainly true that ‘character,’ 
being understood as the representation of an individual in the ludic heterocosm, would 
seem to open more readily onto a perspective of otherness than one of selfhood: Bayliss’ 
comment, quoted above, that the notion of ‘character’ conveys the sense of the figure as 
“an entity constituted separately from the player” is indicative in this regard (2007a, 2). 
However, as Grant Tavinor argues:	  
The relationship between the player and their character does seem to be one of 
identity: if asked of a number of characters on a screen “Which one are you?” 
gamers do not hesitate to pick out their character. (2009, 70) 
The retort to such a position is that articulated by Bayliss, Gee, Jørgensen and 
Férnandez-Vara, who, as we have seen, argue for a distinction between player and 
character on the level of identity.  
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However, it is not – or not primarily – a question of choosing between one or 
the other: of saying that a particular player’s relation to a particular playable figure is 
either one of self or of other. If I am playing Super Mario World (Nintendo 1991) and I am 
asked, by someone unfamiliar with the game, who that is on screen, I am equally justified 
in answering, “That is me,” or, “That is Mario.” Just as they are on the ontological 
dimension of the avatar-as-game-component, identity and difference are both 
constitutive of the player’s relation to the figure on the level of character. Certainly, on 
an experiential level, the balance might shift towards the pole of the self, or towards that 
of the other, in a particular instance of ludic engagement. Nonetheless, both the self-
aspect and the other-aspect are integral components of the relation. Bilbo in The Hobbit, 
Mario in Super Mario World, even “you” in Adventure are all equally ‘I’ and ‘not-I.’  
This duality does not admit to resolution. Instead, it is in the wavering between 
the two positions that the aesthetic character of the playable figure can be identified – a 
wavering resulting from the fact that, in taking up a playable figure – say, for the sake of 
argument, Mario – as ‘I,’ the ludic subjectivity that I inhabit towards the gameworld is 
both “me” and “Mario,” that is, both “I” and “not-I,” or, perhaps, “I-as-Mario.”7  
This in-between quality has led Kelly Boudreau to speak of what she terms a 
“hybrid-identity,” which “does not reside in either the player or the avatar, but rather is a 
fluid, sometimes fleeting form of being that exists somewhere between the player and the 
avatar (or player-character) during the process of videogame play” (2012, 86). Boudreau’s 
notion of hybridity is crucial to understanding how the self-other duality constituting the 
identity distinction gives rise to the emergence of a negotiated identity in between the 
two poles – that is, in the term I have proposed in this dissertation, a ludic subject that is 
not myself, as player, and not the playable figure in its own right, but, rather, me-as-the-
figure. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 If I may be allowed, for a moment, to step outside this investigation’s emphasis on the implied player as a 
function of the game’s formal structure, rather than on individual players, it should be pointed out that this 
is also what allows for the reconciliation of the fixity of a character and the variation of individual playing 
approaches. If we both play Super Mario World, we are “me-as-Mario” and “you-as-Mario” are different ludic 
subjects, and it might even make sense to consider them different characters. 
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6.2.2 The perspectival distinction 
It is not enough, however, to stop at this distinction between the playable figure in its 
status as ‘self’ and as ‘other’. I have already stated that there is a second duality at work, 
one which I have labelled as the phenomenological distinction, and it can be stated as: the 
player can engage with the playable figure in both a subjective and an objective mode of relation.  
 A first insight into the shape that this duality takes in ludic experience can be 
gleaned by considering Katie Salen and Eric Zimmerman’s criticism of what they term 
the “immersive fallacy” (2004, 450). I already touched upon this critique in my analysis of 
the term immersion and the objections to it in section 2.4.3 above, but a more sustained 
engagement with their argument is now warranted. By their definition: 
The immersive fallacy is the idea that the pleasure of a media experience lies in its 
ability to sensually transport the participant into an illusory, simulated reality. 
According to the immersive fallacy, this reality is so complete that ideally the 
frame falls away so that the player truly believes that he or she is part of an 
imaginary world. (2004, 450-451) 
The immersive fallacy, then, refers to the notion of immersion as transportation which I 
discussed in section 4.2.1, albeit one shorn of any qualification or nuance.8 What is 
interesting for the purpose of the investigation at hand is the manner in which it invokes 
the question of the relation between the player and the playable figure. Salen and 
Zimmerman argue that, “the immersive fallacy would assert that the player has an 
“immersive” relationship with the character, that to play the character is to become the 
character” (2004, 453). Instead: 
A player’s relationship to a game character he or she directly controls is not a 
simple matter of direct identification. Instead, a player relates to a game character 
through the double-consciousness of play. A protagonist character is a persona 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 While Salen and Zimmerman’s criticisms would be entirely valid if such a formulation of immersion were 
indeed dominant, it would be a challenge to locate any serious argument for the kind of total, all-
consuming sense of immersion that Salen and Zimmerman rightly describe as a fallacy. Even in theoretical 
projects, such as those of Janet Murray (1998) and Marie-Laure Ryan (2001a), where immersion is granted 
a major role, attention is paid both to the very specific methods by which the fragile illusion is upheld, and 
to the narrow limits within which it is bracketed. As such, the critique of the immersive fallacy veers 
dangerously close to becoming a straw-man argument. 
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through which a player exerts him or herself into an imaginary world […] 
However, at the very same time, the character is a tool, a puppet, an object for 
the player to manipulate according to the rules of the game. In this sense, the 
player is fully aware of the character as an artificial construct. (ibid.) 
In short, “the player takes on the role of the figure in relation to the gameworld while 
remaining aware of her own existence as a player manipulating a game object” (ibid.).9 
The notion of double-consciousness introduced in this passage is key: moreover, it is 
one whose place within the conceptual schema of ludic experience has already been set. 
In deploying Eugen Fink’s ontology of play in order to arrive at a conceptualization of 
the gameworld in Chapter 2, I noted that, according to Fink, the player takes on a “role” 
within the play-world in relation to the play-thing: just as the doll, in play, becomes a 
child, the playing girl becomes its mother (2012[1958, II). However, Fink writes, in a 
distinct prefiguration of Salen and Zimmerman:   
…we must distinguish between the real human being who ‘plays’ and the human 
role within play. The player ‘conceals’ himself by means of his role; in a certain 
measure he vanishes into it. With an intensity of a peculiar sort he lives in the role 
– and yet, again, not like a person who is deluded […] In the performance of 
play, there remains a knowledge, albeit strongly reduced, about his double 
existence. […] This doubling belongs to the essence of playing. (ibid.) 
There is no question of a distinction between ‘self’ and ‘other’ here: from the perspective 
of the playing girl, the mother that she plays, as her ludic subjectivity, is just as much 
‘herself’ as her subjectivity as a player. Instead, the “doubling” Fink refers to here is 
nothing other than what I have termed, in section 2.4, the double perspectival structure 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Though, in section 1.5.2, I explicitly contrasted the question of ludic subjectivity to that of role-playing, it 
is pertinent to point out that this is a point that is also recognized within theorizations of the act of role-
playing as it pertains to RPGs. As Sarah Lynne Bowman writes, though, in role-playing, “players learn how 
to inhabit the headspace of someone other than their primary ego identity,” (2010, 8), this still engages the 
“aspects of their primary identities” which the enacted character draws on or contrast with (ibid., 127). 
Regarding pen-and-paper role-playing, Gary Alan Fine writes that “when animating a character a player 
must choose between playing his own self in the guise of that character or playing the self of that 
character” (2002[1983], 4). Dennis D. Waskul writes that “the activity [of role-playing] necessarily involves 
two distinct, yet simultaneous roles during the same activity; participants are fantasy personas and the 
players who enact the personas” (2006, 28).  
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of ludic engagement. Fink distinguishes between the two subjective positions the player 
must retain in suspension during the act of playing: first, there is the “role” adopted 
towards the play-world, which determines the relation the player is to adopt towards the 
things therein (if her role is ‘mother’, her engagement with the ‘child’ is presumably to be 
one of care), and, hence, to her mode of being-in-the-play-world. Second, there is the 
position of the “human being who ‘plays’”, who retains an awareness that the role of 
‘mother’ – and the sphere of action or ‘world’ to which the role pertains – is one that is 
‘only’ being played.  
 These standpoints correspond, directly, to the internal perspective of the ludic 
subject and to the external perspective of the implied player; as such, I shall loop back to 
the arguments I presented in developing the double perspectival structure in order to 
better articulate the notion of the double-consciousness put forward in Salen and 
Zimmerman. In section 2.4.4, I argued that the implication of the double perspectival 
structure for the player’s relation to the ludic subject is that it is related to both subjectively 
and objectively – it is both the internal perspective through which the gameworld is framed, 
and a figure in the gameworld that is itself perceived from the external perspective.  
 This double perspective is grounded in a two-sided phenomenology of the 
playable figure as the player’s body in the gameworld, which, as Paul Martin has 
observed, is both subject and object (2012, 2). In the subjective mode, the player adopts 
the playable figure as her body-in-the-gameworld, engaging with the gameworld as an 
embodied ludic subject through the playable figure’s ‘opening’ onto the gameworld. The 
result of this is that the figure itself disappears from the player’s focus: it is not a thing 
which I see, but “that by which things are revealed to me” (Sartre 1966[1943], 402). This 
is revealed in Aarseth’s comment that “when I play, I don’t even see her [Lara Croft’s] 
body, but see through and past it” (2004a, 48). In this sense, the ways in which the figure 
structures a ludic subject-position for the player to inhabit in relation to the gameworld 
have been articulated over the course of this investigation so far, through the lens of the 
notions of immersion (Murray 1998; Ryan 2001a; Grau 2003; Ermi and Mäyrä 2005; 
Thon 2008), presence (Lombard and Ditton 1997; McMahan 2003), telepresence (Minsky 
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1980; Steuer 1992; Taylor 2003), focalization (Neitzel 2002; Nitsche 2005; Arjoranta 
2013), recentering (Ryan 2001a), agency (Murray 1998; Mateas and Stern 2005; Wardrip-
Fruin et al. 2009), embodiment (Grodal 2003; Klevjer 2006; 2012; Bayliss 2007a; 2007b; 
Gee 2008) and incorporation (Calleja 2011).   
In the objective mode of the player-figure relation, conversely, the player does not 
inhabit the perspective of the figure, but, rather, maintains a perceptual position (not 
necessarily – and not exclusively – in the visual sense)10 outside of the figure, perceiving it 
objectively (that is, as an object which is given in an intentional act of perception) from a 
point-of-view distinct from it. In this mode, then, the figure becomes itself present to the 
player as an object of perception: the player is no longer only aware of the gameworld as 
perceived through the figure, but becomes aware of the figure itself. As an example of an 
approach within game studies which has foregrounded the objective mode of the player-
figure relation, we can suggest Emma Westecott’s puppet theory of the avatar (2009). 
 
6.2.3 The interrelation of the two distinctions 
To summarize, the playable figure is both a manifestation of the player and also, at the 
same time, a distinct individual, a character with its own attributes and characteristics that 
set it apart from the player as Other. In addition to this, thanks to the double 
perspectival structure of ludic engagement, the player adopts the ludic subject-position 
represented by the figure as her own and looks out at the gameworld from this 
perspective, while, at the same time, retaining an awareness of herself as a player 
engaging with the figure as an object. In short: the playable figure is granted the status of 
both self and other, and it is related to both subjectively and objectively. 
The logical next step, it would seem, would be a linking of these two dualities – 
the one in the ontological status of the playable figure, and the one in the player’s 
subjective relation to it – in a model that traces a direct correspondence between one and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 In the context of the ludic subject-position, I shall consider the interrelation between visual 
point-of-view and perspective in the wider, multi-layered sense implied in the notion of a 
subjective standpoint, in Chapter 7. 
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the other, thereby defining two divergent modes of experiential relation between the 
figure and the player. It is in this direction that game studies has moved to date. The 
unstated implication of the binary of ‘avatar’ versus ‘character,’ which I have already 
explored, is that, if the figure is viewed by the player as ‘herself,’ that must be because it 
is subjectively inhabited, as an avatar or manifestation of the player; if, on the other hand, 
it is viewed objectively, from an external perspective, then it can only be viewed as a 
distinct other, and, hence, as a character.  
Through outlining the implications of the two distinctions, however, I have 
demonstrated that such a dual model of the player-figure relation is over-simplistic on a 
number of levels. Most relevantly to the purposes of this investigation, such a two-
dimensional understanding of the player-figure relation is an indispensable component of 
a theory of the mechanisms of ludic subjectivity.  
The twofold understanding of subjectivity laid out by Dan Zahavi, which I first 
introduced in section 1.5, is relevant again here. I shall again invoke the point that an  
approach to the subject must keep in mind the two ways in which the subject appears to 
herself: first, “the self as an experiential dimension”, in which the subject is equated with 
the first-person perspective that is the ground for phenomenological experience of the 
world, but that, by that token, cannot itself be experienced; secondly, the idea of “the self 
as a narrative construction”, created after the fact in order to unite the disparate strands 
of moment-to-moment experience under a coherent identity (2008, 8). 
Broadly speaking, the distinction here is one between the self as subject and the 
self as object – or, to return to Sartre’s terms, as for-itself and in-itself. Insofar as I am a 
subject and there is, for me, a world, it is because I, as subject, am not what I see but 
what is seeing. As a result, “the ego emerges only when we adopt a distancing and 
objectifying attitude to the experience in question” (ibid., 34). Maurice Merleau-Ponty 
argued for a similar insight in his development of an embodied phenomenology: though 
the individual’s body itself is not an object of perception (insofar as it is that by means of 
which other objects are perceived), it can become an object of perception. Thus, for 
instance, when the left hand touches the right hand, the body is both (perceiving) subject 
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and (perceived) object (2002[1945], 105; 1968, 134). Paul Ricoeur, in the tellingly-titled 
study Oneself as Another (1992), makes perhaps the most cogent case for the fact that the 
individual’s understanding of herself and her own subjectivity is constructed through “a 
dialectic of self and the other than self” (ibid., 3) that lies at the very heart of selfhood.  
This is also true of the player’s relation to the ludic subject, their ‘self’ within the 
gameworld – as has become apparent, the ‘I-in-the-gameworld,’ which is granted the 
status of both self and other, is also, across both of these poles of identity, both 
perceiving subject and perceived object As such, an understanding of the player-figure 
relation must be founded on an uncoupling of the self/other distinction from the 
subjective/objective perspective.11 
 
6.3 A model of the player-figure relation 
 
Adopting such a multi-faceted understanding of the structure of the subject therefore 
leads us to move beyond the binary model of the player-figure relation that has 
dominated game studies to date. Instead of an either/or option defining the player-figure 
relation as either a subjective relation of self or an objective relation of other, it seems we 
might instead suggest four possible modes of relation organised along two axes: 
determining not only whether the relation is subjective or objective, but also, at the same 
time, whether the relation is one of self or other. This would give us four aspects of the 
player-figure relation: subjective/self, subjective/other, objective/self, objective/other 
(see Figure 6.1): 
- The subjective relation of self occurs when the player inhabits the ludic subject-
position established by the figure and perceives this subject as ‘herself’. Here, the 
ludic subject is not itself brought into view; rather, it is that through which the 
gameworld is perceived.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 These arguments shall be thematized as the main focus of Chapter 8, where I shall highlight the self-
reflexive turn by which a first-personal engagement with the gameworld from the standpoint of the ludic 
subject-position can itself become the object of the player’s perception, as the representation of a ludic self.  
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- The subjective relation of other occurs when the player inhabits the ludic subject-
position established by the playable figure, taking it on in relation to the 
gameworld and thereby ‘inhabiting’ the figure as an internal standpoint, but 
nonetheless perceives the subjective perspective through which she is perceiving 
the gameworld as being distinct from her own perspective, and, thus, as 
belonging to an other – in most cases, identifying the perspective through which 
the gameworld is given to her as belonging to a heterocosmic individual, that is, a 
character.  
- The objective relation of self occurs when the player perceives the figure objectively, 
from an external perspective, but nonetheless relates to it as ‘herself.’ This 
dimension of the player-figure relation, then, involves the player perceiving an 
objectified representation of her own ludic subjectivity, thereby allowing for a 
textualization of the player’s own ludic self to be brought into view through an 
autoscopic mechanism.   
- The objective relation of other occurs when the player perceives the figure objectively, 
framed as an object of perception from the external perspective, but relates to it 
as a distinct individual separate from herself. This corresponds most closely to 
the idea of ‘character’ as the representation of a heterocosmic individual. 
These are not to be understood as mutually exclusive alternatives: it is never a case of 
either an exclusively subjective or objective perspective, or of either a relation of 
identity or of difference. No matter which perspective or mode of relation comes to 
the fore at any given point, it remains shadowed by its inverse, and the distinctive 
nature of the player-figure relation lies precisely in the – frequently paradoxical – 
interrelation and interdependence of these opposing modes and perspectives, 
between which no definitive lines of demarcation can be drawn. As Annika Waern 
has noted, bleed between the perspectives that can be attributed to the ludic subject-
position and to the figure-as-character reveals the permeability of the separation 
between the two subject-positions (2010) – and this, as shall become evident in the 
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case study I shall undertake in the second half of this chapter, is not to be taken as an 
accidental or even an occasional occurrence, but as lying at the very heart of the 
aesthetic constitution of figure-based play, and, hence, of ludic subjectivity. It is no 
wonder that Salen and Zimmerman extend the idea of double-consciousness into 
that of the player’s “hybrid-consciousness” in relation to the gameworld (2004, 455), 
or that Boudreau, as I have already noted, speaks of a “hybrid-identity” that “does 
not solely belong to the player, nor to the playable character” (2012, 13). 
 
 
Figure 6.1: A model for the player-figure relation 
 
6.4 Case study: Kentucky Route Zero,  Act 1 Scene 2  
 
In order to gain a clearer picture of these interrelations, and of how the player-figure 
relation operates in the intersections between the four aspects identified by this model, I 
shall turn to a close engagement with an instance of the player-figure relation in action. 
As my example, I have chosen a scene from Kentucky Route Zero (hereinafter KRZ), an 
episodic point-and-click adventure game whose first episode (or “Act”, in the game’s 
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parlance) was released in January 2013. The playable figure is Conway, a delivery-person 
working for a small antiques business. The scene I shall take as the basis of my analysis – 
the second scene in Act 1 – plays out on the Marquez family farm. It follows an opening 
scene in which Conway pulls up to the Equus Oils gas station, looking for directions to 
an address to which he has to make a delivery, but which he can’t seem to find. Joseph, 
the aged gas station attendant, cryptically remarks that Conway needs to take “the Zero”, 
before suggesting he can get better directions at the Marquez household. 
 
6.4.1 The opening 
As Act 1 Scene 2 opens, the player views Conway and his dog (Homer or Blue, 
depending on the player’s choice in the opening scene) in extreme long shot, on an 
empty path lit by the truck’s headlights. The scene is framed by the wooden supports and 
roof of a porch overlooking the scene; at irregular intervals, a figure in silhouette walks 
past in the extreme foreground, momentarily obscuring the view. 
This is an explicitly cinematic – or even theatrical – visual framing that 
immediately implies the player in a very specific position. One could say, leaving the 
heterocosmic frame intact, that the player is granted the perspective of one of the 
unnamed locals sitting on the porch, dispassionately observing the scene – and Conway – 
from their vantage point. More importantly, the visual suggestion of the proscenium arch 
imposes a self-reflexive formalism on the scene, explicitly foregrounding the player’s 
status as audience to the scene (see Figure 6.2). 
It would appear that a neat conclusion could already be drawn here. Clearly, the 
relation that is emphasized in this instance is the objective relation of other. In this 
moment, the player’s perspective on the environment is in no way coterminous with 
Conway’s: she does not see the scene subjectively through Conway, instead, she sees 
Conway objectively, looking onto him as a character in the scene. Crucially, however, this 
is not an instance of what Newman would term off-line engagement, defined as non-ergodic 
engagement “where no registered input control is received from the player” (2002). The 
player is not watching Conway perform actions of his own volition in a cut-scene. While 
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she is engaged in this objective relation to Conway, viewing him from afar as an object in 
a staged scene, the player also retains control of both Conway’s capabilities and 
perceptual apparatus. This is crucial: as Klevjer argues, it is through the capabilities that 
the playable figure grants the player in relation to the gameworld – which, as was 
discussed in section 5.2.5, Klevjer conceptualizes through Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the 
bodily “I can” (2002[1945], 160) – that it can anchor a subject-position that structures 
the player’s phenomenological grasp of the gameworld  (2012, 27). 
 
 
Figure 6.2: The opening scene. 
 
Conway’s capabilities, in the tradition of the point-and-click adventure genre, are 
formulated around a context- and item-specific ‘use’ command; similarly, his perception 
is largely established by means of an equally context-specific ‘look at’ command. KRZ’s 
interface communicates both of these in the form of visual icons contained in text-boxes 
hovering on-screen next to objects with which interaction is possible.  
Two points are of interest here. Fernández-Vara argues that an adventure game is 
defined as one in which “the main mode of interaction is based on a verb + object 
structure” (2008, 213). She notes that the historical move away from parser-based text 
adventures and towards graphical point-and-click adventures was marked by a curtailing 
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of the player’s freedom of action: whereas parser-based games could potentially accept 
and react to a wide variety of inputs (and allowed the player to at least test out any verb 
she could think of), point-and-click adventure games presented their limited vocabulary 
on screen and would not accept any input beyond these verbs. Finding a hunk of meat in 
the kitchen of the Scumm Bar in The Secret of Monkey Island (Lucasfilm Games 1990), for 
example, the player is given the option of looking at it or picking it up, but the lack of 
the appropriate verb in the interface already precludes the player from thinking that it 
might be possible to eat it. In this context, KRZ can be seen to represent an even further 
curtailing of player freedom of action than the classic point-and-click adventure game: 
not only does it display the range of possible ‘verbs’ on-screen, it even goes so far as to 
highlight the (usually no more than two or three) points within a given scene where some 
kind of action is possible. 
Second, in Klevjer’s terms, this constitutes symbolic rather than tangible interaction, 
where “the player gives instructions to the avatar, via the controller interface” rather than 
being given direct control (2012, 27).  Fernández-Vara reaches a similar conclusion, 
arguing that, despite the shift to a graphical interface, the player’s control over the avatar 
in point-and-click adventure games remains, as it is with text adventures, syntactic rather 
than direct (2008, 221).  
It is perhaps advisable to qualify Klevjer’s assertion on this point, and posit that 
the difference between the two categories he proposes is not one of kind but merely of 
degree. After all, any instance of engagement with a playable figure is predicated upon 
some form of mechanism by which the figure responds to commands given by the player 
through the interface. As such, while conceding that some control configurations do 
more than others to close the phenomenological gap between the instruction and the 
performance of the action (as, for example, in the case of most action-adventure games), 
to say that this is, in any literal rather than metaphorical sense, ‘tangible’, is to distort the 
nature of the mechanism at work.    
As such, even if the point-and-click interface remains, in comparative terms, a 
distancing mode of control, it still provides the basic structure for establishing a 
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phenomenological perspective upon the gameworld – a subjectivity for the player to 
inhabit that is distinct from her own, and, moreover, a subjectivity that is embodied, being 
dependent upon Conway’s bodily situatedness in the scene. In this particular instance, 
while the player sees Conway from the perspective of the porch, three objects in the 
scene are presented with a text-box that highlights possible interactions – the truck, the 
dog, and a lone lamp-post illuminating the path ahead. Each of the three text-boxes has 
the eye icon that constitutes Conway’s ‘look at’ command; moreover, the text-box 
attached to the dog includes a ‘talk to’ icon that starts a rather one-sided conversation 
between Conway and his dog, and the text-box attached to the truck also includes a ‘use’ 
icon that, if selected, causes Conway to get into the truck and drive away, effectively 
exiting the scene and returning to the world map.  
 
6.4.2 ‘Looking at’ the world 
In the interest of providing a robust conceptual underpinning to the analysis at hand, I 
shall pause to briefly consider the phenomenological nature of the ‘look at’ command as 
a formal convention of the point-and-click genre. Considered as an action, it constitutes 
one of the primary verbs in the lexicon of actions granted to the player in relation to the 
gameworld (Crawford 2004, 228-229). This is especially evident in earlier examples of the 
graphical point-and-click adventure game, such as the various games LucasArts produced 
using the SCUMM engine between Maniac Mansion in 1987 and The Curse of Monkey Island 
in 1997. Here, unlike in KRZ, “look at” was literally presented, thanks to the SCUMM 
interface, as one of a set of written verbs that the player can direct towards objects in the 
world. What is even more vital, however, is the way in which the ‘look at’ function 
shapes the player’s perspective on, and experience of, the objects in the gameworld. 
After all, in graphical adventure games, the player does not need to use the ‘look at’ 
function to see an object in the gameworld: all she needs to do is look at the object 
presented on screen. What role does the ‘look at’ function perform, then? 
In simple terms, it can be understood as constituting a sustained gaze: the ‘look 
at’ command focuses subjective attention on a particular object, isolating it as a distinct 
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figure of perception against the ground of the world. In phenomenological terms, we can 
call it an intentional function, meaning ‘intention’ in the sense of phenomenological sense 
of intentionality I discussed in section 3.1.  
The question that needs to be asked, however, is – whose subjective perception 
does the ‘look at’ command enact, or, in other words, who is the subject intending the 
object framed by the command? In most cases, what results from directing the ‘look at’ 
command towards an object is a verbal description of that object. KRZ is no exception 
to this. If the player ‘looks at’ Blue/Homer, for instance, the following text description is 
offered: “An old dog in a straw hat. Both have seen better days.” Evidently, the ‘look at’ 
command reveals information about the object at hand that is not available to the 
player’s own visual perception: from the game’s minimalist, low-detail polygonal visual 
presentation, for instance, the player cannot possibly determine that the dog is old.  
What this makes clear is that the ‘look at’ function enshrines a specific subjective 
point-of-view in relation to what it grasps. This leads to the conclusion that the nature of 
the ‘look at’ function is the presentation of objects in the gameworld from a subjective 
perspective distinct from the player’s. Moreover, the information obtained from this 
perspective is conveyed through the introduction of a narrative voice, an introduction – 
to speak in Platonic terms – of an instance of diegesis in a form more commonly defined 
by mimesis, a representation in the mode of telling rather than that of showing. This 
narrative voice, and the perspective on the gameworld from which it speaks, is not that 
of the player – making the ‘look at’ function, then, an instance of what, in section 4.1.1, I 
termed the noetic mode of presentation, wherein what is presented is not simply an 
object, but the object as intended by a perceiving subject. For this reason, the ‘look at’ 
command points both in the direction of the intentional act’s noematic content – the 
object that is intended, i.e. what is seen – towards its status as noesis, that is, as the 
intentional act of a perceiving subject who is thereby brought into view.   
It is arguable that, in many cases, and certainly in the case of KRZ, this perceiving 
subject is to be identified with that of the player-character, that is, the playable figure in 
its heterocosmic dimension. Petri Lankoski makes use of the notion of alignment to refer 
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to the manner in which the player is given access to information in the game, a process 
which will either associate the player’s perspective to that of the figure (through a 
congruence in the range of information that is available to both) or position them as 
separate (if the player has access to more or less information than the character does) 
(2011, 302). Though Lankoski does not make the association, this bears a strong 
resemblance to Gérard Genette’s original formulation of the narratological concept of 
focalization, which this investigation has already delved into in section 4.1.3. There, I noted 
that Genette defines focalization as a “restriction of field” (1980, 189) achieved through 
a “selection of narrative information” (1988, 155). Genette, then, provides us with a 
more rigorous terminology with which to analyze the presentation and restriction of 
information, and to answer the question, “Who sees?” According to Genette’s taxonomy 
of degrees of focalization, we are dealing here with a case of internal focalization, where the 
perspective is linked to that of a character (1980, 189). At the same time, the notion of 
alignment, Lankoski demonstrates, highlights not only what is known, but also how it is 
accessed. With respect to KRZ’s ‘look at’ function, this can be formulated as: the player 
instructs the figure to ‘look at’ an object by clicking on the object, the figure approaches 
the object, and only then, once the figure is located in the right position to examine the 
object, is its description shared with the player.  
Given that the act of consciousness intertwines the intended object with the 
subjective consciousness for whom it is intended (Husserl 2012[1931], 163), each 
instance of the ‘look at’ function reveals the subject that is doing the perceiving as much 
as it reveals the object being perceived, laminating the two as opposing sides of the same 
noesis. The player ‘looks at’ an object in an adventure game not only to learn something 
about the object, but also, just as importantly, to find out what the player-character 
thinks about that object. 
Krista Bonello Rutter Giappone has noted the extent to which, in the Monkey 
Island series (LucasArts 1991-2000), this serves to distance the player from the character 
by means of the foregrounding of the playable figure Guybrush Threepwood’s 
“‘personal’ whim, preference or aversion” when examining objects – for instance, his 
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disgust when ‘looking at’ porcelain (2013, 4). Conway’s subjective perspective is drawn in 
subtler strokes, but it is still the case that each stated observation that addresses the 
instruction to ‘look at’ something constitutes what we can term a “predefined function” 
(Lankoski, Heliö & Ekman 2003, 3) or what, in section 9.5.1, I shall call a “character 
action” – an act (in this case, a verbal act) that can be attributed to the character as a 
distinct heterocosmic individual, rather than to the player. Even from the three such 
observations available here, at the beginning of the scene under investigation, the 
sensitive player can isolate some defined features of his unique perspective on the world: 
most notably, a capacity for laconic observation, and a distinct tinge of melancholy or 
wistfulness. These insights can then be taken as “characterization statements” (Margolin 
1986, 206), contributing to the concretization of an impression of Conway as a living, 
breathing individual in the heterocosm by revealing his perspective on the things he 
looks at.    
How does this force us to reconsider the relation at work between the player and 
Conway in this scene? It seems it is necessary to complicate the hasty conclusion that 
immediately suggested itself. At the same time as the player is viewing Conway from her 
external audience-position on the porch, seeing him as a character in the scene, a 
represented other, she also shares Conway’s point-of-view on the scene. In this moment 
where the objective relation of other is dominant, another aspect of the relation – the 
subjective relation of other – remains in play as another experiential layer. 
 
6.4.3 Walking the path 
The player’s relation to Conway’s subjective perspective becomes even closer when she 
instructs him to start walking up the path. Of course, the player has good reason for 
doing so as opposed to, for instance, instructing Conway to go back to the truck and 
leave the scene.  I have already mentioned that Conway has a motive for being here: he is 
seeking directions to complete his delivery, and has been led to believe he can find help 
at this farm. In ludic terms, then, this constitutes a quest – a series of actions, usually 
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linked in a spatial traversal of the gameworld, that need to be performed in order to 
achieve a stated goal (Tosca 2003a; Aarseth 2004b; 2005). 
Lankoski (2011, 296) has argued that what he terms “goal-related engagement” 
constitutes one of the primary methods by which a bond of identification is formed 
between the player and the character. He defines this mode of engagement as 
“fundamentally an “I” experience: it is about the players acting to reach their goals” 
(ibid., 306); at the same time, if the player’s ludic goals in relation to the game can be 
made to relate to the goals the player-character possesses as a heterocosmic individual, 
then “the emotions of the [player character] and the player will be correlated” (ibid,. 298).  
In section 5.2.4, I already discussed the central role played by an orientation towards 
goals or purposes in the determination of embodied subjectivity (Merleau-Ponty 
2002[1945], 115), and I shall return to this point in the course of my unfolding of the 
dimensions of the ludic subject-position in section 7.2. 
This alignment of perspectives is also represented visually. As Conway walks up 
the hill, the view zooms in closer to Conway’s position. The proscenium arch of the 
porch is left behind, and the way ahead comes into view: the player can see, along with 
Conway, that the path leads to a farmhouse on top of the hill, next to what appears to be 
a graveyard. It is not only this change in framing that works to align the player’s visual 
point-of-view on the scene to Conway’s, but also the game’s impressionistic use of 
lighting, which highlights specific objects and parts of a scene as distinct figures as and 
when they emerge into Conway’s perception, and allows them to retreat into a 
monochromatic ground as his attention shifts away. In this case, just as the scene ahead 
of Conway comes into view, the scene he has left behind – the truck, the dog, the lamp – 
recedes into the background; it is no longer contained in his subjective perspective, and, 
hence, it is no longer part of the player’s, either (see Figure 6.3). The notion of 
focalization as a “restriction of field” is presented in literal terms here.  
As Conway walks up to the house, the viewpoint continues to zoom into the 
scene, with the framing becoming ever more constricted: when Conway is at the door, 
the house fills the frame, just as it occupies the whole of Conway’s field of vision and his 
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attention. However, the house remains a dark, monochromatic silhouette: just like 
Conway, the player can perceive its shape, but cannot glimpse what is inside (see Figure 
6.4). Once the player has instructed Conway to open the door, a text-box appears, 
granting the player the affordance of using an unseen light-switch. (We can assume, by 
drawing on our own experiences of walking into unlit rooms, that Conway has felt 
around for the light-switch in the dark, and that, as such, the availability of the light-
switch within the perceptual field of the ludic subject-position constitutes another 
instance of the player’s being made privy to Conway’s subjective experiences – in this 
case, an experience of the light-switch intuited through the sense of touch – and, 
therefore, another instance of the subjective relation of other.)  
It is only at this point, once the light bulb has flickered to life, that the shape of 
the house is filled in and the interior comes into view. The player can only see the 
interior of the house when Conway can see it, and she might share in his surprise when 
the light reveals a woman standing in the room (see Figure 6.5). Once again, the game’s 
visual presentation links the two perspectives together and ensures that, though the 
player never stops being aware of Conway as a distinct individual she is objectively 
perceiving, she comes to relate to this other subjectively, adopting his perspective on the 
gameworld; even – as in the case of the perception of the woman in the room when the 
lights go on – herself experiencing the same sensation of surprise she might attribute to 
the character. 
Crucially, this sense of surprise is not, at least not initially, attributed to Conway 
as someone distinct from the player – there is no need here to, as Leino suggests, “resort 
to the second-order structure of empathy when describing emotions in play” (2010, 219). 
It belongs to the player herself – I, as a player, experience it proprioceptively, as “my” 
surprise – and results from the embodied “situation of being” (Sobchack 1992, 81) 
framed by the ludic subject-position. It is, then, to be precise, an instance of the 
subjective relation of self, in the sense that I, as player, take ownership of the intentional 
experience obtained from the perspective of the ludic subject-position – I am able to say, 
“As soon as I turned on the light, I was surprised to see a woman had been standing in  
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Figure 6.3: Walking up the path. 
 
Figure 6.4: At the house. 
 
Figure 6.5: Turning on the light. 
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the darkened room.” At the same time, the perspective, being that of a ludic subjectivity 
attached to a figure that is also a character in the heterocosmic dimension of the scene at 
hand, is also attributed, and the player is aware of its being attributed, to Conway as a 
heterocosmic individual distinct from the player – as such, the line between the 
subjective relations of self and of other begin to blur.  
  
6.4.4 Defining through choice 
KRZ’s use of dialogue mostly becomes relevant in the later parts of the scene, which 
constitute an extended conversation between Conway and Weaver Marquez, the woman 
he encounters in the house. However, there is one earlier instance of dialogue, which 
establishes KRZ’s usage of dialogue as a means of determining both Conway as a 
heterocosmic subject, and the player’s relation to this subjectivity. Standing next to 
Blue/Homer in the opening of the scene, the player has the option of instructing 
Conway to talk to the dog. If she takes this option, she is presented with a choice 
between two lines of dialogue: “Pretty dark out here, huh?” / “So I guess we just head 
up the path here; the farmhouse is up the hill a bit”.  
Choosing one dialogue option over the other makes no functional difference: 
either way, the dog will not respond. However, each option bears slightly different 
implications for the nature of Conway’s subjective outlook on the world. The choice 
refers back to earlier dialogue choices in Act 1 Scene 1 that follow a similar pattern, 
asking the player to choose between a comment that reveals a no-nonsense desire to get 
on with the task at hand, and an alternative choice that, instead, reveals an observational 
interest in the scene for its own sake. The first dialogue option in the game, in which 
Conway, having just pulled into the gas station, responds to old man Joseph’s query, 
immediately sets the pattern down in explicit terms: “I’ve been driving all evening 
looking for ‘5 Dogwood Drive’.” / “I’ve got a delivery to make on Dogwood, but I’d 
rather watch the sunset.” 
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Each of the two dialogue choices frames Conway’s perspective on the world 
differently: or, rather, each dialogue choice is the result of Conway describing the world 
through a different perspectival frame that reveals different personal traits. Since Conway 
cannot be both a disinterested, unhurried observer of the moment at hand and an 
efficient, goal-driven individual who sees only means and ends – since, in other words, 
he cannot both privilege the journey over the goal, and the goal over the journey – the 
two options are mutually exclusive. 
If Conway’s characterization as an individual in the gameworld – and the 
resulting make-up of his subjectivity in relation to that world – cannot contain both 
attributes while maintaining coherence, it must be the case that only one of the two 
attributes is to be taken as true: naturally enough, this is the one implied by the dialogue 
option the player actuates. What this makes clear is that Conway, as a character, is not a 
fixed, predetermined construct. While some things about Conway-as-character are 
predetermined and inflexible – his name is Conway, he works as a delivery-person for a 
small antiques store, he is possessed of a distinct weary melancholy, and so on – others 
depend, to a considerable extent, on the choices made by the player in the act of playing. 
Conway is only completed when the player actuates a specific performance of him within 
the (admittedly narrowly restricted) possibility space offered by the game’s network of 
choices. As such, when we speak of Conway, we are speaking of Conway as actuated in 
one particular playthrough.  
In this, Conway stands as a metonym for the way in which the ergodic nature of 
videogames necessitates actualization through the selection of a specific path of traversal 
through the permutations of possibility of the underlying textual engine (Aarseth 1997, 
1). To address the specific manner in which ergodicity relates to the formation of the 
playable figure as character, one can recall Gee’s definition of the identity of the avatar as 
what he terms a “projective identity” emerging between the poles of the player’s “real-
world identity” and the avatar’s “virtual identity” (2004, 54). Though the terms are rather 
vaguely defined in Gee’s formulation, virtual identity describes “one’s identity as a virtual 
character in a virtual world” (ibid.), and appears to align closely with the heterocosmic 
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perspective on the playable figure as a character bearing an individual subjectivity that is 
Other to the player’s own real-world identity in relation to the ludic heterocosm. As I 
already discussed in section 1.3, Gee uses the term projective with the sense of the resulting 
identity being an ongoing project worked out in the interaction between player and game 
for the duration of the player’s engagement. The game, by this understanding, frames the 
boundaries of this possible range of characteristics that can be attributed to its figure, by 
rigidly limiting the choices and possibilities for action available to the player: this is the 
sense in which Janet Murray spoke of “dramatic agency” (2005) and Nick Montfort 
discussed the “fretting” of the player-character as “a constraint and possibility defined by 
the author” (2007, 145). 
To return to the specific dialogue option in question: if, as in this case, there is no 
functional difference to choosing one option rather than another, on what basis does the 
player make the choice? In general (and assuming the player is not simply making choices 
randomly, or according to moment-by-moment whim) two options would appear to be 
before us. In the first case, the player might be choosing dialogue options in a conscious 
act of role-playing. Maintaining a relation to Conway-as-other, in both the subjective and 
objective modes of this relation, the player actively constructs him as a distinct subject, 
and hence as a character without losing sight of his ‘otherness’ – that is, without ever 
identifying the resulting figure as ‘herself’.  
This is probably the case for large sections of the conversation that ensues in the 
Marquez house between Conway and Weaver, in which Weaver poses a string of 
questions relating to Conway’s background. When it appears that Conway might not be 
very familiar with how a TV set operates, for instance, Weaver asks why he did not 
watch TV as a child. The player is given three dialogue options to determine Conway’s 
response: “Mum heard ghosts in the static.” / “Dad was worried about radiation.” / “I 
watch TV.” The response the player chooses is unlikely to have much to do with the 
player’s own childhood experience with TV, and is much more likely to be a result of the 
player’s attempting to actualize a particular vision of what Conway is like as a distinct 
person. Choosing either of the first two options, for example, would characterize 
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Conway as having had a troubled, or at least eccentric, family background and, 
potentially, an unhappy childhood; the last option, conversely, would imply either a 
“normal” childhood (whatever such a thing may be), or a reticence about painful 
memories. Whichever option the player chooses, then, the subjectivity that Conway 
represents will be shaped by the choice, and will, to some degree, determine the frame 
through which the player perceives subsequent events in the game – a case of what 
Waern termed bleed-out, “when the player shares the emotions of the character” (2010, 5).  
The second option to consider is that the player might choose her answers to fit 
her own perspective on the gameworld. To illustrate this point, let us return to the initial 
dialogue choice at the start of the scene, with which we started this section. In deciding 
whether to express absorption in the moment at hand, or anticipation of the goals ahead, 
the player is certainly, as we have just argued, defining Conway as an independent 
individual. However, in the case of this particular choice – and in many other cases – she 
is also being given the opportunity to express her own subjective outlook on the 
gameworld by selecting the option which most closely adheres to it. A player who 
chooses the second option, for instance, might be one who has thoroughly internalized 
the quest structure that generally defines the adventure game genre, and who has, a 
result, framed the gameworld in such a way as to push para-ludic distractions to the 
background. Conversely, a player who chooses the first dialogue option is more likely to 
be one who has taken to heart Joseph’s remark, in the opening scene, that, “You’ve just 
got to stop and take in that road.”  
In both cases, the mental act that the speech act is read as being representative of 
– for the first option, perhaps an apprehension at the uneasy atmosphere of the scene, 
or, alternatively, an observation of the loneliness of the remote location; for the second 
option, an impatience at the long-winded process involved in finding a way to Dogwood 
Drive – belongs not to Conway, or, at least, not only to Conway. It is, primarily, a mental 
act resulting from the player’s own subjective experience of the gameworld from the 
standpoint of the ludic subject-position, and it only also belongs to Conway insofar as, 
through the player’s dialogue choice, Conway is made to reflect this ludic subjectivity – 
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thereby constituting an instance of bleed-in, when the player’s own subjective perspective 
is projected onto the character (Waern 2010, 5). 
What initially appeared to be, in the case of the player sharing Conway’s 
perspective on the gameworld, simply an instance of the subjective relation of other – 
with the player taking on the foreign perspective of a character – is here revealed to be 
something more complicated. The representation of Conway’s subjective position in 
relation to the gameworld has been shown to be partly configured by the player, with this 
configuration occurring in such a way as to reflect, at least at certain, vital points, the 
ludic subjectivity the player enacts in relation to the gameworld. As a result of this, the 
subjective position attributed to Conway, which, so far, it has appeared the player 
inhabits without suspending her awareness of its being an other’s point-of-view, grows 
indistinguishable from the perspective that the player identifies as her own. Just as it did 
in the attribution of the emotion of surprise at the first sight of Weaver Marquez, close 
analysis here reveals the same inseparable intertwining of the subjective relations of self 
and of other.  
It is not the case, then, that the subjective relation of self supersedes or eclipses 
the subjective relation of other: instead, the two become closely interlinked, with the 
player identifying the subject-position and its associated figure as both Conway and as 
‘herself’, with the balance between the two positions shifting from moment to moment. 
The player is more likely, for instance, to attribute the statement, “Pretty dark out here, 
huh?” to ‘herself’, while, on the other hand, attributing “Dad was worried about 
radiation” to Conway-as-character. 
 
6.4.5 A record of the ludic subject 
 It has been established that Conway, as character and as ludic subject, is only completed 
once the player has actualized a particular path through the choices and possibilities for 
action afforded by the game – in other words, Conway is enacted.12 The next question we 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 I shall return to the notion of enactment, and its ties to both the conceptual schema of action 
and the question of an aesthetics of ludic subjectivity, in section 8.1. 
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must consider, then, is: how does Conway, as produced through the player’s engagement 
with the game, emerge as a coherent figure that the player can relate to?    
Stepping into the mode of interpretation that Dominic Arsenault and Bernard 
Perron account for under the hermeneutic spiral (2009, 117, see section 3.4.2), a thematic 
analysis of KRZ would easily conclude that it is a game that foregrounds and thematizes 
its own mediation. Most prominently, it does so through a preoccupation with outmoded 
media technology. Not only do old televisions and radios feature prominently in both its 
plot and visual arrangements, but the game itself bears the audiovisual signs of dead 
medialities, referring back both to the history of the videogame medium and to earlier 
medialities, from the simulated cathode-ray flicker of its opening menu text onwards. Its 
angular, low-detail, solid-colour polygonal visual style recall 3D animation techniques in 
early 1990s adventure games, in particular Another World (Chahi 1991). Other stylistic 
techniques refer back even further: the map that Conway navigates when travelling 
between scenes is drawn in minimalist, white-on-black vector graphics circa 1981, with 
added textual descriptions that recall nothing so much as the scene descriptions in 
interactive fiction games such as Adventure.  
In deploying these stylistic borrowings from the medium’s history, KRZ aligns 
itself within a postmodernist idiom, its stylistic bricolage of visual tropes and techniques 
betraying a self-reflexive concern with its own presentation and mediality, “a sense of the 
presence of the past, but a past that can be known only from its texts, its traces” 
(Hutcheon 1988, 125). Bearing in mind Westecott’s remark that the screen-based 
mediality of videogames means that “the player is always audience to her own play act” 
(2009, 2), the foregrounded self-reflexivity of this presentation in KRZ directs attention 
to the game’s status as game – and, hence, to the actions happening within it as ludic 
actions – as well as to the process of re-presentation itself.  
 Moreover, this is an impression strengthened by KRZ’s generic properties. The 
nature of the point-and-click adventure genre means that, unlike in, for instance, a first-
person shooter or an action-adventure game, there is a more obvious temporal 
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dissociation between player input and resulting visual presentation of the intended 
action, which, naturally, works to foreground this representative quality.  
The most interesting aspect of KRZ’s mediation, however – and the most 
revealing in terms of the nature of the player-figure relation – lies in its treatment of 
dialogue. Whenever the player engages in a conversation with an NPC, the dialogue 
resulting from the player’s recent choices is preserved on-screen in the form of a textual 
presentation. The interesting thing here, however, is the format this textual presentation 
takes. The lines of dialogue spoken by Conway and his interlocutors are presented in the 
format of a dramatic script or screenplay – an impression strengthened by the game’s 
division into numbered acts and scenes, as well as by the use of a font style whose 
cultural association with the typewritten manuscript is unmistakable. This is particularly 
interesting when taken in the light of the designers’ stated intention of placing players in 
the role of “the actor in a play”, in that they “don’t necessarily choose the dialogue or the 
plot, but they choose how to inflect it and how to think about, depending on their 
method of acting, the inner life of the character,” thereby engaging in a form of “creative 
construction” (Elliott in Grayson 2013). It is tempting to link this back to Gee’s notion 
of a “projective identity”, and it is important to recall that, as we discussed earlier, the 
player’s choices in shaping Conway-as-character are not purely disinterested choices 
about the nature of a distinct individual who the player grasps objectively. Instead, these 
choices are manifested through the taking of actions from the ludic subject-position 
Conway represents – and, as we have already argued, the line between this perspective on 
the gameworld being identified as Conway’s and as the player’s own, as a subjective 
relation of self or other, is blurred.  
KRZ’s re-presentation of the player-as-Conway’s verbal acts in the form of a 
dramatic script therefore gives the impression of a dramatic presentation emerging as a 
unified text through the player’s working-out of a path through the choices offered by 
the game (see Figure 6.6). This can be grasped as a very literal manifestation of Calleja’s 
notion of alterbiography, “the ongoing narrative generated during interaction with a game 
environment” (2011, 124), which I shall return to in section 8.2.2.  
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Given that Conway, as the protagonist of the dramatic presentation generated 
during the playing of KRZ, represents a ludic subject taken on by the player as ‘I’ as 
much as he represents a character in his own right, the distinction between an 
alterbiography of entity and of self becomes, not effaced – for it remains a valid 
distinction for discussing the multiple layers of experience at work – but porous. 
Certainly, the protagonist of the dramatic script the player sees on-screen is Conway, 
and, in perceiving Conway thus as a represented character, the player is engaging with 
him in the objective relation of other. However, since Conway is also inhabited by the 
player as a ludic subject, it follows that it is also as a ludic subject, as taken up by the 
player as ‘I-in-the-gameworld,’ that he becomes part of the game’s dramatic presentation, 
and, hence, of its textuality. In perceiving herself in this way, then, the player adopts the 
objective relation of self, by which she becomes available to herself (insofar as she grasps 
the ludic subject as herself) as an object of her own perception. The ludic subject is 
therefore framed through an external point-of-view. However, this happens while the 
player continues to relate to the figure as the self, thereby establishing an aesthetic 
mechanism of autoscopy, or self-perception (Mishara 2009, 591). 
 
 
Figure 6.6: Producing a dramatic script. 
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The player’s ludic subjectivity – the self that she works out in relation to the gameworld, 
in the shape of the playable figure – is therefore re-presented to her as an object of 
perception. Not only that, but the representation of the player’s ludic subjectivity is 
presented to her within the context of the textual unity the game as an aesthetic object 
possesses when framed through the external perspective – a textual unity whose 
elements are organized according to the formal schema of narrative, theme and so on. 
Given the central function that both Ricoeur (1992) and Zahavi (2008) grant to the 
notion of narrative as a structuring principle guiding the transition between the notion of 
the subject as the first-personal bearer of experience and the notion of the self as the 
unity of this moment-to-moment stream of intentional consciousness under the sign of a 
consistent identity, it is not surprising that it is precisely this embedding of the re-
presentation of the enacted ludic subject within the formal structures of the game-as-text 
that bestow upon it the shape, form and characteristics of a coherent ludic self. Here, the 
objective relation of self – the final aspect of the relation – comes forcefully into view. 
 
6.4.6 Sharing the gaze 
There is a final point of interest to consider in the scene in question. This relates to 
something which occurs late in the scene: drawing Conway’s attention to patterns she 
perceives in the TV static, Weaver instructs him to “look closely”. At this point, in the 
fashion the player is accustomed to, a text-box appears on-screen, displaying the option 
to ‘look at’ the TV (see Figure 6.7). I have already discussed the phenomenological 
implications of the ‘look at’ command, and, at this point, the player would presumably 
expect the command to work in the way in which it has been established: that is, 
providing her with a verbal description of the object in question (in this case, the TV) as 
it is experienced from Conway’s subjective perspective – hence, another instance of the 
subjective relation of other. 
Instead, what happens is that the visual perspective pulls in closer to frame the 
TV. For the first time in the scene, and in the game as a whole, Conway disappears from 
view: at this moment, the player’s visual point-of-view becomes coterminous with 
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Conway’s. It is the player’s literal viewpoint, not just Conway’s, that shifts in focus, 
zooming in on the TV, then past the TV to the view from the window behind it. Here, it 
is not Conway who ‘looks’: it is the player, along with Conway, who sees a barn, a 
windmill, two horses and a fence. The subjective perspective at work here is not only 
Conway’s, but is primarily to be understood as the player’s own perspective on the 
gameworld – in the sense that the player identifies the ludic subject to whom this 
subjective perspective belongs as ‘herself’. Of course, it is in the light of Conway’s own 
goals – specifically, his need to locate 5 Dogwood Drive, and, hence, his need to find the 
entrance to “the Zero” – that the scene is viewed, and, in that sense, the subjective 
relation of other remains at play to a considerable degree. However, the shift in visual 
framing renders the subjective relation of self more prominent (see Figure 6.8). 
As a hypnotic loop of ambient electronic music emerges to the fore on the soundtrack, 
the player, perhaps keeping in mind the admonition to “look closely”, inspects every 
detail of the seemingly mundane rural scene for anything of particular significance, taking 
the scene as a whole, and the individual objects within it, in her intentional grasp. Still, 
nothing happens: it is only when the player pulls back from her intense focus in 
perceiving the scene and clicks the mouse button that the next text box – containing 
Weaver’s next lines of dialogue – comes up. Weaver’s comment – “Hey. Hey, wake up. 
You spaced out for a minute there” – refers not only to Conway’s losing himself in 
contemplation of the mysterious scene, but also to the player’s doing the same, thereby 
not realizing she has to click the mouse button for the scene to progress. Again, the line 
between Conway-as-subject and the player’s own subjective perspective on the 
gameworld has been, momentarily, entirely effaced: it is not only that the player has 
taken on Conway’s perspective as her own while retaining a sense of his distinctive 
identity, but that Conway himself has vanished from view, both literally and figuratively, 
and the subject-position is grasped entirely as the player’s own.   
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Figure 6.7: “Look at” the TV. 
 
Figure 6.8: The view past the TV. 
 
After having been absorbed in this scene, Conway and the player grow aware of the 
bigger picture again – the view zooms out to show the interior of the house, but Weaver 
is gone. The sense of the uncanny that this sudden disappearance presents is predicated 
not only on a limitation of Conway’s perspective, but also of the player’s. It works 
precisely because, in the instance of Weaver’s disappearance, the player has fully adopted 
Conway’s subject-position, and shares the limitations of his viewpoint, attention and 
focus – or, in Lankoski’s terms, his alignment. The player does not see what happens to 
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Weaver because Conway doesn’t see, and her perspective on the gameworld is, in this 
moment, his: a perfect example of the subjective relation of other in action.  
 
6.4.7 Drawing things to a close 
The scene ends in a rapid inversion of the sequence of perspectival shifts through which 
it unfolds. As Conway leaves the now-empty house and follows the path down the hill 
and back to Blue/Homer and the truck, the visual point-of-view zooms back outwards 
until, finally, Conway returns to being a small figure in a bigger scene, framed by the 
porch in the foreground. The silhouetted figures on the porch through which the player 
first viewed the scene in its opening moments have now gathered themselves into a 
bluegrass band, and, as the scene draws to a close, they strike up a performance of a song 
whose lyrics offer a commentary on Conway’s plight (see Figure 6.9).  
 
 
Figure 6.9: The bluegrass band. 
 
These final moments therefore enact a return to Conway being framed as an other 
through an external perspective, with the player in the position of the audience viewing 
the scene, and Conway as a character within it, from the outside. However, if it had been 
possible to take this perspective at face value at the start of the scene, it is certainly 
impossible to do so at the end, once the player has related to Conway in all four aspects 
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we have identified in the player-figure relation. This close analysis of this scene has 
demonstrated how these aspects interrelate in a complex relationship, interweaving the 
player and Conway in relations of identity and alterity, objective distance and subjective 
merging. When playing/with the figure of Conway, the player is Conway, but also plays 
him as a distinct figure. She sees the gameworld from the subject-position he represents, 
inhabiting him as a ludic subject, but she also perceives him – and, insofar as she 
identifies with his subjective position, herself – from an external position, as object. It is 
in the interrelations of these seemingly paradoxical dimensions that the aesthetic and 
formal nature of the player-figure relation comes fully to the fore.  
 
6.5 Conclusions 
 
With respect to this scene in KRZ, then, the question regarding the ‘I-in-the-gameworld’ 
is revealed in its full complexity. What is brought into view is the system of subjective 
relations that structures the aesthetics of subjectivity with which this investigation is 
concerned. In short, and to sum up the four dimensions of the player-figure relation, the 
‘I’ under the lens is both the I that sees the gameworld, and this individual through whose eyes I see 
the gameworld; at the same time, it is both the I that is seen in the gameworld, and this individual 
who I see in the gameworld. These, respectively, conform to the subjective relation of self, the 
subjective relation of other, the objective relation of self and the objective relation of other. 
The focus on the playable figure that the investigation has adopted in this chapter 
has shed light on the concrete formal processes by which ludic subjectivity – as it was 
conceptually articulated in the analyses undertaken in the course of the preceding 
chapters – is established as a subjectivity that is both lived and perceived. The remaining 
chapters shall now take up the task of fleshing out the various aspects and interrelations 
of the aesthetics of subjectivity that emerges against the background of the multi-
dimensional player-figure relation this chapter has mapped out. 
 To this end, Chapter 7 shall flesh out the subjective relation to the playable 
figure, highlighting, in practical terms, how it is on this basis that the contours of the 
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ludic subject-position are determined as a structured ‘comportment’ or mode of being-in-
the-gameworld. Chapter 8, then, shall bridge the subjective and objective relations, 
demonstrating how the player’s enactment of a ludic subject in the course of 
experiencing and acting in the gameworld is accompanied by a simultaneous 
representation of this ludic subjectivity, placing the player in an aesthetic relation to her 
own ludic subjectivity. Finally, Chapter 9 shall take as its focus the question of character 
that has been touched upon in this chapter, accounting for the way in which this 
represented ludic subjectivity can, through the intercession of the ordering textual 
structures of narrative form, be given the shape of a unified ludic self. 
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Chapter Seven 
The structure of the ludic subject-position 
 
The overall structure of the aesthetics of ludic subjectivity has now been brought into 
view. This was achieved thanks to the development, in the preceding chapter, of the two-
axis model of the player-figure relation, according to which the playable figure is 
attributed the status of both self and other, and is related to both subjectively and objectively. 
 Following this model, the ludic subject is revealed as the being-in-the-gameworld 
that is enacted when the player engages in a subjective relation to the playable figure, the 
‘I’ who exists in and experiences the gameworld from the internal standpoint cleared out 
for her through taking on the playable figure as a body. The objective relation, 
conversely, results when the playable figure – and, by the same token, the ludic subject – 
is framed through the external perspective, and becomes a distinct object of perception 
in its own right. 
 This chapter shall expand upon the subjective dimension of the relation, taking as 
its theme the structure of the ludic subject-position itself. As has been made amply clear, 
the ludic subject-position refers to the perceptual ‘opening’ or point-of-view the player is 
granted upon the gameworld; in fact, as has emerged from the lines of analysis followed 
in the preceding chapters, it is thanks to the ludic subject as a perspectival standpoint 
that it is possible, in the first place, to speak of a ‘gameworld’ as phenomenally gathered 
up into a factical situation, and, hence, a lifeworld, for the player. However, it is not in 
the direction of the gameworld that this chapter’s engagement with the ludic subject-
position shall proceed, but, rather, in the opposite direction – towards the subjective 
existence implied as the bearer of the subject-position. As Jean-Paul Sartre writes: 
The notion of a point of view supposes a double relation: a relation with the 
things on which the body is a point of view and a relation with the observer for whom 
the body is a point of view. (1966[1943], 433) 
A consideration of the subject to whom a perspective belongs, then, is inherent in the 
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very idea of the perspective itself: 
…the phenomenology of being someone is essentially connected to the 
phenomenology of perspectivalness, to the experiential perspectivity of one’s 
own consciousness. Our experiential life possesses a focus of experience, a point 
of view. It is a first-person perspective in the sense of being tied to a self. Thus, it 
doesn’t make sense to speak of a first-person perspective without speaking of a 
self. (Zahavi 2007, 4) 
Although, as the model of the player-figure relation arrived at in Chapter 6 makes clear, 
this subjectivity that is established for the player through an engagement with the 
playable figure can be granted the status of both self and of other, the distinction, and the 
interrelation, between these two aspects of the relation shall not be taken as the theme of 
this chapter – though it will inevitably be present in the background to many of the 
points raised. The implications of the fact that the resultant subjective perspective is both 
taken by the player as her own and perceived as a foreign subjectivity, bearing the mark 
of an other, will inevitably be present in the background to many of the points raised, 
and shall be unfolded in Chapter 8; here, the focus shall be squarely on delimiting the 
mechanisms of ludic subject-positioning by which a ludic subject is determined in the 
first place.     
 I shall begin by contextualizing the notion of the ludic subject-position within the 
various senses attributed to ‘perspective’ in relation to games. On this basis, I shall then 
dissect the concept of the ludic subject-position into a set of distinct, interrelated formal 
mechanisms functioning to subjectively position the player in relation to the gameworld. 
Finally, by means of a comparative analysis of ludic subjectivity in Minecraft (Mojang 
2011) and Proteus (Key and Kanaga 2013), I shall demonstrate the way in which these 
various mechanisms, operating in unison to determine a ludic subject-position for the 
player, structure her subjective existence towards the gameworld as a particular 
comportment and mode of being-in-the-gameworld.   
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7.1 The ludic subject-position and the gameworld 
 
The concept of the ludic subject-position is intended to formalize the idea of a subjective 
standpoint which the player is invited to adopt in relation to the gameworld. As such, it 
constitutes a more-or-less stringently delimited perspective that brings the world into the 
player’s experience in a particular form. In attempting to pin down its constituent 
elements, and, hence, its structure, it is therefore instructive to consider the various 
senses in which the question of perspective in videogames has been framed – as well as, 
subsequently, making explicit what the concept of the ludic subject-position can add with 
regard to this question.  
 
7.1.1 The multiple senses of ‘perspective’  
John Sharp notes that perspective in videogames can refer to: 
…a means of constructing images with the illusion of dimensionality; a set of 
literary conventions relating to the point of view from which stories are told; the 
visual perspective from which players see a game; a player’s perspective for 
seeing and interacting with a game; and to the rhetorical perspective embedded in 
a game’s design. (2014, 107) 
Sharp refers to these divergent senses of perspective in games as, respectively, linear 
perspective, visual perspective, narrative perspective, player perspective and rhetorical perspective (ibid.). 
Even at the level of these basic definitions, it is evident that the idea of the ludic subject-
position as a standpoint taken on by the player towards the gameworld adheres most 
closely to what Sharp terms the ‘player perspective’, without, as I shall argue below, being 
entirely identical to it. This does not mean that aspects covered by the other senses of 
perspective should be considered as irrelevant, either for a more general understanding 
of perspective in games, or for the specific aim of theorizing what is entailed in the 
notion of the ludic subject-position.  
For the purposes of an investigation into ludic subjectivity, linear perspective can 
be collapsed into visual perspective, as constituting a set of geometric techniques for the 
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establishment of the illusion of three-dimensionality: the practices of linear perspective 
therefore become the means to the end of representing, as a two-dimensional image, the 
visual impression of a three-dimensional world as framed from a particular standpoint 
within it.  In its own right, visual perspective stands in a complex relation to the ludic 
subject-position, related to, but distinct from it: as such, the notion of ‘perspective’ in 
games should not be limited, as it often is, to a matter of visuality. For reasons of clarity, 
I shall adhere to the term point-of-view when speaking of perspective in purely visual terms, 
in contrast to the more general implications inherent in the idea of perspective which I 
intend to link more closely to the ludic subject-position. 
 Narrative perspective, as became evident in section 4.1.3, is a complex 
discussion: even bracketing the fact that a narrative text can incorporate multiple 
perspectives, and focusing purely on a single “articulate reading moment” (Iser 1980, 
114), it is useful, at a minimum, to distinguish between the perspective of focalization 
and that of narration (Genette 1980, 189) – that is, between the represented perspective 
internal to the heterocosm (on the story level) and the representing perspective external 
to the heterocosm (on the discourse level) (Chatman 1986; 1990, 144-145; Prince 2001, 
46).  Splitting Sharp’s ‘narrative perspective’ along this fault-line, the perspective of 
narration, as a textual function and a discursive strategy, can be subsumed into the 
rhetorical perspective. Meanwhile, the perspective of focalization, as relating to a 
“focalizer”, a heterocosmic entity whose subjectivity constitutes the filter through which 
the heterocosm is presented (Bal 2006, 18), can be understood as a dimension of the 
player perspective: Sharp’s mapping-out of the aspects of the player perspective, which I 
shall consider below, already accounts for such a dimension. 
 Finally, rhetorical perspective, relating as it does to the discursive functions 
performed by the game as a textual artifact – and including within it, as I have just 
argued, the perspective of narrative presentation – is related to the external standpoint of 
the implied player rather than the internal one constituted by the ludic subject-position. 
As such, though it refers to a crucial dimension of ludic engagement, it does not relate to 
	  265	  	  
the establishment of the ludic subject-position which the current chapter is concerned 
with. 
 
7.1.2 From perspective to the ludic subject-position 
Given the significant overlap between the concept of the ludic subject-position and what 
Sharp describes as the player perspective, it is worth expanding briefly on the latter. 
Sharp subdivides player perspective into four primary senses: who the player is, what the 
player can do, what the player is asked to do, and what the player feels (2014, 113-4). 
Who the player is, as Sharp describes it, appears to refer to the heterocosmic role the player 
is granted, or, as he puts it, “the character or role the player assumes – a space marine, an 
archeologist, an elf, a god-like controller, a plumber, a rocket ship – is one important 
layer of framing inside the game” (ibid., 113).  What the player can do refers to “the actions 
the player can carry out during the game” (ibid.). What the player is asked to do, as an aspect 
of the player perspective, accounts for the ways in which “the goals the player is asked to 
achieve” (ibid., 114) shape the player’s relation to the gameworld. Finally, what the player 
feels covers the fact that the player’s “emotional response [to objects and elements of the 
game object], whether it be celebratory, happy, frustrated, angry, or otherwise, colors the 
player’s perspective on their play experience” (ibid.).  
 This final dimension of the player perspective is arguably the least satisfyingly 
drawn on Sharp’s dimensions: without a solid theory of emotional involvement in games 
(such as that proposed by Olli Tapio Leino (2010) or Gordon Calleja (2011, 135-146)), 
the concept lacks rigour. The fact that it is presented as both the result of the other 
dimensions of the player perspective and a separate dimension in its own right is even 
more problematic.  
Putting this difficulty aside, Sharp’s unpacking of the various senses of 
perspective in relation to games is an invaluable clarification of a term whose multiple 
significations are not often so clearly demarcated. However, having broken down the 
notion of perspective into its constituent elements, Sharp stops short of unifying these 
disparate dimensions into an understanding of the subject to whom they all pertain. This, 
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of course, is not a criticism – Sharp’s aim, after all, is taxonomical rather than 
phenomenological or structuralist. Still, it is this gap that the linked notions of the ludic 
subject-position and the ludic subject are intended to fill. 
 
7.2 The dimensions of the ludic subject-position 
 
Over the course of the investigation so far, I have, for the most part, been speaking of 
the ludic subject-position as a single, unitary formal structure, which has only been 
reinforced through the metaphors I have deployed to articulate the notion – ‘standpoint’ 
and ‘perspective’ again suggest an idea of the ludic subject-position as a singular vector of 
orientation. This, however, is far from the case. Instead, the ludic subject-position is best 
understood as a loose conglomeration of diverse formal mechanisms, sharing only the 
common denominator of operating, in some way, to determine the player’s relationship 
to the gameworld. The notion of incorporation and the phenomenology of embodiment, 
which I discussed in Chapter 5, present us with the theoretical principles by which the 
various perspectival dimensions making up the ludic subject-position can be threaded 
together around a common centre, coalescing into a perceptual gestalt and linked in 
relationships of mutual influence and determination.1 
In this section, then, I shall unpack the dimensions of the ludic subject-position. 
This shall allow me, in the latter part of this chapter, to bring them back together, 
demonstrating how the interplay of the various formal structures relating to the ludic 
subject-position work in unison to determine the player’s mode of being-in-the-
gameworld: this shall be accomplished by means of a contrastive analysis of ludic 
subject-positioning, and of the resulting modes of being-in-the-gameworld, in Minecraft 
and Proteus. 
It should not be surprising to note that the dimensions of the ludic subject-
position exhibit a considerable (though not total) degree of overlap with the constitutive 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 This is not to say, as the analyses to follow shall demonstrate, that it is not also possible for these various 
structures to operate at cross-purposes. 
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phenomenological aspects of embodied subjectivity explored in section 5.3. It is this 
congruence that makes it possible for the ludic subject-position to be taken up as such a 
position in the first place- Accordingly, the dimensions of the ludic subject-position 
which I shall explore below are: spatial standpoint, visual point-of-view, aural standpoint, 
capabilities and limitations, goal-orientation and passion. I shall expand upon each of 
these in turn.       
   
7.2.1 Spatial standpoint 
In section 5.3.2, I made the observation that one of the most fundamental ways in which 
the body gathers its world around itself is precisely in its giving the subject a position in 
the world: that is, in its laying down of “first co-ordinates” (Merleau-Ponty 2002[1945], 
115). Maurice Merleau-Ponty gives this spatial dimension of embodiment a crucial role in 
the phenomenology of perception, arguing that it is “this spatial existence which is the 
primary condition of all living perception” (ibid., 126).The same is true of ludic 
subjectivity as embodied in the playable figure. In order to expand upon the implications 
of spatiality as a determining principle upon the ludic subject-position, I shall consider 
the spatiality of the ludic subject from five different angles: the establishment of an origo, 
the restriction of the field of information available to the player, the ontic proximity to 
things-in-the-gameworld it renders possible, and the capacity for motility.  
i) Origo. The first point to make is that – to return to Gordon Calleja’s definition 
of the notion of incorporation, already discussed in section 5.2.3 – the playable figure 
establishes a “systemically upheld embodiment of the player in a single location” (2011, 169). This 
grants the player an origo in the space of the gameworld – a ‘here’ or ‘first position’ 
relative to which, as I noted in section 5.3.2, a bodily space is laid out, with things-in-the-
gameworld organized deictically – near or far, left or right, above or below, and so on – 
along lines extending outward from the playable figure as origo or point of origin. As 
Dan Zahavi writes, “the body is characterized by being present in any experience as the 
zero point, the absolute “here”, in relation to which every experienced object is oriented” 
(1994, 65-66).    
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 It is opportune to mention again Stephan Günzel’s observation that “the player 
becomes involved in the game by being in the position of the character who acts” (2005, 
8), as well as Anita Leirfall’s development of the player’s position in the gameworld as 
spatial origo on the basis of a Kantian theory of directionality (2013). One approach to the 
spatiality of games which is particularly relevant to the spatial origo as a dimension of the 
ludic subject-position, and that therefore warrants further analysis, is Christian Elverdam 
and Espen Aarseth’s distinction between what they term absolute and relative positioning in 
game space. In their words, “positioning describes whether the player can discern his or 
her position exactly as the game rules dictate it (absolute) or if he or she must relate to 
other objects to describe his or her position (relative)” (2007, 7).2 
 Elverdam and Aarseth’s distinction is a useful one, and the notion of relative 
positioning helps to describe the way in which the playable figure’s establishment of a 
spatial origo determines an indexical organization of the gameworld for the player as a 
lived, bodily sphere. However, this determination of an indexical spatial organization 
relative to the standpoint of the playable figure as origo is only the first way in which the 
figure’s spatial standpoint determines the embodied ludic subject-position.  
 ii) Restriction of field. The second point to note regarding the significance of the 
spatial standpoint is that, through its support of two other dimensions of the ludic 
subject-position – the visual point-of-view and the auditory standpoint, both of which I 
shall, in turn, focus on below – it serves to determine the range of information available 
to the player regarding the gameworld. In this way, the spatial standpoint acts as the 
principle for a “restriction of field” of information, which, as Gérard Genette notes in 
his development of the concept of focalization, is one of the primary mechanisms by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 It is possible to argue that it is not a question of a particular game making use of either absolute or relative 
positioning, but that, in most situations of engagement with game space, both are possible, shifting only in 
prominence and relevance. In chess, for example, while it is certainly true that a strong absolute positioning 
system is readily available – allowing me to specify that my queen is positioned at E4 – relative positioning 
can also have great significance in the game – for instance, if I were to inform you that your king was 
positioned three squares ahead and two to the right of my knight. Conversely, even in a game like Minecraft, 
in which positions in space are primarily experienced in relative terms, players can have recourse to an 
absolute form of positioning: accessing the debug screen by pressing F3 allows the player to read an 
absolute coordinate for their current position within the game space. This caveat having been made, 
however, the basic distinction they highlight is undoubtedly an analytically fruitful one. 
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which a particular perspective on a textually-established world is enshrined (1980, 189).3  
It is instructive to recall here the point made in the sketching-out of the double 
perspectival structure of ludic engagement in section 2.4, and, in particular, Bernard 
Perron’s example regarding the exploration of the Wood Side Apartments in Silent Hill 2 
(Konami 2001). The fact that the gameworld-internal perspective of the ludic subject 
only grants the player access to a limited range of information regarding the gameworld, 
as opposed to the theoretically total knowledge available from the external perspective, is 
to a great extent determined by the ludic subject’s spatial standpoint. In Perron’s 
example, the player has no way of knowing there is a flashlight in Room 205 until she 
adopts a spatial standpoint in Room 205 – in other words, the contents of Room 205 are 
only included within the range of information available from the ludic subject-position 
once the embodied ludic subject is in Room 205.  
iii) Proximity and distance. The third point of significance of the spatial standpoint 
with regard to the ludic subject-position comes into view when recalling Merleau-Ponty’s 
observations, discussed in section 5.3.1, regarding the ontology of the body as a thing-in-
the-world, which “takes its place among the things it touches” (1968, 133). Thus, the 
location of the playable figure is not only about a set of co-ordinates, but also about its 
proximity to, or, conversely, distance from,	  the things encountered in the gameworld (it is 
noteworthy, of course, that ‘encounter’ is already a term that operates within a spatial 
paradigm, as does Merleau-Ponty’s suggestion that the body “takes its place”). In short, 
the spatial standpoint in the gameworld is what allows the ludic subject to be in the world 
among the things of the world, to be ‘close to’ things. This, in turn, is what allows the 
embodied subject to relate to things: to pick them up, to put them towards some use, to 
act upon them, and potentially, in turn, to be acted upon by them.4 As Martin Heidegger 
writes, “what is ready-to-hand in our everyday dealing has the character of closeness” 
(2008[1927], 135[102]). This proximity to things that the spatial situation of the embodied 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 This refers back to the discussion on the question of focalization in section 4.1.3. 4	  The ways in which the encounter with things-in-the-gameworld is structured according to the 
properties of the playable figure itself shall be considered below, under the name of capabilities and 
limitations and passions as further dimensions of the ludic subject-position.	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subject engenders, then, is what renders possible the gathering of the contingency of 
things-in-themselves into a factical situation for the subject:  
The concept of “facticity” implies that an entity ‘within-the-world’ has Being-in-
the-world in such a way that it can understand itself as bound up in its ‘destiny’ 
with the Being of those entities which it encounters within its own world. (ibid., 
82[56]). 
Ico (Team Ico 2001) provides us with a particularly striking example of this dimension of 
the spatial standpoint in relation to the ludic subject-position. The player, in the guise of 
the titular young boy, must escape from a vast, ancient castle, together with a strange, 
pale girl, Yorda, whom he encounters and frees from a cage suspended in one of the 
castle’s chambers. During the course of the game, Yorda comes to be threatened by 
mysterious shadowy figures that drag her off into the dark portals out of which they 
emerge unless they are fought off.   
The player is thereby placed in a relation of care towards Yorda, and this is 
translated directly into a play of proximity and distance that represents one of the game’s 
primary dynamics. Adopting a protective disposition, the player will attempt to remain 
close to Yorda whenever possible, and the game provides a mechanic dedicated precisely 
to this task. Pressing R1 on the Playstation 2’s Dual Shock controller makes Ico call out 
to Yorda if she is not nearby, and, unless she is prevented, she will then walk up to his 
standpoint. Pressing R1 again when Yorda is in close proximity will make Ico extend his 
hand to her, and it is possible, in a gesture that emphasizes the link between care and 
closeness, to traverse long sections of the game while holding Yorda’s hand.  
 In many situations, on the other hand, the player is forced to leave Yorda behind 
momentarily in order to solve one of the game’s environmental puzzles. The distance 
that is unfolded between the player-as-Ico and Yorda as the object of care thereby leads 
to anxiety, as the player worries about Yorda coming under attack by the shadowy figures 
when she is not within easy reach.5  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The echoes, in this passage, of the Heideggeran notions of ‘care’ and ‘fear’ as essential structures of the 
being-in-the-world of Dasein (2008[1927], 179[140]; 225[180]) are not accidental. Sebastian Möring has 
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iv) Motility. There is a final point to note regarding the spatial standpoint as a 
dimension of the ludic subject-position. The establishment for the player of specific co-
ordinates in the gameworld as “here, where I am” (Sobchack 1992, 4) also implies the 
inverse – that the rest of the gameworld is ‘not-here,’ not where I am: this is the basis, as 
I have shown, by which the spatial standpoint can serve as a restriction of the field of 
information available to the player. However, although I have so far been speaking of the 
spatial standpoint as a static point, the spatiality of the ludic subject’s being-in-the-
gameworld is of course defined by its motility, that is, its capacity for movement.   
With respect to the ludic subject-position, this is important for two reasons. First, 
it reveals the capacity of the player, as ludic subject, to change her spatial standpoint 
within the gameworld according to the capacities for movement afforded by the playable 
figure, which, of course, leads to a redrawing of her factical situation within which her 
ludic subjectivity can orient itself towards its existential projects. If I find myself standing 
at the entrance to my stronghold in Minecraft, looking out over the edge of a canyon, and 
see, on the far rim, a seam of coal that answers to my present needs, then, in terms of my 
current spatial standpoint, the coal is marked by its distance from me, and hence by its 
failure to be present to me as ready-to-hand. At the same time, my proximity to the 
stronghold grants me a sense of safety. However, the capacity for movement the playable 
figure grants me allows me to decide to embark on a journey which, at its culmination, 
grants me a new spatial standpoint in which my ‘here’ and ‘not-here’ have traded places – 
the seam of coal, in its proximal actuality, becomes available to me as ready-to-hand 
(giving me the capability of mining the coal), while, conversely, my distance from the safety 
of the stronghold might become a cause for anxiety or fear as dusk begins to fall.  
Secondly, the capacity for movement in its own right is crucial, insofar as it makes 
the embodied subject’s experience of being in a spatial domain literally an experience of 
movement through that domain: a point which is brought to the fore in the phenomenology 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
examined these existential structures as they can be observed to be at work in ludic engagement (2013, 
289). In this regard, it is noteworthy that these existential structures are often manifested in spatial terms: 
“fear is at play if the harmful object is at an approachable distance from where it can potentially be 
harmful” (ibid., 293).  
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of place developed by Yi-Fu Tuan and Edward S. Casey. It is through inhabiting a space, 
familiarizing myself with it by working out the paths of traversal and embodied 
movement it allows, that it is translated for me into a meaningful place. Tuan suggests that 
“all people undertake to change amorphous space into articulated geography,” and it is 
precisely the process of interpretative familiarization that marks the movement from 
space to place: “what begins as undifferentiated space ends as a single object-situation or 
place […] when space feels thoroughly familiar to us, it has become place” (1977, 72-73). 
Casey argues that the process of inhabiting a landscape is that of “transmuting an initially 
aimless and endless space into a place of concerted action, thereby constituting a dense 
placescape” (1993, 29). The movement from space to place, then, is literally a movement, 
a process of exploration and experimentation with the possibilities of the given space: 
“places […] are something we experience – where experience stays true to its etymological 
origin of ‘trying out’, ‘making a trial out of’” (ibid., 30). 
This process is an inherently embodied one. “If I am to get oriented in a 
landscape,” Casey argues, “I must bring my body into conformity with the configurations 
of the land” – by, for instance, placing oneself in specific relations to landmarks, or 
working out paths determined by the contours of the landscape. Once I have done so, “I 
am able to find my way in a placescape that to a significant degree is marked and 
measured, as well as perceived and remembered, by my own actions” (ibid., 28). The 
range of capabilities of movement that the player is allowed within the gameworld, then, 
determine the form it takes as a meaningful place for the player – and, inseparably, the 
player’s subjective existence as it takes place within it.  	  
7.2.2 Point-of-view 
As a visual opening onto the world, point-of-view can be seen to logically follow on 
from the spatial standpoint established by the body’s existence within the world. There 
is, however, a qualification that needs to be made here, and it is that, in many games, we 
cannot make as transparent an equation of spatial standpoint and visual point-of-view as 
it is possible to make for the embodied subject. In games employing a first-person point-
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of-view – ‘first-person’ here being used in the ‘camera’ sense, rather than in the 
phenomenological sense in which I have been using it to refer to the mineness of 
experience – there is no need to make a distinction between the spatial standpoint and 
the visual point-of-view, and identifying these as aspects of the same ludic subject-
position presents no difficulties.6 However, in many other games, the visual perspective 
the player is granted upon the gameworld is entirely dissociated from the position in 
which the playable figure is located in the gameworld.   
 The dissociation of visual perspective from the spatial standpoint can be 
interpreted as establishing two distinct subjective points of encounter between the player 
and the gameworld. This is the motivation behind Britta Neitzel’s – and, in her wake, 
Jan-Noël Thon’s – separation of the “point of view” and the “point of action,” which I 
have already considered in section 4.1.4. On the basis of this observation, the tendency 
has been for visual point-of-view to be given experiential prominence: in other words, 
the player’s subjective perspective in relation to the gameworld has generally been 
identified with the visual point-of-view rather than with the spatial locus of the playable 
figure. This was already evident in the attempts at applying the notion of focalization to 
an analysis of perspective in games. Whether in Neitzel’s equation of visual point of view 
with the mechanism that focalizes a particular perspective upon the gameworld, or 
Michael Nitsche’s suggestion that the focalizer in Super Mario 64 (Nintendo 1996) is 
Lakitu, the camera operator following Mario around, it is to the visual standpoint that 
focalization has been attributed. 
 This argument is echoed, directly or otherwise, in various approaches to the 
question of perspective. Astrid Ensslin, for example, writes that “there are major 
differences between seeing the avatars perform actions in what is called third-person 
games (or gaming modes), and seeing the gameworld literally from the avatar’s own 
perspective, which happens in first-person games (or gaming modes)” (2011, 125). The 
wording here implies a strong shift in the player’s subjective position in relation to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Here, the aptness of Alexander Galloway’s contextualizing of this visual technique with the cinematic 
technique of the subjective point-of-view shot (2006, 41) becomes apparent. 
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figure that is entirely tied to point-of-view: a first-person perspective implies a subjective 
affinity between the player and the figure, while the (at least partial) dissociation of 
perspective and figure resulting from the third-person perspective entails a subjective 
separation that objectifies the figure. The suggestion, it would seem, is that visual point-
of-view supersedes the ontic embodiment of the figure in constituting the player’s 
subjective access to the gameworld. More directly, this is precisely what Grant Tavinor 
affirms when he states that “gamers do often identify with the point of view in 
videogames” (2009, 75).  
There is some justification to this approach. In Pac-Man (Namco 1980), for 
example, the player’s omni-present point-of-view provides her with a perceptual field 
that is far wider than the one that could putatively be attributed to Pac-Man himself, as 
embodied in a particular spatial standpoint in the maze. In such a case, the ludic subject-
position as the player’s opening onto the gameworld certainly incorporates within it this 
visual point-of-view which cannot be subsumed to the embodied standpoint of Pac-Man 
himself. For instance, the player might choose to change direction and turn back the way 
she came because, from her omni-present, top-down perspective, she can see that there 
is a ghost approaching round the corner, even though this knowledge would not be given 
from Pac-Man’s situated visual field. For this reason, it would be a mistake to found the 
ludic subject-position purely on the standpoint of Pac-Man as playable figure without 
taking into account how this subject-position integrates within it a visual point-of-view 
that grants the player a wider field of knowledge than is available to the figure as 
embodied subject. The same is true of situations in which the visual point-of-view grants 
the player a more restricted field of knowledge than would be available to the playable 
figure – as in the case of the carefully-controlled camera perspectives typical of survival-
horror games, which “play with the field of action in order to hide monsters off-screen” 
(Perron 2012, 81).  
Nonetheless, it is just as simplistic to identify the player’s subjective standpoint 
with visual point-of-view at the expense of all the other dimensions of the ludic subject-
position. This becomes evident in light of the fact that it remains perfectly possible for 
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the Pac-Man player to exclaim, “That ghost is right behind me!” This is despite the fact 
that “nothing can ever be ‘behind’ the frame of view” in a game like Pac-Man (Klevjer 
2006, 151).7 Clearly, the usage of the deictic preposition ‘behind’ here refers back to Pac-
Man as embodied subject in the gameworld: it is his spatial standpoint as indexical origo, 
and the player’s taking up of this standpoint as an aspect of her ludic subject-position, 
that makes the statement possible. Similarly, it is in relation to this same spatial 
standpoint that the proximity of the ghost comes to signal to the player that she is in 
danger. Keeping such points in mind, it is not surprising that, in spite of his theory of 
focalization in games, Nitsche concedes that many games utilizing a third-person 
perspective “have shown that the camera does not have to be in a first-person point of 
view to connect the player to a single virtual role” played out in relation to the 
gameworld (2008, 215).  
 Having established, then, that visual point-of-view stands in a polyvalent 
relationship with the embodied ludic subject-position – in that it cannot automatically be 
reduced to it, nor, conversely, can it be entirely dissociated from it – it is necessary to 
map out some of the basic principles by which the two might relate.  
In their typology of games, Aarseth, Smedstad and Sunnanå distinguish between 
games with an omni-present perspective, which “allow the player to examine the entire field 
or arena at will,” and games with a vagrant perspective, in which “the perspective follows 
a player-token or avatar” (2003, 49). This bipartite distinction is retained in Elverdam and 
Aarseth’s 2007 update to the typology; however, it might be considered too simplistic on 
a number of fronts. Even adhering to the examples provided in the typology itself, no 
distinction is made between a game like chess, in which the entire space of play is visible 
at any given moment of play, and one like Warcraft (Blizzard Entertainment 1994), in 
which only a section of the space is visible at any given point. The earlier development of 
the typology explicitly considers both of these as examples of the omni-present 
perspective. In the later formulation, on the other hand, the omni-present perspective is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Klevjer is here speaking of the isometric point-of-view of games such as Baldur’s Gate (Bioware 1998), but 
the point stands with regard to Pac-Man, and, indeed, almost any 2D game. 
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specifically defined as one in which “the player has a complete overall view of the game 
space” (Elverdam and Aarseth 2007, 7). 
 At a minimum, it would appear, three broad categories of point-of-view would 
be necessary: a truly omni-present point-of-view which encompasses the entire game space 
at once, what might be termed a free perspective, in which the view is limited to a sector 
of the game space but there is little restriction on the movement of the visual frame 
around the gameworld, and an embodied point-of-view, which is in some way attached to a 
playable figure, and thereby dependent upon the figure’s location within the game space.    
 For our current purposes, I shall note that all three modes of point-of-view can 
be attached to an embodied ludic subject-position. Pac-Man or Donkey Kong (Nintendo 
1981) stand as examples of an omni-present point-of-view relating to a ludic subject 
embodied in a playable figure. Meanwhile, Baldur’s Gate (Bioware 1998) makes use of a 
free isometric point-of-view that can be controlled by the player independently of the 
playable figure’s location in the game space. Finally, the fixed perspective category is, as I 
have pointed out, necessarily linked in some way to a playable figure: it can include not 
only games, such as Minecraft, with a first-person visual point-of-view, but also games, 
such as The Last of Us (Naughty Dog 2013), that deploy a third-person perspective. 
However, it is not simply a matter of determining whether or not the point-of-
view is related to the embodied subjective perspective of the playable figure. As Klevjer 
points out, the association of visual point-of-view upon the gameworld with the playable 
figure, which he terms “prosthetic perception” and views as a basic dimension of the 
“subjective avatar” (2006, 146),8 is not an either/or distinction, but “a matter of degree” 
(ibid., 150). As he argues, even the side-scrolling perspective in a 2D shooter such as 
Defender (Williams 1981) exhibits, in a minimal form, an association of point-of-view and 
playable figure. 
  Keeping this in mind, it becomes possible to identify modes of association 
between point-of-view and the embodied ludic subject that go beyond a simple 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 The objections I raised in section 5.4.1 to the question of prosthesis as Klevjer uses it to conceptualize the 
avatar – which, as I argued, succumbs the extensional fallacy – remains valid here. 
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geometrical relation of the former to the latter’s spatial standpoint. In Baldur’s Gate, the 
player is given full control of the game’s isometric perspective, and can move it away 
from the playable figure entirely, to display areas of the gameworld not inhabited by the 
figure at that given moment. However, the dissociation of visual perspective from the 
playable figure is not as total as this might make it seem. Areas of the map the player-
character has not already explored are blacked out; moreover, areas outside a fixed radius 
surrounding the playable figure are covered in fog-of-war, meaning that, outside of this 
radius immediately surrounding the playable figure’s standpoint, the movements of 
enemies or non-player characters are not perceived. Even in cases where the visual point-
of-view is not geometrically coterminous with the playable figure’s visual field, then, it is 
still the embodied ludic subject through which it is filtered.  
 A particularly pronounced way in which the visual point-of-view is marked by the 
embodied ludic subject to whom it belongs is the deployment of what might be termed 
subjective visual effects that explicitly mark the act of vision as belonging to the playable 
figure. Here I shall make reference again to the case of the flashbang grenade explosion 
in Far Cry (Crytek 2004) as analyzed by Olli Tapio Leino (2010, 172), which I first 
discussed in section 5.4.3. As I noted there, Leino uses the observation of the temporary 
‘blindness’ and ‘deafness’ experienced by the player following the explosion of the 
flashbang grenade as the starting-point for a development of what, following Peter Paul 
Verbeek, he terms the “hybrid intentionality” of experience of the gameworld. At that 
stage of the investigation, I noted the difficulties with the notion of hybrid intentionality 
as Leino articulates it. Nonetheless, his central observation – that the interpretation of 
the audiovisual effects generated by the game as ‘blindness’ and ‘deafness’ “does not 
make any sense outside the context of Far Cry, that is, if we take the I as in isolation from 
Far Cry” (ibid., 175) – is crucial here. This makes the ‘I’ that is affected by the flashbang 
grenade, the ‘I’ whose seeing and hearing are temporarily impaired, a subject that is 
constituted only within, and in relation to, the gameworld  
As in Far Cry, the convention of subjective visual effects is most prevalent in 
games employing a first-person point-of view: already in Wolfenstein 3D (id software 
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1992), at the birth of the first-person shooter genre, the screen would briefly flash red 
whenever the playable figure, BJ Blascowicz, took damage. Clearly, this serves as a 
mechanism for providing the player with important visual feedback, letting her know 
when she is taking damage. However, interpreted in phenomenological terms, it also 
serves as an additional marker – beyond the simple fact of positionality manifested in the 
point-of-view – of the embodied subject to whom it belongs. In other words, it indicates 
a perceiver who is not the player, as an embodied subject in the player-world, and whose 
body exists in the gameworld and is affected by it. 
 This is significant in two directions. First, it counters Neitzel’s assertion that, in 
games adopting a first-person point of view (what she terms the subjective point-of-view): 
…the body of the avatar can only be an imaginary one because the spot at which 
the body belonging to the hand, as well as the eyes belonging to the body should 
be situated remains empty […] since the avatar can never be seen, the player does 
not know in which way the eyes of the avatar see. (2002, 6) 
Neitzel’s argument is that this intangibility of the body-in-the-gameworld attached to a 
first-person point-of-view means that there is nothing for an embodied perspective to 
latch onto, and that, as a result, “for the player there is no possibility but to transfer her 
own vision to the imagined avatar” (ibid.). Wolfenstein 3D, however, shows us that it is the 
opposite that is true: the only way to account for the affection of the visual perspective 
by the sensation of pain is to claim that it is in fact the playable figure’s vision that is 
taken on by the player.  
The second insight that needs to be made is that this is not exclusive to games 
that employ a first-person point-of-view. Indeed, it did not even originate there: it is 
possible to find precedents to Wolfenstein 3D in, for example, Prince of Persia (Mechner 
1989), which, despite making use of the side-on perspective typical of the two-
dimensional platform game, displays a split-second flash of bright red every time the 
Prince receives a blow in a swordfight. Such effects have only grown more elaborate over 
time. In Uncharted: Drake’s Fortune (Naughty Dog 2009), if Nathan Drake’s health falls 
below a certain threshold, the colours on screen grow desaturated, the image blurs, and 
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sounds are muffled. In The Witcher (CD Projekt RED 2007), the quest “Old Friend of 
Mine” culminates with the playable figure, Geralt, having a number of strong drinks with 
some old friends with whom he has been reunited: his resultant drunkenness is 
represented by means of a superimposed doubling of the on-screen image and an 
irregular rocking motion to the point-of-view.  
The fact that these subjective visual effects are taken as signaling the 
intentionality of the playable figure constituted as an embodied perceiving subject, 
however, is only half the story. Sticking to the example of Wolfenstein 3D, if the 
conclusion is simply that, phenomenologically, the red flash can be interpreted as the 
visual representation of an intuition of physical pain belonging to the playable figure, this 
would leave the player out of the loop. Clearly, the sensation of being shot does not 
belong to the player: and yet, in taking on board the embodied ludic subject-position that 
has BJ Blascowicz as its body, the player assimilates this intuition as her own: this is what 
allows her to say, “I was shot because I made a mistake,” and to act, intuitively and 
prereflectively, on the intuition – perhaps running for cover, or turning towards her 
assailant to return fire. 
 
7.2.3 Auditory standpoint 
In comparison to the wealth of discussion surrounding visual perspective in games, 
comparatively little has been written that acknowledges the fact that the taking-on of a 
subjective standpoint in, and perspective upon, the gameworld has not only a visual 
dimension, but also an auditory one – a point Tavinor gestures towards, but does not 
follow up, when he speaks of the playable figure as a “virtual listener” in addition to all 
its other qualities (2009, 77).  
 The distinction Aarseth, Smedstad and Sunnanå make between the omni-present 
and the vagrant perspective on the level of visuality can be extended to the auditory 
sense. Here, an omni-present auditory standpoint would describe games in which every 
sound in the gameworld is audible at a volume that is not related to the player’s spatial 
standpoint (or lack of one): this is usually, but not necessarily, linked to an equally omni-
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present visual perspective. A vagrant auditory standpoint, on the other hands, describes 
games in which the player’s location determines the field of hearing, with sounds 
produced in close proximity being audible at a higher volume, while sounds produced 
further away are fainter or entirely inaudible.  
An example will serve to illustrate the importance the auditory standpoint can 
gain. In “Eavesdropping,” the fifth mission in Thief II: The Metal Age (Looking Glass 
Studios 2000), Garrett's objective is to infiltrate the Eastport Seminary, one of the 
strongholds of the Mechanist cult that holds great influence over the city. He has been 
tipped off about a secret meeting being held there at midnight on a particular date, and 
has been led to believe that the meeting concerns him directly. The aim of the mission, 
having sneaked into the seminary via any of the several entry routes available, is to 
navigate its corridors and hallways undetected, in order to, finally, be in the right position 
outside the locked meeting-hall door in order to overhear what is being said inside. Until 
Garrett is in precisely the right spot outside the door, he (and, by extension, the player) 
cannot hear what is being said, making the case a perfect example of the aural dimension 
of spatial positioning.  
 
7.2.4 Capabilities and limitations 
This is a dimension of the ludic subject-position which I have already discussed at some 
length in section 5.3.5 in the course of outlining a phenomenology of the body. In short: 
one of the strongest determining factors that shapes the ludic subject-position in relation 
to a given game’s world is the set of capabilities the playable figure affords her in relation 
to it, which push her in the direction of certain modes of relation to the gameworld. As 
Peter Bayliss argues, “we need to move away from thinking about player intention simply 
flowing through the avatar into the game-world towards how these intentions are 
mediated by what the avatar can do in the game-world” (2007a, 2). In a similar vein, 
Nitsche, speaking of Tekken (Namco 1984), argues that “the interactor [Nitsche’s word for 
‘player’] is confined to the chosen user-avatar's limitations and abilities and its restrictions 
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shape the player's access to the virtual world and the evolving discourse,” thereby 
providing the player with “guidance and a dramatic role” (2008, 215-216). 
A point I already mentioned in passing in section 6.4.2, in the course of the 
critical analysis of the player-figure relation at work in Kentucky Route Zero (Cardboard 
Computer 2013-), is Chris Crawford’s suggestion that it is useful to think of a lexicon of 
verbs open to the player, allowing her to perform actions that represent meaningful 
statements within the gameworld (2002). The richness of this lexicon will vary from 
game to game - a first-person shooter, for instance, might include little but variations on 
‘move’, ‘shoot’ and ‘pick up’, while a role-playing game might make a much wider range 
of possible actions available to the player. Text-based adventure games, such as Adventure 
(Crowther and Woods 1976), and even many point-and-click adventure games, such as 
The Secret of Monkey Island (Lucasfilm Games 1990), literalize this concept, presenting the 
player with an actual list of verbs on-screen, usually including, for instance, “Use”, “Look 
at”, “Talk to”, and so on. However, the same observation is fundamentally true of any 
game: even if the lexicon is not verbalized, it remains the case that the player is presented 
with a particular set of actions that can be directed towards the gameworld.  
Applied to the playable figure, this insight would appear to lead directly to the 
instrumental perspective on the playable figure as avatar, which I touched upon in 
section 6.1.2, and which is typified by James Newman’s assertion that the playable figure 
should be understood as “sets of capabilities, potentials and techniques offered to the 
player” (2002). It is necessary, however, to take this observation further. It is not enough 
to state that a ludic subject-position is defined by the set of actions the playable figure 
allows the player – in such a way that, say, Gordon Freeman in Half-Life 2 (Valve 2004) is 
defined as a ludic subject-position by the verbs ‘shoot,’ ‘run,’ ‘pick up,’ and, conversely, 
the pointed absence of the verb ‘talk’. Verbs taken in isolation in this way are of little 
analytical import: ‘shoot’, for example, cannot be construed as a meaningful action, and 
cannot tell us anything about the ludic subject, unless put in context through a stating of 
what entities in the gameworld the ludic subject is able to direct the action at. The 
capabilities and limitations of the playable figure therefore need to be incorporated into a 
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phenomenology of embodied being-in-the-world before they can reveal anything about 
the ludic subject-position they determine. 
Luckily, the outlining of the phenomenology of the body in Chapter 5 already 
identified the conceptual tools by which this may be accomplished. In section 5.3.5, I 
presented the arguments made by Sartre and Merleau-Ponty regarding the ways in which, 
as an embodied subject, I always already am my capabilities for action, meaning that, in 
Merleau-Ponty’s crucial phrasing, “consciousness is in the first place not a matter of ‘I 
think that’ but of ‘I can’” (2002[1945], 159). The possibilities for action of the embodied 
subject gather her factical situation into an “instrumental complex” (Sartre 1966[1943], 
620), in which possible projects are brought into view and things-in-the-world are 
revealed as affordances or obstacles in relation to these projects. The inverse, as I noted, 
is also true, in that the “I can” could be perceived as shadowed by an “I cannot” (Young 
1980, 146) if, as an embodied subject, I am aware of my limitations as well as my 
capabilities. 
The notion of the bodily “I can” therefore allows us to incorporate the 
instrumental notion of the playable figure as a lexicon of verbs or a set of capabilities 
into a phenomenology of the body, understanding this capacity for action as a basic 
dimension of embodied subjectivity. What this means for the ludic subject-position is 
that, as revealed in the point made by Klevjer, which I already quoted in section 5.4.4, 
“the defining appeal of games like Super Mario 64 [Nintendo 1996] or Grand Theft Auto III 
[Rockstar Games 2001] is that we get to be a different I can, stepping into the shoes […] 
of another body, in another world” (2012, 22). The playable figure, then, grants the 
player a specific “I can” that, in Merleau-Ponty’s term, organizes her embodied 
subjectivity as the centre of her lifeworld into the form of a particular body-schema – 
and, inseparably, gathers up the gameworld into a meaningful instrumental complex.   
I have already given an example of the manner in which the bodily “I can” of the 
playable figure determines the ludic subject-position towards the gameworld: in section 
5.3.5, I offered an analysis of how the player’s engagement with Minecraft as a bodily 
lifeworld was determined by her project of building a stronghold, which in turn was only 
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possible based on the ways in which her “I can” brought things-in-the-gameworld into 
the aegis of her instrumental complex.(see Fig. 5.1). For this reason, I shall limit myself 
here to a brief illustration, chosen for its capacity to demonstrate how the sudden 
addition of a new capability the player is able to wield through the playable figure 
redraws her “I can,” and, as such, inseparably, both her body-schema as an embodied 
ludic subject and the world as instrumental complex to which it forms the centre. 
  About halfway through Half-Life 2, the player is given access to the gravity gun, 
allowing her to pick up a variety of loose items scattered around the game’s 
environments and put them to a variety of uses, either towards the short-term goals of 
surviving from moment to moment, or the long-term goal of making it to the end of the 
game – holding onto the objects as shields from enemy fire, or launching them at high 
speed, turning them into effective projectiles. This represents a radical shift in the way 
these objects are intended by the player – what initially appeared to be useless junk, 
serving only to add to the atmosphere of a decaying, detritus-strewn metropolis, 
suddenly becomes intended as an extremely useful resource. 
A last point to note in this regard is that, in some cases, the fact that the playable 
figure’s capabilities and limitations shape the player’s ludic subject-position, and, hence, 
her perspective upon the gameworld, is literalized through being reflected, in a manner 
akin to the subjective visual effects discussed above, on the level of visual point-of-view. 
Batman: Arkham Asylum (Rocksteady 2009), for example, allows the player to switch from 
the standard view to a ‘detective mode’ that highlights relevant objects in the gameworld 
while reducing everything else to a nondescript, dark blue background: ‘relevant’ here 
meaning those objects towards which the ludic subject’s “I can” could be directed, 
granting an affordance towards a possible action – enemies that can be attacked, stone 
gargoyles upon which Batman’s grappling hook could be put to use, and so on.  
 
7.2.5 Goal-orientation 
The matter of the bodily “I can” of the playable figure as a dimension of the ludic 
subject-position leads directly to the next mechanism by which the player’s relation to 
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the gameworld is determined: namely, the setting of goals towards which her efforts are 
directed. This is ground that this investigation has covered before. In section 2.2.3, 
building on the observations of Hans-Georg Gadamer (1989[1960], 107), I discussed 
task-orientation as a defining quality of the ludic action, and the extent to which goal-
orientation has been discussed as a crucial element of gameness became apparent again 
in the discussion on agency in section 4.4.2. Moreover, in section 5.3, goals – in the form 
of the existential project or “end” towards which the for-itself orients its being – were 
granted a central role in the determination of the embodied for-itself’s bodily space. 
Sartre’s example of the crag that “waits to be illuminated by an end in order to manifest 
itself as adverse or helpful” (1966[1943], 620) is particularly instructive in this regard, and 
also in the interlinking of the question of goals to that of the bodily “I can”. To reiterate 
briefly what I have already discussed at greater length, a goal can only be taken on as 
such if it falls within the horizon of possibility opened by the “I can” and the 
instrumental complex it unfolds around the player; at the same time, the possibilities of 
action that the “I can” structures in the encounter between the player and the gameworld 
only gain significance once the teleological orientation towards some purpose or project 
has been set.     
  The setting of goals, then, determines the ludic subject-position insofar as it 
makes the gameworld appear to the player in the light of these goals. A useful parallel to 
draw might be to Kevin Lynch’s investigations regarding city space. Lynch has suggested 
that the city-dweller negotiates an understanding of – and makes possible an engagement 
with – the complexities of the contemporary cityscape through a process he terms 
‘imaging’, by which he refers to the creation of a cognitive map or image that reflects the 
individual’s specific usage of the space. 
Environmental images are the result of a two-way process between the observer 
and his environment. The environment suggests distinctions and relations, and 
the observer – with great adaptability and in the light of his own purposes – 
selects, organizes and endows with meaning what he sees. The image so 
developed now limits and emphasizes what is seen, while the image itself is being 
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tested against the filtered perceptual input in a constant interacting process. 
(1960, 6) 
The key phrase here is “in the light of his own purposes”. The cityscape, Lynch suggests, 
is selectively mapped – reduced and emphasized - according to the individual city-
dweller’s interests and objectives. Certain objects, places and paths advance into view as 
distinct, meaningful entities, and together they form that particular city-dweller’s image 
of the city – the overwhelming chaos of the cityscape reduced into an ordered cosmos 
that, in the patterns of its selection and ordering processes, reveals at least as much about 
the observer as about the city.  
 In the same way, the player’s intuition of the gameworld is determined by the 
goals she takes on within it: it is in relation to these goals that certain things-in-the-
gameworld will be brought forth in her perceptual field as desirable objects to be 
attained, or as tools that, being ready-to-hand, can be put to use, others come into view 
as obstacles or dangers to be avoided, and others still recede into the background. 
Just as in the case of the dimension of capabilities and limitations, it is possible to 
find examples of games that foreground the goal-oriented dimension of ludic subject-
positioning on the level of the visual point-of-view. In Thief: Deadly Shadows (Ion Storm 
2005), items that count as ‘treasure’, and that therefore add up towards the player’s loot 
score at the end of the mission, are highlighted by means of a glimmering effect, allowing 
them to stand out as objects of intentional focus.  
A qualification needs to be made here, however: the centrality of goal-orientation 
as one of the primary dimensions of ludic subject-positioning should not be taken to 
exclude the possibility of the player – as a ludic subject acting within the gameworld – 
also taking actions that do not have a clear teleological orientation towards either an 
immediate or a final goal. In section 2.2.2, I paused upon Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the 
abstract bodily movement (2002[1945], 127-128), which he defines as an action which, 
having no reference to an object in the world or to a final purpose, instead brings itself – 
that is, the body in its movement – into view. At that stage of the investigation, the 
concept of the abstract movement was deemed unsuitable as a foundation for an 
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aesthetics of ludic actions, given the clear teleology of most actions in this category. 
While that stands unchanged, it is also pertinent to point out that, within the general 
goal-oriented drive of ludic engagement – and, hence, of engagement with the 
gameworld from a ludic subject-position – room can be cleared for actions that are not 
goal-oriented, and that, as such, adhere to Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the abstract bodily 
movement. In other words, it is also possible for the player to engage with the 
gameworld from the ludic subject-position simply for the pure enjoyment of wielding the 
“I can” she has been granted – for the pure pleasure of taking action, without a goal in 
mind.  
In Rez (United Game Artists 2001) – a shooting game with a rhythm-based, 
dance music-influenced aesthetic – the player might choose to time the lock and release 
of the game’s targeting and shooting mechanic to the pulse of the audiovisual rhythm 
which organizes the game’s presentation. Doing so does not grant the player any bonuses 
or achieve any concrete outcome in the game; nonetheless, the player is likely to find 
herself doing so ‘for fun,’ simply in order to participate in the game’s kinaesthetic 
unfolding. To take another example, Just Cause 2 (Avalanche Studios 2010), an open-
world action game, gives the player an extensive “I can,” particularly in terms of motility  
– notably thanks to a paraglider and a grappling hook which the player can, with some 
practice, use in combination in order to launch herself into unlikely flights across the 
landscape. In between taking on missions, the player might choose to forgo advancing 
the game’s campaign, and instead take some time off to explore the possibilities of this 
innovative movement system – throwing herself out of a helicopter and paragliding into 
a mountain valley, say, using the grappling hook to build up her momentum as she glides 
through a jungle canopy. The fundamental role played by goal-orientation in shaping the 
ludic subject-position, then, needs to be bracketed with the understanding that actions 
which are not goal-related – which are performed purely for the sake of wielding the new 
“I can” the player is given in the gameworld – are just as much a part of the vocabulary 
of ludic engagement.  
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7.2.6 Passion 
Before I define this dimension of the ludic subject-position, a note on the usage of the 
term ‘passion’ is in order. The sense in which I am using the terms is a somewhat archaic 
one, drawing on its Latin etymology as passio, or ‘suffering’. In this sense, passion is the 
inverse of action, addressing the body in its passive rather than active dimension – that is, 
not as an “I can” oriented towards the world, but as a tissue upon which the world can 
leave the mark of its own affect.9  
Here, one can recall Merleau-Ponty’s observation that the body, by virtue of 
extending its touch to encounter the things of the world, can itself, reciprocally, become 
the object of touch – the body is also acted upon; it exists, in one of its dimensions, as “a 
passive sentiment” (Merleau-Ponty 1968, 133). The embodied subject, then, is not only 
an agent, but also a patient.  Paul Ricoeur grants this dimension of embodied being an even 
greater role, opposing pathos to praxis as the fundamental duality around which the 
phenomenal lived-body is structured. Praxis, as the name implies, relates to action, and 
hence to an understanding of the embodied being as an agent within the world, 
determined by its actions and the “narrative identity” of the self to which these actions 
are subordinated (1992, 140).10 Pathos, on the other hand, refers to “the passivity of the 
suffering self,” (ibid., 320) – to the body as object for the actions of an Other. I have 
already, in section 5.4.5, remarked upon Ricoeur’s argument for an otherness which lies 
at the heart of selfhood, and which takes the body as its emblem: here, pathos is revealed 
as one of the primary dimensions of this otherness, insofar as it accounts for that which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Though, in common usage, this sense of ‘passion’ might appear to be largely extinct, it does survive as an 
underlying dimension of its more common usage to refer to a strong emotional attachment towards a 
person, thing or activity – as when one says, “I have a passion for modernist poetry,“ or, “I feel 
passionately about her.” This bears the implication of the emotion as being something beyond one’s 
control, something one has no choice but to succumb to – in short, to a sentiment one suffers, rather than 
actively undertakes. An even more clear – though more marginal – residue of this original meaning of the 
term ‘passion’ survives within Christian religious doctrine, where Jesus Christ’s suffering on the cross is 
referred to precisely as “the passion”.   
10 The question of the “narrative of the self” as a key element in self-awareness, in the sense of knowledge 
of oneself, is one that has already been hinted at in the delineation of the twofold understanding of 
subjectivity in section 1.4, where, following Dan Zahavi, the “minimal or core self” of experience in its 
first-personal givenness was opposed to the “narrative self” (2008, 8). Though so far it has been the first-
order experiential dimension of the self which has held the interest of this study – for the necessary reason 
that this is the basic, foundational plane upon which any understanding of the subject must locate its 
starting-point – over the course of the remaining and concluding two chapters of this study, the narrative 
dimension of the self shall be brought to the forefront of the analysis.  
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is constitutive of ‘I’ as lived through no choice of my own – everything which befalls me, 
which I am passively subject to, which, in short, I suffer. Given the centrality of the 
“sharp-edged dialectic of praxis and pathos” (ibid.) to the constitution of the subject, 
and, hence, of selfhood, Ricoeur implores us to “never forget to speak of humans as 
acting and suffering” (ibid., 145). 
In terms of the ludic subject-position, then, passion refers to the playable figure in 
its passive dimension, in its openness to being affected by the gameworld – an openness 
which, as I pointed out in the discussion on the spatial standpoint, is a result of the 
playable figure’s encounter with things-in-the-gameworld. This is the point addressed by 
Klevjer, in a passage I have already made reference to in the course of developing the 
ontology of the playable figure in section 6.1.2, in which he declares that what is relevant 
about Lara Croft, as a playable figure, is “not only that she mediates the player’s ability to 
jump or walk, but also that she embodies the player's risk of falling down the ravine” 
(2012, 18). It is on the basis of such an understanding that Bernard Perron writes, with 
respect to the playable figure, that “one gets as much emotion from the power to act upon 
as from the possibility of being acted upon” (2012, 114) – an observation he makes in the 
context of the survival horror genre, where the player’s vulnerability is emphasized to the 
point of constituting the lynchpin of her experiential engagement with the gameworld, 
which, as a result, takes on the emotional character of fear. 
The player’s relation to the gameworld, then, is just as determined by the playable 
figure in its passivity as in its capacity as a vehicle for action. The passive dimension of 
the ludic subject-position is perhaps best conceptualized as a fundamental reversibility of 
all the aspects of the embodied ludic subject’s relation to the gameworld. If the player-as-
ludic-subject, as embodied in the playable figure, can be spatially positioned in such a 
way that things-in-the-gameworld are in proximity to her, then she, or, at least, the 
playable figure as her ludic body, is also in proximity to them; if she can see the other 
entities in the gameworld, she can also be seen by them; if she can hear them, they can 
also hear her; if she can act upon them, she can also be acted upon by them; and so on.  
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This “passive sentiment” of the body-in-the-gameworld, then, is a direct 
consequence of the fact that, as I observed in section 5.4.5, there are two 
phenomenological aspects of the body – it is “a thing among other things” and also “that 
by which things are revealed to me” (Sartre 1966[1943], 402). Another way of saying this 
is to say that it is both subject (of its own perceptions and actions as for-itself) and object 
(of the perceptions and actions of others), or, as Merleau-Ponty puts it, “there are two 
views of my body: my body for me and my body for others” (2002[1945], 122ff.). If the 
world is sensible to the body, then the body is sensible to the world: “he who looks must 
not be foreign to the world that he looks at. As soon as I see, it is necessary that the 
vision […] be doubled with a complementary vision or with another vision: myself seen 
from without” (Merleau-Ponty 1968, 134). 
By way of an illustration of how this operates in terms of the ludic subject, I shall 
give the example of Thief: The Dark Project, which includes in its interface an icon it terms 
a ‘light gem,’ whose purpose is to indicate to the player Garrett’s level of visibility at any 
given moment. If the player-as-Garrett is standing in the shadows of a darkened alcove, 
then Garrett is not visible to the patrolling guards, and the light gem will be dim or even 
completely dark. If, instead, the player ventures into a brightly-lit corridor, the light gem 
will glow bright to indicate Garrett’s high level of visibility. 
In tandem with Garrett’s fragility compared to the playable figures in many other 
action games with a first-person point-of-view (two or three hits in a sword fight are 
likely to prove fatal), this visibility – the status of the playable figure as an object of 
perception, not only for the player but also for the other existents in the gameworld – 
conditions a particular relation to the gameworld that the player must adopt. The 
vulnerability to being seen – and the repercussions that Garrett as a playable figure would 
be made to suffer – will lead the player to adopt particular patterns of play: traversing the 
spaces of the game’s missions carefully, observing patrol routes from safe hiding-places, 
timing dashes between shadowy alcoves, and so on. As a result of Garrett’s passion, then 
– his liability, as an entity within the world, to suffer the effects of other entities in the 
world – the ludic subject-position towards the gameworld is given a particular cast.    
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7.3 Case study: Minecraf t  and Proteus  
 
The ‘ludic subject-position’ can therefore be understood, in analytical terms, as a set of 
interrelated formal mechanisms that, in their disparate ways, set the parameters for the 
‘opening’ that the player is granted towards the gameworld. However, while adopting this 
frame upon the ludic subject-position is indispensable from a critical perspective, it is 
necessary, for the purposes of an aesthetics of ludic subjectivity, to gain a picture of how 
these mechanism interrelate. As such, having broken down the ludic subject-position 
into its constituent mechanisms, it is now necessary to make a reverse movement: that is, 
to demonstrate the manner in which the player’s engagement with the gameworld 
through the multiple interlocking perceptual mechanisms of the ludic subject-position 
structures a unified ludic subjectivity.  
I shall accomplish this by means of a comparative case study of ludic subject-
positioning in Minecraft and Proteus. In both cases, the player starting a new game finds 
herself alone in the midst of an open, natural landscape, a wanderer in the wilderness. 
The fact that, from this nominally identical starting-point, the games establish such 
radically different interrelations between the player and the gameworld, thanks in large 
part to their divergent deployment of the mechanisms of ludic subject-positioning I have 
analyzed over the course of this chapter, is what renders a comparative analysis of these 
two games particularly illuminating with regard to the formation of ludic subjectivity. 
 
7.3.1 The wanderer in the wilderness 
The trope of the lone individual in the untamed wilderness is a recurrent image that, in 
its various manifestations, remains inevitably inscribed with the mark of divergent 
assumptions regarding the manner of the individual’s engagement with space, place and 
nature. In the age of the Enlightenment, Robinson Crusoe wastes no time in exerting his 
rational mastery over his island, bending the landscape to his will and playing out, as it 
were, the first moves of colonization and industrialization (Defoe 2007[1719]). With the 
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advent of Romanticism, a different relationship between nature and the individual rose 
to prominence, one in which nature and the mind face each other as object and subject, 
and the resulting “direct transaction between that mind and nature”, as M.H. Abrams 
notes, set in motion the processes that “bring into being the phenomenal world and 
constitute all individual experience” (1971b, 91). In William Wordsworth’s “Lines 
Written a Few Miles Above Tintern Abbey” (1798), for instance, “the interchange 
between [the poet’s] mind and nature constitutes the entire poem” (Abrams 1971, 92).  
The manifestations of the trope change along with cultural perspectives on the 
wilderness itself. If the eighteenth century had Robinson Crusoe, the twentieth century had 
Robinson Crusoe on Mars (Haskin 1964); and, if Minecraft and Proteus are anything to go by, 
now that space exploration, the dream of a technological optimism that no longer seems 
to hold, appears to have receded into history, the twenty-first century is forced to 
venture into fantasy or impressionistic generality in order to locate fresh wildernesses to 
subject to the explorer’s gaze. The landscapes of Minecraft and Proteus do not point 
towards any specific, recognizable wilderness – instead, they represent the idea of the 
unspoilt landscape, offering a new procedurally-generated landscape for every 
playthrough, pristine and unseen.   
Minecraft and Proteus both employ open landscape topographies, “the spatial 
structures which afford players the most freedom for navigation” (Calleja 2011, 82). 
Moreover, both are identical in terms of the visual point-of-view they grant the player 
upon their respective landscapes. Applying Aarseth, Smedstad and Sunnanå’s typology of 
perspectives described above (2003, 49), both games can be classified as adopting a 
vagrant perspective, where the visual point-of-view is connected to the ludic subject-
position as a spatial standpoint: here, “the ego has to wander through game space in 
order to apprehend the spatial setting of the game space” (Günzel 2008, 174).  
The first-person perspective both games adopt represents the closest possible 
link between visual point-of-view and the embodied ludic subject. Moreover, it is also 
significant for a second reason. Given that a game is always encountered in the context 
of pre-existing generic and formal expectations resulting from the player’s experience 
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with other games, the first-person perspective Minecraft and Proteus make use of might 
raise expectations of a generic alignment with the first-person shooter (FPS) genre. And 
yet, this is where the similarities stop – both games, Proteus perhaps somewhat more 
radically, position themselves in opposition to the expectations engendered by this 
generic association. Alexander Galloway notes that “two elements alone – a subjective 
camera perspective, coupled with a weapon in the foreground – constitute the kernel of 
the image in the FPS genre” (2006, 57). Though, as we have just pointed out, Minecraft 
and Proteus both adopt the first of these two elements, they both jettison the second.  
This is more than a mere surface-level visual difference. In the FPS genre, the 
weapon pointing into the screen, with the player on one side of it and the various entities 
populating the gameworld on the other, represents arguably the primary line of 
instrumentality connecting the ludic subject to the various things encountered in the 
gameworld. Recalling Sartre’s image of the instrumental complex as “the correlate of the 
possibilities which I am […] the enormous skeletal outline of all my possible options” 
(1966[1943], 425), it is not hard to see that the instrumental complex of the typical FPS 
ludic subject takes the form of a network of routes to be taken, targets to be shot and 
killed, more and better guns to be picked up, and so on. As such, the absence of the on-
screen gun in these two games – in Minecraft, to be replaced by other affordances that are 
occasionally represented in the screen position where a gun would be expected to be, and 
in Proteus seemingly to mark the absence of any affordance at all – reveals the operation 
of a divergent ludic subjectivity defined through a different “I can,” and hence the 
enactment of a different mode of being-in-the-gameworld for the player to inhabit. The 
next stage in this analysis, then, is to look at Minecraft and Proteus individually, focusing on 
the instrumental complex each game establishes to give shape to the gameworld around 
the player’s subject-position.   
 
 7.3.2 Minecraft: the landscape as standing-reserve 
In his discussion on the effects of modern, industrialized technology, Heidegger suggests 
that its point of divergence from other forms of technology lies in its mode of revealing 
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– that is, to return to the point made in section 3.5.2, in the manner in which it brings 
forth a ‘world’ out of the ‘earth’. Understanding technology as techné, Heidegger defines it 
as a ‘bringing-forth’, saying that “every bringing-forth is grounded in revealing [...] the 
possibility of all productive manufacturing lies in revealing” (2004[1953], 318). The 
essence of technology, Heidegger suggests, is that of revealing that which is concealed, 
bringing forth potential forms into unconcealment.  
Industrialized technology, however, operates through a radically different mode 
of revealing: through a process Heidegger terms Gestell (‘enframing’), industrial 
technology – not as a set of equipment or machinery, but as the essential impulse out of 
which that equipment emerges in the first place – places humanity in a specific relation 
to the landscape, whose operation is revealed in Heidegger’s statement that, through this 
enframing, “a tract of land is challenged in the hauling out of coal and ore. The earth 
now reveals itself as a coal mining district, the soil as a mineral deposit” (ibid., 320). 
Heidegger refers to this enframing as standing-reserve11 – its result is that the things 
we encounter in the world are no longer perceived as things, but as sources of raw 
material and reserves that can be stockpiled in order to be put towards some use: 
“everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately on hand, indeed to 
stand there just so that it may be on call for a further ordering” (ibid., 322). The end 
result of this is that the object stops being perceived as an object at all, and we become 
aware of it, instead, exclusively as resource – “whatever stands by in the sense of 
standing-reserve no longer stands over against us as an object” (ibid.).  
This certainly rings true when we consider the way in which the landscape comes 
to be seen in Minecraft. Every entity that can be perceived in the world is a potential 
resource, to be gathered, processed and put to use in crafting. Trees can be chopped 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 This concept has already been brought to bear upon this investigation once before, in section 4.3.3. 
There, in discussing the notion of recentering, and the way in which it demands a linking of the manner in 
which things-in-the-gameworld are perceived to the ludic subject-position through which they are perceived, I 
gave the example of a tree in Minecraft being perceived in the mode of standing-reserve if the player is in 
need of wood for a crafting project. That observation can now be contextualized within this more detailed 
engagement with the ludic subject-position at work in Minecraft.   
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down for wood. Rock can be quarried for building material, or mined in search of coal, 
iron or rarer minerals. Sheep are a source of wool; cows, of leather; pigs, of meat.  
This is made possible by the double-layered ontology that applies to the world of 
Minecraft. If we adopt the frame of the ‘game as system,’ as discussed in section 3.4.3, and 
attempt to apply the form of game-ontological analysis whose project it is to understand, 
and define, the game object as a set of discrete game components organized into a logical 
system, it rapidly becomes apparent that Minecraft presents a singular challenge, in that it 
is possible to ontologically define the set of entities making up its world in two radically 
incompatible ways.  
What is revealed is the possibility – indeed, the necessity – of interpreting the 
landscape through two superimposed frames. Through one frame – the one through 
which the player is likely to perceive the landscape in her initial attempts at making sense 
of it – the world of Minecraft is precisely a landscape, a topographical arrangement of 
hills, forests, deserts, mountains, oceans and caves, populated by various kinds of flora 
and fauna, all of which, as I noted in section 3.1.1 when attempting to locate the basic 
unit of gameworld experience, are immediately intuited as such by the player (see Fig. 
8.1). 
 
 
Figure 7.1 The Minecraft landscape 
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However, nothing in Minecraft is only what it appears to be on this level. Its idiosyncratic, 
blocky visual style might provide the first hint, being strongly reminiscent of a toy 
building-block construction set. And this, in fact, is an apt metaphor for revealing the 
double-layered ontology of Minecraft - a tree is visibly made up of a set number of wood 
cubes, a rocky outcrop is so many cubes of stone, and so on. Adopting the second 
ontological frame, then, the world of Minecraft is seen, not as a landscape, but as nothing 
but a spatial arrangement of resource cubes – a particularly extreme case of Paul Martin’s 
assertion that, over the course of engaging with a game’s milieu, it gradually loses its 
evocative and mysterious qualities, becoming “domesticated through exploration and 
interaction” (2011).  
If the frame through which the player is made to perceive and interpret the world 
can be equated with the ludic subject as embodied in the playable figure, and the range 
and nature of its “I can” is one of the primary mechanisms determining the parameters 
of the frame, then, at this stage in the argument, it would be advisable to determine what 
capabilities for action Minecraft grants the player – and, as such, how it establishes the 
conditions for the player to frame the gameworld as standing-reserve. 
Minecraft seems to offer the player an uncommonly wide range of capabilities for 
action to direct towards the entities of its world. In effect, though – apart from the 
general capacity for navigation and movement – the “I can” that is granted to the player 
can be considered to be organized as two primary impulses, which we might call 
deconstruction and construction. Through the playable figure, the player has the capacity to 
break any entity in the game down into its constituent resource cubes (deconstruction); 
these resources become stockpiled standing-reserve that the player can then recombine 
into new arrangements (construction). All other capabilities for action that the game 
provides (such as the capacity to build and deploy tools) are elaborations on these two 
impulses. 
To invoke a dimension of Elverdam and Aarseth’s typology of games which I 
have not yet referred to, this means that Minecraft’s environmental dynamics are entirely 
free (2007, 7), to the extent that we might even define the process of engaging with 
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Minecraft as being one of reconfiguring its landscape into a new arrangement. Minecraft, 
then, enframes the player in such a way as to lead her towards perceiving things-in-the-
gameworld not primarily as distinct entities, but as stockpiles of resources standing-
reserve. Still, it is not enough to stop here: next, it is necessary to ask a question 
regarding another dimension of the ludic subject-position – namely, regarding what 
function or goal these resources are to be put towards.  
The obvious, initial answer is building: the player gathers resources in order to 
build, as in the example of the project of building a stronghold I discussed in Chapter 5. 
This, however, requires further elaboration: why is it that the player builds? The game 
does not specify any quests or objectives to be met, and does not insist that the player 
must or even should build. Initially, of course, the motivation is survival: the player needs 
shelter in order to hide from the various dangers that come out at night. This is easily 
achieved, however – in practice, a tiny cubicle with a single door is enough to get 
through the night. Yet, building projects rarely stop there – as such, the drive towards 
building must be attributed to some motivation other than that of basic survival.  
One possible answer can be found by returning to Heidegger. The question of 
building is crucial to Dasein, and is an essential aspect of the human mode of dwelling, or 
living in a particular, meaningful place: “we attain to dwelling, so it seems, only by means 
of building. The latter, building, has the former, dwelling, as its goal” (2004[1951], 347). 
The two, in fact, are inseparably linked: “building is really dwelling” (ibid., 350). Dwelling 
is here not understood simply in the sense of houses, or places to stay, but encompasses 
buildings of all forms, and, through them, the essential core of what it means, as a 
human, to inhabit a place. What Heidegger understands by ‘building’ is the sense of the 
built environment as a whole, as a world in our image that is the world in which we 
dwell: “man’s relation to locales, and through locales to spaces, inheres in his dwelling. 
The relationship between man and space is none other than dwelling, thought 
essentially” (ibid., 359).  
For Heidegger, then, building is essentially tied to the question of world-
disclosure. I have already discussed the importance of the question of worldness to 
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Heidegger’s theorization of Dasein – to be is to be-in-the-world, after all; and to build, 
Heidegger argues, is to establish a world – to literally set it in stone. His influential 
example, in “The Origin of the Work of Art”, of the Greek temple in the rock-cleft 
valley, illustrates this point: it is the temple, he argues, that gathers a locus around itself 
and makes the landscape a meaningful place in which the community that built the 
temple can map out the paths of their lives – “the temple-work, standing there, opens up 
a world” (2004[1937], 168). As such, “to be a work means to set up a world” (ibid., 170) 
against the mute material substrate of the earth (see section 3.4.2).    
This, then, is ultimately the mode of being-in-the-world that the ludic subject-
position of Minecraft establishes for the player as ludic subject. It locates the player in an 
initially disorientating, undefined landscape, and, granting her the ability to deconstruct 
and reconstruct the elements of the landscape as she sees fit, tasks her with establishing 
(through the act of building) a place of dwelling, and, hence, with the unfolding of a 
constructed world upon the face of the landscape (see Fig. 7.2). 
 
 
Figure 7.2 The Minecraft landscape transformed into a built environment 
 
7.3.3 Proteus: the Romantic individual in the landscape 
Once its affordances have been grasped, then, Minecraft provides the player with the 
capacity to materially engage with, and reshape, its landscape. By contrast, Proteus seems 
willfully determined to keep the player at a remove from its environment. Before arriving 
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at this point, however, it might make sense to take a step backwards, and consider the 
moments of the player’s first encounter with its landscape.  
Proteus immediately demands motion from the player. The first thing the player 
perceives when starting a new game is the hazy image of an island, barely visible across a 
short expanse of ocean. The player is driven to move forward towards the island in 
preference to any of the other directions she might have randomly chosen to move 
towards; once the player reaches the shore, a line of standing rocks might lead her 
towards the interior of the island; at which point a tower on a hill might catch her eye 
and cause her to change her path; and so on (see Fig. 7.3). 
 
 
Figure 7.3 The landscape of the island in Proteus 
 
At first glance, the landscape in which Proteus locates its player seems considerably richer 
than the one in Minecraft, where the basic components of the landscape are established 
rapidly. By contrast, the landscape in Proteus can occasionally surprise the player even 
after she has thoroughly familiarized herself with the relatively limited extent of the 
gameworld. This is largely due to the fact that Proteus’ island milieu is adorned with an 
excess of what Nitsche calls “evocative narrative elements”, referring to any entity or 
event in a gameworld “that is structured to support and possibly guide the player’s 
comprehension”: as “players encounter and read these elements”, they “learn from them 
as they build contextual connections between elements”, making each newly-encountered 
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element fit the bigger picture, and changing this wider understanding if need be in a 
hermeneutic circle of spatial exploration and interpretation (2008, 37). 
There are visible signs of human habitation: a cabin, a graveyard, standing stones, 
a stone circle and a circular arrangement of totem-like statues silhouetted against the sky 
on the summit of a hill. All of these refer to established – in fact, practically cliché – 
tropes of the coexistence of humanity in the natural landscape. The log cabin might 
recall, specifically, Henry David Thoreau’s Walden (2008[1845]), or, more generally, the 
Romantic, post-Enlightenment impulse of a return to nature viewed as an earthly 
paradise. The stone circles and the standing stones bear the distinct echo of druidic 
practices, while the hilltop statues recall nothing as much as Native American totems. 
However, to all of these the player seems to be alien: the cabin cannot be entered, and 
the stones and statues speak in mysterious sounds. The player, here, remains resolutely 
outside, alone in the wilderness. 
Taking the same approach as was deployed in the analysis of Minecraft, and 
examining the manner in which the “I can” the player is granted determines the 
parameters of her embodied subject-position within the gameworld, one reaches a stark 
conclusion: apart from freedom of movement within the game space, the player is not 
granted any affordances. In fact, the game constantly thwarts the expectations of 
interaction it repeatedly sets up through the introduction of new, promising elements. I 
have already brought attention to one such instance in section 3.4.3, which it is 
opportune to return to here. The island is home to a number of creatures that the player 
encounters at different stages of her exploration of the island: owls, flocks of chickens, a 
fox that peeks out at the player from behind trees, and so on. Though their patterns of 
movement vary, their general behavior is basically identical: all these entities will run 
away when approached, and constantly remain one step ahead of the player’s reach (see 
Fig. 7.4). 
As such, where Minecraft’s environment is entirely dynamic, the landscape in 
Proteus would appear to be entirely fixed. And yet, that is not entirely a correct judgment: 
for, although there is nothing the player can do to alter the gameworld out of her own 
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active agency, the landscape undergoes repeated, radical change of its own accord. At 
certain points in the player’s explorations of the island, an accumulation of visual and 
aural cues lead the player towards the stone circle; when the player enters the circle, a 
change of seasons is triggered. Effectively, this moves the gameworld between four 
successive states during the course of a play-through, each corresponding to one of the 
four seasons: a new game always starts in spring, and will proceed through summer and 
autumn, before ending in winter – making Proteus, unlike Minecraft, finite in its teleology. 
 
 
Figure 7.4 Proteus: A cast of crabs frustrate the player’s attempts at interaction. 
   
Shifting for a moment into the textual-hermeneutic mode of engagement with the game 
associated with the external perspective, one could say that this emphasis on change and 
finitude highlights transience as one of the primary thematic concerns of Proteus - the 
adjective ‘protean’, after all, ascribes to an object the qualities of mutability, adaptability, 
change and impermanence. The commencement of the process that triggers the changes 
in season is heralded by a wind that sets the foliage of the landscape in motion – and 
wind, as Abrams points out, is a recurrent Romantic image of change (1975). Moreover, 
this sense of transience is highlighted by means of the fact that every particular scene the 
game produces can only ever be seen once. Though every procedurally-generated island 
will possess many of the same features, each individual configuration is unique; the game 
pointedly has no save option, and once the player plays through to the end of winter, or 
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decides to leave the game before this point, that specific island can never be returned to. 
With nothing else to do, perception and exploration take on unusually prominent 
roles, with the player’s forward movement and traversal of the space being driven by no 
goal other than that of seeing everything the island has to offer. This structuring of the 
player’s engagement with the landscape as a purely aesthetic experience, albeit one 
defined by the movement inherent in spatial practice, would seem to align Proteus with a 
Romantic aesthetic of nature, which, as Don Gifford notes, was not a static or 
picturesque approach – instead, it was founded on the idea of being emplaced and 
engaging in the play of a place by means of its traversal, constituting “an in-touch-with, 
flow-through experience of landscape” (1993, 131). 
In Heidegger’s terms, the objects the player encounters in Proteus are marked, not 
by readiness-to-hand, but “presence-at-hand” (2008[1927], 67[42]), objects to be 
disinterestedly perceived rather than actively engaged with. For Heidegger, this is, from 
the perspective of Dasein as being-in-the-world, a merely secondary mode of being-with 
objects; however, within the Romantic tradition, it was precisely through disinterested 
contemplation that the individual mind could most forcefully encounter the natural 
world. This is the idea expressed by Wordsworth in these lines from the Prospectus to 
The Excursion, which, as Abrams points out, plot out the idea that something approaching 
a state of grace “can be achieved simply by a union of man’s mind with nature”: 
How exquisitely the individual Mind 
(And the progressive powers perhaps no less 
Of the whole species) to the external World 
Is fitted: - and how exquisitely, too, 
Theme this but little heard of among Men, 
The external world is fitted to the Mind; 
And the creation (by no lower name 
Can it be called) which they with blended might 
Accomplish - (1971[1814]: lines 63-70) 
Through encountering the objects of the natural world – not as objects that are ready-to-
hand, but as objects of disinterested aesthetic perception – the individual mind is driven 
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to the creation of its own meaningful images. This becomes most evident in S.T. 
Coleridge’s elucidation of the role of the primary Imagination as “the living power and 
prime agent of all human perception, and as a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal 
act of creation in the infinite I AM” (1949[1817], 146). The Imagination, in Coleridge’s 
formulation, is the creative process by which the world comes into being for the 
individual perceiving consciousness, and which constitutes a reflection, within the 
subjective mind, of the ceaseless coming-into-being of the external world.  
If we are to convincingly make the argument that Proteus positions the player in a 
Romantic mode of being in relation to the landscape, it is vital to locate a formal 
structure by which this subjective “creation” by the Imagination of an image that reflects, 
and responds to, the external natural object – an image, then, that is the product of the 
encounter of Mind and Nature – is accounted for.   
It is arguable that precisely such a formal structure could be identified in one of 
the more unique aspects of Proteus:  its deployment of a dynamic soundtrack that is 
generated by, and is reflective of, the player’s exploratory movements through the 
landscape. Specific musical cues, aural elements and melodies are attached to particular 
objects in the landscape, emerging onto the horizon of the audible as the objects come 
into view. Thus, for instance, when approaching the tower-like structures standing on 
certain hilltops, a high-pitched squeal of discordant, electronic notes makes itself heard, 
growing increasingly dominant, and finally almost overwhelming, the closer the player 
approaches to the towers.  
Once the philosophical outlook of the game is grasped as Romantic, it is easy to 
consider this synaesthetic quality as constituting an attempt at formalizing – and 
mediating – a sense of the reflections and images of the external world playing upon the 
surface of the Romantic Mind. It is for this reason that the focus in Proteus falls squarely 
on perception and exploration, and why agency – if it is to be found at all – can only be 
located in the player’s capacity to organize the (admittedly, very rich) audiovisual output 
into pleasing arrangements. The player is, in fact, given a number of possibilities in terms 
of defining their perception of the gameworld: she can, for instance, intentionally choose 
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to linger near the hilltop statues in order to admire the psychedelic visual effect they 
produce (see Fig. 7.5), or she can choose to seek out and follow the lines of stone circles 
in order to ‘perform’ a scale of musical notes. 
 
 
Figure 7.5 Proteus: the psychedelic effect produced in proximity to the hilltop statues 
 
Having made this interpretative leap, moreover, the occasionally frustrating lack of 
agency upon the landscape, the detachment this leads to, the alienation from the 
apparent sites of human dwelling, and even the oddly weightless feeling of the player’s 
embodiment in the game that led Ian Bogost to claim that “there is no ‘you’ in Proteus” 
(2013), begin to make sense. The post-Kantian Romantic subject, after all, is, as Abrams 
notes, the victim of “an absolute and unsalvageable division between subject and object, 
mind and alienated nature” (1971b, 269): it is against this background that the striving to 
reestablish a prelapsarian unity between mind and nature occurs.   
 
7.3.4 A mode of being-in-the-world 
Minecraft and Proteus were chosen for close analysis due to the contrasting ludic subject-
positions they establish upon a shared initial thematic foundation – the lone wanderer in 
the wilderness. The former, through its granting the player the capacity to deconstruct 
game entities into resources that could then be used to construct new structures in the 
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gameworld, leads the player to frame its landscape in the mode of the Heideggerean 
standing-reserve; moreover, in allowing the player the capacity to reshape the landscape 
in her own image, the game invites the construction of a built world in which to dwell. 
Proteus, by contrast, positions the player in the mode of the Romantic wanderer, 
perceiving the landscape through an aesthetic frame: in this regard, it is no coincidence 
that the game opens with the opening of eyelids, recalling Ralph Waldo Emerson’s 
casting of himself in the face of nature as a “transparent eyeball” (1983[1836], 10) seeing 
beauty in the potential correspondences of Mind and Nature, but also feeling detachment 
due to the unbridgeable gap between subject and object that the split between the two 
enacts in the first place.      
Neither of these subjective standpoints is explicitly prescribed to the player – in 
fact, both games stand out for their refusal to provide the player with any explicit 
instructions. Here, there is no explicit setting of any quest or goal to structure the player’s 
traversal of the landscape (Tosca 2003a; Aarseth 2004b; 2005). Instead, the relations that 
are determined between the player and the virtual landscape emerge organically through 
the formal structure by means of which the player is embodied in their respective spaces, 
and which reflect the mechanisms of ludic subject-positioning categorized in section 7.2.  
If what I have termed the ludic subject-position can be understood as a static 
frame or an enshrined perspective upon the gameworld, then what happens when the 
player engages with the gameworld through this frame is that she enacts the mode of being-
in-the-gameworld that is determined by the ludic subject-position. I shall expand on what I 
mean by this. 
Heidegger writes that, on the grounds of this basic existential structure of being-
in-the-world, “Dasein’s being takes on a definite character” (2008[1927], 78[53]) due to 
its coming to be oriented towards specific things-in-the-world in specific ways:  
Dasein’s facticity is such that its Being-in-the-world has always dispersed 
[zerstreut] itself […] into definite ways of Being-in. The multiplicity of these is 
indicated in the following examples: having to do with something, producing 
something, attending to something and looking after it, making use of something, 
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giving something up and letting it go, undertaking, accomplishing, evincing, 
interrogating, considering, discussing, determining… (ibid., 83[56]) 
All of these represent modes of being-in-the-world, which, through their being taken on 
and lived, in an existential sense, not only cause the world to come into view in a 
particular form for the subject, but also cause the subject to take a particular form in 
view of the world. This recalls the point made in section 2.2.3, regarding Hans-Georg 
Gadamer’s suggestion that every playing has its characteristic “comportment” 
(1989[1960], 107) which is the result of the player’s orienting herself towards the task 
that is set for her by the situation of play: it is now clearer what this comportment entails, 
on what ontological ground it is manifested, and what phenomenological character it 
takes. One is also reminded of the observation made by Sebastian Möring that “games 
are always already existential” (2013, 50). The ludic subject, then, can be understood as 
that subjective existence which has as its mode of Being the being-in-the-gameworld that is determined by 
the parameters of the ludic subject-position.  
 
7.4 Conclusions 
  
This chapter has consisted of two movements. First, against the background of a 
consideration of the multiple senses of ‘perspective’ in relation to games, I broke down 
the notion of the ludic subject-position, which, so far, had remained a largely unitary and 
monolithic concept, into a set of separate but interrelated formal mechanisms: spatial 
standpoint, visual point-of-view, auditory standpoint, set of capabilities and limitations, goal-orientation, 
and passion towards the gameworld. 
 These, I argued, interrelate around the playable figure as it is taken up by the 
player in the subjective relation, thereby becoming an embodied ludic subject (“I-as-
figure” as a subjective existence within the gameworld). In the second part of the 
chapter, then, an analysis of the relation between the ludic subject and the gameworld in 
Minecraft and Proteus was used to bring these disparate formal structures back into a 
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concept of the unified ludic subject-position, and the ludic subjectivity that is enacted 
through it, as a determined mode of being-in-the-gameworld. 
This, then, points towards the possibility of founding a poetics of the figure game 
upon a consideration of the mode of being-in-the-world in which the player is located. 
What such a poetics would bring to light as a fundamental aspect of the figure game 
form would therefore be the double movement I have described – one in which the 
virtual environment of the game is perceived as a meaningful lifeworld through its 
organization as the phenomenological sphere surrounding the player’s subjective 
position, while, simultaneously, the player’s in-game subjective existence, and the being-
in-the-gameworld through which it is defined, emerges in relation to this meaningful 
lifeworld.   
I have now developed the first of the two dimensions of the aesthetics of ludic 
subjectivity I mapped out in section 1.3. There, in introducing the theme of ludic 
subjectivity as the focus of this study, I argued that the ludic subject is not only lived by 
the player as a being-in-the-gameworld (which is what this chapter has analyzed), it is 
also brought into view as a ludic self that is represented back to the player as a self which 
is herself, but which also, by virtue of the distance between this self in the gameworld and 
the self of the player in her external standpoint, becomes the object of autoscopic 
perception. It is this move which allows – as I noted in section 2.3.3 – for the being-in-
the-gameworld to reflect, in aesthetic terms, a being-in-the-world, and, inseparably, for 
the ludic subject to be taken up as an aestheticization of the self. 
 The remaining task of this consideration of the aesthetics of ludic subjectivity, 
then, is precisely that of conceptualizing the manner in which the ludic subject – which, 
as lived by the player as ‘I,’ is enacted as a being-in-the-gameworld – can become the 
object of perception. Doing so shall necessitate a shift from investigating the subjective 
relation of the playable figure to investigating the objective relation, and it is precisely 
this shift that the next chapter shall undertake.  
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Chapter Eight 
From the ludic subject to the ludic self 
 
 
Following on from the development of the two-axis model of the player-figure relation, 
Chapter 7 proceeded to expand upon the formal construction of the subjective relation 
to the playable figure. The structure of the ludic subject-position as a subjective 
‘openness’ towards the gameworld, determining the givenness of the gameworld in ludic 
experience as a lifeworld within which the player can enact an existential praxis of being-
in-the-gameworld, has now been more thoroughly conceptualized.  
 What remains to be done is to determine how the player’s adoption of the ludic 
subject-position – and, hence, of the comportment and mode of being-in-the-gameworld 
it sets in motion – leads, first, to the enactment of a ludic subjectivity, and, second, to the 
presentation of an aestheticized ludic self. The argument I shall work towards is one that 
operates according to the logic of the double perspectival structure of ludic engagement 
mapped out in section 2.4, as it takes the form, in the category of figure games that this 
investigation is concerned with, in the simultaneity of the subjective and objective 
relations to the playable figure. In short, the internal perspective of the ludic subject-
position, which results from a subjective relation to the playable figure, leads, when 
inhabited by the player, to the enactment of a ludic subject as a first-personal, lived 
experience of being-in-the gameworld. At the same time, the external perspective frames 
a representation of the playable figure – and, by extension, of the enacted ludic subject – 
within the textuality of the game artefact; it is this textualized representation of her own 
ludic subjectivity as lived that makes it possible for the player to see her own in-game ‘I’ 
in the coherent unified form of a ludic self.         
First, mineness shall be clarified as an intrinsic quality of gameworld experience as 
pertaining to the ludic subject-position: it is against this basic mineness of ludic-
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subjective experience that the subjective relation to the playable figure shall be examined 
in both its aspects as a subjective relation of self and of other. On this basis, I shall 
consider the question of action as it relates to the ludic subject: this shall involve a 
recourse to the conceptual analysis of action (von Wright 1971; Anscombe 1979[1957]; 
Davidson 1980) and its reconciliation with the phenomenology of the embodied subject 
in the work of Paul Ricoeur (1992).  
This chapter will then proceed to engage with the move from the subjective to 
the objective relation to the playable figure. This move shall be made in the context of a 
development of the twofold understanding of subjectivity, as already introduced in 
section 1.5, and which, following Ricoeur and Dan Zahavi (2008; 2010), shall lead to a 
discussion of the “narrative self” as it emerges as a consciousness of self against the 
background of lived, first-personal subjectivity – a point I shall link to Gordon Calleja’s 
notion of “alterbiography” (2011). Through this theoretical framework, I shall proceed to 
examine the formal techniques by which the player’s enacted ludic subjectivity is 
represented within the game’s textual presentation as a ludic self, thereby establishing an 
autoscopic aesthetic effect as the player is made witness to a representation of herself-in-
the-gameworld. Finally, the insights gained in this direction shall be concretized by 
means of a close analysis of the technique of narrative as it is used in Bastion (Supergiant 
Games 2011).  
 
8.1 The enactment of the ludic subject 
 
As an interrelating set of mechanisms organized around the form of the playable figure, 
the embodied ludic subject-position, as laid out in section 7.2, is a static formal structure. 
On the other hand, the ludic subject, as the being-in-the-gameworld that results when the 
player adopts the subjective relation to the playable figure, taking on its ludic subject-
position and engaging with the gameworld from its standpoint, is a happening that is set in 
motion in the course of ludic engagement, a being as verb. As a player, I pick up a game; 
the mechanisms of the ludic subject-position structure my perspective upon the 
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gameworld along particular lines, leading me to comport myself in a particular way 
towards the gameworld. It is the ludic subject as lived in the course of ludic engagement, 
as the playing out of this comportment, that I shall now take up as my focus. 
 
8.1.1 The mineness of ludic subjectivity 
It is necessary, first of all, to emphasize once more a point which has been central to this 
investigation from the very start: namely, the mineness of ludic subjectivity. When, as a 
player, I identify the playable figure as ‘myself’, as ‘I-in-the-gameworld,’ I take up the 
embodied ludic subject-position as my own – meaning that my experiences of being-in-
the-gameworld as an embodied ludic subject, with the playable figure as my body, are 
experienced precisely as my own. 
  This is what is meant by what Zahavi terms the “first-person perspective” which 
is intrinsic to, and constitutes the basic experiential dimension of, the phenomenological 
subject of experience: the idea of the first-person perspective can, in fact, be “articulated 
in terms of a pre-reflective and non-conceptual sense of ownership or consciously 
experienced ‘mineness’ that accompanies bodily sensations, emotional states and 
cognitive contents” (2007, 4).  
 In the same way, it is the basic quality of ludic subjectivity that the experiences of 
the ludic subject are experienced, first and foremost, in this first-personal mineness. It is 
not the case that, as a player, I am somehow first aware of an experience of the 
gameworld – “There is the perception of a creeper behind the tree,” or even, “Steve, the 
playable figure in Minecraft (Mojang 2011), perceives a creeper behind the tree” – which is 
only then, a posteriori, identified as being my experience. Rather, I am immediately cognizant 
of the experience first-personally, as mine. It is for this reason that it is mistaken to speak, 
with Tim Marsh, of gameworld experience obtained through the ludic subject-position as 
being constituted of “feelings of acting vicariously – imaginatively experiencing 
something through another person, being, object or character” (2006, 196).  
To return to a point I have already made in outlining the implications of the 
subjective relation in section 6.2.2, if I, as player, take on the ludic subject as my first-
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personal experiential standpoint towards the gameworld, then my perspective cannot, by 
the same token, frame the playable figure itself, either as figure or as ludic subject. I have 
already mentioned Espen Aarseth’s point, speaking of Lara Croft in Tomb Raider (Core 
Design 1996), that “when I play, I don’t even see her body, but see through and past it” 
(2004a, 48). If, in the subjective relation, the player looks out at the gameworld from the 
subjective standpoint that Lara represents upon it as a ludic subject, then she exists for 
the player as an ‘opening’ onto the gameworld, and hence fades from view. 
Aarseth’s observation here is in accordance with the phenomenological account 
of the embodied subject, which I discussed at some length in Chapter 5. To recapitulate, 
it is an explicit quality of the phenomenology of the body as it is developed from Husserl 
onwards that “originally I do not have any consciousness of my body as an object […] 
when the body moves and acts, I am moving and acting” (Zahavi 2003, 101).  
Of course, it has already become evident enough that if, as a ludic subject-
position, the playable figure is an opening onto the gameworld, it cannot be said to be an 
entirely ‘transparent’ opening. In enforcing, as I demonstrated in Chapter 7, a particular 
mode of being-in-the-gameworld, and therefore shaping the player’s existential praxis in 
the gameworld and determining, to within a narrow range of possibility, the 
comportment she is to adopt in playing out her ludic subjectivity, the ludic subject-
position not only brings the gameworld into view in a particular configuration, but also 
brings itself into view as the particular openness towards the gameworld that it is. It is 
taken on by the player as a constraint, even if, insofar as I am the ludic subject, it is a 
constraint “that I am, the very one to which I must consent” (Ricoeur 1992, 119ff.). As 
such, despite the mineness of ludic-subjective experience, it cannot escape, at the same 
time, denoting the otherness of the playable figure in its status as a figure distinct from 
me:1 here, the narrow, porous barrier between the subjective relation of self and of other 
becomes clear.  
   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 This is the point at which a link can be drawn between the ludic subject and the question of character, 
insofar as the parameters determining the ludic subject-position, as listed in section 7.2, can also be put 
into the service of determining the playable figure as a character. I shall expand upon this in Chapter 9. 
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8.1.2 Action, intention and the subject 
Before tackling the point of the attribution to the ludic subject of a status as both self 
and other, however, it is necessary to address, in more rigorous terms, the enactment of 
the ludic subject: that is, determining, in more concrete terms than have been used to 
address it so far, what happens, from the subjective perspective of gameworld 
experience, when the player begins to engage with the gameworld through the ludic 
subject-position. The conclusion arrived at in Chapter 7, that the ludic subject-position 
determines a mode of being-in-the-gameworld, and, hence, a particular comportment, is 
a useful indication in this regard, but, nonetheless, it remains a very general, top-down 
perspective. It is necessary to accompany this with an understanding of the manner in 
which the ludic subject is enacted in the moment-to-moment praxis of ludic engagement.      
It is the conceptuality of action that shall prove key here: the enactment of the ludic 
subject implies, very literally, a putting into action. The question of action has already come 
into view along the route this investigation has taken so far: most prominently, in the 
discussion of the aesthetic character of ludic action in section 2.2, and in the engagement 
with the notion of agency as articulated in the game studies discourse in section 4.4. By 
and large, however, in determining the phenomenological character of ludic engagement, 
the question of action has remained secondary to that of perception.  
By way of grounding an analysis into the enactment of ludic subjectivity, I shall 
begin with a focus on the conceptuality of the relation between action and the subject. 
That action is just as fundamental to the being-in-the-world of the embodied subject as 
perception should come as no surprise in the wake of Jean-Paul Sartre’s articulation of 
the “instrumental complex” of possible bodily actions that gives form to the for-itself’s 
factical situation (1966[1943], 620), or Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s argument that “I can” 
rather than “I think that” is the first principle of consciousness (2002[1945], 160). It 
bears stressing that perception and action are, in fact, portrayed as being two sides of the 
same coin. Sartre writes that, “perception is naturally surpassed toward action; better yet, 
it can be revealed only in and through projects of action” (1966[1943], 425). Merleau-
Ponty would appear to agree, writing, in the same vein, that “the plunge into action is, 
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from the subject’s point of view, an original way of relating himself to the object, and is 
on the same footing as perception” (2002[1945], 127). 
 In identifying a conceptual schema within which the question of action can be 
tackled, I shall again bring to bear upon this investigation the analytic philosophy of 
action, representing, as it does, the most sustained theoretical engagement with the 
matter. This does not entail a turning-away from the phenomenological perspective 
which has served as the primary framework for this investigation as a whole – Ricoeur’s 
application of the problematics of action to the question of the self (which very much 
parallels the current investigation’s analysis of action in the context of ludic subjectivity) 
reveals not only the possibility of an integration of the two conceptual frameworks, but 
also the advantages that such an integration brings.2 
In section 2.2.1, I stressed the differentiation, within this tradition, between an 
action and an event in the general sense, a differentiation that, on one level, is made on 
the basis of the former being the result of an intention, with the latter being the result of a 
cause. The difference, simply put, is that, as I noted at that earlier stage, intention is 
forward-looking, in contrast to the retrospection inherent in the determination of the 
cause of an event. As Georg Henrik von Wright puts it, “causality is […] contrasted with 
teleology, and causal explanation with teleological explanation” (1971, 83). 
 Accordingly, it is with the notion of intention, in the sense in which the term is 
used within the conceptual analysis of action,3 rather than in the sense in which it is used, 
in phenomenology, to speak of the “intentionality” of consciousness - that a 
conceptualization of action must begin. ‘Intention,’ G.E.M. Anscombe writes, is itself a 
problematic term, in that it can be used with at least three distinct senses: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 This is in spite of the fact that, as Ricoeur notes, the form of conceptual analysis of action practiced by 
G.E.M. Anscombe and Donald Davidson “deliberately turns its back on phenomenology,” focusing on the 
analysis of actions which are open to external observation, and hence being “in no way interested in the 
phenomenon which would be accessible to private intuition alone” (1992, 67-68). In other words – to 
recall the distinction made in Chapter 5 – what the analytical approach to action takes as its object is the 
action as it is manifest for others rather than as it is for me, in being performed. Despite this, as I have already 
noted, Ricoeur points the way towards a fruitful reconciliation of the disparate conceptual schemata.  
3 In keeping with the analytic turn away from phenomenology, as Ricoeur notes, it is necessary to note, 
with the analytic approach to action, that “intention, for it, is not intentionality in Husserl’s sense” (1992, 
67). Care must be taken for the distinction between the two senses to be kept in mind.  
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When a man says ‘I am going to do such-and-such’, we should say that this was 
an expression of intention. We also sometimes speak of an action as intentional, 
and we may also ask with what intention the thing was done. (1979[1957], 1) 
Intention, then, can be spoken of under the heading of “expression of intention for the 
future”, “intentional action” – that is, determining whether or not a particular action was 
done intentionally, and “intention in acting” (ibid.). It is in the last of these senses that 
this investigation shall adopt the concept of intention. In this formulation, stating the 
intention underlying an action becomes a means of describing an action: 
If an agent does A with the intention of doing B, there is some description of A 
which reveals the action as reasonable in the light of reasons the agent had in 
performing it. (Davidson 1980, 85) 
In short, as Ricoeur puts it, “to say what an action is, is to say why it is done” (1992, 63).4 
This still leaves it necessary to define more rigorously the manner in which ‘intention’ 
should be understood as an explanation of action. 
The first observation to be made is that intention is, first and foremost, a mental 
phenomenon. Anscombe writes that: 
…if we want to know a man’s intentions it is into the contents of his mind, and 
only into these, that we must enquire; and hence […] if we wish to understand 
what intention is, we must be investigating something whose existence is purely 
in the sphere of the mind. (1979[1957], 9) 
To think of actions in terms of intentions, then, is to shift the plane on which the 
analysis of action is conducted from the ontic domain upon which the action takes place 
as an event, resulting in some manner, great or small, in a change in the state of the 
world, to that of the consciousness within which the mental act of intending occurs – as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 In this regard, there exists a distinction – and, simultaneously, a relation – between intention and motive. 
Anscombe writes, “a man’s intention is what he aims at or chooses; his motive is what determines the aim 
or choice” (1979[1957], 18). To extend Davidson’s formula, I might do A with the intention of doing B 
because of a motive C. For example: I put the kettle on with the intention of brewing coffee because I 
need my morning dose of caffeine to start my day. Or, to put it differently, the intention of an action 
describes what I wanted to do, while the motive specifies why I wanted to do it. However, the question of 
motive within this conceptual schema of action – specifically in its differentiation from the notion of 
‘mental cause’ – is a much greater discussion that goes beyond the scope of the current investigation. 
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becomes apparent in Ricoeur’s suggestion that intention should be understood as “the 
aiming of a consciousness in the direction of something I am to do” (1992, 67). By this 
understanding, “the action is forming an intention” (Davidson 1980, 89). 
 This brings a conceptual difficulty into view – namely, how to account for the 
point of encounter between the subjective origins of the conscious act of intending and 
the physical status of an action as an event in the world? Von Wright conceptualizes this 
by saying that action “presents two aspects: an “inner” and an “outer””, with the former 
being “the intentionality of the action, the intention or will “behind” its outer 
manifestions,” and the latter being “some event” in the world, such as “the fact that a 
certain handle turns or window opens” (1971, 86-87).5 
 Von Wright’s approach to bringing these two aspects of the action together is to 
link them by means of a systemic logic. By his argument, an action has meaning, for its 
agent, within the context of a “closed system” (ibid., 78) that an agent isolates from her 
environment, rendered in the form of a “state-space” (ibid., 49) such that an intentional 
action can be understood as “interference” (ibid., 61) with the system’s autonomous 
operation, the intent to change the organization of the system from an initial state a to a 
final state b. Ricoeur explains:  
…it is in doing something that an agent learns to ‘isolate’ a closed system from its 
environment and to discover the possibilities of development inherent to this 
system. The agent learns this by setting the system in motion, beginning from 
some initial state the agent has ‘isolated.’ It is this setting things in motion that 
constitutes interference, at the intersection between one of the agent’s abilities 
and the resources of the system. (1984, 135) 
A conceptualization of action along these lines resonates with a number of points raised 
during the course of this investigation. The notion of the isolation of the domain of ludic 
action was discussed, by way of Eugen Fink (2012[1958]) and Hans-Georg Gadamer 
(1989[1960]), in section 2.3, under the name of the gameworld. In section 3.3, the 
understanding of the ‘game as system’ was developed in terms of how it impacts upon 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 This, as von Wright concedes, does not apply to mental acts, which have no outer aspect. 
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the unfolding of the gameworld as a lifeworld in the player’s consciousness – and, in this 
regard, it is opportune to note that the way in which such a systemic understanding is 
drawn out of direct gameworld experience, as per Dominic Arsenault and Bernard 
Perron’s “gameplay spiral” of heuristic engagement (2009, 115-117), hews very close to 
von Wright’s arguments regarding the way in which the agents constitutes her 
surrounding situation into the order of a closed system by means of experimentation and 
observation (1971, 63-64). 
One point I shall draw attention to is that, in the definition of this “intersection,” 
Ricoeur’s adoption of von Wright’s action theory takes this investigation back to the 
phenomenology of the embodied subject discussed in Chapter 5. It is – to return to the 
terminology my investigation at that stage borrowed from Sartre – a being-for-itself 
making its subjectivity and its existential project of self-determination manifest on the 
ontological level of things-in-themselves. The key to this, Ricoeur argues, is the discourse 
of the “I can” proposed by Merleau-Ponty, which I first discussed in section 5.3.5, and 
which, in this context, offers: 
…an ontology of one’s own body, that is of a body that is also my body and which, 
by its double allegiance to the order of physical bodies and to that of persons, 
therefore lies at the point of articulation of the power to act which is ours and of 
the course of things which belongs to the world order. (Ricoeur 1992, 111). 
With this insight, the conceptual analysis of action returns this investigation to the two-
sided phenomenology of the body discussed in section 5.4.5.  
There is one final point I wish to draw out of a consideration of the notion of 
intention as a descriptor of action: namely, that it requires ascription to an agent. As 
Ricoeur argues, “of intention we say that it is someone’s intention, and of someone we say 
that he or she intends to do something” (1992, 95). Ricoeur’s usage of the term 
‘ascription’ warrants comment. What it highlights is not simply the attribution of the 
intention to the agent (in the sense of saying “this intention A belongs to this agent B”), 
but, more radically, its belonging to the agent in the vein of a predicate about who the agent 
is: “ascription marks the reference of all the terms of the conceptual network to its 
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pivotal point: “who?”” (ibid.). In ascribing an intention to an individual, we are saying 
something about the individual, through the definition of a mental predicate (Strawson 
1959, 104): we add, to the set of predicates by which we know the individual, the 
knowledge that this is someone who has this intention. Put differently, we know the individual 
through her intentions, which, conversely, we can only know as her intentions on the 
basis of an interpretative act of ascription. 
Of course, one’s own actions do not demand interpretation in the same way, 
given that they belong to the class of things one “knows without observation” (ibid., 13), due 
precisely to the proprioceptive ownership of these actions. As Ricoeur puts it: 
I do not say that I knew that I was doing this or that because I had observed it. It 
is in doing that one knows that one is doing something, what one is doing, and 
why one is doing it. (1992, 70) 
Or, in Max Scheler’s words, “it is essential to the Being of acts that they are Experienced 
only in their performance itself” (1973[1916], 371). This, of course, is a result of the 
fundamental mineness of intentional first-personal subjectivity, which I have just discussed 
in the preceding section. What role, then, does the ascription of intention play in the 
analysis of the self in action?  
Ricoeur’s answer to this question is the key insight with which I shall return from 
this focus on the notion of action to the question of the constitution of ludic subjectivity.  
Given the situation of deliberation before the opportunities for action presented by one’s 
factical situation, Ricoeur argues that “making up one’s mind is cutting short the debate 
by making one of the options contemplated one’s own” (1992, 95). The decision to act – 
to be faced with the “skeletal outline of all my possible actions” (Sartre 1966[1943], 425) 
and, out of this branching multiplicity of possible actions, choose one action and make it 
my own – comes to be understood as a self-ascription. The performing of an intentional 
action – the aiming of my self, as being-in-the-world, in the direction of a change I wish 
to bring about in the world – is at the same time a determination of who I am. By this 
understanding, at the same time as a choice of action states, “I wish to bring about this 
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particular change in the world,” it also states, “I am someone who wishes to bring about 
this particular change in the world, as opposed to any other.”  
 Through the taking of action in the world, then, ‘I’ come to be constituted as ‘I, 
defined through the set of actions I ascribe to myself in performing them’. This 
formulation reveals the link that can be made between this conceptual analysis of action 
and, not only Sartre’s notion of the existential praxis of being-for-itself as a self-
determination, but also, more generally, to the question of the manner in which the 
subject, as being-in-the-world, can accede to some form of awareness of oneself as a self. 
This point shall be taken up in section 8.2 below. 
  
8.1.3 The ludic subject in action 
Against the background of this conceptualization of action and its relation to the subject 
as agent, then, it is possible to discuss the question of action as it relates to ludic 
subjectivity, and as it aids in the constitution of the ludic self. 
 That action is fundamental to the understanding of ludic experience goes without 
saying: I have already brought up the discourse on the question of agency in game studies 
in section 4.4 (Murray 1998; Mateas and Stern 2005; Wardrip-Fruin et al. 2009), and the 
discussion there can serve as a springboard for the integration of the question of action 
with that of ludic subjectivity. The conclusion reached by the investigation at that point 
was that agency must be thought of in terms of how it is determined by the player’s 
engagement with the playable figure. By means of the working-through, in section 5.3, of 
the phenomenology of embodied subjectivity, and, in section 7.2, of the mechanisms by 
which the ludic subject-position is shaped as an embodied one, this was concretized 
through the theorization of the “I can” and the instrumental complex. 
 It remains to be shown how action in the gameworld takes its place within the 
consciousness of the ludic subject alongside perception of the gameworld. The link 
between the two, on a phenomenological plane, is clear. Perception and action, insofar as 
the former refers to the aiming of consciousness in an intentional relation to actual 
things-in-the-gameworld, and the latter refers to the intentional aiming of consciousness 
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towards the bringing-about of a non-actual state of affairs, describe two sides of the 
same coin. In this regard, it is not surprising to note Calleja’s point that the player’s 
relation to the gameworld is “first and foremost a disposition and readiness to act” (2011, 
41). Before the taking of action itself, it is as such a disposition towards action that the 
player-as-ludic-subject’s being-in-the-world orients itself towards its situation.  
An example might serve to illustrate this point. During a game of Thief: The Dark 
Project (Looking Glass 1998), the player, as master thief Garrett, finds herself on the 
upper floors of a palatial mansion. Hiding in an unlit alcove, she has a view along a 
corridor she needs to traverse in order to arrive at a room containing an item she is 
required to steal. Two torches amply light the corridor, and a pair of guards patrol the far 
end. Concealed in the dark, the player-as-Garrett is safe – recall here the point made in 
section 7.2.6, where Garrett’s visibility as marked on an interface level by the light gem is 
a prime example of his vulnerability towards the gameworld. Conversely, Garrett would 
certainly be spotted if the player were to leave the safety of darkness. 
Here, the player might stand, immobile, for several minutes, not taking any action 
– and yet, in all that time, she would be, on a subjective level, far from inactive. She 
might be taking stock of the situation, observing the guards’ movement and trying to 
calculate the timing of their patrol patterns. She might be consulting her map and 
attempting to determine whether she might be able to avoid the guards by taking a more 
circuitous route. She might be looking through her inventory to find any items she could 
use to cause a distraction that would drive the guards from their posts. In all this, though 
the player does not actually perform any action, one would be amiss to state that the 
player’s being-in-the-gameworld is not marked by an intensely active disposition, and that 
this is not intimately tied to her embodiment in the gameworld as Garrett.  
In short – to draw on the conceptual arsenal this investigation has built up by 
this point – the player, on the basis of the “I can” that she is as an embodied ludic 
subject, is considering the web of possibilities of action constituting the instrumental 
complex which, in Sartre’s existential terms, are also, as her possibilities, part of her being. 
It is in these phenomenological terms that a situation is established against which agency 
	  321	  	  
can be exerted, in the form of “the satisfying power to take meaningful action”, to return 
to Janet Murray’s formulation (1998, 126).  
In this situation, the player might decide, after her deliberation, to use two of her 
limited stock of water arrows to put out the torches in the corridor, thereby allowing 
herself-as-Garrett to proceed along the corridor unseen. Following von Wright’s theory 
of action, this could be put in the following way: the player perceives the system that 
constitutes the gameworld as being in a particular state A (the corridor is lit), and forms 
an intention to act in such a way as to bring about a different state B (the corridor is 
unlit).6 She could just as easily have decided upon another one of the possibilities 
forming her instrumental complex, such as, for instance, using normal arrows to kill the 
two guards – thereby, in von Wright’s terms, actuating a different branch of the 
possibility space of world-states, resulting in a new end state C (in which the corridor is 
still lit but the guards are dead).  
It might certainly be, of course, that the outcome of a player’s action does not 
match up to her intention: the resulting game state, in this case, would be different to the 
one she envisioned. The action might fail: the player, for instance, might misjudge the 
angle at which she launches her water arrows, and, as a result, miss the flaming torches 
entirely, leading to a world state D (the corridor is still lit and the guards are alive, but 
Garrett has two less water arrows in his inventory). Alternatively, the action might 
succeed, bringing about the state B that was the player’s original intention, but might set 
in motion a different chain of cause and effect than what the player envisioned. Perhaps 
the player does manage to put out the torches using the water arrows, but the torch’s 
being put out alerts the guards to the fact that something is amiss, causing them to break 
out of their fixed patrol patterns and move closer to Garrett’s location. This will, of 
course, result in a new world-state and, hence, a new situation within which the player-as-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 It is impossible not to note the congruence between von Wright’s system-focused action theory and 
Jesper Juul’s proposal for an understanding of games as state machines, with the constituent components of 
the game system being, at any given moment of play, arranged in a particular configuration, which is linked 
along lines of possibility to other configurations in a branching “game tree” of possible states (2005, 60). 
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Garrett, on the basis of the same “I can” and the way in which the situation is resolved 
into an instrumental complex of possibilities, must form a new intention, and so on.  
Despite this element of unpredictability that characterizes any translation of 
intention into action, what is revealed here is an essential future-orientation or teleological 
character to ludic subjectivity – at least, insofar as it relates to, and is constituted by, its 
capacity for action.7 The action of launching the water arrows at the flaming torches is 
therefore intended as leading to a desirable gameworld-state. Moreover, the individual 
action, and the intention behind it, connects in action-chains following the overarching 
goal-orientation of the ludic subject, as articulated in section 7.2.5. In this regard, Petri 
Lankoski speaks of the intention attributed to each individual in-game action as 
coalescing into a granular dimension of moment-to-moment “subgoals” oriented 
towards the achievement of overarching “regulating goals” (2011, 297) – which, in terms 
of the constitution of the ludic subject as being-for-itself, represent the existential 
projects towards which its being-in-the-world is directed.    
 
8.1.4 The ascription of ludic action 
In all of the above, there is no question but that the player ascribes the action that is 
taken to herself, not to Garrett as a playable figure or a heterocosmic individual standing 
apart from her. It is she who has the internal consciousness of deliberating, of perceiving 
the instrumental complex of possibilities as her possibilities. Finally, it is she who ascribes 
to herself the intention of putting out the water arrows and, concurrently, the decision 
not to kill the guards. 
  In doing so, following Ricoeur’s argument regarding the self-ascription of action, 
the player is not only choosing one of the many possible world-states that might result 
from the range of “I can”s available to her. At the same time, she is also determining her 
own ludic subjectivity through its enactment: as soon as the action is taken, it becomes 
part of the set of actions she recognizes as her own.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 This should serve to recall the point made in section 2.2 regarding the teleological orientation of ludic 
actions, as framed through the Gadamerian notion of the task-orientedness of play (1989[1960], 107).	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 With respect to the particular action I have used as an example here, the decision 
to put out the torches rather than, say, taking one’s chances and dashing down the 
brightly-lit corridor, suggests a meticulous, careful disposition; at the same time, the 
decision to avoid killing the guards might reveal an ethical decision to avoid killing unless 
absolutely necessary, even if, as in this case, killing the guards would eliminate the risk of 
being caught. This moral principle, then, is ascribed to the ludic subject ‘player-as-
Garrett,’ which, as her ludic subjectivity, the player relates to proprioceptively. The taking 
of the action, then, is inseparable from the ascription of the qualities, “I am someone who is 
meticulous” and “I am someone who avoids killing,” to this ludic subject. 
Here the meaning of the phrase “enactment of the ludic subject” becomes clear, in that 
it is only through the player’s engagement with the gameworld through the frame of the 
ludic subject-position that the ludic subject comes to be determined, not only as ‘life 
story,’ but also, as the above example demonstrates, as the set of defining predicates that 
can be extracted from such a ‘life story.’  
It remains necessary, however, to account for the fact that, while playing Thief, 
the player is aware that the figure she controls is the titular thief, a man named Garrett 
who lives in the steampunk-tinged medieval City that constitutes the game’s heterocosm. 
The game provides the player with an array of what Uri Margolin terms “characterization 
statements” (1986, 206, see section 9.3.2) allowing her to build a coherent idea of who 
Garrett is as a person defined through a set of predicates that, very likely, does not have a 
great deal of overlap with the set of predicates by which the player would define herself 
as a person. Between his history, his voice, his physical appearance, and the actions 
which the game’s events lead him to perform, the player builds an understanding of 
Garrett as someone who is meticulous, patient, cunning, quick-thinking, courageous but 
cautious and far from foolhardy, with a streak of sardonic cynicism and a pronounced – 
but not complete – amorality.   
These characteristics are Garrett’s, not the player’s – but to play Thief is to take 
on the subjective position delineated by these attributes as your own. Certainly, some 
degree of role-playing – the conscious or unconscious willingness to “inhabit the 
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headspace of someone other” (Bowman 2010, 8) – can be a factor in this regard. 
Fundamentally, however, it is the mechanisms of ludic subject-positioning that lead the 
player to “see as” and “play as” Garrett. As I noted in section 7.2.6, it is Garrett’s 
physical vulnerability that necessitates caution, the impossibility of surviving a straight-up 
fight with multiple assailants that demands resourceful quick-thinking if a plan goes awry 
and Garrett is spotted, the need to sit and observe guard patrol routes from a concealed 
vantage-point that requires patience, the multiplicity of possible approaches and paths of 
traversal that demands cunning in choosing the best option for a given situation: and so 
on. In these ways – and in many others – it is not simply that the player consciously 
decides that she is going to “play as” Garrett, but that the patterns of play – and hence, 
the comportment and the being-in-the-gameworld – that Thief establishes lead the player 
to adopt Garrett’s subjectivity as her own, to think of herself as Garrett – and this, in a 
seeming paradox, without in any way erasing his status as a character, a heterocosmic 
individual with an identity distinct from the player’s.  
The ‘self’ and ‘other’ aspects of the subjective relation, then, are, as already 
became apparent in the analysis of Kentucky Route Zero (Cardboard Computer 2013-) in 
section 6.4, not to be understood as alternatives. Rather, ‘self’ and ‘other’ necessarily 
constitute the two poles of the ludic subject, as captured in the appellation ‘I-as-Garrett.’ 
While attention can shift from one pole to the other, the opposite is always held in 
suspension – the ludic subject is both me and not me.  
 
8.2 From the subject to the self 
 
In first introducing ludic subjectivity as the theme of this investigation in section 1.3, I 
outlined a number of distinct senses that the notion implied. I have, over the course of 
the investigation so far, analyzed the first two of these senses: first, delineating the ludic 
subject-position as a set of formal mechanisms that determine a subjective ‘opening’ 
onto the gameworld, and, as a result, shape the player’s mode of being-in-the-gameworld, 
and second, highlighting the way in which engagement with the gameworld through the 
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frame of the ludic subject-position enacts a ludic subject, as the lived, first-personal ‘I’ of 
gameworld experience. 
 The consideration of the ascription of action to the ludic subject has now led the 
investigation to the threshold of its engagement with the third and final sense of ludic 
subjectivity – the ludic self. Precisely in its nature as a subject, the ludic subject is not, 
itself, an object of direct perception: I experience the gameworld through it, and, on this 
level, it is only available to me as the subjective pole – the proprioceptive mineness – of 
gameworld experience, rather than as an object I can know in itself. However – as has 
already become evident – an individual or person within the ludic heterocosm is brought 
into view to whom all these experiences and actions are ascribed, and who is thereby 
defined through them. This is the ludic self – the ‘I-in-the-gameworld’ that is available to 
me, as a player, as a coherent unity that I can frame in my own intentional consciousness 
– or, in other words, as the self that is the object when I speak of a ‘consciousness of 
self’ within the gameworld. 
 In this section, I shall engage with the question of how a ludic self emerges out 
of the substrate of ludic-subjective experience. In order to do so, I shall first return to 
Husserl and Sartre, considering their phenomenological accounts of the question of self-
consciousness. This shall lead to the notion of the “narrative self,” as it is developed in 
Ricoeur (1992) and Zahavi (2008) – an understanding of the constitution of the self 
which, through Calleja’s notion of ‘alterbiography’ (2011), will serve as an entry-point to 
the theorization of the emergence of the ludic self.      
 
8.2.1 Self-consciousness and the subject of experience 
As became apparent in the engagement with Edmund Husserl’s theorization of the 
intentional structure of consciousness in Chapter 3, if every act of thought (cogitatio) has 
its object (cogitatum), it is impossible to be aware of oneself, as cogito, except as the subject 
of the perception of some external object – a formulation established in opposition to 
the Cartesian positing of a pure, unintended cogito that requires no object to achieve self-
awareness: “I am present to myself continually as someone who perceives, represents, 
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thinks, feels, desires, and so forth; and for the most part herein I find myself related in 
present experience to the fact-world which is constantly about me” (2012[1931], 54). 	  
However, implied in this consciousness of the world and of the objects within it 
– a being-in-the-world that I always already am – is the realisation that I do find myself in 
this consciousness of the world: or, at a minimum, I encounter a sense of myself as a 
perceiving subject. As Zahavi notes, there exists an inconsistency in Husserl’s 
formulation of the temporal structure for this consciousness-of-self (2008, 41).  At 
points he appears to argue that every act of consciousness consists of two simultaneous 
moments: a primary consciousness (of the object captured in the intentional grasp) and a 
secondary consciousness through which the subject perceives its own perceptions in the 
moment of those perceptions, as summarized in the statement that consciousness “is not 
only a lived-experience continually streaming along; at the same time, as it streams along 
it is also the consciousness of this streaming” (2001, 320). 
In this approach, Husserl would appear to argue that intentional consciousness, 
in its grasping of the objects of the world towards which its attention is directed, is also 
aware of the very same grasping: “no matter what else it may be intrinsically conscious 
of, [consciousness] is, at the same time, consciousness of itself” (1969[1929], 273). If I 
see a tree in front of me, I am clearly conscious of the tree; at the same time, I am 
conscious of the fact of that perception, that is, that I as a subject am seeing a tree in 
front of me. That is: by the same phenomenological movement by which a tree appears 
before me as an object of my consciousness, I come into view myself as a subject 
perceiving this tree.  
At other points, however, Husserl argues for a different temporal structure to 
this double consciousness, suggesting that “our experience of an ego is the result of a 
reflective operation” (Zahavi 2008, 36). In these moments, awareness of one’s own 
subjective existence within an intentional act is not a constituent element of that 
intentional act, but a supplement that manifests itself only if we choose to reflect, in 
retrospect, upon our own earlier intentional acts, thereby turning those subjective acts 
into an object of thought: 
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Living in the cogito we have not got the cogitatio consciously before us as an 
intentional object; but it can at any time become this: to its essence belongs in 
principle the possibility of a “reflective” directing of the mental glance towards itself 
naturally in the form of a new cogitatio and by way of a simple apprehension. In 
other words, every cogitatio can become the object of a so-called “inner 
perception”, and eventually the object of a reflexive valuation, an approval or a 
disapproval, and so forth. (2012[1931], 71)  
 Here, Husserl echoes Theodor Lipps, who similarly argued for the necessity of a 
reflective operation that makes the first-order intentional act the object intended in a 
second-order act: 
To be sure, my own activity may become objective to me, namely, when it is no 
longer my present activity but when I contemplate it in retrospect. But then it is 
no longer immediately experienced, but only remembered in imagination. And 
thus it is objective. (1962[1903], 375) 
It is this latter position that would come to form the basis of Sartre’s existential 
phenomenology of being as being-for-itself. Sartre places the question of reflection at the 
centre of the structure of subjectivity and of consciousness of the self. Following 
Husserl, Sartre grants primacy to direct, intentional experience of things in the world. On 
the level of the intentional act of perception, he argues, my consciousness “does not 
know my perception […] all that there is of intention in my actual consciousness is 
directed toward the outside” (1966[1943], 12). Stating that reflection is a primary 
structure of subjectivity, then, requires, as its foundation, the basic, externally-focused 
intentional consciousness of a thing-in-the-world:  
…reflection has no kind of primacy over the consciousness reflected-on. It is not 
reflection which reveals the consciousness reflected-on to itself. Quite the 
contrary, it is the non-reflective consciousness which renders reflection possible. 
(ibid., 13) 
What this means is that “there is a pre-reflective cogito” (ibid.). In perceiving the tree, I 
might not have consciousness of myself, but I do have a consciousness which I am conscious of, 
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in the sense of being conscious of seeing the tree: “when we investigate appearing 
objects, we also disclose ourselves as datives of manifestation, as those to whom objects 
appear” (2008, 123). This is the consciousness that Zahavi attributes to the “minimal or 
core self” (ibid., 8). In such a case, “the relation between a single experience and the ego is 
analyzable in terms of a part-whole relationship,” and “to do egology is to integrate the 
cogitationes into the ego” (Ricoeur 1967, 93). The subject, as ego, thereby comes into 
view “as “bundle” or interweaving of psychic experiences” (Zahavi 2008, 32-33).   
 However, this is not sufficient to achieve a satisfying dimension of self-
consciousness: as Amie Thomasson notes, “so known, the ‘I’ logically presupposed by 
experiences is simply the ‘pure’ Ego, myself qua bearer of these experiences, not myself 
qua actual human being in the world” (2005, 133). For this reason, it is necessary, at this 
stage, to follow Sartre in his explanation of what happens as a result of the reflective 
operation of subjectivity on the basis of this pre-reflective intentionality. It is this which 
shall, finally, lead the discussion in the direction of the self which forms the object of 
“consciousness of the self.”  
 
8.2.2 Reflection and the self 
In taking itself as its intentional focus – that is, setting up its first-order acts of 
consciousness as the intentional object of a second-order act of consciousness – the 
question of self-consciousness comes face-to-face with a difficulty to which I have 
already alluded: that of an emerging distinction between the subject that perceives and 
the subject that is perceived. In this apparent duality, it is only the first that can truly be 
called a subject, in the sense of a subject of consciousness: the perceived subject takes on 
the status of intentional object. In Sartre’s words, “consciousness is a reflection 
(reflet), but qua reflection it is exactly the one reflecting (reflechissant)” (1966[1943], 122). 
This difficulty is one which this investigation has already faced before – 
specifically, in the emergence of the two-sided phenomenology of the body in section 
5.4.5, where it became apparent that, in Ricoeur’s words, “our body is at once a body like 
any other (situated among other bodies) and an aspect of the self (its manner of being in 
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the world)” (1992, 33). Regarding the basic reflective structure of consciousness of the 
self, Sartre argues that this can only be overcome by positing a mode of being of the for-
itself as “a duality which is unity, a reflection (reflet) which is its own reflecting (reflection)” 
(1966[1943], 123). 
Crucially for the purposes of this investigation, what this involves is the setting-
up of the self, which Sartre defines as “an indication of the subject to himself” (ibid.). The 
self, then, is Sartre’s name for the image of oneself one perceives in self-reflection: “the 
self refers, but it refers precisely to the subject. It indicates a relation between the subject 
and himself” (ibid.).  
Far from representing the aporia of an irreconcilable duality, Sartre argues, this is, 
in fact, constitutive of the core structure of being-for-itself: 
The self therefore represents an ideal distance within the immanence of the 
subject in relation to himself. […] This is what we shall call presence to itself. 
The law of being of the for-itself, as the ontological foundation of consciousness, 
is to be itself in the form of presence to itself. (ibid., 123-124) 
It is this constitution of a self as a reflective representation of the subject of 
consciousness to itself that allows consciousness to be literally available for itself. 
Moreover, it is this same mechanism which Ricoeur approaches in speaking of an 
“otherness of a kind that can be constitutive of selfhood as such” (1992, 3): selfhood 
demands the establishment of a self which is available to me as an object of perception, 
and which therefore stands against my subjective standpoint at the same time as it is, 
inherently, a part of my being.  
 The question that remains to be answered, then, is what form does this self take, 
and how is it constituted as the unified image of a person against the stream of non-
identical, ever-changing experience? This question sets the investigation on the path 
which leads to the second dimension of subjectivity which Zahavi opposes to the 
minimal subject of first-personal experience – this is the subject-as-object, a “self” or 
“identity” that the subject, whether consciously or unconsciously, sets up in order to 
contemplate her own nature and answer the question of her own identity.  
	  330	  	  
 
8.2.3 The ‘narrative self’ 
Zahavi argues that it is in the direction of a concept of the self as a narrative construct 
(2008, 106) that one must turn in order to find an organizing principle around which to 
structure the self as a coherent identity: “to answer the question “Who am I?” is to tell 
the story of a life” (ibid., 107). 
Certainly, Zahavi argues, this can only occur on the basis of a prior self-
recognition as the subjective pole of a first-personal consciousness, that is, as a minimal 
self: “only a being with a first-person perspective could make sense of the ancient dictum 
“know thyself”; only a being with a first-person perspective could consider her own 
aims, ideals and aspirations as her own and tell a story about them”(ibid., 129). 
 At the same time as this demonstrates a necessary dependence of the narrative 
self upon the subject of experience, it also demonstrates a fundamental distinction 
between the two. Sartre wrote of the distinction between the self as the reflection and the 
subject as the reflected, and, hence, of the self as a representation for the subject, which 
cannot be known directly; in the same way, the narrative self represents the existential 
subject, but it is an interpretation of it which is neither identical nor equal to it.    
 In what way, then, does the mechanism of narration mediate between the first-
personal subject of existential praxis and experience on the one hand, and the fixed 
image of the ‘narrative self’ on the other? The first step already became apparent above, 
at the point at which the conceptual analysis of action led to the notion of the self-
ascription of one’s own actions as predicates regarding one’s identity. 
 It is to Ricoeur, then, that this investigation must turn in gaining a clearer notion 
of the narrative self. Ricoeur himself already makes the link between action and 
narration. Drawing on Hannah Arendt (1958), he states that “action is that aspect of 
human doing that calls for narration. And it is the function of narration, in its turn, to 
determine the ‘who of action’” (1992, 58). Of course, it is not enough to simply stop at 
the level of the ascription of one action after another if a coherent unity of selfhood is to 
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be achieved. What is necessary, Ricoeur argues, is the identification of an aspect of the 
subject of experience that is constant across the temporal dimension of its stream of 
consciousness: “is there a form of permanence in time that is a reply to the question 
“Who am I?”?” (ibid., 118). 
 Ricoeur’s answer is to resort to the conceptuality of character. By thus drawing on 
the narrative paradigm, what Ricoeur aims to do is to apply to the stream of lived 
experience unified only in its mineness the qualities of “unity, internal structure, and 
completeness” (ibid., 143) that define a narrative, in the classic Aristotelian sense 
(2000[c.335BC]), as an ordered sequence of actions and events – and thereby to locate a 
“concordant discordance” in lived experience (ibid.).  
As a result, Ricoeur argues, character, as an image of the self that ascribes to it a 
“set of lasting dispositions by which a person is recognized” (ibid., 121), results from a 
two-way process:  
…it is formed in accordance with a twofold movement of ascending 
complexification starting from basic actions and from practices, and of 
descending specification starting from the vague and mobile horizon of ideals 
and projects in light of which a human life apprehends itself in its oneness. (1992, 
158) 
In other words, I ascribe to myself my actions and experiences, but, at the same time, I 
contextualize these within the more-or-less distinct overarching ideas I have regarding 
who I am. 
 
8.2.4 Calleja and the notion of “alterbiography” 
Game studies already provides us with a way to theorize the mechanism by which ludic-
subjective experience in the gameworld can serve as the foundation of such a ‘narrative 
self’: this is Calleja’s notion of the alterbiography, as referring to “the ongoing narrative 
generated during interaction with a game environment” (2011, 124). According to this 
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understanding, the sequence of actions resulting from the player’s engagement with the 
gameworld is interpreted by the player as the coherent narrative of an active subject – 
literally, the writing of an alternate life. 
 Calleja suggests that the alterbiography resulting from the player’s engagement 
with the gameworld can be framed in one of two ways: either as an alterbiography of self, 
with the player herself being the subject and protagonist of the narrative (“I unlocked a 
hidden chamber in the ancient tomb”), or an alterbiography of an entity, where this role 
shifts to the heterocosmic character being played (“Lara Croft unlocked a hidden 
chamber in the ancient tomb”) (ibid., 125-126).8 
 In this way, Calleja’s development of the notion of alterbiography not only 
accounts for the cognitive mechanism by which the player apprehends her own actions 
as a ludic subject as cohering into a narratively organized identity. It is also aware of the 
double-sidedness of the identity relation between the player and the playable figure 
against which the enactment of a subjectivity within the gameworld takes place. In other 
words, the notion of the alterbiography not only offers a description of what is entailed 
in the objective relation to the playable figure, it also accounts for the two dimensions of 
the objective relation as both a relation of self and of other.  
 Having said that, the notion of alterbiography, as useful as it is, can only take this 
investigation so far. Calleja notes that “alterbiography is a cyclical process afforded by 
the representational, mechanical, and medium-specific qualities of a game” (ibid., 124). 
This is key: in the figure game form, the leap from a subjective to an objective grasp of 
the self does not happen through an internal act of reflection that turns the self into an 
object of thought. Instead, the leap is produced by the audiovisual medial apparatus of 
the game presenting the player with a ready-made mediation of her own ludic 
subjectivity, already encoded according to formal, generic and aesthetic conventions and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 A third category that Calleja identifies, the alterbiography of miniatures, falls outside the remit of this 
investigation, in that it describes “situations in game environments in which the players can control several 
entities at once” (2011, 125), and, as such, does not refer to engagement with the gameworld through an 
embodied ludic subjectivity in the context of a figure game. 
	  333	  	  
structured into a narratively meaningful form.9 However, Calleja’s development of the 
notion does not go further either in theorizing these qualities, or in offering a 
conceptualization of the relation between the player’s first-order experience in the 
gameworld as a ludic subject, and the second order of experience in which this 
gameworld experience is re-presented in a narrative form.  
 In order to arrive at a more complete understanding of the objective relation – 
and of the presentation of a ludic self that it allows for – it is necessary to return to the 
notion of the double perspectival structure of ludic engagement, and to focus on the 
representational strategies by which the player’s first-order experience of the gameworld 
as the ludic subject is reframed as second-order experience in the textual unfolding of the 
game artefact perceived from the external perspective. 
 
8.3 The presentation of the ludic self 
 
When articulating the double perspectival structure as the primary axis of ludic 
engagement in section 2.4, I paused to highlight the implications of this experiential 
structure upon the ludic subject that constitutes the theme of this investigation. The 
insight gained at that point was that, firstly, as embodied in the playable figure, the ludic 
subject constitutes the subject-position internal to the gameworld to which gameworld 
experience – that is, experience of the gameworld as an existential world for me – pertains. 
Secondly, the same ludic subject, as taken on as ‘I-in-the-gameworld’ and as constituting 
my internal perspectival standpoint, is itself framed as an object of perception through 
the external perspective which I, as player, inhabit simultaneously.      
The question of the two-sided engagement with the ludic subject that results 
from this double perspectival structure was again brought to the fore of the analysis in 
section 6.2.2, while developing the perspectival distinction as a determining principle in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  This observation broaches the question of narrative in relation to games, which – needless to point out – 
has been a point of contention throughout the history of game studies. I will address this question directly 
in section 9.1.1, by way of clearing the ground for theorizing narrative character as the structuring principle 
for the textualization of the ludic self.	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player’s relation to the playable figure. There, a line was drawn between the subjective 
and the objective relation to the playable figure, which was conceptualized as intersecting 
with, and cutting across, the distinction between the self- and other-status of the playable 
figure. In tackling the second dimension of subjectivity, then, it is necessary to move 
from the analysis of the subjective relation to that of the objective relation. In terms of 
the double perspectival structure, what is entailed is a shift from considering ludic 
subjectivity as it constitutes the internal perspective to considering how it is itself 
constituted in the external perspective. 
 
8.3.1 From the internal to the external perspective 
I have already discussed at length what is entailed in the notion of the internal 
standpoint, or, as I have termed it, the ludic subject-position. In section 7.2, I considered 
the formal mechanisms through which it is established. In section 7.3, through an 
engagement with Minecraft and Proteus (Key and Kanaga 2013), I demonstrated how these 
formal mechanisms coalesce into the specification of a particular mode of being-in-the-
gameworld, and, hence, into a determination of the player’s comportment towards the 
gameworld and her subjective being within it. Finally, in section 8.1, I focused on the 
enactment of this ludic subjectivity – detailing how, through the taking up of the ludic 
subject-position and the extension of its proper being-in-the-gameworld in the direction 
of a project of action, and on the basis of the proprioceptive ownership of the subjective 
gameworld experiences and actions pertaining to this ludic subject-position, the player 
enacts an existential praxis in the gameworld within which an oscillation between the 
status of ‘self’ and of ‘other’ can be witnessed.  
 It is now time to shift attention to the external perspective. In the light of the 
discussions regarding the phenomenology of subjectivity and self-knowledge, which I 
have just presented, the implications of this perspectival shift are hard to overstate. If, 
from the internal standpoint of the ludic subject, the player acts as ‘herself,’ performing 
actions within the gameworld that are ‘hers,’ in the full phenomenal and existential sense 
discussed above, then, from the external standpoint, what the player perceives is a 
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representation of her own actions. In other words, having taken up the ludic subject as 
‘I,’ and therefore taken possession of her actions and experiences as the ludic subject, she 
now sees herself on screen. It is only necessary to recall Merleau-Ponty’s comment that “I 
should need the use of a second body” – implying a second perspectival standpoint – in 
order to perceive my own embodied being as object (2002[1945], 104). By this 
understanding, the double perspectival structure of ludic engagement sets up the player’s 
own body as the ‘second body’ to the ‘first body’ of the ludic subject as invested in the 
playable figure.  
 I shall illustrate this by returning to Aarseth’s Tomb Raider example. In terms of 
the player’s engagement with Lara Croft as a playable figure, this means that, on a first 
order of experience, by engaging in the subjective relation – thereby becoming ‘I-as-Lara-
in-the-gameworld’ – I have the experience of being this ludic subject. In more concrete 
terms, I have the sensation of deciding that it is necessary for me, to complete my 
overarching goal of getting to the end of the level, to perform a jump across a ravine. I 
have the awareness of making a calculated comparison between the span of the ravine 
and the distance I believe myself to be capable of jumping – in other words, I apply the 
‘I can’ which I have adopted in taking on Lara as my body-in-the-gameworld as the 
structuring principle by which I attempt to map out an instrumental complex of possible 
actions, and into which, then, the ravine must be brought into view as either ‘jumpable’ 
or ‘not jumpable’. I am aware of weighing the likelihood of my making the jump against   
the “risk of falling down the ravine” (Klevjer 2012, 18), knowing that, in its passive aspect, 
my body-in-the-gameworld is subject to both gravity and taking damage from falls, and is 
therefore unlikely to survive the drop in the case of an unsuccessful jump: in other 
words, I know I am in thrall to the “gameplay condition,” meaning that the 
consequences of my decisions will be upheld by the ludic materiality of the game if I 
were to fail to make the jump (Leino 2010, 101). Against all these considerations, finally, 
I am also aware of taking the decision to jump, and then performing the mental act 
which causes me to press X on the Playstation controller, an action I, as player, interpret 
not as ‘pressing X’ but as ‘jumping’. Rendered in terms of the conceptual analysis of 
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action described above, I can say that, on the basis of the motive of getting to the ancient 
treasure in the tomb I am currently raiding, I formed the intention of jumping across the 
ravine, which I put into action through extending my initiative into the gameworld, 
thereby making one of the possibilities of bodily action forming my instrumental 
complex my own¸ and, consequently, adding to the definition of the ludic subjectivity I 
enact through my existential praxis – perhaps, for instance, as a daredevil who is not 
afraid of risking everything on a near-impossible jump. All of these I experience as my 
acts of consciousness – they are “known without observation”, to return to Anscombe’s term. 
“I feel myself active,” and the attendant sensations of being active belong “to no object that 
stands apart from me” (Lipps 1962[1903], 376) 
 At the same time, however, I also have the separate, but interlinked, sensation of 
watching a textualized presentation of this on-screen figure, in whom I am invested 
subjectively, hesitating at the edge of the ravine, performing the jump, nearly falling to 
her death but just managing to grab onto the opposite rim and pull herself up to safety. I 
witness this, not as the actions of another, but, as my actions, having their roots in my 
subjectivity and enacting my initiative upon the gameworld. In other words, I have the 
experience both of performing these actions and of witnessing them; I have both internal and 
external cognition of these actions.   
In practice, what this means is that, as Bob Rehak argues, “avatars reduplicate 
and render in visible form their players’ actions” (2003, 107), and that, as a result, “as we 
play we also watch ourselves play; video games are by turns, and even simultaneously, 
participatory and spectatorial” (ibid., 119). This observation is one that is repeated in 
Marie-Laure Ryan’s observation that “players are not only agents but also spectators of 
their own pretended actions” (2006, 190), as well as in Emma Westecott’s argument that 
the screen-based mediality of digital games means that “the player is always audience to 
her own play act” (2009, 2). Moreover, as I have already pointed out in section 2.4.4, this 
aligns figure games with the aesthetics of interactive digital art, in which, according to 
Katja Kwastek, “one’s own actions become available as an object of reflection” (2013, 
163). 
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 This is the fundamental aesthetic quality of what, in terms of the dimensions of 
the player-figure relation, I have termed the objective relation of self: namely, that this 
dimension of the relation accounts for the fact that the player is presented with a 
representation of her own ludic subjectivity. As such, it establishes a mechanism of 
autoscopy, to borrow, following Stephan Günzel (2013) a term from psychology and 
cognitive science which refers to “a loosely related complex of experiences in which one 
sees (or experiences) a “double” as external to one’s current vantage point” (Mishara 
2009, 591). 
Relating this back to the twofold understanding of subjectivity, and the opening 
of the first-personal subject of experience onto selfhood through the mechanisms of 
self-awareness in experience, it becomes evident that it is precisely through the 
establishment of this autoscopic aesthetic relation that the player’s ludic subjectivity can 
come to be constituted in her experience as a coherent ludic self, an object of her own 
self-awareness. In order to better articulate the formation of the ludic self on the 
foundation of ludic subjectivity, then, I shall move on to a closer examination of the 
formal structures determining the objective relation to the playable figure, and, hence, to 
the ludic subject. 
 
8.3.2 The objective relation to the enacted ludic subject 
The idea that videogames establish a mechanism by which the actions of the ludic 
subject may become mediated objects of perception is, of course, not a novel one. The 
‘instant replay’ function, by which the player’s complete sequence of ludic actions is 
replayed in retrospect, has featured in videogames at least since the arcade game Food 
Fight (General Computer Corporation 1983), and is particularly common in racing games 
and sport simulations. As such, there is no question that playing a videogame can result in 
a representation of events that the player, or other people, can be the audience for. 
Already, even in this detached mode of a posteriori representation, a form of autoscopy 
makes itself apparent: in watching a replay of her performance in a race in Gran Turismo 
(Sony Computer Entertainment 1997), for example, the player will associate her 
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perception of the represented action with her memory of her subjective consciousness of 
performing the action: seeing the representation of a decisive overtaking manoeuvre 
through which she gained the lead, she will recall the proprioceptive sensations of 
performing that action – as in the example of Tomb Raider above, the mental acts of 
weighing one’s option, taking a decision, exercising one’s initiative, and so on. 
However, the aesthetic structure which is pointed out by Rehak, Ryan and 
Westecott, and which, following Günzel, I have labelled with the term autoscopy, is not 
one which occurs separately from, and subsequent to, the act of playing, but is rather an 
intrinsic dimension of ludic experience as adhering to the double perspectival structure. 
Even this suggestion – that the double perspectival structure of the figure game presents 
the player with a mediation of her own ludic subjectivity – is not surprising: this was 
evident, in fact, at the very start of this investigation, being manifest in the opening 
sentences of Adventure (Crowther and Woods 1976).  
Of course, the distinction between the player’s actions as the ludic subject and 
their representation is easily made in the case of the text-based adventure game. This is 
due to their turn-based temporal structure: first, the player inputs a command (‘takes an 
action’), then, subsequently, the game provides, as output, a description of the results of 
her action. Conversely, the near-immediate simultaneity of action and representation of 
action in most situations of audiovisual videogame play might tend to obscure the 
fundamental experiential distinction between the first-person, subjective experience of 
performing the action and the simultaneous, second-order experience of objectively 
perceiving a second-order representation of the same action.   
The representation of the enacted ludic subject becomes more foregrounded 
when there is a more prominent mismatch between the time of this enactment, on the 
moment-by-moment basis of the experience of taking action, and the time in which is 
mediated. This is the case, to varying degrees, in games in which, as in the case of the 
text adventure genre, the player actions follow a turn-based temporality, where, usually, 
the player sees her actions being performed at a time subsequent to and separate from 
the time of her performing them. Battle sequences in the Japanese role-playing game 
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genre, such as Final Fantasy VIII (Squaresoft 1999), are an example of this: often the 
player, having selected an attack, is then at leisure to sit back and take in the sometimes 
quite lengthy animation by which ‘her’ action is performed.10 It is also the case in certain 
real-time games - prominent examples of this include the special combos in fighting 
games such as Street Fighter IV (Capcom 2008), which result in attacks that are delivered 
through elaborate animations that extend long after the player is done inputting the 
sequence of button-presses that triggers the animation.  
In both of these situations, the player’s perception of the mediated action is 
temporally dissociated from her subjective experience of performing those actions, and 
there is no longer any danger of the second-order objective experience of the performed 
actions being effaced. In fact, at the extreme which these examples represent, the 
experiential association of the performed action and the perceived action might be 
severed entirely, with the player no longer being able to associate with the action she sees 
the playable figure perform as being her own. In such situations, the objective relation of 
self gives way entirely to the objective relation of other which is always already the other 
side of the same coin, and the aesthetic effect is no longer one defined by an autoscopic 
quality, but by a relation to a character, as the representation of a heterocosmic individual 
distinct from the player (see Chapter 9). 
Staying away from such extreme cases, what is established through the double 
perspectival structure – as, through the example of Tomb Raider, we have seen it manifest 
– is a dynamic interplay between the player’s enacted, embodied existence in the 
gameworld as subject and as object. Following the conceptualization of action in its 
phenomenological aspect, it is not simply the physical dimension of action in its 
externality as an event in the gameworld that is represented. Instead, what is represented 
to me as player is my action for me as ludic subject, in its springing-up from my being-for-
itself in-the-gameworld as ludic subject. It is this subjectivity itself which becomes 
objectified in the form of a ludic self.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Final Fantasy VIII features the longest attack animation in any Final Fantasy game. The attack in question 
is the Eden summon, whose associated animation lasts one minute and forty seconds. 
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It has already become apparent that the formal mechanism by which this is 
rendered possible is the distribution of the player’s experience across the two standpoints 
constituting the double perspectival structure – the player adopts both the perspective of 
a ludic subject and that of the player outside the game (see Fig. 2.2). In practical terms, 
then, the double perspectival structure of ludic experience as it pertains to the figure 
game can be understood as the simultaneous co-presence of two distinct gazes – that of 
the ludic subject, and that of the player – both of which can be said to belong, in 
different ways, to the player. The ludic subject looks out at the gameworld, and the player 
looks onto the ludic subject. 
In some cases, as in games that use a first-person point-of-view, the two gazes 
are superimposed, and the distance between the two is at a minimum – which is not to 
say that the gap between the two is effaced. Recall the point made in section 5.4.3 in the 
context of Olli Tapio Leino’s phenomenological analysis of the experience of the 
flashbang grenade explosion in Far Cry (Crytek 2004) (Leino 2010, 172-177). Though Far 
Cry makes use of a first-person visual point-of-view, at the point at which the flashbang 
grenade ‘blinds’ the ludic subject, it remains possible for me as a player to ‘see my 
blindness’ from the external standpoint.  
In order to gain a better understanding of the interrelation of the two gazes, I 
shall turn to another example. In Grim Fandango (LucasArts 1998), the player’s external 
perspective on the protagonist, Manny Calavera, is framed in fixed, pre-rendered third-
person cinematic angles that befit the game’s noir-influenced generic styling. At the same 
time, the player is invited to share Manny’s own subjective gaze as distinct from this 
visual point-of-view. When Manny is in close proximity to an object of interest, his head 
will turn towards the object, leading the player to follow his line of sight, and, 
consequently, to see the object being highlighted through Manny’s eyes, from his 
standpoint as a ludic subject: that is, figure out how it might be of use with a view 
towards the goals defining Manny as a ludic subject, which, of course, are also, in the 
‘self’ dimension of the player-figure relation, the player’s goals once she has taken on this 
ludic subjectivity as ‘herself’. In Fig. 8.1, for example, Manny’s head turns to take in the 
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bottle of Scotch, directing the player’s attention, from her ludic-subjective standpoint, 
towards it, and considering its possibilities within the instrumental complex of her 
possible actions. Once she has oriented herself to look at the bottle through Manny’s 
eyes, figuratively speaking, the player is engaging in the subjective relation of other, 
wherein the subjective perspective she towards the gameworld remains marked as being 
that of an other, but is nonetheless taken on as her subjective standpoint towards the 
world.11 
  
 
Figure 8.1. Grim Fandango (LucasArts 1999): the gaze of the ludic subject. 
 
In order to conceptualize the experiential implications of the two interrelating gazes as 
shaped by the double perspectival structure of the player’s intentional orientation 
towards the game, I shall turn to Vivian Sobchack and her development of a 
phenomenology of cinematic perception. Her argument is that what can be identified as 
the basic unit of cinematic perception operates according to a double movement. By her 
formulation, cinematic experience can be understood as “the perception (act of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 It is instructive to recall the analysis of the ‘look at’ command in Kentucky Route Zero performed in section 
6.4.2. 
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consciousness) of (mediation) expression (object of consciousness) and/as the expression (act 
of consciousness) of (mediation) perception (object of consciousness)” (1992, 18-19). 
This formulation deserves to be unpacked in greater detail. The structure mapped 
out here is built on a fundamental reversibility in the relation between perception and 
expression that gives us two formulations, each the inverse of the other:  
i) the perception of expression 
ii) the expression of perception 
The first statement positions the (viewer’s) act of perception as an intentional act, with 
the film as the intended object that is perceived through this act of consciousness. The 
second statement, on the other hand, states that film expresses a perception of the world. 
In other words, film establishes a phenomenological structure by which an original act of 
perception is expressed (through the formal and cultural codes that determine the 
process of mediation) and becomes itself an object of perception. 
 It is in this sense that Sobchack argues that film is “as much a viewing subject as it is 
also a visible and viewed object” (ibid., 21-22), and that, as a result, “cinematic vision in the 
film experience is articulated by both the film and the spectator simultaneously engaged 
in two quite distinctly located visual acts that meet on shared ground but never identically 
occupy it” (ibid., 23).  
Sobchack’s unpacking of the phenomenological structure of film experience 
therefore restates, according to the formula of the intentional model of consciousness, 
the conclusion this investigation had reached in section 4.1, when investigating the noetic 
mode of presentation in non-ergodic works – namely, that an essential duality exists 
between the represented perceiving consciousness and the perspective of its presentation 
on the level of textual discourse.  
A comparison between the scene in Grim Fandango and the shot from Maniac 
(Khalfoun 2012) analyzed in section 4.1.6 (see Fig. 4.2) is particularly demonstrative in 
this regard. There, I argued that, in the reception of the film, an absolute distinction was 
made between the subjective standpoint of Frank, whose perceptual focus is the dolphin-
shaped ornament on the bathroom shelf belonging to Lucie, whom he has just 
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murdered, and the subjective standpoint of the viewer, whose focus is more likely to be 
Frank’s reflection in the mirror.  
 My analysis of the sequence in Grim Fandango illustrated in Fig. 8.1 might, on the 
face of it, appear to follow a similar structure. Again, Manny’s subjective orientation 
towards the bottle of Scotch appears to set up his subjective perception in opposition to 
that in which, through the fixed cinematic third-person point-of-view, the player is 
located. However, while the phenomenological structure of two distinct visual acts 
resulting from two different subject-positions is identical, the difference is that, in Grim 
Fandango, it is the player who inhabits both positions. As such, in Sobchack’s terms, the 
player is both the one whose perception is expressed, and the one who perceives the 
expression of (her own) perception. 
 There is another point to be made regarding the objective relation to the enacted 
ludic subject, and it is hinted at in Sobchack’s usage here of the term “expression”. I have 
so far discussed the basic phenomenological structure of the mechanism of autoscopy 
which is the result of the objective relation. However, in doing so, I have taken for 
granted the givenness of ludic subjectivity as an object in the external perspective. Such 
an approach omits a vital aspect of the process, as Sobchack’s formulation highlights. 
Applying her insight to the double perspectival structure of the figure game form, it 
becomes evident that, for the perception of the ludic subject to itself be perceived, it must 
be expressed in the form of a textualized representation – it is this representation which 
is the object of the player’s external perception. The next step, then, is to focus on the 
representational mechanisms by which the ludic subject – not just as a figure, but in its 
subjectivity as enacted – is represented to the player in the external perspective.   
 
8.3.3 The mediation of the enacted ludic subject 
When first articulating the double perspectival structure and its importance to the 
aesthetic form of the figure game, I made the point that, in addition to its other 
conceptual advantages, the organization of the aesthetics of the figure game form 
according to this structure allows the question of ludic subjectivity to neatly sidestep the 
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trap of the “immersive fallacy” (Salen and Zimmerman 2004, 450). This is due to the fact 
that, while the sense of being-in-the-gameworld resulting from the adoption of the 
internal standpoint of the ludic subject might indeed operate according to “the 
perceptual illusion of non-mediation” (Lombard and Ditton 1997, 9), and thereby 
conveys a sense of being-there that, as I noted in Chapter 4, has been discussed in terms 
of notions such as immersion and presence, it is, at the same time, ‘bracketed’ through 
being itself framed in the external perspective, and, as a result, is caught up in the 
signification of the game as textual artefact.    
This results in what might appear to be something of a paradox. In constituting 
the ludic subject-position as a cognitive ‘opening’ onto the gameworld for the player, the 
internal perspective, almost by definition, operates according to a logic of mediation that 
falls under Jay Bolter and David Grusin’s notion of transparent immediacy (1999, 23), 
according to which the medium of presentation engages in an effacement of its own 
mechanisms of mediation in order to provide the illusion of an unmediated ‘window’ 
onto the domain of representation.12 At the same time, the external perspective, as I 
argued in section 2.4.3, frames the game, and the presentation of the player’s own 
enacted ludic subjectivity, as a textual artefact. On this perspectival dimension, the game 
does not operate through an illusion of transparency – on the contrary, in many cases, 
the mode of mediation at work is that of hypermediacy, “in which representation is 
conceived of not as window on to the world, but rather as “windowed” itself” (ibid., 34), 
being foregrounded through the self-aware deployment of established and recognized 
formal and stylistic modes of representation. 
 This was already apparent in the scene from Grim Fandango I considered above, 
where, as I have already mentioned, the external perspective the player is granted upon 
her ludic subjectivity as Manny is constructed according to the visual tropes of film noir, 
including a preference for “oblique and vertical lines” and “expressionist lighting” that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 This inevitably recalls Marie-Laure Ryan’s observation, discussed in section 3.3.5, that, in the mode of 
heterocosmic representation, “the text is apprehended as a window on something that exists in time and 
space well beyond the window frame” (2001a, 93). At the same time, it should not obscure the fact, 
acknowledged in section 4.3.1, that ‘immediacy’ or ‘realism’ are always inevitably codified functions of 
textuality and representation, rather than a denial or an escape from mediation. 
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falls into the frame “in such odd shapes – jagged trapezoids, obtuse triangles, vertical 
slits” (Schrader 1972, 10-11). 
 Retracting my steps further, to the first example I gave in the preceding section – 
that of replay modes in racing games such as Gran Turismo – the same observation 
becomes apparent, albeit with a different cultural frame of reference. Rather than making 
use of the limitless visualization and perspectival possibilities inherent in representing 
events in a virtual environments, the default presentation of these replays is constructed 
around a sequence of fixed camera positions that are clearly intended to be received ‘as 
if’ they were an actual televised broadcast of a motorsports event. From playing the role 
of a racing driver during the course of the race, the player switches, while watching the 
replay, to the role of a sports fan viewing the race on TV from home – with the 
difference, of course, that it is her own being and actions as ludic subject, as represented, 
that she spectates upon.  
Examples of this phenomenal structure, and its attendant aesthetic effects, 
abound. In his analysis of the Silent Hill series, Bernard Perron demonstrates the games’ 
adherence to the conventions of the survival horror genre as inaugurated by Alone in the 
Dark (Infogrames 1992). In this regard, one of the primary formal characteristics of the 
genre, which the Silent Hill games exploit to the hilt, is the organization of the player’s 
visual point-of-view as a sequence of discrete third-person camera positions selected for 
cinematic effect. In an in-depth analysis of the scene in Silent Hill (Konami 1999) in 
which the playable figure, Harry Mason, follows the non-player character Cheryl into a 
dark alley, Perron examines the way in which the player-as-Harry’s traversal of the 
confined space is framed through a sequence of mobile high-angle camera positions 
(2012, 81-83). Not only does this have an effect on the player’s internal perspective on 
the gameworld – in that, as I noted in section 7.2.2, it narrows the field of this 
perspective and limits the player’s knowledge of her surroundings – it also frames the 
visual presentation of the external perspective as “remediated cinematic” one (ibid., 21), 
which also has the added effect of framing the player in the relation of a cinematic viewer 
towards her own ludic subjectivity: “you actually see your player character […] being 
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(b)eaten to death in a corner and being dragged along the ground by a zombie” (ibid., 
22).  
 Nor is this in any way an isolated case, or limited to the survival horror genre. To 
return to a game I have already referred to in Chapter 7, in Ico (Team Ico 2001), the 
third-person camera angles favour distant long shots that not only emphasize the 
smallness of the titular ludic subject against the vast architecture of the crumbling castle 
in which he is trapped, but also suggest the watching presence of the ancient spectral 
forces haunting the castle: another example of what the film theorist Carol J. Clover 
terms the “predatory gazing” that is a common formal technique of horror cinema (1995, 
193).13  
Moreover, it is also possible to identify examples that aim at a completely 
different aesthetic effect. In Jet Set Radio (Smilebit 2000), the player takes the role of a 
member of a rebellious skater gang fighting oppressive police forces in a colourful, cel-
shaded heterocosmic representation of Tokyo. The primary objective in each level is that 
of spraying a graffiti tag at fixed strategic points. Whenever the player reaches one of 
these points, she must successfully complete a minigame involving precise directional 
movements of the Dreamcast controller’s analogue stick to simulate the movements of 
the spray can. These sequences are presented as a rapidly-edited montage of swooping 
camera angles, timed to the player’s movements of the analogue stick and accentuated by 
musical flourishes, inevitably bringing to mind the hyper-kinetic visual language of the 
contemporary pop music video.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Illustrative examples of this trope at work in horror and science-fiction cinema – where it is often 
wedded to a monstrous or otherwise inhuman subjective point-of-view – include the machinic vision of 
the titular android in The Terminator (Cameron 1984), the infra-red vision of the alien hunter in Predator 
(McTiernan 1986), the extreme wide-angle vision of the xenomorph in Alien3 (Fincher 1993) or the fast-
motion tracking shots that send the camera flying through the streets of Victorian London before arriving 
at Mina Murray’s bedroom window to signal the vampire’s supernatural presence in Bram Stoker’s Dracula 
(Coppola 1992). So familiar are the visual properties of such shots that they can be used to imply an 
observing presence even when none has been otherwise established: the lurking, low-angle shot that creeps 
up on Betty (Naomi Watts) and Rita (Laura Elena Harding) when they arrive at the Club Silencio in 
Mulholland Drive (Lynch 2001) is a perfect illustration of this point. The examples from Silent Hill and Ico 
would seem to adhere to this latter example, adding to the general atmosphere of dread by making the 
ludic subject an object of predatory vision without directly specifying a particular subject of this vision. 
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In all of the examples covered above, then – Grim Fandango, Gran Turismo, Silent 
Hill, Ico and Jet Set Radio alike – what is noteworthy is not only the fact of the 
establishment of a perspective upon the enacted ludic subject that is distinct from the 
ludic subject’s own perspective upon the gameworld, but also the fact that this external 
perspective encodes the representation of the ludic subject within a textuality that 
foregrounds its organization according to the formal, stylistic and iconographic codes of 
existing genres and cultural forms – in the examples I have presented, film noir, live TV 
motorsports coverage, the horror film and the music video. Moreover, this appropriation 
and foregrounded reference to recognizable modes of presentation also extends to 
borrowings from within the videogame form itself – the analysis of Kentucky Route Zero in 
section 6.4 highlighted the indebtedness of its representation to the visual and formal 
techniques of a number of distinct historical videogame traditions.  
To return to Bolter and Grusin, it might be concluded that the interplay between 
the internal and the external perspectives of ludic engagement thereby enshrines “the 
tension between regarding a visual space as mediated and as a “real” space that lies 
beyond mediation” (1999, 41). At the same time as the internal perspective of the ludic 
subject-position creates an ‘opening’ through which the player has access to first-order 
experience of the gameworld – and hence to the sense of being-in-the-gameworld that 
forms the core of ludic subjectivity – her enactment of this same ludic subjectivity is 
encoded, as, in Sobchack’s terms, an “expression of perception,” on the level of textual 
artifactuality in which the game appears to her from the external standpoint. 
 
8.4 Case study: Narration in Bast ion  
 
The action role-playing game Bastion (Supergiant Games 2011) presents us with a 
situation in which the textual representative strategies by which the autoscopic aesthetic 
function is established – and a presentation of the player’s ludic self is constructed – are 
foregrounded to an exceptional degree. Having said that, it must be stressed that its 
exceptionality lies not in kind but in degree, with Bastion simply laying an added emphasis 
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on a dimension of ludic experience which, as I have argued, is intrinsic to the double 
perspectival structure of such experience. As such, in providing an analysis of the ways in 
which Bastion constructs a presentation of the player’s enacted ludic subjectivity, my aim 
is to shed light on the fundamental formal and phenomenological structures determining 
the aesthetics of subjectivity at work in the form of the figure game.  
 
8.4.1 Narration and the playable figure 
Bastion opens with an image of the Kid, the otherwise-unnamed playable figure, asleep on 
a mattress in what appear to be the remains of a small room, floating in mid-air against 
an indistinct backdrop (see Fig. 8.2). The scene is viewed from the isometric perspective 
used throughout the entire game, about which I shall make two observations. First, 
recalling the discussion on visual point-of-view in section 7.2.2, it is easy to observe that 
the point-of-view here is not coterminous with the spatial standpoint of the ludic 
subject,14 and that, as such, the separation of the two gazes resulting from the double 
perspectival structure of ludic engagement is foregrounded to a greater degree here than 
it would be in, say, Minecraft or Proteus. 
The other observation to be made regarding this point-of-view is that it adheres 
to the formal conventions of a videoludic tradition that stretches back to the arcade 
game Zaxxon (Sega 1982), and that has grown into a firmly established visual trope of 
videogame presentation. More specifically, through its usage in games such as Diablo 
(Blizzard Entertainment 1996), Titan Quest (Iron Lore Entertainment 2006) and Torchlight 
(Runic Games 2009), this particular isometric mode of visual presentation is one which, 
within the contemporary gaming landscape, is particularly associated with the action role-
playing game genre (ARPG) to which Bastion belongs. As such, the mode of visual 
presentation of the gameworld – and of the player’s subjective actions within that 
gameworld – is instantly familiar as a conventionalized one that adheres to generic 
expectations.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14Having said that, it is certainly, to return to Aarseth, Smedstad and Sunnanå’s term, a vagrant perspective, 
in that the camera is fixed on the Kid and follows him as he traverses the gameworld, rather than revealing 
the entirety of the gameworld at any given time. 
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Figure 8.2. Bastion (Supergiant Games 2011): the opening scene. 
 
As this opening image comes into view, a voice-over narrator sets the scene: 
Proper story’s supposed to start at the beginning. Ain’t so simple with this one. 
Now here’s a kid whose world got all twisted, leaving him stranded on a rock in 
the sky.  
At the end of this brief introductory sequence, the player is given control. With the Kid 
starting off asleep in bed, the only action the player can perform is to get out of bed, an 
action performed simply through the player’s inputting a command for the figure to 
move in any direction. Of course, this apparently simple action is significant on a number 
of levels. In purely ludic terms, it is the moment of the player’s taking control of the 
figure, and, hence, it represents the coming-into-being of the ludic subject ‘I-as-the-Kid’. 
On a narrative dimension, it is the first step in the hero’s journey. On the level of the 
analysis of action and the subject, it represents the first statement of initiative, and the 
first self-determining ascription that begins the constitution of the ludic self that will be 
played out in the player’s engagement with the game.  
As soon as the action has been performed, however, the player does not only, as 
she would expect, see the Kid on-screen get out of bed and take a first step. This would 
constitute the baseline mode of representation of the player’s action that she would 
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expect to encounter, and that, in its conventionality, barely registers as an act of 
representation. What actually happens in this case is that, at the same time as the player 
sees the Kid, now identified as ‘I’, perform the action on-screen, the same narrator who 
introduced the scene describes the action: “He gets up.” 
This is the point at which it becomes apparent that Bastion makes use of a second, 
simultaneous avenue of mediation, translating the ludic subject’s gameworld actions into 
an ongoing, on-the-fly verbal narrative. This unfamiliar mode of representation draws 
attention to the basic, underlying fact of the autoscopic form inherent in the double 
perspectival structure of ludic engagement – foregrounding the fact that, simultaneously 
with the player’s performing of an action as ludic subject, she is also the audience for a 
re-presentation of these actions, in this case structured into a coherent narrative along 
codes familiar from cinematic voice-over conventions.  
Though the use of voice-over narration is not common in games, it is not 
unheard of - a roll-call of games making use of voice-over narration during ludic 
engagement would include, among others, Duke Nukem 3D (3D Realms 1996), Thief: The 
Dark Project, Max Payne (Remedy Entertainment 2001) and No More Heroes (Grasshopper 
Manufacture 2010). The games listed here all feature vocal interjections of varying 
frequency on the part of the playable figure in its dimension of character, effectively 
acting, in each case, as – to refer to Gérard Genette’s taxonomy of narrative voice – an 
autodiegetic narrator (1980, 245) recounting their own story. In none of these cases is the 
first-person narrator engaged in describing the actions the player performs as a ludic 
subject. Instead, their speech, in general, is geared towards providing either background 
context or idiosyncratic commentary upon the events the player-as-ludic-subject is either 
witness to or participating in – in other words, specifying their own perspective as 
distinct from that of the player. 
One could also note that what all these games have in common is that they invite 
the player to take on ludic subjects that are particularly strongly determined in their 
character dimension, and that, to varying degrees, are, at a minimum, questionable on 
moral grounds – the list above features, in order, a hyper-violent, misogynistic parody of 
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the self-absorbed male action hero, a professional thief, a renegade, drug-addicted 
detective and a would-be hitman. Against this observation, it might be surmised that the 
function of the autodiegetic narration in each of these cases is that of keying the relation 
as a subjective relation of other, thereby allowing it to be placed at a safe, ironic distance 
from the player.15  
Bastion’s narrator, on the other hand, is a third-person narrator, speaking of the 
Kid from an external perspective, and therefore more transparently establishing a 
perspective upon the ludic subjectivity of the player-as-the-Kid – though, to refer back to 
the discussion on focalization in section 4.1.2, the narrator also grants the player insights 
into the Kid’s inner life, crossing over into, in Genette’s terms, internal focalization 
(ibid., 190). 
An hour or two into the game, the narrating voice is revealed to belong to a non-
player-character the Kid encounters – the Stranger (later in the game, his name is given 
as Rucks). An important point to note regarding the attribution of this narration to this 
heterocosmic figure is that his constitution as a character – both in terms of his vocal 
delivery (deep, gravelly voice, a terse but poetic manner of speaking) and in his 
appearance (his costume, handlebar moustache, and so on) – mark him out as a familiar 
figure, a trope of the Western genre in cinema. In fact, he recalls one character in 
particular: the narrator in The Big Lebowski (Coen Brothers 1998), played by Sam Elliott, 
who is also referred to as the Stranger, and who has been acknowledged as an influence 
on the design of Bastion’s narration by the game’s creators.16 What should be noted, of 
course, is that the Stranger in the Coens’ film is already a character that is presented as a 
conscious pastiche of an instantly recognizable cinematic type. Bastion’s narrator, in other 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 There is also another situation in which Bastion’s usage of on-the-fly narration is anticipated. The 
reference being made here is to sports games: taking EA Sports’ FIFA series as an example, every 
instalment since FIFA 97 (1996) has featured such a commentary. What makes the parallel interesting is 
that, in both cases, the player’s actions are re-mediated according to the established formal and cultural 
conventions of a pre-existing mediality. Just as Bastion references the formal conventions of cinema, FIFA 
references the conventions of the televised live sports broadcast. However, given that, in the FIFA games, 
the player takes on a transcendent ludic subjectivity incorporating, under its wing, the whole eleven-man 
football team, it falls outside the remit of this investigation’s engagement with the aesthetics of embodied 
ludic subjectivity. 
16 In an interview, the game’s sound director, Darren Korb, makes the influence explicit (Indiegames.com, 
2011). 
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words, is a pastiche of a pastiche – he brings a whole generic context along with him. In 
aesthetic terms, having such a narrator verbally represent the actions constituting the 
player’s enacted ludic subjectivity places this subjectivity within a familiar, and 
immediately meaningful, generic context, with the result that their significance can be 
reinterpreted according to the iconographies and cultural codes by which this context is 
defined. 
 
8.4.2 The formal functions of the narration and the ludic self 
As the player continues her engagement with Bastion, venturing out of the Kid’s bedroom 
into the world which, in a striking visual trick, constitutes itself beneath his feet as he 
travels through it,17 the narrator continues to present, and to give meaning to, the player’s 
ludic-subjective actions. The next step, then, is to lay out, by means of a textual analysis, 
the functions by which this narration structures its presentation of the enacted ludic 
subjectivity of the player-as-the-Kid in such a way as to grant it the coherent unity of a 
meaningful ludic self.    
  i) First is the simple representation of the ludic subject’s actions. When the player 
successfully defeats the first enemy encountered in the game, delivering a fatal blow with 
the Cael Hammer the Kid has just picked up, the narrator offers a simple: “Kid pops him 
good.” It is in this dimension that the narration is most purely engaged in setting up an 
objective relation of self – presenting to the player her own enacted ludic subjectivity.  
 ii) Next, the narration also attributes character emotions to the player’s ludic-
subjective actions. Right after obtaining the Cael Hammer – the first weapon in the game 
– the Kid is presented with a clearing full of piles of rubbish that can be satisfyingly 
smashed with the hammer. At this point, the player might busy herself with doing 
precisely this – her motivation might be that of getting used to the game’s attack 
controls, or it might be simply that of taking joy in smashing things for no particular 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 It is tempting, in the context of this investigation, to read this as a literalization of the phenomenological 
tenet, which I have stressed throughout, regarding the status of the world being constituted in the subject’s 
perception of it. This, however, would almost certainly be a case of over-reading.  
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reason. However, the narrator has something to say even about this: if the player keeps it 
up long enough, he will interject by saying, “Kid just rages for a while.”  
 This is different from the first example, in that an emotional motive is attributed 
to the action which the player cannot identify as her own: as such, the register shifts into 
that of the objective relation of other. Even if the player were to relate to this emotion, it 
would still represent a case in which one has to “refer to game characters as Others or 
resort to the second-order structure of empathy when describing emotions in play” 
(Leino 2010, 219): as Zahavi puts it, “the experience you empathically understand 
remains that of the other” (2010, 291). The player might empathize with the Kid’s rage, 
but its ascription remains to the Kid: there is no self-ascription of the emotion by way of 
the ludic subject.  
 Of course, given the interrelation between the four aspects of the player-figure 
relation, it is entirely possible for such character emotions to be adopted in the vein of 
“vicarious experiences through character” (Marsh 2006, 197), and thereby to “bleed” into 
the ludic subjectivity of the player (Waern 2010, 5) – in this way, coming to influence the 
player’s own subjective standpoint towards the gameworld. Having heard the voice-over 
narration describe the Kid’s rage – and, putting herself in the Kid’s position, 
understanding his anger at seeing the world he knows destroyed – the player might elect 
to continue her destructive rampage under the influence of this empathetic rage. This is 
an equally essential dimension of ludic subjectivity, and highlights the hybridity inherent 
to the ludic subject, which – as I have already noted in section 6.2.1 – Kelly Boudreau 
has identified under the name of “hybrid-identity” (2012). However, for analytical 
purposes, it is necessary to keep this phenomenal structure distinct from that in which 
the player acts upon the gameworld on the basis of an intention she can ascribe directly 
to herself.  
 iii) At other points, the narration works to establish an alignment of field. When the 
player-as-the-Kid arrives at a fountain in a plaza, the narrator says, “Kid’s worked up 
quite a thirst by now, so that fountain looks real inviting.” Again, this would appear to be 
saying something relating to the perspective of the Kid as a distinct heterocosmic 
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individual, rather than the player’s standpoint as a ludic subject. However, the case is 
different here: what the narration is doing in this instant is alerting the player to the Kid’s 
subjective perception in order for the player to align her own perspectival focus with it.  
‘Alignment’ is here being used here in the sense in which Petri Lankoski uses the 
term to refer to a paralleling of the player’s perspective to the player-character (2011, 
302).18 Much as in the case of the example from Grim Fandango discussed above, where 
Manny’s gaze directs the player’s attention to follow it to the bottle of Scotch, this 
narratorial insight into the Kid’s subjective perspective will orient the player’s own gaze 
towards the fountain, highlighting it as a significant feature and thereby bringing it into 
the frame of her own ludic-subjective perspectival standpoint, and, as a result, into her 
construction of the game-as-lifeworld.  
 iii) Finally, the narrator also gives narrative context to the player’s actions and 
experiences. Arriving at an impressionistically-drawn scene of ruin, the player hears, “He 
sees what’s left of the Rippling Walls. Years of work undone in an instant. In the 
Calamity.” This category of narrative statements does not directly act to represent the 
enacted ludic subject; in fact, it provides information which is not available through any 
other channel to the ludic subject. In doing so, it establishes the context within which 
these actions are granted narrative significance. 
Bringing these together, then, the narration in Bastion performs four formal 
functions. It offers a representation of the player’s actions, presents character emotions, 
establishes an alignment of field between the player’s perspective and that of the playable 
figure, and offers narrative context to the player’s actions as ludic subject. As a textual 
technique, then, the narration in Bastion highlights, in a particularly foregrounded manner, 
the representational strategies by which the player’s enacted ludic subjectivity – in its 
first-personal mineness as a stream of experience – is incorporated into the textual 
presentation of the game’s unfolding. Not only is the player’s enacted ludic subjectivity 
represented to her as an object of perception, but this representation is incorporated into 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Lankoski’s usage of the notion of alignment has already been used once in this investigation, in the 
context of the analysis of Kentucky Route Zero in section 6.4. 
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a generic, cultural and iconographic context, presented, in aesthetic terms, as an intrinsic 
element in the unity of the game’s textual presentation. 
 
8.5 Conclusions 
 
This chapter has performed two of the most crucial tasks at the heart of this 
investigation. Firstly, taking up the insight obtained in Chapter 7 regarding the nature of 
the ludic subject-position as the determination of a mode of being-in-the-gameworld, it 
has demonstrated how the player’s taking-up of the ludic subject-position leads to the 
enactment of a ludic subjectivity, as a stream of direct, first-personal experience resulting 
from the player-as-ludic-subject’s engagement with the gameworld.  
 Secondly, this chapter also laid out the presentational mechanisms by which this 
enacted ludic subjectivity is represented to the player as an object of her own perception, 
thereby establishing a relation of autoscopy, or self-perception. This autoscopic structure 
results directly from the double perspectival structure of ludic engagement: it is this 
which allows the player an external perspective on her own subjectivity. As such, what 
the formal structure of the figure game offers is a literalization of the subjective 
processes of self-consciousness: the self here does not emerge through a reflective 
inward turn on the part of the subject, as per Sartre, or through a hermeneutic 
engagement with the discordant totality of one’s own actions and experiences, as Ricoeur 
would argue. Instead, the formal establishment of an external perspective does this work 
for the player, presenting her with a very literal image of herself-in-the-gameworld: one 
that, moreover, through being constructed in the language of the game’s stylistic      
The final chapter of this study shall now take precisely this meaningful textual 
and aesthetic unity of the represented ludic self as its object of focus. Following Ricoeur, 
I shall argue that it is the schema of ‘character’ that serves as the organizing principle by 
which the ludic self, as the autoscopic representation of the player’s enacted ludic 
subjectivity, is granted unity and coherence. As such, it is to the question of ‘character’ 
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and the bearing of the notion upon the question of ludic subjectivity that I shall now 
turn.  
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Chapter Nine 
Character and the ludic self 
 
In Chapter 8, this investigation arrived at a crucial juncture, and crystallized a theoretical 
understanding of a number of the key formal structures of the aesthetics of ludic 
subjectivity. In previous chapters, I had focused on the development of the 
phenomenology of ludic subjectivity as a determined mode of being-in-the-gameworld 
shaped by the mechanisms of ludic subject-positioning and taken on by the player. On 
that basis, I was then able to demonstrate, firstly, how the engagement with the 
gameworld through the frame of the ludic subject-position takes the form of the 
enactment of a ludic subjectivity, and secondly, how this enacted ludic subjectivity is 
represented to the player as a ludic self.  
 The conclusion that was reached was that this establishment of a ludic self – an 
‘I-in-the-gameworld’ that the player is able to perceive as ‘herself,’ in a relationship of 
autoscopy or self-perception – depends upon the representation of the player’s enacted 
ludic subjectivity on the textual level of the game’s presentation. There is one final task, 
then, that remains to be done in bringing this theorization of the aesthetics of ludic 
subjectivity to a close: namely, that of determining the form that is taken by this ludic self 
as a textual representation of the player’s enacted ludic subjectivity that is made available 
to her as an object of perception. 
 In section 8.2.3, I noted that it is to the notion of character that Paul Ricoeur 
turned when faced with the difficulty of accounting for the unity of the image of the self 
in self-perception (1992, 118). Accordingly, in this chapter, I shall make the same move: 
my argument is that it is in the notion of the ‘player-character’ that it is possible to 
identify the logic by which the ludic self is organized into a coherent unity as an element 
of the textual presentation of the game’s unfolding – thereby establishing an objective 
relation of self, and, as a result, an autoscopic aesthetic function. 
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 Before embarking on this final stage of the investigation, however, an important 
caveat needs to be made. At the start of this investigation, in section 1.2, I rejected both 
‘avatar’ and ‘character’ as terms to refer to the entity under the player’s control in the 
gameworld, opting instead for the neutral term ‘playable figure,’ as being able to 
encompass the multiple ontological aspects of this entity, subsuming the aspects 
addressed by ‘avatar’ and ‘character’ to a single concept. It might be objected that my 
taking up the term and the conceptuality of ‘character’ at this concluding stage of the 
analysis would seem to represent a pointed disavowal of this neutral stance by coming 
down, in the final analysis, on the ‘character’ side of the fence. 
 This is not what the arguments presented in this chapter are intended to convey. 
Firstly, the conceptuality of ‘character’ – as referring, as I shall argue below, to the 
textualized representation of a heterocosmic individual – is being invoked here not with 
respect to the playable figure, but to the ludic subject: the arguments I have presented 
regarding the distortions inherent in considering the playable figure solely through the 
conceptual lens of ‘character’ continue to hold. Secondly, this adoption of the 
terminology of character should not be understood as replacing, at the last minute, the 
conceptuality of ludic subjectivity which has been constructed throughout the course of 
this investigation. Rather, the point I wish to make is that it is according to the textual 
logic of ‘character’ that the representation of the player’s enacted ludic subjectivity – 
which was the focus of Chapter 8 – can be made to cohere into the unity of a ludic self. 
In other words, the conceptuality of ‘character’ as a formal device is being put in the 
service of clarifying the final movement of the aesthetics of ludic subjectivity – that of its 
textualization within the game’s multimodal presentation.  
 
9.1  “Character” in games 
The notion of ‘character’ is one that has been brought to the fore at several stages of this 
investigation. In section 6.1.3, player-character was discussed as one face of the two-sided 
ontology of the playable figure, in opposition to avatar.  There, I made the point that 
player-character describes the playable figure in its significance on the dimension of the 
	  361	  	  
ludic heterocosm, that is, as discussed in section 3.4.4, understood through the 
interpretative frame of the ‘game as heterocosm,’ while avatar describes the playable 
figure as a game component, that is, as laid out in section 3.4.4, in the meaning it holds 
within an understanding of the ‘game as system.’   
 The conceptuality of ‘character’ surfaced again, in a very different context, in 
section 8.2.3, where, as I have noted, it was employed by Ricoeur to define the logic by 
which the “discordance” of one’s moment-to-moment stream of experience can be 
resolved into a “concordance” on the basis of the identification of “the set of lasting 
dispositions by which a person is recognized” (1992, 121).  
 This chapter shall bring together, and build upon, these earlier insights into the 
notion of character as it applies to ludic subjectivity, specifically, in order to answer the 
question: in what way does the textual form of character give shape to the representation of a ludic self? 
However, this question can only be tackled on the basis of an understanding of the 
manner in which the conceptual schema of narrative – upon which the concept of 
‘character,’ after all, takes its place – applies to the form of the figure game that is this 
investigation’s domain of study. This, then, shall have to be the first step of this 
concluding analysis in my investigation. 
 
9.1.1 The narrative question 
Though this investigation has had recourse to narratological concepts on occasion – such 
as the deployment of the notion of focalization in section 4.1.3 (Genette 1980, 189; Bal 
1985, 102-110; Margolin 2009), and the tangential approaches to the subject of character 
which I have just discussed – I have, so far, largely sidestepped the direct addressing of 
the question of narrative as it applies to games, and the bearing it might have upon the 
aesthetics of ludic subjectivity. However, the shift of focus onto the question of 
character brings the discussion squarely onto the conceptual plane of narrative – as such, 
while a complete engagement with the debates surrounding the question of narrative in 
games (cf. Eskelinen 2001; 2012; Juul 2001; Aarseth 2004b; 2012; Ryan 2006; Calleja 
2011) is beyond the scope of this investigation, it is nonetheless necessary to devote 
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some space to the matter. The basic question that needs to be answered, then, is: in what 
way can the concept of narrative be brought to bear upon games as experienced in the 
process of ludic engagement?  
This is clearly a question which can only be answered on the basis of an 
understanding of the term ‘narrative,’ or, rather, of the specific meaning with which the 
term ‘narrative’ is to be employed. In this regard, the first thing that needs to be noted is 
that perhaps the dominant definition of ‘narrative’ within narratology – the field of the 
study of narrative, but one whose origins in literary theory often grants its approach a 
necessarily medium-specific slant – cannot be unproblematically applied to games 
without considerable modification. Gérard Genette, for instance, suggests that narrative 
discourse, which he takes as his object of study, is composed of three elements, which he 
refers to by the terms story, “the signified or narrative content,” narrative, “the signifier, 
statement, discourse or narrative text itself,” and narrating, “the producing narrative 
action,” that is, the act of telling (1980, 25). This is a framing of narrative which defines it 
as a purely verbal phenomenon: “any narrative […] is a linguistic production undertaking 
to tell of one or several events” (ibid., 30). 
In the same vein, Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan writes that “the term narration 
suggests (1) a communication process in which the narrative as message is transmitted by 
addresser to addressee and (2) the verbal nature of the medium used to transmit the 
message” (1983, 2-3). Again, in very similar terms, Gerald Prince defines narrative as: 
The recounting (as product and process, object and act, structure and 
structuration) of one or more real or fictional events communicated by one, two, 
or several (more or less overt) narrators to one, two, or several (more or less 
overt) narratees. (1987, 58)1 
Marie-Laure Ryan terms this the “speech-act approach to narrative” (2006, 5), being 
founded upon an understanding of narrative that requires an actual or implied narrative 
situation as an act of linguistic communication between the narrator and the receiver(s) of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 It is worth noting that, in the 2002 update to his dictionary of narratological terms, Prince rescinds this 
position and adopts a more general understanding of the concept of narrative. Nonetheless, it is this earlier 
definition which has continued to prove influential.  
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the narrative. Clearly, this restricted understanding of the term would exclude its usage, 
not only with respect to games, but also other media, such as comics, film and drama, 
which, in most cases, do not feature such an explicit narrative situation.2  
 Instead, Ryan, following H. Porter Abbott (2002, 16), adopts a model of 
narrative which understands its constitutive elements as being story and discourse (2006, 7). 
Story, for Ryan, is “a mental image, a cognitive construct that concerns certain types of 
entities and relations between these entities” (ibid.) – which she further elaborates on by 
arguing that a story has a spatial dimension (it “must be about a world populated by 
individuated existents”), a temporal dimension (“this world must be situated in time and 
undergo significant transformations”) and a mental dimension (“some of the participants 
in the events must be intelligent agents who have a mental life”) (ibid., 8).  
 Discourse, on the other hand, refers to the textualized presentation of this story, 
whether the medium of this presentation is verbal, visual or anything else. In other 
words, discourse refers to a unity of semiotic content (usually, but by no means 
necessarily, organized as a temporal sequence), which, in its aesthetic reception, is 
concertized in the form of a story. As per Ryan’s definition, this is a mental construct of 
a textually represented world, populated by existents that are granted implied subjective 
interiorities, and changing over time through undergoing a sequence of events. 
Moreover, as such a mental construct dependent upon the unity of its discursive 
presentation, ‘story’ itself implies an organization of its elements into a coherent, ordered 
unity, thereby fulfilling the criterion of the formal unity of the aesthetic object specified 
in section 2.1.3.   
Such an approach to the question of narrative has been employed with game 
studies – it is the foundation for Gordon Calleja’s notion of alterbiography (2011, 145), 
which I discussed in section 8.2.4, and also underlies Espen Aarseth’s development of a 
theory for a “shared ludo-narrative design space” (2012, 2). Moreover, it is necessary for 
me to make clear, at this stage, how much this investigation up to this point has implicitly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 It is, of course, possible for all these media to make use of the structure of the narrative situation – for 
instance, through the usage of voice-over narration in film. It would not ring true, however, to suggest that 
it is only in such situations that one can speak of narrative in non-literary medialities. 
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been leaning upon precisely such an understanding of narrative, without bringing the 
matter to the fore. 
Firstly, in deploying the notion of the ludic heterocosm (see section 3.4.4) to 
refer to the gameworld in its representational dimension – or, more accurately, to the 
represented world referred to by the game system and the complete set of semiotic 
information whose presentation it structures – what I have been talking about is precisely 
what Ryan identifies as the spatial dimension of story.3 Secondly, in the discussion of the 
ludic subject and its enactment within the gameworld, including in its heterocosmic 
dimension, I have of course been discussing the consciousness of at least one “intelligent 
agent”. Finally, even the temporal dimension has come into view in the consideration, in 
Chapter 8, of the enactment of the ludic subject as being the result of the sequence of 
the player’s actions in, and experiences of, the gameworld. 
A final point needs to be made regarding the question of narrative, understood in 
this way, and its relation to the double perspectival structure of ludic engagement 
discussed in section 2.4 – it is in this relation that the vital role to be played in this 
investigation by the notions of narrative, and, more specifically, of character, can come 
into view. From the internal perspective, the player, as a ludic subject 
phenomenologically embodied as a member of the gameworld, has first-personal 
experience of playing out a subjective existence within that domain – framing its objects 
in intentional acts of perception, exercising her “I can” in view of her existential projects, 
and so on. From the external perspective, on the other hand, what the player perceives is 
a translation of the events, actions and situations to which her first-order subjective 
consciousness of being-in-the-gameworld relates into discourse,4 in the form (most 
commonly) of a temporal sequence of audiovisual presentation.5 The result of this is that 
the textual discourse in which the game presents itself to the player in her external 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 This, of course, was already evident in my usage of Ryan’s theorization of the narrative world (2001a, 91) 
in defining the ontology of the ludic heterocosm.  
4 Here, one could recall Aarseth’s theorization of the surface-level production of the cybertext, in any 
single given actualization or traversal, as a semiotic sequence of “scriptons” (1997, 62).  
5 Though, of course, it could also be, as in the case of text-based adventure games, such as Adventure 
(Crowther and Woods 1976) translated into linguistic discourse.  
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standpoint outside the game constructs the player’s enactment of a ludic subjectivity in 
the gameworld as the story it refers to, meaning that the conceptual framework of ‘story’ 
– implying, as Ryan notes, an ordered unity on the levels of spatiality and temporality, a 
“unified causal chain” of events leading to some form of “closure,” and so on – is 
superimposed upon the player’s first-order experience of being-in-the-gameworld as a 
ludic subject, granting it the same qualities of order, unity and meaningfulness. 
 
9.1.2 ‘Character’ as the unity of representation of the ludic self 
As I argued in section 6.1.3, though the notion of character is one that is frequently 
encountered in game studies’ engagement with the playable figure, there is little 
agreement, either on the relevance of the term in this context, or even on what it should 
mean when applied to the playable figure. For every theory that player agency can be 
made to cohere to the nature of a predetermined character through the shaping of 
“dramatic agency” (Murray 2005), one finds a counter-reaction stating that the nature of 
the figure as a vehicle for player agency renders notions of character irrelevant: it “just 
becomes a “cursor” for the player’s actions” (Frasca 2001, 2), being understood purely in 
instrumental terms as a set of tools to be deployed by the player (Newman 2002). To 
this, in turn, is opposed the objection that “the steerable thing being discussed is a 
character, with an anthropomorphic nature and a character's place within the interactive 
fiction world” (Montfort 2007, 141). More recently, the discussion has taken new 
inflections in Kristine Jørgensen’s outlining of the conflict between player agency and the 
constraints of a fixed, predetermined character (2010), or Clara Fernández-Vara’s 
signaling of a radical split between player and character (2011).	  
 By and large, in the cases where the term ‘character’ does bear a specific, defined 
meaning in the conceptual schema of the playable figure (rather than simply being used 
to define the figure itself), it is located as one side of the duality Rune Klevjer highlights 
between avatar and character (2006, 116; 2012, 17). By this definition, then, ‘character’ 
would refer to the status of the playable figure as “an entity constituted separately from 
the player” (Bayliss 2007a, 2):  the distinct identity of the character “sets them apart from 
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the player, emphasizing the gap between character and player” (Fernández-Vara 2011, 
13). It is worth recalling here the consternation faced by players of Crysis (Crytek 2007) in 
Kristine Jørgensen’s study – already mentioned in section 6.1.1 – when the playable 
figure suddenly begins to speak in his own voice, thereby giving “the impression of 
suddenly turning from being completely controlled by the player into being an individual 
and autonomous being with a will of his own” (2009, 3). In order to contextualize this 
discussion within the schema of the player-figure relation which has been concretized in 
the model proposed in section 6.3, then, I shall note that the notion of ‘character’ has 
tended to be used to refer to the attribution of an identity status of ‘other’ to the playable 
figure: it is a character insofar as it is not myself. 
 Against the background of the understanding of narrative as it relates to the 
double perspectival structure of ludic engagement, however, the usage of the notion of 
‘character’ here must diverge on a fundamental level from this dominant usage. 
According to this understanding, ‘character’ refers to the textualized representation of 
my being-in-the-gameworld as a ludic subject: it is the objectification, on the level of 
discourse of the game’s semiotic presentation – whether this is audiovisual, or verbal, or 
otherwise – of my first-order subjective consciousness of the gameworld, which, by this 
very act of discursive presentation, becomes available to me as a meaningful unity.   	  
 In other words, ‘character’ refers not to the playable figure, but to the unity into 
which the representation of the player’s ludic subjectivity is shaped as seen from the 
objective, external perspective. It is the representation, in the game’s textual discourse, of 
an individual in the gameworld, whether I take this individual to be ‘I-in-the-gameworld’ 
(the objective relation of self) or a heterocosmic individual who is distinct from me (the 
objective relation of other) – or even, as is more likely, if these two perspectives 
interrelate and bleed into each other, giving rise to composite entities that are both self 
and other, such as (to give some examples I have focused on in earlier chapters) I-as-
Conway, I-as-Garrett, I-as-Manny-Calavera, or I-as-the-Kid.	  
Thus, the approach I shall take in applying the question of character to ludic 
engagement must differ from Calleja’s argument – with respect to the two dimensions of 
	  367	  	  
the alterbiography of self and the alterbiography of an entity, which I discussed in section 8.2.4, 
that “the generation of alterbiography can feature the character as a separate entity 
controlled by the player or can be considered as being about the player in the world” 
(2011, 125, emphasis added). The textual representation of an individual in the game’s 
presentation is not a character if and only if I do not identify him or her as myself; the 
figure as available in the game’s textualization of my enacted ludic subjectivity is a 
character even if I identify him or her as myself. 
I shall give an example. A player of The Elder Scrolls V: Skyrim (Bethesda 2011) 
might choose to create a playable figure who bears as close a physical resemblance to her 
as possible, giving it her own name and granting it statistical attributes that match up to 
her own self-perception: considering herself to be intelligent but not in particularly good 
physical shape, for example, she might create a magic-using figure with a high 
intelligence value, but low strength. She might, then, fully embrace the resulting figure as 
‘herself-in-the-gameworld’, proceeding to perform actions within the gameworld that are 
consistent with the habits and “lasting dispositions” (Ricoeur 1992, 121) that constitute 
her own answer to the question, “Who am I?”  
However, even in a case such as this, what the player sees on-screen is no less a 
character than Lara Croft or Manny Calavera. It is still the representation of an individual 
in the heterocosm, composed within the sequence of audiovisual presentation the player 
is witness to from the external perspective as a textual entity – that is, as an organized 
accretion of semiotic cues that is gathered up in its reference to a distinct, individuated 
figure.  
Conversely, even when the player is engaging with a playable figure with a rigidly 
determined identity distinct from her own – as in the case of Lara Croft or Manny 
Calavera, it is still the case, as I argued in section 8.1.1, that, in the moment of ludic 
engagement, the player takes proprioceptive ownership of her actions in the gameworld 
as the playable figure. She still has internal consciousness of the actions and experiences 
pertaining to the embodied subjectivity of the playable figure as her own; as such, in 
	  368	  	  
subjective terms, the being-in-the-gameworld she sees represented on-screen remains her 
own at the same time as it bears the mark of a distinct identity.  
Thus – insofar as what the objective relation frames is the same playable figure to 
which the player engages in a subjective relation – what is at play is always, to some 
degree, an objective relation of self. This is the core insight that brings into view what I 
have termed, following Stephan Günzel (2013), the autoscopic aesthetic function 
established by the form of the figure game, which allows the player’s lived and enacted 
ludic subjectivity to be represented as the image of a ludic self that is organized according 
to the logical principles of narrative, on the levels of both story and discourse, within 
which its status as a character locates it. 
	  
9.2 The two senses of ‘character’	  
	  
If the notion of ‘character’ therefore constitutes the unifying principle of the textual 
presentation of the ludic self, then the importance of more fully theorizing what is 
involved in the notion becomes apparent. However, the theorization of character 
presents a particular difficulty. At first glance, characters – those represented individuals 
routinely encountered, not only in games, but also in novels and short stories, on TV, on 
stage or at the cinema – are “so familiar a phenomenon that they do not seem to require 
closer inspection” (Eder et al. 2010, 3).	  
On the other hand, literary theory in particular has, for some time, recognized 
that “once they are subject to closer scrutiny, characters prove to be highly complex 
objects” (ibid.) – and this is before we consider the additional levels of complexity 
resulting from the idiosyncrasies of the familiar notion of character operating within the 
aesthetic form of the figure game, and, particularly, from the entanglement of the player-
character in the multi-dimensional lines of influence that constitute the player-figure 
relation. In order to highlight the implications of the notion of character upon the 
constitution of the aesthetics of ludic subjectivity, then, it is necessary to develop a more 
rigorous theory of what the notion implies.   
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9.2.1 Character as a heterocosmic individual 
As is often the case, there is no better starting-point than the common-sense 
understanding of the term. In this sense, as I have just noted, ‘character’ refers to the 
lifelike, possibly extremely engaging people we ‘encounter’ in our reading of a novel, our 
viewing of a film, our playing of a game, in much the same way as we would encounter a 
person in the street or at a café. By this understanding, ‘character’ designates a person – a 
human6 individual endowed not only with the outward appearance of personhood, but 
also with the “mental dimension” Ryan attributes as being necessary to the existents in a 
story (2006, 8).   
 It is this understanding of character that is invoked when James Phelan writes 
that “characters are images of possible people” (1989, 2), and when Uri Margolin defines 
a character as a “possible non-actual individual” (1990, 844).7 The implications of this 
deceptively simple definition are more fully unpacked in Margolin’s earlier explanation: 
“Character” or “person” in narrative will be understood as designating a human 
or human-like individual, existing in some possible world […] a Narrative Agent 
(=NA) to whom inner states, mental properties (traits, features) or complexes of 
such properties (personality models) can be ascribed on the basis of textual data. 
(1986, 205). 
However, at the same time as these formulations highlight the fact that, in the reception 
of the work, a character appears first and foremost as a person, they also complicate this 
basic understanding of the nature of character. This is revealed in Phelan’s statement that 
characters are not simply “possible people,” but “images of possible people” (emphasis 
added), and likewise, in Margolin’s point that the properties of an individual can only be 
perceived “on the basis of textual data”. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Or, at any rate, to some degree anthropomorphic, in consciousness if not in physical form.  
7 “Non-actual” in this case refers, of course, to the position of the work’s recipient in an external 
standpoint. Recalling the notion of recentering discussed in section 4.3, it is pertinent to note that, once the 
recipient of the work adopts a subjective standpoint internal to the heterocosm, then the character-as-
heterocosmic-individual is, from her standpoint, very much actual.  
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The problem presented by the constitution of character, then, takes its shape 
from the gap that opens up between the impression received by the reader, viewer, 
audience or player of a living, breathing individual, and the reality that, if one were to 
attempt to pinpoint any concrete ontological existence for this individual, one would 
come up only with a limited set of textual signs. 
 
9.2.2 Character as textuality 
This duality in the meaning of the term ‘character’ has, unsurprisingly, led to a duality in 
theoretical approaches. As Henriette Heidbrink writes, there exists: 
…a continuum between  ›abstraction‹ and ›concretion‹, whereas the first pole 
stands for the medial material, the text, the signs, or the structures of the medial 
product and the second pole stands for the character that is via reception perceived 
as a humanlike entity with a coherent self including an individual personality 
(2010, 72). 
Heidbrink argues that a debate has taken shape along the lines of this dichotomy, 
between what she terms “humanistic” positions that focus on the analysis of characters 
as individuals that can, for critical purposes, be considered independently of the text, and 
those grouped under the banner of “formalists, structuralists and semioticians” (ibid., 
73), who dismiss this impression of a human individual as an extraneous accretion to a 
set of semiotic data, and, as a result, develop a perspective according to which characters 
“dissolve into textuality”, in Rimmon-Kenan’s phrase (1983, 31).	  
This dichotomy can be summarized, in semiotic terms, as one between an idea of 
character as a signifier and as a signified. Rimmon-Kenan puts it succinctly when she says 
the distinction is between understanding characters as “words” or as “people” (ibid.). It 
is in the apparently paradoxical co-presence of both understandings that the true 
ontological nature of character is to be found. The irreducible individuality of character 
as a possible non-actual individual, marked out by the proper name as its symbol, as well 
as by the essential nature that name stands for (Genette 1980, 246), is an illusion 
constructed through an accumulation of textual signs, and, in understanding the nature 
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of character, its “verbal surface” is as crucial as the “suggestion and imitation of human 
life” it establishes (Price 1983, 57). 	  
As such, it is in the apparently paradoxical co-presence of both understandings 
that the true ontological nature of character is to be found. The impression of a human 
individual can only be understood in the light of the system of signifiers out of which it 
is generated, and the same set of signifiers only makes sense with reference to the total 
impression towards which it is oriented. Put in a different way, and to return to 
Heidbrink’s terms: a hard-line humanist position cannot hope to get very far in its 
consideration of the human individual that emerges from the text apparently fully-
formed and walking on its own two feet without considering the semiotic foundation on 
which this impression is built. Equally problematically, a dogmatic structuralist-semiotic 
approach runs the risk of missing the wood for the trees. Given that a set of semiotic 
elements within a text can only be grouped under the unifying aegis of a ‘character’ if the 
individual signs are, in the first place, recognized as pointing towards the same figure, 
then such a figure (to which one can only apply the label of a human individual, albeit 
not necessarily an actual one) must have been posited, and kept in mind, during the act 
of reading. A purely semiotic approach would thus be guilty of the a posteriori erasure of a 
unified figure that must necessarily have been already established in the act of reading for 
that reading to have taken place. It is in this light that, to use the terms suggested by 
Phelan, a character is both mimetic, a (re)presentation of a possible person, and 
synthetic, a textual construct constituted of signs (1989, 2).8 	  
  
9.3 A semiotic-structural model of the player-character	  
 
It is apparent enough, however, that in its basic constitution, a ‘character,’ if one were to 
adopt a bottom-up textual-analytical approach, is a semiotic construct, a figure that 
emerges through the accretion of a set of textual signifiers. It is necessary, then, to found 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Phelan also introduces a third quality – thematic – to refer to character’s status as textual elements 
performing a signifying function within the work as a whole – but this is less directly relevant to our 
current concerns. 
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an ontological understanding of the player-character, at the most radical level, on an 
identification of the signifying elements out of which it is accrued. 
 
9.3.1 Two existing approaches to the theorization of the player-character	  
It is hard to locate, within game studies, a rigorous theoretical framework by which such 
a task can be achieved. As with any rule, of course, exceptions exist: a survey of the 
relevant literature reveals two models that can be employed in orienting this investigation 
towards the task of achieving such an ontological understanding of the player-character. 
These are the approaches to the player-character proposed by Fernández-Vara (2011) 
and Lankoski, Heliö and Ekman (2003); I shall consider these below.	  
Fernández-Vara suggests a list of the “identity markers” of the player-characters 
as being “name, image, animation, speech, backstory” (2011, 10). While this is a start in 
determining the constitution of the player-character as a textual entity, it does not go far 
enough in taxonomizing the various avenues by which characterization might occur, nor 
does it account for the specificities of the character in question in its association with a 
playable figure under the player’s control. 
This was precisely the difficulty tackled by Lankoski, Heliö and Ekman in their 
attempt to analyze the constitution of player-characters (2003). Starting with reference to 
Rimmon-Kenan’s discussion of the nature of literary characters, their model attempts to 
expand the understanding of the methods by which the determination of character can 
also occur through game-specific means, suggesting the ways in which the ‘player’ side of 
the dual term ‘player-character’ must reshape the understanding of ‘character’. In this 
regard, their insights are invaluable, and shall be drawn upon throughout the course of 
this chapter. At the same time, however, non-ludic modes of characterization are 
bracketed and set aside from the main thrust of their analysis, missing the potential to 
arrive at a unified understanding of the specification of player-characters that fully 
integrates all possible avenues of characterization available to games as a hybrid form 
that also incorporates non-ludic medialities.   
	  373	  	  
What is necessary, then, is a model that weds Fernández-Vara’s taxonomical 
approach towards the semiotic aggregation of the character’s textuality to Lankoski, 
Heliö and Ekman’s acknowledgment of the player’s role in the constitution and 
determination of this textual whole. It is with this aim in mind that I propose a new 
semiotic-structural model of the player-character in its textual dimension.  
 
9.3.2 Margolin and the taxonomy of “characterization statements” 
The model of characterization that I shall use as the foundation and starting-point in this 
endeavour is that proposed by Margolin (1986). According to his model, the basic 
building-blocks of character, on the textual level, are what he terms characterization 
statements (ibid., 206). A characterization statement (hereinafter CS) is a textual cue from 
which some attribute or trait pertaining to a character can be inferred. As the reader 
engages with a text, she will encounter a sequence of CSs for any given character, and 
will interpret each CS as an insight into some aspect or trait of the character in question. 
Margolin refers to this process of “the ascription of individual mental traits” or factual 
attributes to a textual individual on the basis of an inference from a CS as characterization 
(ibid.).  
A character is therefore always a product of a second-order process of 
signification – Margolin notes that a “character or person is a signified, for which some 
other textual elements serve as signifiers” (ibid.). Moreover, the inferential nature of 
characterization reveals a considerable level of ambiguity at work. Most CSs 
accommodate multiple readings – different, perhaps even directly contradictory, 
character attributes can be inferred from the same CS depending on how it is interpreted 
by the reader. This is the point made by Roland Barthes in his influential reading of 
Honoré de Balzac’s Sarrasine: 
To read is to struggle to name, to subject the sentences of a text to a semantic 
transformation. This transformation is erratic; it consists in hesitating among 
several names: if we are told that Sarrasine had ‘one of those strong wills that knows no 
obstacle’, what are we to read? will, energy, obstinacy, stubbornness, etc.? (1974, 92)   
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Since character is not explicitly given by the text, but must instead be constructed by the 
reader out of a potentially scant aggregate of semiotic cues, it makes little practical sense 
to speak of the character existing as a character – that is, as a possible individual – in the 
text. It is better to conceive of character as a mental construct arrived at by the reader, 
built up piece by piece, in puzzle-like fashion, through the gradual accumulation of CSs – 
to return to the discussion on aesthetic theory in section 2.1, a “concretization”, in 
Roman Ingarden’s term (1985).  
This is the process that Margolin terms character-building, which “consists of a 
succession of individual operations of characterization, together with second order 
activities of continual patterning and repatterning of the traits obtained in the first order 
operations, until a fairly coherent constellation or trait paradigm has been arrived at” 
(1986, 206). As Rimmon-Kenan puts it, “if a common denominator, e.g. ambivalence, 
emerges from several aspects, it can then be generalized as a character-trait, and in a 
similar way the various traits combine to form the character” (1983, 38). The result of 
this is that “character can be seen as a tree-like hierarchical structure in which elements 
are assembled in categories of increasing integrative power” (ibid., 37). 
Margolin’s next step is to offer a taxonomy of the possible categories of CSs, 
thereby mapping out the semiotic foundations upon which the hierarchical signifying 
structure of character is established. A caveat is necessary: the very term Margolin 
chooses – character statement – implies a linguistic frame of reference. It describes a 
mediality of character according to which information about the non-actual individual in 
question is to be gleaned from linguistic propositions, whether this is in the form of 
direct statements of a character’s attributes, or – as would be much more often the case – 
through making inferences regarding the character’s nature on the basis of statements 
regarding their actions. As such, Margolin’s taxonomy must be modified to fit the 
specificities of the player-character – not only through taking into account the fact that 
games, as “integrated crossmedia packages” (Aarseth 2012, 2), set in motion a polymodal 
semiotic presentation that can include visual, verbal, aural as well as purely ludic signs, 
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but also, as Lankoski, Heliö and Ekman do, taking into account the role of the player in 
the determination of the textual unity constituting the player-character. 
Nonetheless, Margolin’s basic distinction between three categories of CSs – static 
mimetic elements, dynamic mimetic elements and formal textual patterns – provides this 
investigation with a solid initial stepping-stone in coming to terms with, and attempting 
to arrive at a comprehensive categorization of, the complete span of modes of CSs 
games afford in relation to their player-character/s and, therefore, of the expressive 
capacity of the player-character as an aesthetic figure.  
It is to the task of formulating such a categorization that I shall now turn. 
Though reference will also be made to a range of other games and player-characters, this 
categorization shall be framed through a close analysis of the player-characters in The 
Last of Us (Naughty Dog 2013) and Gone Home (The Fullbright Company 2013). The Last 
of Us was chosen as an example of a game whose high production values and adherence 
to the medial and generic conventions of audiovisual narrative result in a highly specified 
player-character constituted of a dense, multi-medial network of CSs. By way of contrast, 
Gone Home was selected in order to provide an opposite case, where the player-character 
is minimally specified and, if it is to emerge as a character at all, requires far more in 
terms of reconstruction on the reader’s part. As such, these two case studies will allow 
for the development of a structural model in the light of radically divergent approaches 
towards the semiotic construction of the player-character. 
 
9.4 Static mimetic elements 
 
In Margolin’s classification of CSs, static mimetic elements refers to statements regarding 
fixed (or relatively fixed) facts regarding a character, including “name, appearance, 
customs, habits, man-made and natural setting or environment” (1986, 206). Of course, 
with respect to a literary character, these elements might change drastically over the 
course of a narrative. How much that is true of Jane Eyre at the start of Charlotte 
Brontë’s novel, as a ten-year-old living in the Reed household, remains true of Jane Eyre, 
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the experienced, financially independent woman at the novel’s end? The same is true of 
player-characters in games, who are capable of undergoing radical transformation over 
the course of a playthrough while remaining, recognizably, the same character. For 
example, Jodie Holmes in Beyond: Two Souls (Quantic Dream 2013) is glimpsed (and 
played) at various stages in her life: as a toddler, a young girl, a teenager and a young 
woman. In between these scenes, many of the static mimetic elements undergo radical 
shifts: her appearance changes, her costumes are different, her environment – and the 
role she plays within it – vary, and so on. Moreover, with specific reference to the 
category of static mimetic elements that are termed “ludic elements” below, we can note 
that “character development” as a game mechanic is a defining feature of the role-playing 
game genre. This demonstrates the fact that the mutability of player-characters is itself an 
accepted trope, and that the usage of the term static mimetic elements no more implies a 
rigidly unchanging nature for player-characters than it does for literary characters – 
contrary to Frasca’s suggestion that “most videogame characters would be flat” (2001, 1), 
a reference to the novelist E.M. Forster’s definition of flat characters as those that “do 
not change throughout the course of the work” (2002[1927], 104).  
With that caveat out of the way, I shall propose a subdivision of static mimetic 
elements associated with the player-character into three categories. Represented elements 
shall refer to CSs delivered through audiovisual or linguistic signs attached to the figure 
in question. The category of contextual elements covers CSs that convey information 
regarding the character’s place in their environment. Finally, mechanical elements describes 
the set of CSs which can be inferred from the properties of the figure as a game 
component, that is, as an entity within the game system.  
 
9.4.1 Represented elements 
i) Name 
A player-character’s name is often the first CS a player encounters. It can reveal the 
individual’s gender and, to a considerable extent, their socio-cultural background – 
“Mario”, for instance, signals the iconic plumber’s Italian ethnicity. A character’s name 
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can also bear symbolic significance, being used to highlight important traits or attributes, 
or to reveal the character’s function in the narrative – think of how Gordon Freeman’s 
surname in Half-Life 2 (Valve, 2004) signals his role as the “free man”, striving for 
humanity’s freedom in the face of the oppressive Combine occupation. 
In Gone Home, the name Kaitlin Greenbriar (or its shortened form, Katie) lets us 
know that the character is female, and probably of Anglo-Saxon descent – an ethnicity 
that, in the context of the US in the 1990s, suggests, at the very least, the strong 
possibility of a life of upper- or middle-class privilege. As a derivative of “Catherine”, 
Katie’s given name shares the Greek etymological root καθαρός (katharos), meaning 
“pure” – a fact which, if one were etymologically minded, might colour one’s initial 
impression of the kind of person she is. By contrast, in The Last of Us, the given name 
Joel – no surname is ever provided – seems to purposely reveal little about the game’s 
protagonist, apart from a down-to-earth everyman quality. The lack of a surname – a 
quality which extends to all the non-player characters in the game, all of whom are 
referred to only by their first name – can also be interpreted as communicating the 
dissolution of societal structures in the game’s post-apocalyptic setting.   
ii) Physical appearance 
Along with the name, the player-character’s physical appearance is often what constitutes 
the first impression of the textual individual that the player is encountering. With regard 
to our case studies, physical appearance plays a greater role in The Last of Us than it does 
in Gone Home. Given the latter’s first-person perspective, combined with the slightly 
disconcerting lack of mirrors in the Greenbriar family home, the only images of Katie 
that the player receives are her passport photograph (see Fig. 9.1) and the family portrait 
hanging in the entrance hall (see Fig. 9.2). Apart from locating her, thanks to her 
hairstyle, in the game’s period setting, these two images are most notable for their 
pointedly mundane quality, which aligns with Gone Home’s general stylistic direction. In 
The Last of Us, Joel’s appearance – full beard, weathered features, slim but muscular build, 
slightly graying hair, hard, clear eyes – gives the player more to go on (see Fig. 9.3). It is 
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Figure 9.1 Gone Home: Katie’s passport on the inventory screen 
 
Figure 9.2 Gone Home: The family portrait. Katie is in the centre at the back 
 
Figure 9.3 The Last of Us: Joel framed in a cut-scene 
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easy to detect an earthy, no-nonsense, stereotypical masculinity. It is just as easy to gain 
the impression of an individual who bears the mark of long suffering, who has been 
shaped by having to survive in his harsh, post-apocalyptic conditions, and whose best 
years are behind him.    
iii) Costume/s 
Lisbeth Klastrup and Susana Pajares Tosca have applied fashion theory to their study of 
players’ choices when clothing their avatar in World of Warcraft (Blizzard Entertainment 
2003), noting that “the way our characters look is important to us,” being able to signal 
the player’s status, group allegiances and individual style (2008, 4). Though this study was 
focused on the social role of costume in WoW’s multiplayer environment, its central 
insight – that the outfit worn by a playable figure can serve (indeed, can hardly choose 
but function as) a rich layer of signification – is one that can be extended to the playable 
figures of single-player games. Costume can signal the character’s belonging to a 
particular social group, nationality, organization or historical period – whatever gender, 
race and appearance the player chooses for Shepard in Mass Effect (Bioware 2007), for 
instance, he or she wears the uniform of the SSV Normandy. Clothes can also highlight a 
character’s adherence to a particular subculture – Ben in Full Throttle (LucasArts 1995), 
with his biker’s leather jacket and boots, is the perfect example – or associate a character 
with a familiar set of cultural or generic iconography, as, for instance, Manny’s white 
smoking-jacket and black tie in the Year Two passage of Grim Fandango (LucasArts 1998) 
makes specific reference to Rick (Humphrey Bogart)’s outfit in Casablanca (Curtiz 1942). 
Joel’s plain, utilitarian work clothes associate perfectly with the masculinity of his 
physical appearance, adding to the impression of an individual who is oriented towards 
manual labour and physical action, and who gets his hands dirty: their worn, stained 
nature also suggests having lived through hard times. Finally, his clothes also associate 
him with the Western genre, further adding to the conglomerate of CSs which mark him 
out with such familiar – indeed, cliché – attributes as “masculine”, “tough” and “stoic”. 
On the other hand, what little we see of Katie’s outfits in Gone Home – in the family 
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portrait, she is wearing a plain, formal black dress – provides us with little on which to 
base a CS. 
iv) Voice 
If a character speaks, independently of what they say, the nature of their voice – its 
physical qualities, any traces of an accent, vocal tics or habitual mode of speaking – can 
constitute a CS. Mario’s cheerful disposition and Italian accent, at least since he was first 
voiced in Super Mario 64 (Nintendo 1996), are major elements in his characterization, 
even on the basis of only a handful of phrases; meanwhile, in Thief: The Dark Project 
(Looking Glass 1998), it is Garrett’s frequent, characteristically gravel-voiced 
interjections that constitute one of the primary avenues of characterization.  
Katie’s only vocal utterance in the game is the message she leaves on the family’s 
answering machine: this message is played at the start of the game, and is played again if 
the player chooses to listen through the messages stored on the answering machine. Her 
voice seems upbeat – she speaks rapidly and confidently. With The Last of Us, Joel’s gruff, 
often mumbled vocal delivery emphasizes a reserved, somewhat introverted disposition – 
and we might be tempted to also detect a resigned weariness, which would chime with 
Joel’s haggard appearance.   
v) Animations 
As Westecott notes, player-characters possess a pre-determined “constrained gesture set” 
(2009, 5), and the nature of this gesture set can affect the player’s perception of the 
character to a great degree. The same action can be interpreted as revealing radically 
different character traits depending on how it is animated. Mario’s joyful leap in Super 
Mario 64 and Nathan Drake’s athletic but desperate, edge-grabbing scramble in Uncharted: 
Drake’s Fortune (Naughty Dog 2007) might animate what is, at heart, the same ludic 
action, but the difference in the attendant animation results in the action registering as a 
very different CS in the respective cases.    
Once again, animations are not a factor at all in Gone Home. However, in The Last 
of Us, Joel’s animations serve to reinforce many of the characteristics suggested by his 
physical appearance. His movements are heavy and deliberate, revealing a steady, 
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meticulous character, but also one who performs actions swiftly, decidedly and 
forcefully. The gruesomeness of the animations whenever Joel performs a violent action 
– such as strangling a human enemy, or smashing a clicker’s face in with a brick – are 
equally significant. One can read “confidence” and “experience” in the efficiency of the 
actions, and, in their cold brutality, also an indication of a character who has grown 
desensitized to the violence that is necessary for his survival. 
 
9.4.2 Contextual elements 
i) Possessions 
The generally strictly-delimited set of objects a player-character has in their possession – 
either at the start of the game, or later on – can also be used as the vehicle for CSs. In 
Beyond Good & Evil (Ubisoft 2003), for example, Jade’s possession of a camera 
metonymically indicates her journalistic professional background. This applies both to 
objects that are modeled as meaningful components within the game system, that can be 
picked up, used, carried in the character’s inventory or be otherwise interacted with (what 
Aki Järvinen would term “components-of-self” (2008, 64)), and also to objects which are 
not part of the game system, and would, in Espen Aarseth’s terms, be considered “extra-
ludic” (2012, 3): as I argued in section 3.4.4, both categories of objects gain equal footing 
on the ontological plane of the ludic heterocosm, and, since this is the plane upon which 
an ontology of character is founded, both can convey CSs as long as they are in some 
way associated with the character in question. In Deus Ex: Human Revolution (Eidos 
Montreal 2011), for example, the books lining the shelves of player-character Adam 
Jensen’s apartment, even though they are, in game-systemic terms, little more than a 
texture on the wall, act as a particularly effective exposition for Jensen’s interests and 
preoccupations. 
At the beginning of Gone Home, the only objects in Katie’s inventory are her 
passport and her flight ticket. Both items – together with the travel bag laid on the porch 
in front of her feet at the game’s opening – serve to contextualize her arrival at her 
family’s new home after a long period of absence, filling in the details of a year spent 
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traveling around Europe. We might also wish to read these as indications of an 
adventurous, open-minded personality. Joel’s possessions, on the other hand, are 
comparatively scant, and constitute only what is necessary for survival in the hostile post-
apocalyptic environment – a flashlight, a gun, a limited supply of ammunition. Again, the 
indication here is of an individual who, whether by natural inclination, by the demands of 
his situation, or by some combination of both, eschews anything but the bare necessities 
of survival.   
ii) Environment 
Much can be gleaned regarding a character based on the physical setting in which, by 
necessity or by choice, they find themselves. The idyllic, Arcadian milieu of Hyrule 
reveals as much about Link in The Legend of Zelda: A Link to the Past (Nintendo 1991) as 
the opening tour of the Black Mesa Research Facility in Half-Life (Valve 1998) tells us 
about the kind of life led by Gordon Freeman. This is particularly true of games which 
allow the player to explore their character’s home: Heavy Rain (Quantic Dream 2010), for 
example, uses domestic spaces as an efficient means of conveying its player-characters’ 
lifestyle, habits and preoccupations. Ethan Mars’ personal crisis following the death of 
his son and his separation from his wife is expressed through a contrast between the 
bright, airy, clean-lined home he lives in at the start of the game, and the dingy, 
disorganized tenement he moves into after the incident.  
At face value, Gone Home is a game entirely about Katie returning home – 
however, due to her family having moved house during her time in Europe, the house 
she is returning to is not, strictly speaking, her own. The room prepared for her is still 
unlived-in, full of stacked-up boxes still to be unpacked. This frames Katie’s traversal of 
the house as an exploration of an unknown milieu, rather than as the titular 
homecoming. Importantly, this aligns her unfamiliarity and curiosity about the space with 
the player’s own, making it easier for the player to inhabit the subject-position she 
represents. At the same time, this dissociation from her family home can also itself be 
read as a CS, revealing her traveler’s alienation from the once-familiar setting she has 
returned to. 
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At the start of The Last of Us, the environment Joel has to exist in – the military-
policed quarantine zone, with its strict rations and regulations, and the dangerous ruined 
city that surrounds it, ridden with armed bandits and with the infected – contextualizes 
much of what we have read into Joel’s own representation, making more sense of his 
weathered appearance, his utilitarian clothes and possessions, his weary voice and his 
determination.  
iii) Role 
What is the character’s role in their environment? Here we might consider such factors 
as a character’s job or profession, their belonging to organizations or groups of any kind, 
and the relations between the character and non-player characters (NPCs). 
As a college-age young woman from what appears to be a reasonably affluent 
family, Katie’s decision to take a gap year and travel around Europe instantly frames her 
– however right or wrong this framing might be – as a recognizable stereotype. It signals 
“adventurousness”, but in a predictable, conventionalized gesture. More interesting are 
her relationships to the members of her family. I have already touched on Katie’s 
alienation from her family resulting from her time away – though the postcards found 
throughout the house mark an effort to retain contact, and the personal comments 
addressed to individual members of the family suggest intimacy and a keen observer’s 
eye. Moreover, Katie appears to play the role of a confidant to her younger sister Sam, 
who trusts her enough to share her deepest secrets and feelings with her, even while she 
conceals these same feelings from their parents. 
At the start of the game, the player learns that Joel is a smuggler, working within 
a criminal underground to deliver goods through the borders of the quarantine zone. 
Later, when Ellie and he arrive in Pittsburgh and are ambushed by a gang of desperate 
bandits, Joel reveals that he had been involved in such ambushes on unsuspecting 
survivors himself in the past. This might lead the player to ascribe to him traits of 
amorality, unscrupulousness or – more mildly – opportunism driven by necessity. 
However, during the course of the game, against the background of this shadowy past, 
Joel is, to a considerable extent, defined by his relationship with Ellie once she is placed 
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under his care. It is on the ambiguous implications of the relationship – which can be 
called paternalistic and protective, but also, less charitably, possessive and obsessive – 
that Joel’s characterization is founded. 
 
9.4.3 Ludic elements 
The sub-category of static mimetic elements I am terming “ludic elements” warrants a 
preliminary elaboration. In the analysis of the ontology of the playable figure in section 
6.1, I noted a crucial distinction between the figure as avatar, that is, as viewed through 
the frame of the ‘game as system,’ as a game component under the player’s control, and 
the figure as avatar, as perceived through the frame of the ‘game as heterocosm’ to refer 
to a represented heterocosmic individual implied through a network of signification. 
Given this double-layered ontology of the playable figure, it should not be surprising to 
note that the attributes of the figure as a game component – its capabilities and 
limitations in relation to the other entities in the gameworld, the procedures by which it 
functions within the game system – can themselves become a vehicle for 
characterization. As such, unlike the other categories of CSs we have considered so far, 
CSs based on ludic elements, as the name suggests, operate through a mediality that is 
strictly unique to games. 
There is a crucial point to be made here. As shall become apparent, the ludic 
elements which contribute to the shaping of the playable figure as a character, being 
defined as the mechanical composition of the playable figure as a game component, are, 
to a great degree, very much the same mechanisms I investigated in section 7.2 as being 
responsible for the constitution of the ludic subject-position. This should not be 
surprising: after all, as I am arguing, the player-character is the textualization of the 
enacted ludic subjectivity resulting from the player’s engagement with the gameworld as 
determined by the frame of the ludic subject-position. Given that the ludic subject-
position constitutes the disposition that is taken up by the player as the ‘I-in-the-
gameworld,’ it is not surprising that it is precisely in the parameters of the ludic subject-
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position that many of the “lasting dispositions” (Ricoeur 1992, 121) by which a character 
is defined as an individual can be identified.    
i) Capabilities and limitations 
During the course of this investigation, I have already discussed, at more than one point, 
the “I can” of bodily capabilities that the playable figure grants the player, and its 
centrality in determining the frame of the ludic subject-position (see sections 5.4.4 and 
7.2.4). At the same time, these capabilities can also be put in the service of 
characterization: what the player-character can and cannot do in the ludic heterocosm 
constitutes an especially direct and revealing form of CS, both in itself and – as shall 
become evident on the level of dynamic mimetic elements – in terms of the range of 
actions it renders possible and attributable to the character. Though she does not 
specifically invoke the question of character, this is what Janet Murray hints at when she 
writes that, for interactive drama to be successful, “participation in an immersive 
environment has to be carefully structured and contained […] the range of allowable 
behaviors should seem dramatically appropriate to the fictional world” (1998, 106). In 
this regard, Lankoski, Heliö and Ekman state that “limiting a player’s freedom is an 
effective and frequently used method of creating personality to [sic] the protagonist 
character” (2003, 2); Nick Montfort writes that the player-character should be 
understood as “a constraint and possibility defined by the author, within which the 
interactor is bound to a particular perspective and a particular set of capabilities” (2007, 
145); and Peter Bayliss argues that the limitation of the playable figure to a predefined set 
of action possibilities “highlight that the avatar is also a character” (2007a, 2).  
In a later paper, Lankoski expands on this point, engaging in an analysis of the 
fighting game Dead or Alive 3 (Team Ninja 2001) that takes as its starting-point the 
observation that “each selectable PC [player-character] attacks differently” (2011, 298). 
This leads, he argues, not only to a ludic differentiation between the various playable 
figures, each of which, in the fighting game tradition, grants the player idiosyncratic 
tactical advantages and disadvantages – with some, for instance, having slow but 
powerful attacks, while others are defined through nimble movement. Lankoski’s 
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argument is that Dead or Alive 3’s “predefined functions and possible and impossible actions (i.e., 
the kinds of attacks a character is able to do)” allow it to “distinguish different PCs from 
each other,” (ibid., 300) not only as game components, but also as characters. The reason 
for this is that it is the actions available to her through the particular playable figure she 
has chosen that will determine: 
…whether a player will try to fight using counterattacks, powerful attacks, or 
faster and weaker attacks. Consequently, a player will project intentions to the 
character, and those projected intentions are likely to influence the perceived 
personality of the character. (ibid., 298) 
Lankoski’s insight here is indispensable, not only insofar as it highlights the manner in 
which the playable figure’s capabilities and limitations act as meaningful CSs, but also in 
paving the way for a discussion I shall soon move on to: namely, that of accounting for 
the way in which actions performed by the player can be taken up in the service of 
characterization.   
In mechanical terms, Katie’s capabilities in Gone Home do not go far. Apart from 
the basic spatial abilities of looking and moving conventionally associated with the first-
person perspective, the only capabilities she has are picking up and examining objects in 
the environment, and interacting with household objects by means of a single, context-
sensitive “use” command (for instance, turning light switches on or off). Where Katie’s 
abilities go beyond this basic set is in her capacity to scrutinize objects: when Katie picks 
up an object, she can zoom in to examine its details, and rotate it to view it from every 
angle. With progress in the game depending on scouring mundane items – crumpled 
notes and receipts, old magazines and school assignments – for clues, this close scrutiny 
becomes a major aspect of Katie’s character, as we perceive it in the game: one might 
deduce from this a CS defining Katie as a good observer, or as a meticulous personality.    
Joel’s capabilities in The Last of Us are largely defined by the game’s adherence to 
the third-person action-adventure genre. As such, the ability to walk, run, move stealthily, 
take cover, use firearms and engage in melee combat constitute the standard set of 
capabilities for this genre. If we are to identify any meaningful CSs here, they must lie 
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either in idiosyncratic emphases or nuances within this conventionalized set, or in the 
way(s) in which these affordances are contextualized. In the first case, the two additions 
to the generic action-adventure set of capabilities are Joel’s “listen mode” – effectively 
similar to x-ray vision, allowing the player to identify the locations of enemies hidden 
behind walls – and his ability to pick up the discarded bottles or bricks littering the 
gameworld and put them to a variety of uses, throwing them to create a distraction or 
using them as projectile or melee weapons. Taken together, these affordances emphasize 
a strong sense of spatial and environmental awareness, privileging careful, studied 
planning. In the second case, the orientation of the essentially violent set of affordances 
towards a setting which, as we have described, is almost constantly life-threatening, 
frames the violence, at least initially, as necessary, desperate self-defense rather than as 
unwarranted aggression – though, as these acts of violence accumulate and escalate 
throughout the course of the game, the player might be forced to reconsider this initial 
assumption about Joel’s attitude towards his own violent acts. 
ii) Passion 
It is not enough to consider what the player-character can and cannot do in its relation to 
the other entities in the gameworld. As I noted in section 7.2.6, the ludic subject is 
determined by its passions as much as its actions; by its vulnerability and openness to be 
acted upon as much as by its capacity to act. The same remains true once the focus is 
shifted to the level of character: as such, player-characters are also defined by what we 
might term their passions – the ways in which they are passively open to the influence of 
other entities in the gameworld.  
Once again, Katie appears to be quite limited in this regard: she is not physically 
affected in any way by any other entity in the gameworld. Joel, on the other hand, is 
vulnerable to a great number of threats presented by his post-apocalyptic milieu and its 
inhabitants. A face-to-face encounter with the more dangerous types of infected 
frequently results in instant, unavoidable death. There are also numerous environmental 
threats: areas infected by fungal spores require Joel to put on his gas mask or risk 
infection, and he is also liable to drown in the occasional sections where he must venture 
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underwater to clear a path ahead. This fragility in the face of an extremely hostile 
environment further contextualize Joel’s affordances, framing them even more clearly as 
the necessary way of life he has had to adopt in order to survive 
iii) Goals 
The player-character’s capabilities and limitations are not meaningful in isolation: they 
gain their significance through being set to work towards a goal or set of goals. The same 
is true of its passive dimension, which only gains meaning through being understood as 
hindering or facilitating the achievement of the goal/s in question.9  
These goals – whether set by the game or self-imposed by the player – are, by 
definition, the player’s own, ludic goals. At the same time, however, they can also be 
attributed to the player-character as a heterocosmic individual: this mirroring results in 
what Lankoski termed a “goal-related engagement” between the player and her character 
(2011, 297). More importantly for our current purpose, this means that the ludic goals 
assigned to the player, when grasped as the player-character’s goals within the 
gameworld, can serve as yet another CS layer – “goals are a very powerful tool of 
presenting the nature of a character” (Lankoski, Heliö & Ekman 2003, 5). 
Katie’s goal in Gone Home is to investigative: she is placed in the detective role in 
a textbook example of an embedded narrative structure (Ryan 2007; Vella 2011, 8), 
piecing together events that took place before her arrival on the scene. Her intention, 
then, is that of deducing the events that have taken place in her family’s life during her 
time away. As a CS, this is open to being read in a number of ways: it could be 
interpreted as connoting nothing more than an idle, detached curiosity on Katie’s part, or 
it could be read as her displaying worry and concern for her missing sister.  
Joel’s overarching goal is to protect Ellie, and to escort her safely to the end of 
the game: this frames his capabilities for action and violence in a very different 
perspective compared to if these capabilities were employed towards ensuring only his 
own survival. Where these capabilities – and the actions that result from putting them to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 In this regard, it is instructive to recall the meditation on the example of the crag first developed by Jean-
Paul Sartre (1966[1943], 620), and later elaborated on by Maurice Merleau-Ponty (2002[1945], 507), which I 
have already discussed in section 5.3. 
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use – could have been read as simply demonstrating a fierce hunger for survival and a 
drive for self-preservation, they are instead recontextualized as demonstrating paternal 
care and protectiveness. 
iv) Attributes 
In addition to being defined by their capabilities to act upon the world, their passive 
vulnerability to be acted upon by it in turn, and the goals towards which their actions are 
oriented, player-characters are also determined, in a perhaps even more direct manner, by 
means of their statistical attributes. These can be made available to the player as direct 
statistical values – as in the case of most RPGs – or they may only become evident to the 
player ecologically, by witnessing the character interact with the gameworld and drawing 
conclusions. In the fighting game Soul Calibur (Project Soul 1999), for example, the player 
can note that Taki moves around the arena much faster than Astaroth: thus, while the 
underlying statistical values that define each character as a game component remain at 
the level of the unseen game system, simple observation of the game in progress is 
enough to reveal the presence of these values. 
This last example reveals an important point to be made here. Unlike the other 
categories of ludic elements, attributes only have the possibility of serving as meaningful 
CSs if they can be compared to those of at least one other (player or non-player) 
character. Their significance, in other words, is relative rather than absolute. The player 
might realize she has been playing a character with a particularly high strength value only 
when she switches to playing a character with a much lower value for this particular 
attribute, which provides her with a point of comparison she would not have had 
otherwise. Since the figure’s statistical attributes address its relation to the game system in 
the computational language of the game system, these values only refer to that system 
and cannot meaningfully be compared to an external frame of reference, hence 
necessitating an internal one if they are to have any meaning. A character’s slow 
movement might simply be a function of the given game’s general slow-paced nature: it 
can only become the basis for a meaningful CS (“This is someone who moves slowly”) if 
a character who moves around the world faster makes the first character’s sluggishness 
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significant by contrast. In practical terms, while Taki’s speed is a meaningful CS when 
contrasted with Astaroth’s relatively unwieldy movement, it makes little sense to 
compare Taki’s movement to that of Chun-Li in Street Fighter IV (Capcom 2009), since 
the attributes of the respective characters address entirely different game systems.    
  There are significant exceptions to this general rule: visible statistical attributes 
might provide the basis for an internal comparison between an individual character’s 
strengths and weaknesses. Imagine the situation of encountering an RPG player-
character about which nothing is known expect that he possesses a Strength value of 18 
and an Intelligence value of 6; or, conversely, a player-character with the reverse of those 
values. Even without knowing how these values compare to those of other characters in 
the game, a player with even a passing knowledge of the conventions of the genre will 
have no trouble finding ready stereotypes to draw on in order to flesh out this basic level 
of information into an image of a possible individual. Based only on this information, the 
player might guess that the first character belongs to some form of melee-combat-
focused warrior class, such as a barbarian, while the second would be likely to be a magic 
user, possibly a wizard. Given that each of these stereotypes brings with it a whole range 
of assumptions regarding, for instance, the physical appearance, dress, habits and 
behaviour of the individual in question, the power of attributes as a vehicle for CSs 
becomes particularly evident.   
 The second exception by which statistical attributes might become meaningful 
CSs even with no other characters present upon which to base a comparison is in the 
situation where a character development system – a point I shall examine below – allows 
the player-character’s set of attributes to change over time. As such, the present 
configuration of the player-character’s statistical attributes might gain significance in 
contrast to an earlier configuration, or to possible choices along the branching tree of 
character-development options that were not selected. 
So established have statistical attributes become as an efficient means of 
specifying character that they have transcended the boundaries of the ludic form, having 
been borrowed – albeit always in self-conscious quotation marks – by works in other 
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medialities. Thus, Bryan Lee O’Malley’s graphic novel Scott Pilgrim’s Precious Little Life 
(2004) – a work which borrows extensively from videogames for its iconography and 
structural properties – is able to use explicitly-given statistical attributes as an efficient 
means of providing the information required to establish its characters in its first pages.    
Katie in Gone Home has no visible attributes, and, with no other characters 
present in the game, no points of comparison are available by which her attributes might 
be brought into relief: as such, no CSs can be identified for Katie in this category. In The 
Last of Us, meanwhile, Joel is defined through a number of attributes: maximum health, 
listen mode distance, crafting and healing speed and weapon sway, as well as mastery of 
the various categories of weapons available to use in the game.  
v) Development 
Changes in the ludic aspects of the playable figure – for instance, through a change in 
their statistical attributes, or in their set of capabilities – can become a vehicle for CSs 
expressing the way in which a character might change over time. One could reasonably 
observe that it is strange to list ‘development’, which, by definition, implies mutability, 
under the category of static mimetic elements. This complaint can be answered by 
making the point that, while character development in this sense does indeed refer to 
diachronic changes in the constitution of a character’s ludic elements over the course of 
a game, the capacity for development, or the lack of this capacity, is itself a static element. 
In almost all cases where development is a property of a player-character, this 
development is structured as an incremental improvement in the character’s capabilities 
and statistical attributes. This is the model to which the standard levelling-up character 
development mechanic of the role-playing game genre subscribes. However, it is also 
possible to think of examples where character development goes along a different route. 
In Planescape: Torment (Black Isle 1999), for example, if the Nameless One is being played 
as a mage, the player can choose to permanently lose a number of hit-points in exchange 
for learning a set of powerful fire spells from Ignus, a mage who joins his party. 
Interpreted as a CS, the resultant shift in the Nameless One’s attributes as a playable 
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figure would imply a character who has been consumed and rendered physically frail by 
the powerful magic he wields.  
There is no development in Katie’s ludic aspects throughout the course of Gone 
Home. Joel, on the other hand, follows the standard mode of improvement. While 
exploring the game’s environments, it is possible to find pill-like ‘supplements’ that can 
be accumulated and used to ‘level up’ a number of Joel’s attributes – for instance, his 
maximum health, or the speed with which he can craft items.     
 
9.5 Dynamic mimetic elements 
 
In Margolin’s model, CSs addressing dynamic mimetic elements are those which refer to 
“verbal, mental or physical acts” performed by that character (1986, 206): actions serve 
as indexical signs for particular traits in the individual personality by which they are 
produced. Margolin argues that this is true not only of physical acts, but also of verbal 
ones – referring not just to the linguistic content of a character’s speech, or even to 
paralinguistic elements such as tone of voice, but, rather, subsuming both to an 
understanding similar to John Searle’s speech-act theory (1969). If we are also made privy 
to the character’s inner life through an internally focalized mode of presentation, then 
purely mental acts (what a character thinks, decides, plans, wonders, etc.) can also 
constitute meaningful CSs. 
A conceptual formulation for this category of CSs must therefore be built upon a 
consideration of the role played by action in the process of characterization. Of course, 
Margolin was far from the first to link action explicitly to character – I have already 
noted, in section 2.2.1, that Aristotle wrote that “imitative artists represent men in 
action” (2000[c.335BC], 59), at one go determining character to be the object of art and 
specifying representation of action as being the means by which representation of 
character may be achieved. Henry James famously argued that character and action – or, 
in his term, “incident” – in narrative are essentially two sides of the same coin, saying: 
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“what is character but the determination of incident? What is incident but the illustration 
of character?” (1956[1884]).  
Naturally, this dimension of characterization reveals the entry-point by which the 
analytical framework for the ascription of action (see section 8.1.4), as it is taken up by 
Ricoeur as the primary mechanism for the characterization of the self (1992, see section 
8.2.3) can be brought into the current discussion. This is a move that, with a view to the 
final achievement of an understanding of the textual unity of the player-character as the 
image of a ludic self, has two advantages. First, the conceptual analysis of action and its 
terminus in the ascription of intentional action to the agent grants an added incisiveness 
to the analysis of dynamic mimetic elements as a mechanism of characterization. It 
becomes clearer that listing an action as a CS pertaining to a character reveals more than 
simply, “This character has done A,” but, at the same time, also ascribes that quality to 
that character – “This character is defined as someone who does A”. Possible 
extenuating circumstances and justifications aside, a character who commits a murder is a 
murderer, and the predicate “is a murderer” becomes one of the set of “distinctive 
marks” (Ricoeur 1992, 119) by which the character is defined. Second, in the reverse 
direction, the incorporation of the analytical framework of the ascription of action into 
the wider frame of Margolin’s semiotic model of character allows it to take its rightful 
place among all the other avenues by which a character is determined. 
With regard to the player-character, an important theoretical distinction needs to 
be drawn between two categories of action: those that, whether in the form of off-line 
sequences or through some other technique, are performed independently of the player, 
and those which are performed through player input. These shall be termed, respectively, 
character actions and player actions.  
 
9.5.1 Character actions 
This constitutes the less conceptually problematic of the two sub-categories of dynamic 
mimetic elements. In most games, there is some set of actions which the player-character 
is observed to perform without any input from the player. These might include actions 
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the player sees the character perform when she is, to use Newman’s terminology, “off-
line”, not actually playing: for instance, during a cutscene, or in the form of an idle 
animation that is triggered if a certain amount of time elapses without player input – 
Sonic’s impatient foot-tap in Sonic the Hedgehog (Sonic Team 1991) is a particularly iconic 
example of the latter. The verbal acts that constitute a character’s voice-over – such as 
Garrett’s vocal interjections in Thief: The Dark Project  – would also be considered under 
this category. This can also include actions taken by the character during play – that is, to 
use Newman’s term, during the player’s “in-line” engagement (2002); while exceptional, 
cases exist where the player-character refuses to follow the player’s input, perhaps 
performing a different action of their own accord. Guybrush Threepwood in The Curse of 
Monkey Island (LucasArts 1997) is representative of this, frequently refusing to perform 
dangerous or unpleasant instructions – such as insulting a gang of fearsome pirates – and 
instead performing an entirely different, unexpected action of his own accord. Such 
actions are unequivocally to be attributed to the character rather than the player, and, as 
such, can easily be taken as strong CSs whenever they occur. In this regard, in terms of 
the dimensions of the player-figure relation, such actions – which the player can, in no 
way, ascribe to ‘herself,’ can clearly be taken to fall within the domain of the relation of 
other. 
With no cut-scenes or other form of off-line sequence, the instances in Gone 
Home in which Katie performs an action of her own accord are few – in fact, precisely six 
in total – but revealing. Mostly, these fall under the category of mental acts, representing 
Katie’s thoughts on the situation at hand by means of short text interjections on-screen. 
One of the first objects found in the course of the game, concealed in a trunk on the 
porch, is a duck-shaped festive ornament. When the player picks it up, we read Katie’s 
thought on the matter, which is simply, “Good ol’ Christmas duck” – a throwaway 
statement that reveals Katie’s nostalgic relief at returning home after her time away.  
Her remaining character actions build a clear, linked pattern. When searching her 
father’s library, the player-as-Katie finds pornographic magazines hidden in a box 
beneath copies of his novel. Here, Katie’s thought, marked with, the player might 
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imagine, embarrassment or disapproval, is, “Gosh, dad.” The situation is repeated, to 
cumulative, even comic, effect, when a risqué magazine is found hidden at the bottom of 
the wardrobe in Sam’s room (“Gosh, Sam”). Later, if the player decides to look through 
the drawers in Katie’s parents’ bedroom, a condom is discovered in the underwear 
drawer (“Gross”) and a self-help guide to improving one’s married sex life is found in 
the ensuite bathroom (“Ugh”). 
Already there is enough in the form of characterization here to establish a distinct 
character trait – though, of course, to return to Barthes’ point about the fundamental 
elusiveness of character, the player might construct this trait in different ways: as a sign 
of a general discomfort about sexuality on Katie’s part, for instance, or, perhaps, more 
specifically, as embarrassment at coming across her family’s intimate secrets. The most 
forceful case of a character action on Katie’s part, however, is the final one, occurring 
when a torn-out page from Sam’s diary is found crumpled up in a waste-paper basket in 
the basement. When the page is picked up, it is displayed on-screen in the usual manner; 
however, the player is barely given enough time to skim the first few sentences, and get 
an idea of the subject of the page – in which Sam describes her erotic feelings towards 
Lonnie as their relationship grows more intense – before the page is automatically closed, 
with Katie’s comment, “Okay, that’s enough of that.” If the player tries to “use” the note 
again to continue reading, Katie flat-out refuses to do so, giving only the comment: 
“I…no.”  
Where Gone Home is minimal in terms of character action, The Last of Us is 
maximal. Thanks to a wealth of cut-scenes, as well as to Joel’s numerous pre-scripted in-
line conversations with Ellie and other NPCs, many of the actions that prove most 
crucial to Joel’s characterization are character actions that are not the result of player 
input. As a result of this, there are far too many individual character actions for us to 
present an action-by-action analysis on a similar level of granularity for the game as a 
whole. Instead, to provide an illustrative example, we can focus on a sequence of crucial 
character actions which occur in the game’s closing moments.   
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In the final sequences of The Last of Us, rather than allowing Ellie to be killed in a 
medical procedure to extract the source of her immunity, Joel violently infiltrates the 
headquarters of the Fireflies organization in order to rescue her, finally killing Marlene, 
the leader of the Fireflies, in cold blood to prevent her from ever attempting to track 
them down. Subsequently, he lies to Ellie about these events, leading her to believe the 
Fireflies let her go because there was no way of using her immunity as the basis for a 
vaccine. This sequence consists of a number of distinct acts which are crucial to the 
determination of Joel’s character, and which are performed without any player input: 
i) Joel decides saving Ellie’s life is more important than a chance to obtain a cure for the fungal 
epidemic that is driving humanity to extinction. This mental act can be read as the final 
indication of his fatherly devotion to Ellie – a devotion which can be linked to the loss of 
his own daughter in the first days of the plague. Less positively, it can be read as the sign 
of his obsessive need to atone for his perceived failure to protect his own daughter, 
being willing to potentially put the entire future of humanity at risk in order to fulfill his 
own emotional need to care for Ellie. Viewing this mental action in the light of the traits 
that have already been established in Joel’s characterization makes such interpretations of 
the act more likely than, for instance, attributing Joel’s decision to his adherence to a 
moral perspective determined by a Kantian categorical imperative that forbids murder 
even in the case where such an act might prevent greater loss of life. 
ii) Joel shoots Marlene. This physical act, while, superficially, no different from the 
many murders Joel has committed during the course of the game in order to ensure his 
own survival and to protect Ellie, bears a pronounced dramatic effect. Through 
Marlene’s own characterization, she has been framed as far from a villain – she is level-
headed, sympathetic, and idealistic; we learn that her decision to allow Ellie to be 
operated on was agonized over, leaving her wracked with guilt and self-doubt. In her 
confrontation with Joel, she is determined, but reasonable, conciliatory, and non-violent. 
Moreover, as the leader of the Fireflies, Marlene appears to embody one of the main 
hopes for the establishment of an alternative post-epidemic social arrangement to the 
military’s totalitarian rule. Joel’s decision to kill Marlene in cold blood when he realizes 
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he cannot sway her therefore serves to reinforce the traits of obsession and ruthlessness 
that have already been suggested. 
iii) Joel lies to Ellie about what happened. This verbal act can be interpreted as a final 
instance of Joel’s paternal attitude towards Ellie, shielding her from the guilt she might 
feel if she knew the truth. On the other hand, we might just as validly read this final 
action – with which the game ends – as a means for Joel to avoid confrontation with 
Ellie and to keep her enmeshed to him in a paternal relationship on which he has 
become emotionally dependent. 
  
9.5.2 Player actions 
In the vast majority of games, however, character actions in the sense described above 
constitute no more than a very small sub-set of the complete set of actions that can be 
attributed to the player-character. Much more numerous are player actions – those actions 
which are dependent on player input and, as such, unlike character actions, being 
perceived by the player as being her own as much as they are the character’s.  
The fact that this category of dynamic mimetic elements is labeled “player 
actions” is not in any way meant to insinuate that these actions are to be considered less 
relevant to characterization. It is only meant to differentiate these actions from those 
character actions which are performed independently of the player. As Rehak (2003, 
107), Ryan (2006, 190) and Westecott (2009, 1) point out, and as I discussed at length in 
Chapter 8, games re-present to the player a mediation of the actions she herself performs 
within the gameworld; as such, player actions themselves become signs in the semiotic 
textuality of the game, and, in the process of characterization, are weighed just as much 
as character actions: “as the player controls the character, the actions the player takes in 
the game also define what the character is like” (Lankoski, Heliö and Ekman 2003, 3).10 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Of course, to a great extent, the sequence of actions performed by the player in the course of playing a 
game – and, as a result, the aggregation of player actions that will ultimately be integrated into the set of 
dynamic mimetic elements determining the player-character as a character – is itself defined by the 
parameters of the “I can” that the player is granted through the playable figure. This was discussed in 
section 7.2.4 as one of the primary aspects of the ludic subject-position.   	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Of course, to a great extent, the sequence of actions performed by the player in 
the course of playing a game – and, as a result, the aggregation of player actions that will 
ultimately be integrated into the set of dynamic mimetic elements determining the player-
character as a character – is itself defined by the parameters of the “I can” that the player 
is granted through the playable figure. This was discussed in section 7.2.4 as one of the 
primary aspects of the ludic subject-position; moreover, the set of capabilities and 
limitations linked to the figure as a game component has already been discussed as, in 
itself, a potential avenue for CSs. The set of player actions, it can be said, is an 
actualization of the set of the character’s capabilities and limitations: out of the set of 
possible actions available to her, the player, in the enactment of her ludic subjectivity, 
actualizes a particular sequence of actions.  
Even if there is some room for the player to choose which actions to perform 
and which to avoid, she is always inescapably enacting one out of a limited set of 
actualizations of a given player-character. Here, it might be useful to recall Murray’s 
prescription that “participation in an immersive environment has to be carefully 
structured and contained,” in the sense that “the range of allowable behaviors should 
seem dramatically appropriate to the fictional world” (1997, 108). A crucial point needs 
to be made here: if a coherent character is to be the result of the processes of 
characterization taking place during the duration of a game, then the actions performed 
by the player, as CSs, have to match up, not only to the actions performed by the 
character, but to the complete set of CSs that define the character. Situations where the 
mechanical nature of the figure – and, as a result, the actions that the player is driven to 
perform through the figure in the act of playing – do not match up to the patterns 
established through other channels of characterization can potentially give rise to a 
dissonance between the on-line and off-line manifestations of a character, with it 
requiring more effort, or even becoming impossible, to connect the CSs available from 
both channels into a coherent set of character traits and attributes. 
Arguably, in both Gone Home and The Last of Us, the set of available player actions 
firmly entrench the impressions we have already built of their respective player-
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characters. Katie is primarily receptive, as befits someone fulfilling the role of an 
investigator unearthing an embedded narrative (Ryan 2007; Vella 2011). Essentially, the 
part she plays is a second-order narrative built around the investigation and gradual 
uncovering of a temporally-precedent first-order narrative – as such, she searches, she 
reads, she moves from room to room trying to piece clues together. It could be argued 
that, being located within this narrative structure, absent and temporally distanced from 
the events with which she is concerned, what is further emphasized is the sense of 
estrangement and alienation she feels towards her family after her time away, and her 
desire to reconnect with their lives.  
Meanwhile, the player’s actions as Joel – with play following a pattern of 
exploration of a sequence of environments in search of supplies, alternating with 
encounters with enemies that can be approached with stealth or with brute force – again 
play into the set of character traits already identified: his methodical, structured 
awareness of the situation, his ruthless efficiency and his level-headed approach to 
dangerous situations are all enacted in play. Furthermore, in the player’s constant need to 
be aware of Ellie’s location and status during combat – initially in order to ensure her 
safety, but, as the game progresses, also, increasingly, as a tactical ally – one can read 
both an underlining of Joel’s protective, paternalistic attitude towards Ellie, and also the 
gradual (but never complete) shift in his attitude towards her as he begins to trust her 
with more responsibility.  
 
9.6 Formal patterns 
 
This is the most vaguely-defined category in Margolin’s taxonomy, covering “grouping of 
[narrative agents]; the analogies, parallels or contrasts between them created by such 
groupings; repetitions or gradations, and various stylistic features associated with their 
introduction or occurrence” (1986, 206). As vague a delineation as this may be, it is 
nonetheless clear that this category involves a shift in focus. From looking at what about 
a character is represented, here the focus of analysis shifts to how it is represented, paying 
	  400	  	  
attention to formal techniques and the deployment of aesthetic, generic and medial codes 
rather than to the extraction of nuggets of information.  
A couple of examples of the kind of formal techniques which might be included 
in this category might suffice as an illustration. One could consider, for instance, the 
extent to which Katie’s characterization is driven by a sustained contrast between her and 
Sam. This is most evident in the juxtaposition of their images in the family portrait: 
aspects of Katie’s appearance which appeared neutral or unremarkable in isolation gain 
semiotic relevance through contrast with Sam. Katie’s stylistically conservative black 
dress stands in contrast to Sam’s flannel shirt, which aligns the younger sibling with the 
grunge and, more specifically, riot grrrl subcultures. Sam’s androgynous outfit also serves 
to make the relative femininity of Katie’s dress semiotically relevant.  
Nor is the contrast between the siblings limited to the family portrait. Other 
explicit compare-and-contrast parallels are made throughout the game. At different 
points in the game, the player finds copies of the same school homework assignment – a 
biology exercise in which sentences have to be placed in the right order to give an 
account of the female reproductive cycle – filled in by both sisters. Katie’s assignment is 
filled in correctly; Sam’s, on the other hand, incorporates the given sentences into a 
Second World War narrative in which the protagonist’s fiancé is killed in a bombing raid, 
drawing a parallel between the protagonist’s grief and subsequent resilience and the 
biological process of menstruation and ovulation. The CS that is implied in the contrast 
between the two assignments – Katie as straight-laced, Sam as artistic and rebellious – 
does not need to be spelled out. 
In the opening scene of The Last of Us, a common formal technique for 
introducing the player-character is exemplified in a particularly striking fashion. In 
general, it is an established technique for the player-character to be introduced in a cut-
scene, thereby allowing the player an external perspective on the character before she is 
asked to step into the ludic subject-position the figure represents. The introductory cut-
scene for Uncharted: Drake’s Fortune (Naughty Dog 2007), for instance, economically 
reveals protagonist Nathan Drake – before handing control of him over to the player – 
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in a brief but action-packed scene of off-line engagement. While witnessing Drake in 
conversation with the journalist Elena Fisher, and then fighting off a pirate assault, the 
player learns that he is a descendant of the explorer Sir Francis Drake, a man of action 
who is not reluctant to get his hands dirty, a confident, somewhat brash, quick-witted 
individual who is never short of a quip to lighten the mood, and someone who is not 
above bending the rules to get things done.   
The Last of Us follows the same pattern – providing the player with an initial 
experience of Joel from an external perspective – but does this through initially giving 
the player control of (hence, asking the player to inhabit the ludic subject-position of) 
Sarah, Joel’s young daughter. This prologue plays a vital role in Joel’s characterization – 
not only because Sarah’s death at the end of the sequence allows us to consider long-
gestating sentiments such as grief and guilt as being central to Joel’s character, but also 
because it presents Joel to the player in the mode in which, once the player takes control 
of him, he will adopt towards Ellie: paternal, protective, resourceful. In essence, before 
the player picks up Joel’s controls, he has already been established as a character through 
being framed from an external perspective – an effect similar, if more pronounced, to 
that which is often achieved in games through an introductory cut-scene. 
We can also identify another formal arrangement in The Last of Us: at a later stage 
in the game, and then again in its downloadable add-on, Left Behind (2014), the player is 
given control of Ellie, and hence has the opportunity to compare how the same actions 
are performed differently by the two player-characters. By necessity, Ellie’s actions are 
similarly violent, but instead of forceful determination, what we see in her movements – 
apart from the lightness of youth – is raw, undisciplined force, motivated not by 
efficiency but by fear and desperation. Thus, certain actions that Joel is capable of are 
impossible for Ellie: while Joel can sneak up on human enemies and kill them 
soundlessly, by grabbing hold of them and snapping their neck – thereby gaining a 
crucial stealth advantage – Ellie lacks either the physical strength or the hand-to-hand 
combat practice to pull off the maneuver.  
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To break this down according to the model I am in the process of establishing, 
Joel and Ellie, as player-characters, are determined through a broadly similar range of 
dynamic mimetic elements – whether this is player or character actions. However, thanks 
to much more drastic divergences in the static mimetic elements through which they are 
constituted – in this case, particularly thanks to the different animations through which 
the same actions are enacted – the same actions convey very different CSs.  
This does not only illustrate the important point that one cannot take any 
category of CSs in isolation without considering how all the avenues of characterization 
we have outlined interrelate in a dense network of mutual influence and re-
contextualizing. More crucially for our current point, the contrast that is created between 
Ellie and Joel as player-characters in the sequences in which player control switches to 
Ellie (a contrast which, as we have seen, is primarily founded on a minimal difference in 
the set of static mimetic elements associated with the respective characters) further 
serves to highlight Joel’s own characterization. The contrast might therefore be resolved 
into CSs such as, “Compared to Ellie, Joel is desensitized to killing others,” or, “Compared to Ellie, 
Joel moves more assuredly in combat situations.”(Of course, the contrast also works, 
simultaneously, in reverse, providing CSs that define Ellie in relation to Joel at the same 
time as Joel is defined in relation to Ellie.)  
 
9.7 From the player-character to the ludic self 
     
By means of this adaptation and elaboration of Margolin’s semiotic-structural model of 
characterization, then, the notion of ‘character’ as a textual construct has been rendered 
concrete. The semiotic-structural model of the player-character that I have developed 
therefore provides a toolset for the textual analysis of player-characters across the 
multiple semiotic dimensions of their presentation. Such an analysis, in rendering the 
player-character into a defined semiotic corpus of CSs, is the necessary first step in a 
critical engagement with such characters as textual entities. Moreover, as I shall argue 
below, in the openings it allows for the player’s own ludic-subjective actions to be 
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incorporated into this corpus of CSs, the mechanism is revealed by which the enacted 
ludic subject, in the disparate actions by which it is lived, can be gathered up into the 
representational unity of a character.   
However, stopping simply at the proposition of this semiotic-structural model of 
the player-character, essential though it is, leaves us short of a complete understanding of 
the question of character as it relates to the aesthetics of ludic subjectivity. In this 
section, having laid down the understanding of character in its semiotic and textual 
dimension as the necessary baseline from which any rigorous approach to the analysis of 
character must start, I shall first proceed to consider how this semiotic substrate is 
overtaken in the formation of an impression of a heterocosmic individual. I shall argue 
that the key point in this process is the attribution of a subjectivity, and, hence, an 
interiority and a perspective, to the character. Upon this basis, I shall then proceed to 
return this understanding of the player-character back into the fold of the investigation 
of the ludic self, thereby drawing this investigation to its conclusion. 
 
9.7.1 Reading the subjectivity beyond the textuality 
By their very nature, characters – much like the heterocosms of which they are members 
– are never available to the recipient of the work as figures whose outlines are completely 
shaded in. As Price notes, “fictional characters are only partially specified” (1983, 57). 
Having completed both games and seen the processes of characterization through to the 
end, there remains much the player does not know about Joel and Katie. This applies not 
only to background biographical detail – say, where Joel was born, or what Katie’s 
favorite food is – but also to aspects of the respective characters that are crucial to the 
events occurring in the course of the game. It is never specified, for instance, whether 
Katie, in piecing together the details of Sam and Lonnie’s relationship, shares their 
parents’ disapproval of the same-sex relationship, or whether she holds a more open-
minded attitude on the issue.   
To a great extent, of course, this is due to the inevitable fact that characters are, 
by their very nature, “ontologically ‘thin’ and not maximal, having only a limited number 
	  404	  	  
of properties and relations” (Margolin 1990, 847) – in other words, they share the 
ontological ‘smallness’ which, following Umberto Eco (1994, 85), I described as being an 
essential characteristic of the heterocosm in section 3.4.5. Fundamentally, this is also due 
to the basic duality of character, as articulated by Price (1983), Rimmon-Kenan (1983), 
Phelan (1989) and Heidbrink (2010): a character is a textual construct, but it is also the 
superseding of this construct in the form of the impression of an individual. 
What shape, then, is taken by this impression of an individual that goes beyond 
the accumulation of textual data? It would not simply take the form of a mental addition, 
on the part of the recipient of the work, of more defining predicates to fill in the “gaps” 
left in by the work: for instance, by deciding, on the basis of no evidence in the work 
itself, that a particular character has red hair, or kept a pet basset hound as a child, and 
then adding these two ‘new’ CSs to the existing corpus to enrich the image of the 
character at hand. 
Instead – and to return to Ryan’s setting-out of the dimensions of story – the 
crux of the leap from the textual dimension of character to what Phelan calls the 
“mimetic dimension” of character (1989, 2), and what Price calls the “suggestion and 
imitation of human life” beneath the “verbal surface,” is the leap into the mental 
dimension: that is, the assignation, to this figure concretized out of an accretion of 
textual data, of a subjectivity and a perspective on the world. It is this interiority that 
constitutes the purest indication of the irreducible, individual interiority that constitutes 
the essence of a character – the “precious remainder” that Barthes identifies (1974, 190) 
once the simple accumulation of textual signs have all been taken into account. With all 
the categories of CSs examined in the structural-semiotic model above, this opening onto 
the mental inner life is the direction in which each CS, once taken as a statement or 
predicate about the character in question, opens. To give just one example, the analysis 
of dynamic mimetic elements – that is, the character’s actions as CSs – involves the 
interpretation of action in the form of intentions, and hence, as I demonstrated in 
section 8.1.2, into mental predicates (Anscombe 1979[1957], 9; von Wright 1971, 86; 
Davidson 1980, 89).	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At the end point of this move from textuality to the individual subject that is 
inscribed within its representational codes, the question of character opens onto that of 
perspective. Virginia Woolf observed that a textual character “has the power to make you 
think not merely of it itself, but of all sorts of things through its eyes” (1924, 19); this 
idea can also be seen in James’ notion of the character who acts as a “reflector,” through 
whose eyes a story is framed (1972[1908], 247), and, later, in the development of the 
notion of focalization (Genette 1980, 189, see section 4.1.3), particularly as it results in 
Mieke Bal’s notion of the focalizing character, in which “we [as readers] see through the 
eyes of the character” (1985, 104).11  
This concretizes the ontological duality of character that was alluded to earlier: in 
this sense, then, a character is both a textual exteriority and a subjective interiority, with 
the former acting as a representation of the latter – or, conversely, with the latter only 
emerging in an interpretative concretization on the basis of the former.  
 
9.7.2 The player-character, the ludic self and the player 
In the analysis of the player-character as a specific kind of textual entity, however, there is 
an additional factor at play which accounts for an ‘incompleteness’ of the player-
character that is entirely different to the incompleteness of character identified by literary 
theorists like Margolin, Price or Alan Palmer, who writes that a character only exists as a 
character once the reader “collects together all of the isolated references to a specific 
proper name in a particular text and constructs a consciousness that continues in the 
spaces between the various mentions of that character” (2004, 176). 
It is on this crucial point that a player-character does not exist as a fully-
determined corpus of CSs until actualized by player input that the ontological nature of 
the player-character is set apart from other formulations of character; crucially, it is also 
on this point that the discourse of character returns this investigation fully into the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 This should, of course, serve to recall the discussion on the noetic mode of presentation in section 4.1.1, 
where, without thematizing the matter of ‘character,’ this investigation paused to consider the situations in 
which the textual heterocosm is framed through the subjective perspective of a member of the 
heterocosm. 
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territory of ludic subjectivity. In formal terms, this difference is predicated on the ergodic 
nature of game textuality (Aarseth 1997, 1): since the user function of the player is 
configurative, the complete set of CSs that constitute a player-character’s textual 
substrate is not present and accounted for from the start, but is only fully determined 
once the player’s selections and ludic actions have traced out a path of traversal through 
the network of possibilities offered by the game and, in the case of The Last of Us, for 
example, actuated a specific ‘Joel’ out of the network of possibilities afforded by the 
game. One player might favour Joel’s affordances for stealth and spatial awareness, 
patiently assessing every situation and avoiding confrontation and violence where 
possible. Another player might instead make a point of eliminating every hostile 
individual encountered. The ludic subject-position The Last of Us establishes allows for 
both styles of play, but the ludic self – and, hence, the character – that is enacted in the 
first playthrough is different from the character that results from the second, even with 
all the other CSs that go into his constitution remaining unchanged. 
However, for the purposes of this investigation, what is even more important is 
what this highlights on the level of ludic subjectivity. In section 6.4.5, I discussed the 
presentation, in Kentucky Route Zero (Cardboard Computer 2013), of the player’s dialogue 
choices in the format of a screenplay. In section 8.3.1, I demonstrated how the player’s 
subjective experiences relating to the taking of a difficult jump over a ravine in Tomb 
Raider (Core Design 1996) are subsequently accompanied by the experience of watching 
herself perform the jump. In section 8.4, I considered at some length the aesthetic 
mechanisms by which the voice-over narration in Bastion (Supergiant Games 2011) not 
only represented the actions constituting the player’s enacted ludic subjectivity, but also 
granted them significance through placing them within a generic, iconographic and 
narrative context. 
Recasting these observations in the light of the conceptualization of the player-
character as a textual unity, it becomes possible, finally, to outline the ludic self as a formal 
structure that lies at the core of the aesthetics of subjectivity set in motion by the figure 
game. To the observation, which I have already stressed, that the game’s textual 
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presentation offers the player a representation of her own ludic-subjective actions (Rehak 
2003, 119; Ryan 2006, 190; Westecott 2009, 2), I can now add a second insight. What 
gathers the representation of these actions into a meaningful textual unity that is 
comprehensible, to the player, as the image of herself, as an ‘I-in-the-gameworld’ – a self-
image she can hold up as an object of perception – is the fact of their being gathered up 
within the signifying unity of the player-character. As a result, these represented actions 
are given meaning through their context within the set of CSs by which they are 
surrounded, incorporated into the presentation of an ‘other’. At the same time, however, 
the constitution of this other through the set of actions the player identifies, 
proprioceptively, as hers (see section 8.1.1) recasts the whole into a form the player can 
simultaneously recognize, and grasp, in the completeness of its textual unity, as a 
representation of ‘herself’ – a ludic self that gives shape, form and unity to her enacted 
ludic subjectivity. 
The end-point of the aesthetics of ludic subjectivity, however, is not the 
sublimation of this image of the ludic self out of the experience of ludic subjectivity, 
which, once this image has been achieved, ceases to be important. Instead, it is precisely 
in the interrelation between the ludic subjectivity, as it is lived in its first-personal 
experiential dimension, and the ludic self as the textual representation of this ‘I-in-the-
gameworld’ on a second-order level of experience, that the primary mechanism of the 
aesthetics of ludic subjectivity can be identified. This returns the investigation, again, to 
the question of the double perspective: from the internal perspective, I am my ludic 
subjectivity, while, from the external perspective, this ludic subjectivity which I am 
becomes available to me in the form of a textualized character. As such, ludic 
subjectivity, on an aesthetic level, is a subjective interiority and an objective exteriority 
reflecting each other – the two dimensions cannot but interrelate.  
I shall draw, one last time, on Ricoeur in order to conceptualize this duality. In 
developing his understanding of ‘character,’ he argues that what is designated by the term 
should be understood as belonging to: 
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 …two orders, that of objectivity and that of existence. A portrait painted from 
outside? But also a manner of being that is one’s own. A combinatory of 
permanent features? But an indivisible style. A type? But an unsubstitutable 
singularity. A constraint? But a fate that I am, the very one to which I must 
consent. (1992, 119ff.) 
My ‘character’ is, on an external level, a conscious self-ascription born of a reflective 
movement - a consistent ‘self’ I hold out before me which, through being so held out, is 
not me, and which, on a moment-by-moment basis, I can succeed or fail in living up to. 
At the same time, ‘character’ refers to the “limited openness of our field of motivation 
taken as a whole” (1986, 60), or that being which I am without being able to choose 
otherwise. In the same way, the ‘character’ of my ludic subjectivity is both the organized, 
unified image that is presented to my external perspective as the image of a ludic self, 
and, at the same time, also the attributes and parameters which structure the disposition 
of my first-personal experience as a being-in-the-gameworld.  
 
9.8 Conclusions  
 
This consideration of the question of character has therefore led this investigation to its 
end point. By way of identifying where the notion of character fits into the conceptuality 
of ludic subjectivity – and also by way of offering a recap as this investigation draws to a 
close – I shall go through the primary steps that have been identified in the aesthetics of 
subjectivity of the figure game:   
- First, the player adopts an embodied ludic subject-position in the gameworld by 
taking on the playable figure as her body in the gameworld. This allows her, in 
existential terms, to organize the gameworld around her standpoint as a factical 
situation. 
- The parameters of the ludic subject-position will structure her being-in-the-
gameworld into a particular mode, granting it its specific disposition and 
comportment. 
	  409	  	  
- By engaging with the gameworld in the existential shape it has been given by her 
embodied ludic subject-position, the player enacts a ludic subjectivity. The ludic 
subject, on this level, is, as its name implies, a purely internal, first-personal 
construct. It is the ‘I’ to which the complete set of the player’s intentional acts 
towards the gameworld (perceptions, intentional actions, etc.) pertain: it is what 
allows the player to experience her actions as a ludic subject proprioceptively, as 
her own. It is, as such, an operation on the dimension of the subjective relation: 
the ludic subject is not itself an object of view; instead, it is what brings the 
gameworld into view. 
- At the same time, the investment of the ludic subject in the playable figure, as an 
entity the player stands apart from, establishes a dimension of otherness within 
this fundamental selfhood of the ludic subject. It is ‘I-in-the-gameworld,’ but it is 
an ‘I’ that I-as-player can, if I wish to, distance myself from. 
- This is possible due to the player’s retaining of an external subjective standpoint 
as a player outside the game – a standpoint which is supported by the game’s 
audiovisual presentation of the player’s own enacted ludic subjectivity back to 
her. Thus, this external standpoint frames a perspective the player can adopt 
upon her own enacted ludic subjectivity, resulting in a mechanism of autoscopy. 
Here, an image can be grasped of the ludic self, that is, the player’s own enacted 
ludic subjectivity as it appears to her as an object of perception from an external 
perspective. 
- Finally, this image of the ludic self, as textualized within the game’s audiovisual 
presentation, is organized according to the logic of character, granting it aesthetic 
unity, coherence and significance.  
The textualized form of the player-character, then, provides the player with an image of 
her enacted ludic subjectivity organized according to the laws of order, finitude, internal 
structure and cohesion of narrative, and encoded within the iconographic, generic and 
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formal systems of the game’s textuality, and therefore available to her own perception as 
an aesthteticized ludic self. 
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In conclusion 
 
“We are who we pretend to be, so we must be careful who we pretend to be.” 
- Kurt Vonnegut, Mother Night 
 
 
In the Philip K. Dick short story “We Can Remember It For You Wholesale” 
(1997[1966]), the protagonist, Douglas Quail, visits Rekal Incorporated, a company that 
offers the service of implanting “extra-factual memories.” Quail, desiring to visit Mars 
but knowing he is unlikely to ever be able to afford the trip, wishes to at least have the 
memories of having had the experience.  
Once at Rekal’s premises, he learns of an optional extra to the experience. Should 
he so desire, he can choose, not only to be implanted with the memory of having been 
on another planet, but, over and above that, to have been to Mars as someone else, namely, 
as a secret agent on a mission. As the Rekal employee McClane says in the story’s 
cinematic adaptation as Total Recall (Verhoeven 1990): 
What is it that is exactly the same about every single vacation you have ever 
taken? […] You! You’re the same. No matter where you go, there you are. It’s 
always the same old you. Let me suggest you take a vacation from yourself. 
As a narrative trope, the idea of ‘becoming someone else’ that this invokes is couched in 
the language of escapism or wish-fulfillment. As I noted in the introduction to this study, 
it is precisely with this language that the emergence of the figure game as an aesthetic 
form was announced, and it was precisely these same two dreams that were held out to 
potential players. You can travel to marvelous worlds, these games professed – other planets, 
monster-ridden dungeons and fantastical landscapes. You can be someone else, they added – 
usually, of course, a heroic figure of some description, a brave knight, a powerful wizard 
or a space marine. 
 As has become evident, the answer to the first of these promises is the 
establishment of a gameworld – a self-contained ontic domain that is distinct from the 
player’s own world and that represents a ludic heterocosm. This world being established, 
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it is still necessary for the player to be given an existence within it, in order for her to 
have the experience of being in the gameworld. For this reason, the player is given a playable 
figure within this world, which, in an act of interpellation, she is asked to identify as 
“you” – that is, as herself-in-the-gameworld.  
 Through a set of formal mechanisms gathered around the form of this playable 
figure, it comes to represent, for her, an embodied ludic subject-position. In other words, the 
playable figure becomes her subjective standpoint in the gameworld. It allows her to 
meet the things in the gameworld on their level, as an ontic equal, a member of the same 
world. It serves as the centre of her spatial organization, allowing her to describe things-
in-the-gameworld as ‘near’ or ‘far’ based on their position relative to the playable figure. 
It grants her a visual point-of-view and an aural standpoint. It provides her with a 
particular “I can,” a set of capabilities for action she can direct towards the things-in-the-
gameworld, and it also gives her a set of goals towards which to orient herself, and in the 
light of which her actions will take on the shape of existential projects. By the same 
token, it also allows her to, in turn, be affected by the things of the gameworld, to, for 
better or worse, be acted upon by them. 
 In all of these ways, this ludic subject-position that the playable figure grants the 
player structures her being-in-the-gameworld into a particular mode, giving her a specific 
disposition towards the gameworld and determining her comportment within it. If the 
playable figure is a lithe, agile but vulnerable young boy, as in Ico (Team Ico 2001), the 
player is likely to clamber all over the game’s architecture, making full use of the athletic 
“I can” she has been granted in order to explore every nook and cranny of the 
gameworld; conversely, she is likely to be wary in a fight, knowing how frail the form she 
has been given is. On the other hand, if the playable figure happens to be Batman, as in 
Batman: Arkham Asylum (Rocksteady Games 2009), then the player – having been granted 
an “I can” that includes, within its range, “I can beat up five thugs in a brawl” – is much 
more likely to engage with the gameworld from a position of power, and to not be afraid 
of a fight. 
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 By engaging with the gameworld through the frame of the ludic subject-position, 
the player enacts a ludic subject – the first-personal bearer of a subjective stream of 
experiences relating to being in, and acting in, the gameworld. The term ‘first-personal’ 
here addresses the proprioceptive character of these experience: the player recognizes all 
of these experiences as hers – meaning, also, that she recognizes herself in them. She is likely 
to say, “I climbed up to the highest tower to admire the view,” or “From there, I could 
see the bridge to the mainland,” or, “I beat up the five thugs in the alley.” The player’s 
ludic subjectivity, then, is a being-in-the-gameworld she experiences, and recognizes, as 
her own.  
 
I have spoken about the first of the two promises that the figure game makes the player 
– that of being in another world. This still leaves the second of the two promises to be 
answered – the promise that the game will let you not only be in the gameworld, but be 
someone else. However, I need hardly point out that this has already been addressed in 
meeting the first promise. In order for the player to have the experience of being in the 
gameworld, she is placed in a relation to the playable figure: this playable figure 
structures her ludic subject-position, and, as a result, determines her experience of, and 
in, the gameworld on every level: in terms of how the gameworld is given form and 
meaning in her experience as well as in the character of the ludic subjectivity she enacts 
in this gameworld. 
 In other words: the playable figure comes with its own identity that is distinct 
from the player’s, and, as a result, the ludic subjectivity the player enacts in the 
gameworld will bear its mark as much as the player’s. In the examples above, it might 
have been the same player engaging with Ico and with Arkham Asylum. However, she was 
not the same ludic subject in both games: engaging with the respective gameworlds 
through the embodied ludic subject-positions of Ico and of Batman leads her to enact 
ludic subjectivities that bear the distinctive identities of these playable figures. Playing 
Arkham Asylum, she is both herself and Batman: more to the point, her being-in-the-
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gameworld can best be described as ‘herself-as-Batman,’ a wavering between the pole of 
self and other that constantly retains both in suspension.    
The ‘I-in-the-gameworld,’ then, is already revealed as a complex entity, 
containing within it poles of identity and difference, selfhood and otherness, all while 
being taken up by the player in the first-person, as ‘I’. 
 
 Nor do matters end there. In all of this, ‘she’ – the implied player addressed in all of 
these cases – does not disappear into the ether: she is still present as the bearer of the 
experience of being someone else. In playing Arkham Asylum, she takes up the playable figure 
of Batman. In doing so, as I have shown, she takes up the ludic subject-position he 
represents, and sees the gameworld, as it were, through his eyes. However, at the same 
time, there is still someone here, on this side of the screen – someone she recognizes as 
‘herself’ – who is conscious of having the experience of being Batman at the same time as she 
experiences the gameworld as Batman. 
This observation brings into view the fundamental double perspectival structure 
of the figure game, and the distribution of the player’s subjectivity that it structures. In 
the course of ludic engagement, the player occupies two subjective standpoints – a 
perspective internal to the gameworld, from which the gameworld appears to her as an 
experiential world, and a perspective external to the gameworld, from which the game is 
seen as a ‘mere’ artefact, one among the things in the player’s world.  
In a sense, then, the player enacts two ‘I’s while playing the game. The first is the 
‘I-in-the-gameworld,’ what I have termed the ludic subject, to whom the internal 
perspective belongs. The second is the ‘I-as-player,’ the individual sitting on the couch 
holding the controller in her hand, watching the game unfold on her TV screen. These 
two ‘I’s, and their two subjective perspectives, exist concurrently, in constant suspension, 
throughout the course of the player’s engagement with the figure game.  
This distribution of the player’s subjectivity becomes particularly striking when 
taking into account what it means in relation to the ludic subject – the ‘I-in-the-
gameworld’. In being taken up as a ludic subject – that is, when it is related to 
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subjectively – then this ‘I-in-the-gameworld’ is not itself an object of perception: rather, 
it is the player’s first-personal pole of experience of the gameworld, that is, the 
subjectivity through which she sees the gameworld. As the ludic subject ‘I-as-Batman,’ the 
player beats up five thugs in an alley; the attendant acts of consciousness – seeing the 
thugs, taking the decision to attack, choosing to punch the leftmost one first, and so on – 
are hers, and she relates to them proprioceptively.  
At the same time, from her external standpoint, the player sees herself-as-Batman 
beating up five thugs. More accurately, what she sees is a representation of her own 
enacted ludic subjectivity, incorporated into the textual presentation unfolded by the 
game’s medial apparatus. Thanks to the distancing standpoint of the external perspective, 
then, the player is able to stand, not only in a subjective relation to the playable figure, 
but also, simultaneously, an objective one. She sees the gameworld, as the ludic subject, 
through the frame of the ludic subject-position, but, at the same time, she sees the ludic 
subject as an object of perception through the game’s mediation. 
To sum up the mechanisms at work in the aesthetics of subjectivity that have 
emerged: the player relates to the playable figure as both self and other, both identifying it 
as ‘I-in-the-gameworld’ and retaining an awareness of its distinct identity as an other. At 
the same time, the player relates to the playable figure both subjectively and objectively: she 
adopts it as her ludic subject-position internal to the gameworld, while, at the same time, 
relating to it as an object of perception from the external perspective. 
There is one more point to add. What is framed through the external perspective 
is not simply the playable figure as an other. Instead, as I have already suggested, it is the 
player’s own enacted ludic subjectivity – the player sees herself fighting the thugs, sees 
herself climbing the tower, sees herself seeing the view. The formal structure of the figure 
game form, then, provides the player with an aestheticized representation of her own, in-
game subjective existence: an image of her ludic self that is available to her aesthetic 
contemplation.  
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It is opportune to note that the narrative trope of ‘being someone else’ rarely ends well. 
A cursory survey of such fictions would suggest that this is so for two distinct, almost 
diametrically opposed, reasons. First, there is the danger that the lines between the 
individual’s original subjectivity and her new one grow blurred – that the mask burns 
itself into the face, that we can so surely become another subject that we lose our grasp 
of who we ‘are’ ourselves. In “We Can Remember It For You Wholesale,” the implanted 
memories of the ‘other’ resonate unexpectedly with concealed memories of Quail’s own, 
leading to a cognitive breakdown as he is rendered unable to tell which experiences were 
his and which were not. In another example of the trope, Marghanita Lanski’s novella 
The Victorian Chaise-Longue (1999[1953], this is taken to an extreme of existential horror: 
falling asleep on the item of antique furniture described in the title, the protagonist, 
Melanie, wakes up in the body of its previous owner, Milly, a Victorian-era woman dying 
of consumption. Horrified, she realizes, at one point, that she can no longer remain 
certain of the boundaries of her phenomenal subjectivity: feeling Milly’s bodily 
sensations as her own, she can no longer tell what, in the stream of her own 
consciousness, is ‘her’ and what is Milly. 
In Seconds (Frankenheimer 1966), the opposite danger is highlighted – that the 
face shows through the mask, that we are too fundamentally ourselves to ever be able to 
escape our subjectivity and play out a different one. Arthur Hamilton (John Randolph), a 
middle-aged banker in an unhappy marriage, meets a mysterious organization who give 
him the chance of a new life in a new skin. After extensive cosmetic surgery and 
coaching, he re-emerges as Tony Wilson (Rock Hudson), an artist with a beach house in 
Malibu. However, what soon becomes apparent is that he has remained the same person 
beneath his new skin: that, despite having all the trappings of a glamorous new life and a 
privileged subject-position prepared for him at its centre, his dispositions, his mode of 
being, his character have remained fundamentally unchanged, and he is unable to comport 
himself in the way his new skin demands.    
 However, things do not always turn out so badly. In Being John Malkovich (Jonze 
1999), Craig Schwartz (John Cusack) discovers a portal which, when entered, transports 
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one’s consciousness into the subject-position (to keep to the terminology I have been 
using throughout this investigation) of the actor John Malkovich, seeing the world 
through his eyes as him. The experience proves so intoxicating that people are soon 
queuing to be John Malkovich for a few minutes – to have the experience of, as Schwartz 
puts it, “thinking differently, moving differently, feeling differently.” People who have 
this experience return to their own skin, and their own subjectivity, transformed: in the 
case of Lotte Schwartz (Cameron Diaz), for example, taking up a standpoint in a male 
subject-position, embodied within a male body, reveals a dimension to her own gender 
identity she had not previously been able to articulate.  
The relations of self and other, and of subject and object, that constitute the 
formal structure of the aesthetics of subjectivity set in motion by the form of the figure 
game are unlikely to go as far as they do in any of these fictional examples. Nonetheless, 
what I have hoped to demonstrate through the set of interlocking analyses constituting 
this investigation is that the play of ludic subjectivity bears striking, and aesthetically rich, 
resonances with the phenomenological and existential structures by which subjectivity 
and selfhood are constituted. As such, in letting us engage with a self that is also another, 
and giving us the means to live this self, in an experiential and existential sense, at the 
same time as we can hold it before us at the distance of aesthetic contemplation, the 
form of the figure game foregrounds and aestheticizes the play of selfhood and 
otherness, identity and difference, and subjectivity and objectivity by which, as subjects 
and as selves, we constantly know ourselves, construct ourselves and, at the same time, 
escape our own grasp.  
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